

1 **How long do bacteria, fungi, protozoa, and viruses retain their replication capacity on**
2 **inanimate surfaces? A systematic review examining microbiological environmental**
3 **resilience and healthcare-associated infection (HAI) risk by “fomite-borne risk**
4 **assessment”**

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49 **Summary**

50 In healthcare settings, contaminated surfaces play an important role in transmission of nosocomial
51 pathogens potentially resulting in healthcare-associated infections (HAI). Pathogens can be transmitted
52 directly from frequent hand-touch surfaces close to patients or indirectly by staff and visitors. HAI risk
53 depends on exposition option, extent of contamination, infectious dose (ID), virulence, hygiene practices
54 and patient vulnerability. This review attempts to close a gap in previous reviews on persistence/ tenacity
55 by only including articles (n=179) providing quantitative data on re-cultivable pathogens from fomites
56 for a better translation into clinical settings. We have therefore introduced the new term “replication
57 capacity” (RC). The RC is affected by degree of contamination, surface material, temperature, relative
58 humidity, protein load, organic soil, UV-light exposure (sun) and pH-value. In general, investigations
59 into surface RC are mainly performed *in vitro* using reference strains with high inocula. *In vitro* data
60 from studies on 13 Gram-positive, 25 Gram-negative bacteria, 18 fungi, 4 protozoa and 36 viruses spp.
61 should be regarded as worst case scenario indicating upper bounds of risks when using such data for
62 clinical decision making.

63 Information on RC after surface contamination could be seen as an opportunity to choose the most
64 appropriate infection prevention and control (IPC) strategies. To help with decision-making, pathogens
65 characterized by an increased nosocomial risk for transmission from inanimate surfaces (fomite-borne)
66 are presented and discussed in this systematic review. Thus, the review offers a theoretical basis to
67 support local risk assessments and IPC recommendations.

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
69 **Keywords:** replication capacity, persistence, tenacity, viability, resilience, transmission,
70 bacteria, fungi, protozoa, viruses, inanimate surfaces, fomites, fomite-borne risk pathogens,
71 HAI

72 **Introduction**

73 Information about pathogen replication capacity (RC) after surface contamination is an important basis
74 for infection prevention and control (IPC) including the risk assessment of healthcare-associated
75 infections (HAI) and nosocomial outbreaks. In addition, this information is of high importance for
76 outpatient settings and community outbreaks.

77 Pathogens can be spread from contaminated surfaces by direct patient contact, airborne dispersal (small
78 and large aerosols) or indirectly via hand and medical devices after contamination from hand-touch
79 surfaces (Fig. 1). Exogenous transmission of HAIs in Europe corresponds to only about 5-20 % of the
80 total number of HAI incidents (1), making the hand the main vector for pathogen transmission from
81 contaminated inanimate surfaces (2-31). Consequently, international guidelines assign a key role of
82 cleaning / disinfection of areas beside patients, especially surfaces receiving frequent hand / skin contact
83 (32-35). An additional benefit is the relatively low cost of interventions aiming at controlling this source
84 as opposed to many others, e.g. impregnated catheters (36). However, as recently witnessed during the
85 SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, the role of decontamination of inanimate surfaces can also be overrated (37).
86 Inappropriate use of disinfectants leads to costly interventions alongside risk of disinfectant tolerance
87 and even antibiotic resistance, environmental pollution (38-40) and adverse effects for humans (41-44).
88 Therefore, it would be useful to obtain greater insight on the RC of pathogens on inanimate surfaces in
89 order to implement the most appropriate, risk assessed decontamination procedures.



90 Since hands are the main vehicle for potential nosocomial pathogens, hand hygiene and surface cleaning
91 should complement each other to prevent HAI (45).




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transmission routes from contaminated surfaces




environmental factors influencing the replications capacity on inanimate surfaces




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timeline of replication capacity of pathogens on *surface xy* at room temperature (exemplary illustration)



timeline of replication capacity of *pathogen xy* on different surfaces at room temperature (exemplary illustration)



95

96 **FIGURE 1** Transmission routes from contaminated inanimate surfaces and environmental influences

97 **Defining terms of cultivable pathogens from inanimate surfaces**

98 Resilience is to withstand or to recover quickly from difficulties and therefore being able to keep or
99 come back to the standard or previous condition. Resilience is a positive characteristic from the
100 perspective of the microbes, which in the medical context can have negative implications from the
101 patient's perspective.

102 To determine the environmental resilience of pathogens, different methods of recovery are available to
103 describe their burden on inanimate surfaces. For viruses only indirect cultivation is possible because
104 cells are needed for replication. Unfortunately, (reverse transcriptase) polymerase chain reaction ((RT-
105)PCR) does not allow a conclusion to be drawn about remaining infectivity of viruses (e.g. plaque
106 forming units (PFU)). Pathogen dependent, different terms with different meanings are used for the
107 ability of pathogens to be recovered from inanimate surfaces. In order to have the same understanding,

108 some common terms will be preceded by a brief explanation. Von Sprockhoff (46) proposed
109 'survivability' synonymously to 'tenacity' as the robustness of microorganisms to defined exogenous
110 factors. The term 'tenacity' refers to the resistance of bacteria, fungi, protozoa and viruses to

111 environmental influences. In the Anglo-American language, the term ‘tenacity’ is uncommon; instead,
112 terms such as ‘resistance’, ‘sensitivity’ or ‘survival’ are used more often (47). The Latin origin ‘tenacitas
113 = to hold on’ is not helpful for understanding what the term means. In the broader sense, tenacity means,
114 ‘the determination to continue what you are doing’ (48). Another comprehensive definition is, ‘the
115 quality or state of being tenacious’ (49). Professionals in clinical disciplines are unaware of the term
116 ‘tenacity’ for microorganisms. Therefore, we need something that linguistically expresses the viability
117 of bacteria, fungi, protozoa and viruses when they contaminate surfaces, in order to be able to assess the
118 risk of onward spread of nosocomial pathogens emanating from that surface.


119 Since bacteria, fungi and protozoa function autonomously, the terms ‘persistence’, i.e. ‘viability’, or
120 ‘survival’ are used synonymously. Survival can be understood as persisting viability under
121 disadvantageous circumstances (50). Some microorganisms persist through an adaptive reaction to
122 survive in the environment by reducing metabolism and by morphological, biochemical and / or genetic
123 adaptations, especially for bacteria in biofilms and/ or as bacterial spores (51-53). Another mode of
124 adaptation is the transition to viable but non-cultivable (VBNC) cells, which can only be converted back
125 to a replicative, virulent state through certain stimuli (54, 55). Protozoan cysts act as a survival niche
126 and protective shelter (56). The criterion for determining the persistence of microorganisms is whether
127 it can replicate after it has contaminated a surface.

128 Unlike bacteria, viruses need the synthetic apparatus of intact host cells for their replication. Viruses
129 have neither their own metabolism and energy production nor the possibility of protein synthesis.
130 Therefore, strictly speaking, they are not living beings. The criterion for viral infectivity is the ability to
131 replicate in host cells so that quantification *in vitro* is possible by resuspension from the surface, transfer
132 to the cell culture and counting dead cells, the so-called cytopathic effect. Not every virus is capable of
133 inducing CPE, while demonstrating other significant features. The viral ability to replicate is referred as
134 ‘replication capacity’ (57), which is used in different contexts, e.g. for change under antiviral therapy
135 (58). In parallel, the ability of vectors to transfer antibiotic resistance genes can also be termed
136 ‘replication capacity’ (59). Viral persistence, on the other hand, is understood as the genetic information
137 of viruses presenting in cells of the host organism and the possibility of a virus reactivation under certain
138 circumstances, e.g. in the case of immunosuppression of the host (e.g. herpes viruses).

