Dr Simon Powers S.Powers@napier.ac.uk
Lecturer
Cooperation in large‐scale human societies — What, if anything, makes it unique, and how did it evolve?
Powers, Simon T.; van Schaik, Carel P.; Lehmann, Laurent
Authors
Carel P. van Schaik
Laurent Lehmann
Abstract
To resolve the major controversy about why prosocial behaviors persist in large-scale human societies, we propose that two questions need to be answered. First, how do social interactions in small-scale and large-scale societies differ? By reviewing the exchange and collective-action dilemmas in both small-scale and large-scale societies, we show they are not different. Second, are individual decision-making mechanisms driven by self-interest? We extract from the literature three types of individual decision-making mechanism, which differ in their social influence and sensitivity to self-interest, to conclude that humans interacting with non-relatives are largely driven by self-interest. We then ask: what was the key mechanism that allowed prosocial behaviors to continue as societies grew? We show the key role played by new social interaction mechanisms—change in the rules of exchange and collective-action dilemmas—devised by the interacting individuals, which allow for self-interested individuals to remain prosocial as societies grow.
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | Apr 27, 2021 |
Online Publication Date | Jun 4, 2021 |
Publication Date | 2021-08 |
Deposit Date | Jun 4, 2021 |
Publicly Available Date | Jun 4, 2021 |
Journal | Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews |
Print ISSN | 1060-1538 |
Electronic ISSN | 1520-6505 |
Publisher | Wiley |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 30 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 280-293 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1002/evan.21909 |
Keywords | cooperation, cultural group selection, evolutionary psychology, human social evolution, institutions, large-scale societies |
Public URL | http://researchrepository.napier.ac.uk/Output/2773095 |
Files
Cooperation In Large-scale Human Societies – What, If Anything, Makes It Unique, And How Did It Evolve?
(2 Mb)
PDF
Publisher Licence URL
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Copyright Statement
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
You might also like
The concurrent evolution of cooperation and the population structures that support it
(2011)
Journal Article
The co-evolution of social institutions, demography, and large-scale human cooperation
(2013)
Journal Article
Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations
(2012)
Journal Article
Downloadable Citations
About Edinburgh Napier Research Repository
Administrator e-mail: repository@napier.ac.uk
This application uses the following open-source libraries:
SheetJS Community Edition
Apache License Version 2.0 (http://www.apache.org/licenses/)
PDF.js
Apache License Version 2.0 (http://www.apache.org/licenses/)
Font Awesome
SIL OFL 1.1 (http://scripts.sil.org/OFL)
MIT License (http://opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.html)
CC BY 3.0 ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
Powered by Worktribe © 2024
Advanced Search