PLC Memory Attack Detection and Response in a Clean Water Supply System

Robles-Durazno, Andres; Moradpoor, Naghmeh; McWhinnie, James; Russell, Gordon; Maneru-Marin, Inaki

Abstract

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are frequently used in manufacturing and critical infrastructures like water treatment, chemical plants, and transportation schemes. Citizens tend to take modern-day conveniences such as trains, planes or tap water for granted without considering the critical systems involved for their operations. Interrupting these industries could lead to disastrous consequences, leading to financial losses or even costing human lives. For that reason, researchers have been actively investigating the threats targeting ICS. In this paper, the authors propose a mechanism of attack detection and mitigation for attacks focusing on the input memory of Programming Logic Controllers (PLCs). To help investigate this concept, a testbed that models a clean water supply system was built using components and technologies currently used in the industry. The mechanism supporting attack detection and response for the input memory is implemented within the PLC itself as part of its programming. The mechanism of response involves three different techniques: optimised datablocks, switching between control strategies and obtaining the sensor readings directly from its analogue channel. The results demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed approach along with the effectiveness of each response mechanism.

Citation

Robles-Durazno, A., Moradpoor, N., McWhinnie, J., Russell, G., & Maneru-Marin, I. (2019). PLC Memory Attack Detection and Response in a Clean Water Supply System. International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 26, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijcip.2019.05.003

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Mar 11, 2019
• Online Publication Date: May 14, 2019
• Publication Date: 2019-09
• Deposit Date: Mar 12, 2019
• Publicly Available Date: May 15, 2020
• Journal: International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection
• Print ISSN: 1874-5482
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 26
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijcip.2019.05.003
• Keywords: Industrial Control System; Clean Water Supply System; SCADA; Testbed; Attack Detection; Attack Response; Programming Logic Controller; Memory Attacks
• Public URL: http://researchrepository.napier.ac.uk/Output/1652814
• Contract Date: Mar 12, 2019