139 In summary, only RC reflects the viral load on a surface, because viral RC correlates with the viral
140 infectivity (60). Given that for microorganisms and protozoa, as well as viruses, the criterion of
141 replication determines infectivity and because the term ‘replication capacity’ does not allow different
142 interpretations, the term ‘replication capacity’ (instead of tenacity, persistence, survival or viability) is
143 proposed to describe recovery from inanimate surfaces.

144 **Risk assessment from inanimate surfaces as origin of HAI**

145 Information on RC of pathogens on inanimate surfaces could assist with the following aims:

- 146 - To determine the most effective decontamination strategy, firstly, for known nosocomial
147 pathogens, and secondly, in the event of the emergence of a new pathogen with initially
148 unknown properties and potential for epi- or pandemic spread;
- 149 - **Generally, to provide a risk assessment for IPC measures after pathogen release from patients**
150 **to interrupt further transmission;**
- 151 - To provide a risk assessment of the need for final disinfection measures required after hospital
152 discharge of pathogen carriers, especially for isolated patients;
- 153 - To inform control methods for nosocomial outbreaks;
- 154 - To help determine standard operating procedures (SOP) for surface cleaning and / or
155 disinfection, especially hand-touch sites without any knowledge about the presence of potential
156 pathogens;
- 157 - To help determine SOP for surface cleaning and / or disinfection, following incidents such as
158 sewage or floodwater spillage, building works, etc.;
- 159 - To assess the risk of the possibility of further spread of pathogens after hand contact of
160 contaminated surfaces and medical devices especially for research purposes;
- 161 - To assess the risk-benefit between disinfection efficacy, expense and environmental impact and
162 thus finally IPC;
- 163 - To analyze the RC under influence of probiotic cleaning as new option for 

164 Walther and Ewald (61) distinguished a highly virulent long-lasting group containing variola (smallpox)
165 virus, *Mycobacterium tuberculosis*, *Corynebacterium diphtheriae*, *Bordetella (B.) pertussis*,

166 *Streptococcus (Str.) pneumoniae*, and (avian) Influenza A Virus (virulence determined from mortality
167 rate or case mortality). These pathogens have a mean percent mortality $\geq 0.01\%$ and a mean survival
168 time > 10 days (d). In contrast, a low-virulence and low-persistent group (mean percent mortality $<$
169 0.01% and time of survival < 5 d) includes viruses such as Rubella, Mumps, Parainfluenza, Respiratory
170 syncytial, Varicella-zoster, Rubella and Rhinovirus, alongside the bacteria *Mycoplasma pneumoniae*
171 and *Haemophilus (H.) influenzae*. This is even more interesting, since these bacteria and viruses belong
172 to totally different species, families and genera, respectively. While our review focuses on transmission
173 modes via inanimate surfaces (fomite-borne), another category of pathogens is relevant for risk
174 assessment (see Fig. 1). The longer a nosocomial pathogen persists on a surface, the longer the surface
175 may be a source of transmission and endanger a susceptible patient or healthcare worker. Furthermore,
176 a correlation between virulence and persistence is reported (62), the sit-and-wait hypothesis predicts that
177 virulence should be positively correlated with persistence in the external environment because
178 persistence reduces the dependence on host mobility for transfer to a patient. This has been confirmed
179 for respiratory tract pathogens (62). The pathogenicity including factors as infectious dose (ID), RC and
180 risk of transmission determines the outbreak potential of a pathogen and must be considered as basis for
181 the IPC strategy. For surfaces as (temporary) origin of HAI, the RC of pathogens from fomites is
182 essential. The main focus in this context was the transmission mode from inanimate surfaces. High
183 virulent pathogens with outbreak potential due to low ID, long-lasting RC require additional to the non-
184 targeted near-patient (high-touch) surface disinfection, a targeted cleaning and disinfection as patient-
185 remote (low-touch) surface disinfection and final surface disinfection. Such pathogens with increased
186 “fomite-borne risk”, characterized by an increased nosocomial risk for transmission from inanimate
187 surfaces, are marked in blue in the tables 3-7. Of course, disinfection measures are only one part of the
188 IPC strategy combined with the other standard precaution such as hand hygiene and additional pathogen-
189 related measures such as barrier nursing, isolation, antimicrobial chemotherapy and antiseptic
190 decolonization. With growing knowledge, the classification of “pathogens with nosocomial risk for
191 spread from inanimate surfaces” can be further developed.

192 There is a practical way of looking at this. For example, admission to a room previously occupied by a
193 patient infected and/ or colonised with a pathogen is a known risk factor for acquisition of that pathogen

194 (63). This risk can be quantitated and it appears that the relative differences in acquisition risk between
195 the pathogens mirror environmental longevities. As expected, organisms such as *Acinetobacter*
196 *baumannii* complex and *C. difficile* present the highest risk for acquisition, and they also happen to be
197 the most resilient in the healthcare environment (64). This begs the question even over the need for
198 cleaning / disinfection priorities for a recently vacated room, depending on which pathogen infected the
199 previous patient. So, in accordance with survival and replicative properties, decontamination strategies
200 could range from a quick wipe over the hand-touch surfaces for MRSA, disinfection of the sink / shower
201 for ESBLs and comprehensive air and surface disinfection for *C. difficile*, etc. If pathogens released
202 from the respiratory tract, knowledge of the RC makes it possible to assess whether surfaces outside the
203 patient's contact area should also be included in the final disinfection, e.g. wall surfaces and slatted
204 curtains. A focus on targeted cleaning and disinfection allows pathogen-related risk to dictate the most
205 appropriate decontamination practice for all patient spaces (45). This risk assessment is the logical
206 consequence of a basic risk without knowledge of existing pathogens and enables a - in theory - most
207 effective strategy.

208 To assess the timeline of RC for risk of further spread, it is necessary to consider RC in more detail.
209 This includes baseline inoculum, the surface material, temperature, relative humidity (RH), protein load,
210 organic soil, light exposure, and pH-value. Thus, it is not just the type of pathogen or evidence for them
211 (e.g. DNA, RNA), but whether they are capable of being transmitted to, and replicating in, the host
212 (Fig.1). Transmission potential of pathogens on surfaces is not restricted to the direct and indirect contact
213 transmission route, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Some, but not all potential pathogens on inanimate surfaces
214 can be aerosolized and transmitted contact-free. This potential additional risk is not within the scope of
215 this review. **But**, if the RC is known, the infection risk can be estimated for respiratory released and
216 aerogenic transmissible pathogens.

217 The aim of this review was to collect and assess published data related to RC of all types of nosocomial
218 pathogens contaminating inanimate healthcare surfaces **as basis for evaluating healthcare-associated**
219 **infection risk by fomite-borne risk assessment. For determination of IPC strategies both RC and ID**
220 **should be considered. This data might assist by evaluating the transmission and infection risk and**
221 **therefore guide most appropriate IPC measures.**

222 **Method**

223 The basis of this review made use of three reviews (65-67) with at least partly similar aims, from which
224 literature was screened and adopted. In order to update and expand the current reviews, afterwards a
225 systematic literature search was conducted and reported in accordance with the PRISMA guideline and
226 the German Manual for literature research in databases (68).

