Restraining opportunism in hotel management contracts

Panvisavas, Veerades; Taylor, Stephen

Abstract

Management contracts are widely used throughout the world as a mechanism for separating the ownership of hotel properties and their management. The research reported here concerns how Thai hotel owners seek to control the international hotel chains where properties are operated under hotel management contracts (HMCs). Adopting agency theory, the research findings reported here suggest that restraints against agent opportunism tend to focus on two key aspects: contractual controls and operational controls. Additionally, the findings also suggest that the outcome control needs to be viewed as a priority for effectively controlling hotel management companies when using HMCs.

• Presentation Conference Type: Conference Paper (unpublished)
• Conference Name: CHME Annual Research Conference
• Start Date: May 14, 2008
• End Date: May 16, 2008
• Deposit Date: Dec 2, 2019
• Public URL: http://researchrepository.napier.ac.uk/Output/1190694