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Uncertainty and communication complexity in iterated cooperation games

Andras, Peter

Authors

Profile image of Peter Andras

Prof Peter Andras P.Andras@napier.ac.uk
Dean of School of Computing Engineering and the Built Environment



Abstract

Iterated cooperation games (e.g. Prisoner’s Dilemma) are used to analyze the emergence and evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals. Uncertainty of outcomes of games is an important factor that influences the level of cooperation. Communication of intentions also has a major impact on the outcome of situations that may lead to cooperation. Here we present an agent-based simulation that implements the uncertainty of outcomes together with the communication of intentions between agents. This simulation is used to analyze the relationship between uncertainty and the complexity of the language that the agents use to communicate about their intentions. The complexity of the language is measured in terms of variability of its usage among agents. The results show that more outcome uncertainty implies lower complexity of the agent language.

Citation

Andras, P. (2008, August). Uncertainty and communication complexity in iterated cooperation games. Presented at Artificial Life XI 2008, Winchester

Presentation Conference Type Conference Paper (published)
Conference Name Artificial Life XI 2008
Start Date Aug 5, 2008
End Date Aug 8, 2008
Publication Date 2008
Deposit Date Nov 17, 2021
Publisher MIT Press
Pages 9-16
Book Title Artificial Life XI 2008
Public URL http://researchrepository.napier.ac.uk/Output/2809217
Related Public URLs https://alife.org/conference/alife-11/