227 Based on the modified PICO scheme (table 1) the search strings were compiled. The search was
228 restricted to publications from 2020 onwards to obtain only hits that were not already included in the
229 search of the latest included review (67). The language was limited to German and English. The
230 databases PubMed and Web of Science were searched due their medical focus. The search was
231 conducted on the 26th of January 2023.

232 **TABLE 1** Search strategy; segments and search terms

Segment	Search terms
Pathogens	Bacteria, virus, fungi, protozoa
Conditions	Surface, fomite, inanimate, temperature, humidity, light
Setting	Nosocomial, hospital-acquired
Outcome	Persistence, survival, transmission, tenacity

233 Duplicates were removed using *Citavi 6* (Swiss Academic Software GmbH). Four reviewers carried out
234 the screenings blinded (two reviewers per article) using an online document to record the decisions. The
235 articles were compared against predetermined inclusion and exclusion criteria (table 2).

236 In case of different assessments, a third reviewer joined the discussion, and a consensus was reached.
237 Firstly, the titles and abstracts were screened and then the full texts of the included records. Eligible
238 reviews were not included but searched for primary studies, which were then also screened as described
239 above.

240 **TABLE 2** Inclusion and exclusion criteria

Inclusion	Exclusion
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Narrative review, rapid review, scoping review, systematic review, randomized controlled trial, quasi randomized controlled intervention study, not randomized controlled studies, pro- and retrospective cohort studies, case control studies, historically controlled studies, cross-sectional studies	Single-arm follow-up studies (case reports, case studies, ...), commentaries, study protocols, conference abstracts, books, editorials, model studies
Human pathogenic species within the following groups: viruses, bacteria, protozoa, fungi that are relevant for hospital acquired infections from surfaces ¹	Other pathogens
Inanimate surfaces – specifically surfaces relevant in hospital settings. Cave: if the only information found was not on hospital relevant surfaces, the information is reported to give insight into possible tenacity of the pathogen.	Animate surfaces
Persistence, tenacity, survival, temerity, recultivable, replicable; a resuspension has to be made from the test surface and then transferred to the cell culture or nutrient medium	Anything concerning the treatment, symptoms, or genetic surveillance; studies on the effect of disinfectants; studies on the effect of antibacterial / antiviral surfaces
Since 2020	Before 2020
English, German	Other languages
	Relevant data / methodology (e. g. inoculum concentration) not given
¹ Although ectoparasites can also be transmitted nosocomial (69), they were excluded because they are multicellular arthropods reproducing outside the human organism.	


241 The data was extracted into an online table by the reviewers. A cross check was conducted afterwards.

242 *Tables 3-7 were completely modified from the informative appendix (only in German) (70) of the*
243 *recommendation of the Commission for Hospital Hygiene and Infection Prevention (KRINKO) on*
244 *Hygiene requirements for cleaning and disinfection of surfaces (71). Table 8 was modified from Jawad*
245 *et al. (72).*

246 **Evaluable publications:** Out of the three reviews this review is based on, 145 publications were
247 included. Additionally, through the systematic search 495 records were identified via the databases (Fig.
248 2). 152 duplicates were removed. The title and abstract of the remaining 343 records were screened
249 leading to the inclusion of 40 reports. 32 of these were excluded during the full text screening. Four

250 primary studies and four reviews were included. The reference lists of the reviews were screened for
 251 other eligible studies which lead to the inclusion of another 22 primary studies. Within the scope of the
 252 systematic search, a total of 26 primary studies were included. Adding the studies from the three initial
 253 reviews, a total of 171 publications were included.

254




255

256 **FIGURE 2** Flow chart (modified from (73))

257 Our review does not claim to completeness all pathogens with ability to induce outbreaks; such as
258 *Mycobacterium chimera*. The priority for us was to observe the transmission possibility from hand-
259 touch inanimate surfaces; this is why we did not consider pathogens dominating in other hospital
260 hygiene relevant settings (e.g. water , air and food).

261 The tables 3-7 focus on the most important pathogens and relevant environmental (temperature, RH,
262 light, surfaces) data for clinical settings. For better clarity, inocula were reported by waiving application
263 conditions. Due to the inconsistencies in the kind of units used to report results, the initial inoculum
264 (starting point) was converted into decadic logarithm. For additional data and details of recultivation
265 and expanded environmental conditions, see ^{suppl} supplementary material. Pathogens with an increased
266 fomite-borne transmission potential were highlighted in blue. For this tentatively introduced
267 classification we used a simple scoring system: Pathogens are characterized with **firstly**) a high
268 virulence and / or **secondly**) a long RC and / or **thirdly**) a high potential for nosocomial spread. A
269 pathogen belongs to the fomite-borne risk group if at least two of the three statements are fulfilled. This
270 is to be understood explicitly as a basis for discussion and is summarized illustratively in the figure.



272 **FIGURE 3** Introduced classification of pathogens with fomite-borne transmission potential and derived
273 IPC strategies

274

275

276 Replication capacity of bacteria

277 Especially in the near-patient environment of microbial colonized or infected patients, the responsible
278 species underlying the colonization or infection can be detected, especially if no surface cleaning or
279 disinfection has been carried out. In order to clarify transmission routes, such detection has been carried
280 out primarily for resistant species such as Methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus (S.) aureus* (MRSA) (74,
281 75), vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) (74, 76), carbapenem-resistant enterobacterales (CRE)
282 (77, 78), *Acinetobacter baumannii* complex (79), *Clostridioides (C.) difficile* (79, 80) and recently for
283 the high pathogenic yeast *Candida (C.) auris*. For species regularly detected in nosocomial outbreaks or
284 which frequently colonize or subsequently infect subsequently admitted patients after patient discharge,
285 the knowledge of RC is of special interest, because intensified surface cleaning with disinfection as part
286 of an intervention bundle proved effective in controlling transmissions and even an outbreak. This has
287 been proven for nosocomial outbreaks by VRE (18, 25), *C. difficile* (16), MRSA (81), *Acinetobacter*
288 (*A.) baumannii* (4, 8, 22, 28), CRE (14, 25) and *C. auris* (Ahmad et al. 2023). The acquisition of
289 pathogens from the discharged patients caused by deficiencies in final disinfection is repeatedly
290 described (5-7, 9, 15, 23, 82) and evaluated in meta-analyses (21, 31). However, none of these studies
291 have shown by genomic surveillance that the previous and the new patient were colonized with the same
292 clone of the respective species. Recent work suggests, that clonality cannot be assumed, but there is a
293 high likelihood of clonality depending on species (87).

294 In most reports, RC was studied on dry surfaces using artificial contamination of a standardized type of
295 surface in a laboratory. Bacteria were prepared in broth, water or saline and removed from the germ
296 carrier by different rinsing solution e.g. dist. water, physiol. NaCl, phosphate buffered salt solution
297 (PBS), or Triton X-100, sometimes in combination with ultrasound (table 3 and 4).

