A Forensic Audit of the Tor Browser Bundle

Muir, Matt; Leimich, Petra; Buchanan, William J.

Abstract

The increasing use of encrypted data within file storage and in network communications leaves investigators with many challenges. One of the most challenging is the Tor protocol, as its main focus is to protect the privacy of the user, in both its local footprint within a host and over a network connection. The Tor browser, though, can leave behind digital artefacts which can be used by an investigator. This paper outlines an experimental methodology and provides results for evidence trails which can be used within real-life investigations.

Citation

Muir, M., Leimich, P., & Buchanan, W. J. (2019). A Forensic Audit of the Tor Browser Bundle. Digital Investigation, 29, 118-128. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.diin.2019.03.009

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Mar 23, 2019
• Online Publication Date: Mar 30, 2019
• Publication Date: 2019-06
• Deposit Date: Apr 8, 2019
• Publicly Available Date: Mar 31, 2020
• Journal: Digital Investigation
• Print ISSN: 1742-2876
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 29
• Pages: 118-128
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.diin.2019.03.009
• Keywords: Digital forensics, Tor, Windows 10,
• Public URL: http://researchrepository.napier.ac.uk/Output/1715664
• Publisher URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1742287619300829
• Contract Date: Jun 19, 2019