Nilupulee A. Gunathilake
Electromagnetic Side-Channel Resilience against Lightweight Cryptography
Gunathilake, Nilupulee A.
Authors
Abstract
Side-channel attacks are an unpredictable risk factor in cryptography. Therefore, observations of leakages through physical parameters, i.e., power and electromagnetic (EM) radiation, etc., of digital devices are essential to minimise vulnerabilities associated with cryptographic functions. Compared to costs in the past, performing side-channel attacks using inexpensive test equipment is becoming a reality. Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices are resource-constrained, and lightweight cryptography is a novel approach in progress towards IoT security. Thus, it would provide sufficient data and privacy protection in such a constrained ecosystem. Therefore, cryptanalysis of physical leakages regarding these emerging ciphers is crucial. EM side-channel attacks seem to cause a significant impact on digital forensics nowadays. Within existing literature, power analysis seems to have considerable attention in research whereas other phenomena, such as EM, should continue to be appropriately evaluated in playing a role in forensic analysis.
The emphasis of this thesis is on lightweight cryptanalysis. The preliminary investigations showed no Correlation EManalysis (CEMA) of PRESENT lightweight algorithm. The PRESENT is a block cipher that promises to be adequate for IoT devices, and is expected to be used commercially in the future. In an effort to fill in this research gap, this work examines the capabilities of a correlation EM side-channel attack against the PRESENT. For that, Substitution box (S-box) of the PRESENT was targeted for its 1st round with the use of a minimum number of EM waveforms compared to other work in literature, which was 256. The attack indicates the possibility of retrieving 8 bytes of the secret key out of 10 bytes. The experimental process started from a Simple EMA (SEMA) and gradually enhanced up to a CEMA. The thesis presents the methodology of the attack modelling and the observations followed by a critical analysis. Also, a technical review of the IoT technology and a comprehensive literature review on lightweight cryptology are included.
Citation
Gunathilake, N. A. Electromagnetic Side-Channel Resilience against Lightweight Cryptography. (Thesis). Edinburgh Napier University
Thesis Type | Thesis |
---|---|
Deposit Date | Aug 21, 2023 |
Publicly Available Date | Aug 21, 2023 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.17869/enu.2023.3175197 |
Award Date | Jul 7, 2023 |
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