298 After this preparation, members of the Gram-positive genera enterococcus (e.g. VRE)
299 and staphylococcus (e.g. MRSA) survive for months on dry surfaces. Among streptococci, RC differs
300 depending on the species, i.e. for *Streptococcus (Str.) pneumoniae* < 24 h, *Str. pyogenes* 1-3 d and
301 *Str. salivarius* > 88 h. In addition, *Corynebacterium pseudotuberculosis* survives 1-4 d on dry plastic
302 surfaces. In contrast, *C. diphtheriae*, isolated from dust in patient rooms, survives 7-90 d, depending on

303 species. By daylight *Mycobacterium tuberculosis* survives for 2-5 d. In darkness the recultivation is
304 possible up to 200 d (table 3).

305 There are only a few studies in which wildtype and antibiotic resistant representatives of the same
306 species were compared with each other. For enterococcus there are hints of higher RC for VRE
307 compared with sensible enterococci present. Moreover, in dust a Methicillin-sensitive *S. aureus* (MSSA)
308 demonstrated a shorter survival time on surfaces than MRSA (table 3).

309 Spores of *Bacillus* und *Clostridioides* (*C.*) spp. survive depending on the material > 6 mon. In contrast,
310 the vegetative form of *C. difficile* drops to the detectable threshold within 15 minutes (min) (table 3).

311

312 **TABLE 3** Replication capacity of Gram-positive bacteria from inanimate surfaces modified from (70) (pathogens with “fomite-borne risk”, characterized by an
 313 increased nosocomial risk for transmission from inanimate surfaces, are marked in blue; for additional data and details of recultivation and environmental
 314 conditions, see supplementary material)

Pathogen	Initial inoculum	Replication capacity	Surface	Reference
<i>Bacillus subtilis</i> spores	~ 8 lg CFU	After 15 d reduction by ~ 0.3 lg, after 56 d: reduction by ~ 0.7 lg	Glass	(84)
	7.1-9.5 lg CFU	> 200 d: reduction by ~ 2 lg	Polycarbonate	(85)
	6 lg CFU	≥ 1 d: 5 lg	Stainless steel	(86)
<i>Clostridioides (C.) difficile</i> spores	6 lg CFU	After 2 d: reduction by ~ 2 lg, after 4 wk: 8 CFU, after 5 mon: 1 CFU	Floor	(87)
	6-7 lg CFU	After 6 wk: reduction by ~ 0.5 - 0.8 lg; after 12 wk: reduction by < 3 lg	Steel	(88)
<i>C. difficile</i> veg.	~ 6 lg CFU	15 min: reduction by ~ 4 lg	Glass	(89)
<i>Corynebacteria</i> generic	2.7-3.8 lg CFU	≥ 48 h: mean recovery 3.6 %	Cotton	(90)
<i>Corynebacterium diphtheriae</i>	up to 155 CFU	7-90 d (strain-dependend)	Dust	(91)
<i>Corynebacterium pseudo-tuberculosis</i>	~ 6 lg CFU	3 d	Plastic	(92)
<i>Corynebacterium striatum</i>	6 lg CFU	After 48 h: 7.7 lg / 6.8 lg / 2.6 lg	Polyvinyl chloride (PVC)/ silicone / stainless steel	(93)
<i>Enterococcus faecium</i>	6-7 lg CFU	After 12 wk: reduction by < 3 lg	Steel	(88)
	~ 6.5 lg CFU	49 d / 51 d / 49 d	Cotton / wool / silk	(94)
	250 CFU	7 d up to 28 d: 250 - 70 CFU / 250 - ~ 32 CFU / 250 - 160 CFU / 250 - ~ 50 CFU	Glass / PVC / stainless steel / aluminum	(95)
	8 lg CFU	1 to 16 wk	PVC	(96)
	8 lg CFU	< 4 mon: ~ 2 lg recultivable	Ceramic / PVC / rubber / steel	(97)
	~ 5 lg CFU	33 / > 90 / > 90 d	Cotton / polyester / polypropylene	(98)

	5-6 lg CFU	≥ 7 d (3 lg / 3 lg)	Polyester / Terrycloth	(99)
	10 lg CFU	≥ 21 d (4-5 lg)	Cotton	(100)
<i>Enterococcus faecalis</i>	6-7 lg CFU	After 6 wk: reduction by < 1.8 lg	Steel	(88)
	7.5 lg CFU	After 8 wk: 6.5 lg	Ceramic / cotton / synthetic fibers	(101)
	5.2 lg CFU	After 1 d: survival of 3 %	Cotton	(102)
	~ 5 lg CFU	> 90 / > 90 / > 90 d	Cotton / polyester / polypropylene	(98)
	6 lg CFU	≥ 1 d: 5 lg	Stainless steel	(86)
	<i>Enterococcus</i> spp.	7.2 lg CFU	Mean survival rate 3 d (dried in water), 43 d (dried in egg white)	Glass
Vancomycin resistant <i>Enterococcus</i> (VRE)	~ 6 lg CFU	After 6 wk: reduction by ~ 3 lg	Steel	(88)
	5 lg CFU	≥ 7 d	Furnishings	(103)
	<i>E. faecalis</i> 4.5 lg	Dried 60 min: 3 lg CFU; dried 90 min: 3.6lg CFU	Stainless steel	(104)
	8 lg CFU	1 to 16 wk	PVC	(105)
	<i>E. faecalis</i> : ~ 5 lg CFU	22 / > 80 / > 80 d	Cotton / polyester / polypropylene	(98)
	<i>E. faecium</i> : ~ 5 lg CFU	> 90 / > 90 / > 90 d		
<i>Micrococcus luteus</i>	7.1-9.5 lg CFU	After 120 d: reduction by ~ 6 lg	Polycarbonate	(85)
	5.2 lg CFU	After 2 d: survival of 20 %	Cotton	(102)
<i>Mycobacterium tuberculosis</i>	0.1 mg / ml	Recultivable in daylight after 1 d, recultivable in darkness for 9 d, not recultivable after 40 d	Coverslip	(106)
<i>Staphylococcus aureus</i> , methicillin-susceptible (MSSA)	7.3 lg CFU	≥ 11 d	Glass	(72)
	5.2 lg CFU	After 25 d: survival of 0.8 %	Cotton	(102)
	7.5 lg CFU	After 8 wk: ~ 6.5 lg CFU / ml	Ceramic / cotton / synthetic fibers	(101)
	8 lg CFU	2 d / 18 d / > 45 d / 43 d	Latex / cotton / vinyl flooring / granite	(107)
	~ 6.5 lg CFU	37 d / 37 d / 41 d / 37 d	Cotton / cotton polyester / wool / silk	(94)
	6 lg CFU	9 d / 10 d / 3 d	Formica / stainless steel / enamel	(108)
	250 CFU	After 21 d: 5 CFU/ after 7 d: ~ 5 CFU / after 21 d: 0 CFU / after 7 d:~ 10 CFU	Glass / PVC / stainless steel / aluminium	(95)

