Uncertainty in iterated cooperation games

Andras, Peter

Abstract

The emergence and evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals is a key question of theoretical biology. Uncertainty of outcomes of interactions between individuals is an important determinant of cooperative behavior. Here we describe a model that allows the analysis of the effects of such uncertainty on the level of cooperation. We show that in iterated cooperation games the level of cooperation increases with the level of outcome uncertainty. We show that this is the case if the individuals communicate about their cooperation intentions and also if they do not communicate their intentions.

Citation

Andras, P. (2008). Uncertainty in iterated cooperation games. In 2008 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation (IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence) (593-599). https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC.2008.4630856

• Presentation Conference Type: Conference Paper (Published)
• Conference Name: 2008 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation (IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence)
• Start Date: Jun 1, 2008
• End Date: Jun 6, 2008
• Online Publication Date: Sep 23, 2008
• Publication Date: 2008
• Deposit Date: Nov 17, 2021
• Publisher: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
• Pages: 593-599
• Series ISSN: 1089-778X
• Book Title: 2008 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation (IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence)
• ISBN: 978-1-4244-1822-0
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC.2008.4630856
• Keywords: iterated cooperation games, selfish individuals, theoretical biology, cooperative behavior, cooperation intentions
• Public URL: http://researchrepository.napier.ac.uk/Output/2809157