	7.2 lg CFU	Mean survival 26 d (dried in water), 35 d (dried in egg white); after 12 d: ~ 3 lg CFU loss (water); after 18 d: ~ 5.7 lg loss (egg white)	Glass	(72)
	Desiccation: 7.3 lg CFU Wet : 3-4 lg CFU	After 25 d desiccation: 4.4 lg Wet: after 7 d not recultivable	Aluminium	(109)
	6-7 lg CFU	Dry < 7 mon, at 32 % RH > 5 mon	Dust	(110)
	a) dry inoculum: 5-6 lg CFU b) liquid inoculum: ~ 6 lg CFU	a) After 24 h: 6.7 lg CFU, after 7 d: 22 CFU /after 24 h: 6.3 lg CFU, after 7 d: 1 CFU b) After 7 d: 16.2 lg / 6.1 lg	Polymer without silver / with silver	(36)
	8 lg CFU	With dust: < 28 d, without dust: < 35 d	Bottles with and without dust	(111)
	7 lg CFU	≥ 12 d / 12 d / ≥ 14 d	Plastic / laminated plastic / polyester	(112)
	5-6 CFU (mattress cover) 14-34 CFU (drapes) 5-6 CFU (bed sheets)	Recovery after 72 h at 22 °C: 98 CFU / / 1 CFU / 17 CFU / 3 lg / 1 CFU / 1 CFU	Dry mattress cover / wet mattress cover / dry drapes / wet drapes / dry bed sheets / wet bed sheets	(113)
	8 lg CFU	< 21 d / ≥ 21 d (6 lg)	Polyester / cotton	(114)
	5-6 lg CFU	≥ 206 d / 25 d / 11 d / ≥ 206 d	Mattress inner foam / PVC / cotton / polyester	(115)
	9 lg CFU	≥ 21 d: 4-5 lg CFU	Cotton	(100)
	5.7 lg CFU	≥ 11 d: 4 lg CFU	PVC	(86)
	5.7 lg CFU	≥ 11 d: 3 lg CFU / ≥ 11 d: 3 lg CFU / ≥ 11 d: 3 lg CFU	Aluminum / plastic / stainless steel	
	6 lg CFU	≥ 1 d: 6 lg CFU	Stainless steel	
	0.05 OD ₆₀₀	≥ 7 d: survival rate: 4 %	Polypropylene	(116)
<i>Staphylococcus aureus</i> , methicillin-resistant, Epidemic (EMRSA)	8.7 lg CFU	≤ 60 min / 270 min / ≥ 360 min	Copper / brass (80 % Cu, 20 % Zn) / stainless steel	(117)
<i>Staphylococcus aureus</i> ,	6-7 lg CFU	After 6 wk: reduction by 5-6 lg CFU	Steel	(88)
	8 lg CFU	1 d / 18 d / 41 d / 40 d	Latex / cotton / vinyl flooring / tile	(107)

methicillin-resistant (<i>MRSA</i>)	3.2-4.9 lg CFU	After 7 d: recovery 59-125 %; after 14 d: 26-42 %; after 28 d: 0.2-16 %; after 56 d: 0-1 %	Dry mop	(118)
	9 lg CFU	< 318 d	Plastic	(119)
	8 lg CFU	With dust: < 126 d; without dust: < 175 d	Bottles with and without dust	(111)
	5.6 lg CFU)	< 21 / 14 / 3 / 40 / > 51 d	Cotton / cotton terry / cotton and polyester / polyester / polypropylene	(98)
	~ 7.3 lg CFU	< 96 d	Glass	(120)
	6 lg CFU	≤ 63 d / ≤ 56 d / ≤ 21 d / ≤ 14 d / ≤ 14 d / ≤ 3 d / ≤ 5 min	Vinyl / plastic / ceramic / bed sheets / towels / wood / razors	(121)
	7 lg CFU	≥ 12 d / 11 d / 9 d	Plastic / laminated plastic / polyester	(112)
	6.3-6.7 lg CFU or 4.3-4.7 lg CFU	≤ 8 d or < 2 d	Polypropylene	(122)
	5-6 lg CFU	≥ 7 d: < 1 lg / 1 lg	Polyester / terrycloth (towel)	(99)
<i>Staphylococcus aureus</i> , Vancomycin intermediate (VISA)	8 lg CFU	1 d / 3 d / > 45 d / > 45 d	Latex / cotton / vinyl flooring / granite	(107)
<i>Streptococcus faecalis</i>	Desiccation: 6.9 lg CFU Wet: 3-4 lg CFU	After 25 d desiccation: 4.6 lg Wet: after 10 d not recultivable	Aluminium	(109)
<i>Streptococcus pyogenes</i>	~ 7.7 lg CFU	< 2 h	Plastic and ceramic / plastic / stainless steel	(123)
	8 lg CFU	planktonic: 3 d; as biofilm: > 120 d	Plastic / textiles	(124)
	5-6 lg CFU	≥ 206 d / 25 d / 11 d / ≥ 206 d	Mattress inner foam / PVC / cotton / polyester	(115)
<i>Streptococcus pneumoniae</i>	2.8-3.6 lg CFU	≥ 48 h: mean recovery 0.2 %	Cotton	(90)
Streptococci, Staphylococci from saliva; combined analysis	5.3 lg CFU for <i>Staphylococcus aureus</i> ; 5.9 lg CFU for <i>Streptococcus pyogenes</i> ; 5.8 lg CFU for <i>Streptococcus salivarius</i>	> 88 h	Glass / latex / wood	(125)

Legend: CFU = colony forming units, lg = decadic logarithm, min = minute, h = hour, d = day, wk = week, mon = month, PVC = polyvinyl chloride

315

316

317 Initial comment is that neither Gram-positive nor Gram-negative organisms represent a uniform group
318 regarding recultivation potential from inanimate surface (Tables 3 and 4). Some species can survive for
319 month, such as *Escherichia (E.) coli*, *Klebsiella* spp., *Pseudomonas aeruginosa*, *Serratia marcescens*,
320 *Enterococci*, *Acinetobacter* ssp. and *Clostridioides* ssp.. This is also reflected in infection epidemiology
321 since these pathogens can cause ongoing transmission incidents and outbreaks. The *Salmonella* genus
322 behaves very differently: *Salmonella (S.) typhimurium* is still present in garden soil 280 d after
323 contamination (126), *S. paratyphi B* survives in soil up to 259 d (127) and *S. enteritidis* for more than
324 11 month, whereas *S. typhi* survives only 4 d.
325 Conversely, Mitscherlich and Marth (128) demonstrate the persistence of *Proteus* spp. in the
326 environment with 1-2 d. *P. morgani*, *P. rettgeri*, *P. vulgaris* and *P. mirabilis* survive in sterile clay loam
327 at 18-20°C species-dependant 35-40 d. The decimal reduction time was about 6 d (129). *Shigella flexneri*
328 persists for 6 d (130). *B. pertussis*, *H. influenzae*, and *Vibrio cholerae* persist only few days ((131);
329 Table 3). Aerosolized *H. influenzae* is characterized by short survival on glass (0.29 d), wood (0.08 d),
330 and fabric (< 1 d) (128, 132).

331 **TABLE 4** Replication capacity of Gram-negative bacteria from inanimate surfaces modified from (70) (pathogens with “fomite-borne risk”, characterized by an
 332 increased nosocomial risk for transmission from inanimate surfaces, are marked in blue; for additional data and details of recultivation and environmental conditions,
 333 see supplementary material)

Pathogen	Initial inoculum	Replication capacity	Surface	Reference
<i>Acinetobacter baumannii</i>	~ 6.5 lg CFU	19 d / 19 d / 7 d / 19 d	Cotton / cotton polyester / wool / silk	(94)
	6-7 lg CFU	After 6 wk: reduction by 4-5 lg	Steel	(88)
	6 lg CFU	11 d / 12 d / 6 d	Formica / stainless steel / enamel	(108)
	250 CFU	After 28 d: ~ 112 CFU / ~ 112 CFU / ~ 18 CFU / ~ 20 CFU	Glass / PVC / stainless steel / aluminum	(95)
	7.1-9.5 lg CFU	After 20 d reduction by about 5.5 lg	Polycarbonate	(85)
	1200 resp. 1100 CFU	Biofilm-forming < 36 d / non-biofilm-forming <15 d	Glass	(133)
	7.3 lg CFU	3 d	Glass	(134)
	7.3 lg CFU	up to 33 d	Glass	(135)
	7.3 lg CFU	7 - 70 d (strain-dependent)	Glass	(136)
	~ 8 lg CFU)	3 - 90 d (strain-dependent)	Polystyrene	(137)
	~ 7.3 lg CFU	< 96 d	Glass	(120)
	8 lg CFU	50 % of strains mean survival at least 2 wk (< 2 lg recultivable), strain-dependent < 4 mon (7 lg recultivable)	Ceramic / PVC / rubber / steel	(97)
	4.1 lg CFU	Dried 60 min: 4 lg; dried 90 min: 3.9 lg	Stainless steel	(104)
	6 lg CFU	≥ 1 d: 4 lg	Stainless steel	(86)
	7 lg CFU	≥ 60 d: survival rate: 10 %, 40 %, 40 %	Cotton / plastic / glass	(138)
	5-6 lg CFU	≥ 7 d: 2 lg / 3 lg	Polyester / Terrycloth	(99)
	7.2 lg CFU	Mean survival rate strain-dependent 2-29 d (dried in water); < 59 d (dried in egg white); after 18 d ~ 5.5 lg loss	Glass	(72)
	<i>Acinetobacter johnsonii</i>	Mean survival rate 3 d (dried in water); 12 d (when dried in egg white)		
<i>Acinetobacter junii</i>	Mean survival rate 2 d (dried in water); 13 d (dried in egg white)			
<i>Acinetobacter lwolffi</i>	Mean survival rate 6 d (dried in water); 8 d (dried in egg white)			
<i>Acinetobacter lwolffi</i>	7.3 lg CFU	3 d	Glass	(134)

<i>Acinetobacter calcoaceticus anitratus</i>	4 lg CFU	after 1 h: 3 lg	Hardboard	(139)
	5.2 lg CFU	After 25 d survival of 0.6 % of the CFU / after 7 h survival of 40 % of the CFU	Cotton / glass	(102)
<i>Acinetobacter calcoaceticus lwoffii</i>	4 lg CFU / sample	After 1 h: 3 lg CFU	Hardboard	(139)
	5.2 lg CFU	After 7 d not recultivable	Cotton	(102)
<i>Acinetobacter radioresistens</i>	7.3 lg CFU	157 d	Glass	(134)
<i>Bordetella pertussis</i>	8 lg CFU (0.01 ml)	< 0.04 h - 5 d / 3-5 d / < 0.04 h - 5 d / < 0.04-4 d / 0.2-1 d	Glass / plastic / rubber / / fabric / / paper	(140)
<i>Campylobacter jejuni</i>	0.1 ml contaminated water from screw coolers	4 h / 4h / 7 h / 7 h	Aluminum / stainless steel / formica / ceramic	(141)
	8-9 lg CFU	After 28 d: ~ 5 lg (without wood 0 lg after 2 d) / polyurethane and glass: ~ survival for 2 d (pore-size-dependent)	Wood / polyurethane / glass	(142)
	7 lg CFU	≤ 250 min (4 lg) / ≥ 250 min (3 lg) / < 250 min (1 lg) / < 180 min	Stainless steel / formica / ceramic / cotton	(143)
<i>Enterobacter cloacae</i>	250 lg CFU	After 3 d: ~ 14 CFU / after 2 d: ~ 12 CFU / after 3 d: ~ 13 CFU / after 2 d: ~ 5 CFU	Glass / PVC / stainless steel / aluminum	(95)
<i>Escherichia coli</i>	6 lg CFU	After 48 h: ~ 1.5 lg / after 24 h: ~ 1.5 lg	Plastic / carton	(144)
	9 lg CFU	After 100 d: 1 lg	Plastic	(145)
	7.3 lg CFU	After 7 d (dry): not recultivable; after > 28 d humidity	Wood / steel	(146)
	7-8 lg CFU	< 120 min	Plastic / wood	(147)
	5.2 lg CFU	After 7 h: not recultivable/ after 7 h: survival of 0.8 % of CFU	Cotton / glass	(102)
	7.5 lg CFU	After 8 wk: ~ 6.5 lg CFU / ml	Ceramic / cotton / synthetic fibers	(101)
	7-9 lg CFU	After 2 h decrease by: 1.7 lg / 0.37 lg / 1.09 lg / 0.44 lg / after 24 h: 0.06 lg	New dry Wood / new wet wood / used dry wood / used wet wood / plastic	(148)
	8 lg CFU	< 4 mon (~ 2 lg recultivable)	Ceramic / PVC / rubber / steel	(97)
	~ 6.5 lg CFU	45 d / 37 d / 45 d / 45 d	Cotton / cotton-polyester / wool / silk	(94)
	250 CFU	After 1 d: ~ 5 CFU / after 1 d: 2 CFU / after 2 day: 1 CFU / after 2 d: 1 CFU	Glass / PVC / steel / aluminum	(95)

	7.1-9.5 lg CFU	After 6 h: decrease by about 6.5 lg	Polycarbonate	(85)
	7.2 lg CFU	Mean survival rate 1 d (dried in water), 3 d (dried in egg white)	Glass	(72)
	6-7 lg CFU	At 58 % RH > 8 mon	Dust	(110)
	Desiccation: 6.9 lg CFU Wet: 3-4 lg CFU	After 25 d desiccation: 0.7 lg CFU / cm ² Wet: > 12 d	Aluminum	(109)
	5-6 lg CFU	After 24 h: 0.2 CFU, after 7 d: not recultivable / after 7 d: 8 CFU	Polymer without silver / with silver	(36)
	1-2 CFU (mattress cover) 2 CFU (drapes) 1-2 CFU (bed sheets)	Recovery after 72 h at 22 °C: 4 lg / 4 lg / 3.7 lg / 5.7 lg / 3.2 lg / 4.2 lg	Dry mattress cover / wet mattress cover / dry drapes / wet drapes / dry bed sheets / wet bed sheets	(113)
	8 lg CFU	< 10 d / ≥ 21 d (6 lg)	Polyester / Cotton	(114)
	5-6 lg CFU	≥ 206 d / 11 d / 7 d / ≥ 206 d	Mattress inner foam / PVC / cotton / polyester	(115)
	2.7 - 3.2 lg CFU	≥ 48 h: mean recovery too numerous to count	Cotton	(90)
	5.7 lg CFU	≥ 1 d: 2 lg	Vinyl chloride	(86)
	5.7 lg CFU	≥ 4 d: 1 lg / ≥ 7 d: 1 lg / ≥ 4 d: 1 lg	Aluminum / plastic / stainless steel	
	6 lg CFU	≥ 1 d: 3 lg	Stainless steel	
	5.7 lg CFU	≥ 7 d: 3 lg	Plastic	
<i>Francisella tularensis</i>	~ 8 lg CFU	After 240 h: 4 lg / after 96 h not recultivable	Glass / paper	(149)
<i>Haemophilus influenzae</i>	6 lg CFU	after 1 h: 99.99 % reduction	Aerosol	(150)
	2.8-3.5 lg CFU	≥ 48 h: mean recovery 1.8 %	Cotton	(90)
<i>Helicobacter (H.) pylori</i>	9 lg CFU	After 30 min: 7.8 lg, after 60 min: ~ 1.1 lg / after 30 min: 8 lg, after 60 min: ~ 1.3 lg	plastic / ceramic	(151)
<i>Klebsiella pneumoniae</i>	5.2 lg CFU	After 1 h not recultivable	Cotton	(102)
	7.5 lg CFU	After 8 wk: ~ 6.5 lg CFU / ml	Ceramic / cotton / synthetic fibers	(101)
	~ 6 lg CFU	After 6 wk: ~1 lg	Steel	(88)
	250 lg CFU	After 3 d: ~ 25 CFU / after 3 d: 17 CFU / after 2 d: 21 CFU / after 2d: 13 CFU	Glass / PVC / stainless steel / aluminium	(95)
	7 lg CFU	After 25 d desiccation: 1.8 lg	Aluminium	(109)
6-7 lg CFU /	At 58 % RH > 15 mon	Dust	(110)	

	3.9 lg CFU	Dried 60 min: 3.4 lg; dried 90 min: 1.8 lg	Stainless steel/plastic	(104)
	5-6 lg CFU	< 3 d / < 7 d	Polyester / terrycloth	(99)
<i>Listeria monocytogenes</i>	6 lg CFU	After 48 h: ~ 3.4 lg / ~ 1.2 lg	Plastic / carton	(144)
	7-8 lg CFU	After 180 min: 4 lg	Wood / plastics	(147)
	6 lg CFU	After 10 d: 5 lg / after 5 d: 1.5 lg	Stainless steel / acrylonitrile butadiene rubber (ABK)	(152)
	9 lg CFU	After 50 d: ~7.5 lg CFU; after 50 d (biofilm): ~7.3 lg CFU	Stainless steel	(153)
	8 lg CFU	After 20 d: 2 lg	Stainless steel	(154)
	7.3 lg CFU (biofilm)	After 21 d: 5.3 lg	Stainless steel	(155)
<i>Neisseria gonorrhoeae</i>	2 x ~ 20 µl Patient exudate (with proven infection)	At least until 24 h recultivable	Plastic / cotton-polyester	(156)
	1 drop of positive urethral secretion	Until 17 h: recultivable, after 24 h: not recultivable / until 24 h: recultivable, after 48 h: not recultivable	Glass / textile	(157)
<i>Pseudomonas aeruginosa</i>	a) dry inoculum: 5-6 lg CFU b) liquid inoculum: ~ 6 lg CFU	a) After 7 d: 6.2 lg / 6.2 lg b) After 7 d: 7.8 lg / 7.8 lg	Polymer without silver / with silver	(36)
	8 lg CFU	After 48 h: average < 2 lg	Door handles / chairs / spirometer tubing	(158)
	7.5 lg CFU	After 8 wk: 6.5 lg	Ceramic / cotton / synthetic fibers	(101)
	5.2 lg CFU	After 2 h: not recultivable	Cotton	(102)
	~ 6.5 lg CFU	13 d / 23 d / 33 d	Cotton / cotton polyester / wool / silk	(94)
	250 CFU	after 2 d on all surfaces < 2 lg	Glass / PVC / stainless steel / aluminium	(95)
	6 lg CFU	4 d / 5 d / 1 d	Formica / stainless steel / enamel	(108)
	Desiccation: 6.4 lg CFU Wet: 3-4 lg CFU	After 2 d desiccation: not recultivable; wet: > 12 d	Aluminum	(109)
	6-7 lg CFU	At 58 % RH > 8 mon	Dust	(110)

	1-4 CFU (mattress cover) 2 CFU (drapes) 1 CFU (bed sheets)	Recovery after 72 h at 22 °C: 3.9 lg / 4 lg / 3.5 lg / 5.5 lg / 4 lg / 4.1 lg	Dry mattress cover / wet mattress cover / dry drapes / wet drapes / dry bed sheets / wet bed sheets	(113)
	8.7 lg CFU	20 d, 5 d, 4 d	Cotton	(100)
	6 lg CFU	≥ 1 d: 4 lg	Stainless steel	(86)
	5 lg CFU	≥ 7 d / 24 h / 24 h / 24 h / 24 h / ≥ 7 d / 24 h / 24 h / 24 h / ≥ 7 d / ≥ 7 d / 5 min / 24 h / ≥ 7 d	Paper-backed wallcovering / vinyl composition tile / micro vented perforated vinyl wallcovering / latex paint / vinyl wallcovering, nonwoven backing / linoleum / vinyl sheet goods flooring / rubber tile flooring / synthetic-backed carpet / vinyl-backed carpet / fabric upholstery / polyester and acrylic blend upholstery / vinyl upholstery / 100 % polyester upholstery	(103)
<i>Salmonella enteritidis / enterica</i>	~ 5 lg CFU	After 8 h: 2 lg / not recultivable	Plastic / carton	(144)
	7 lg CFU	< 1680 min / ≥ 1920 min: 1 lg / < 480 min / < 240 min	Stainless steel / formica / ceramic / cotton	(143)
	9 lg CFU	<i>Salmonella chester</i> after 100 d: 3 lg; <i>Salmonella oranienburg</i> > 200 d	Plastic	(145)
	~ 9.3 lg CFU	> 48 h	Petri dish	(159)
<i>Salmonella typhimurium</i>	5.2 lg CFU	After 7 h: not recultivable	Cotton cloth / glass	(102)
	3.6 lg CFU	< 6 wk	Stainless steel	(160)
	1 µl of overnight cultures inoculated on agar and incubated at 25 °C	ST19: after 1 mon 59.7 ± 12.3 % recultivable; ST313: after 1 mon 13.1 ± 9.6 % recultivable	Plastic	(161)
	2 drops bacterial suspension	Up to 50 mon	Dust	(162)
	5.2 lg CFU	After 1 d: not recultivable	Cotton	(102)
	6 lg CFU	After 3 d: 2 lg / after 1 d: 1.75 lg	Stainless steel / acrylonitrile butadiene rubber	(152)
	6-7 lg CFU	> 30 d: reduction between 3-6 lg	Stainless steel	(163)

	7-8 lg CFU	≥ 28 d: 2-3 lg / ≥ 24 h: 3 lg / ≥ 24 h: 4.5 lg	Tile / wood / carpet	(164)
<i>Serratia liquefaciens</i>	7.2 lg CFU	Mean survival rate 3 d (dried in water), 43 d (dried in egg white)	Glass	(72)
<i>Serratia marcescens</i>	250 lg CFU	After 3 d: ~ 40 CFU / after 3 d: ~ 15 CFU / after 2 d: ~ 1 CFU / after 3 d: ~ 2 CFU	Glass / PVC / stainless steel / aluminum	(95)
	7.2 lg CFU	Mean survival 12 d (dried in water), 9 d (dried in egg white)	Glass	(72)
	Desiccation: 7.3 lg CFU Wet : 3-4 lg	After 25 d desiccation: 2.6 lg; wet: > 12 d	Aluminum	(109)
	5.2 lg CFU	After 1 h: not recultivable	Cotton cloth / glass	(102)
	6 lg CFU	≥ 1 d: 4 lg	Stainless steel	(86)
<i>Shigella dysenteriae</i>	~ 5 lg CFU	After 4 h: not recultivable	Plastic / glass / aluminum / wood / textile	(165)
<i>Shigella sonnei</i>	9 lg CFU	≤ 10 d / ≤ 27 d / ≤ 23 d / ≤ 9 d / ≤ 28 d	Glass / cotton / wood / metal / paper	(166)
	~ 5.7 lg CFU	Survival after 24 h: 100 % / 100 % / 100 %; after 48 h: 75 % / 63 % / 50 %; after 72 h: 13 % / 0 % / 0 %	PVC / polystyrene / spreelacart	(167)
<i>Shigella flexneri</i>		Survival after 24 h: 100 % / 100 % / 83 %; after 48 h: 67 % / 58 % / 33 %; after 72 h: 0 %		
<i>Stenotrophomonas maltophilia</i>	~ 6.5 lg CFU	7 d / 7 d / 7 d	Cotton / cotton-polyester / wool / silk	(94)
<i>Vibrio cholerae</i>	8.2 lg CFU	Normal cultivable status 1 h / 1 h / 1.5 h / 1.5 h / 3.5 h / 4 h / 4 h; VBNC status < 7 d	Aluminum / glass / plastic / steel / iron / paper / textile / wool	(168)
	8.2 lg CFU	4 h: 2 lg / 4 h: 2 lg / 3.5 h: 3.5 lg / 1 h: 3 lg / 1.5 h: 2.5 lg / 1.5 h: 0.5 lg / 1.5 h: 3 lg / 1 h: 3 lg	Cotton / wood / paper / glass / plastic / stainless steel / iron / aluminum	(169)
Legend: CFU = colony forming units, lg = decadic logarithm, min = minute, h = hour, d = day, wk = week, mon = month, PVC = polyvinyl chloride VBNC = viable but non-culturable				

334

335

336 Replication capacity of fungi

337 For RC determination, fungi were removed from the germ carrier mostly by dipping or vortex in bouillon
338 or tryptic-soy-broth (TSB), sometimes in combination with ultrasound, and by contact with agar plate,
339 overlaying with agar or smear (Table 5).

340

341 Moulds occur ubiquitously in nature, are thermotolerant and can survive on surfaces for 2 d to > 30 d
342 depending on the material (Table 5). Indoor airborne mould measurements underline the survival for
343 several months (170, 171). Moulds can multiply at a RH \geq 75 % at room temperature (RT), which can
344 lead to mould infestation (172). The species *Cladosporium*, *Aspergillus* and *Penicillium* are the most
345 frequently detected moulds on hospital surfaces (173-175). *Mucor* and *Aspergillus (A.) spp.* were
346 isolated from room air and dust from an air-conditioning system with a defective filter and were linked
347 with mycotic endocarditis in patients undergoing open heart surgery (176). Moreover, Mucorales
348 (*Rhizopus spp.*), recovered from linen were associated with a Mucormycosis outbreak (177, 178), and
349 even survived a certified health care laundry process (178). Other Mucorales (*Mucor spp.*) persisted on
350 various materials for weeks (179).

351 The dermatophytes *Epidermophyton (E.) floccosum*, *Trichophyton (T.) mentagrophytes* and
352 *Tricholporum violaceum* survived in skin scales for 10 years at -20 °C, while *T. rubrum* and *T.*
353 *verrucosum* could no longer be cultivated under the same conditions (180). *Microsporium canis* has been
354 detected on hospital surfaces (175). In Germany in the 1920s *E. floccosum* and *Microsporium (M.)*
355 *audouinii* dominated as pathogens of human dermatophytoses and *T. rubrum* was almost insignificant;
356 dermatophyte isolates increased from 41.7 % in 1950 to 82.7 % in 1993, so that *T. mentagrophytes var.*
357 *interdigitale* was gradually replaced by *T. rubrum* as the main pathogen of tinea pedis and
358 onychomycosis. With the introduction of griseofulvin in 1958, both, *M. audouinii* and *T. schoenleinii*
359 were virtually eradicated (181). In the case of tinea pedis, *T. rubrum* was detectable in 86 % of patients,
360 *T. mentagrophytes* in 81 % of patients in house dust (182). Both dermatophyte species could also be
361 detected and cultivated on the bare soles of the feet after leaving public baths. Washing and drying only
362 did not result in complete elimination (183). Since the beginning of the 20th century, the incidence of
363 *Microsporium canis* infections in Europe, especially in Mediterranean countries and Slovenia, has been

364 increasing sharply, with dogs and cats being the natural reservoir (184). However, further spread is also
365 possible via combs, brushes, hats, furniture, bedding, etc.

366

367 *Candida (C.) albicans*, the most common nosocomial yeast, can survive up to 4 mon on surfaces. RC
368 for *C. glabrata (Nakaseomyces glabratus)* was described to be similar but shorter for *C. parapsilosis*
369 (Table 5). In the patient environment, *C. glabrata (Nakaseomyces glabratus)*, *C. parapsilosis*, *C.*
370 *tropicalis*, *C. albicans*, *C. metapsilosis* and *C. lusitaniae* were detected on dry surfaces in ~ 3 %, on
371 moist surfaces in ~ 14 % (185).

372

373 Several recent outbreaks have been caused by the new emerging multidrug-resistant *C. auris* (186)
374 which differs from other yeasts and dermatophytes in nosocomial spread (187, 188). *C. auris* is capable
375 of colonizing patients and it can persist on a patient for over a year (189, 190). It can be transmitted
376 through direct contact, e.g. hands, but also through indirect contact via fomites, such as medical devices,
377 other devices and surfaces that directly contact the patient (188, 191, 192). From 2015 to 2017 an
378 outbreak with 70 patients occurred in a neuroscience intensive care unit of the Oxford University
379 Hospitals, United Kingdom. The outbreak was linked with the use of reusable skin-surface axillary
380 temperature probes, suggesting that *C. auris* persisted in the environment and initiated a large outbreak
381 (193). By now, several outbreaks have been reported from different countries and hospitals reflecting
382 the high relevant transmission capacity of this new pathogen. This is particularly important since this
383 species is highly virulent, reflected by a substantial high proportion of invasive isolates leading to a high
384 blood culture positivity rate in outbreaks. The risk of nosocomial spread through surfaces is represented
385 by a higher RC in *in vitro* settings. Moreover, *C. auris* is often resistant to many antifungals which
386 complements higher risk of colonization and probable outbreak potential, with special regard to pan-
387 resistant strains of *C. auris* (194). *C. auris* is now established in 43 countries across five continents
388 (195).

389 **TABLE 5** Replication capacity of moulds and yeasts from inanimate surfaces modified from (70) (pathogens with “fomite-borne risk”, characterized by an increased
390 nosocomial risk for transmission from inanimate surfaces, are marked in blue; for additional data and details of recultivation and environmental conditions, see
391 supplementary material)

Pathogen	Initial inoculum	Replication capacity	Surface	Reference
<i>A. brasiliensis</i>	4 CFU	Recovery after 72 h at 22 °C: 0 CFU / 0 CFU / 0 CFU / 3 CFU / 0 CFU / 2 CFU	Dry mattress cover / wet mattress cover / dry drapes / wet drapes / dry bed sheets / wet bed sheets	(113)
<i>A. flavus</i>	4-5 lg CFU	2 to > 30 d / 2 - 20 d / > 30 d / 8 to > 30 d	Cotton / polyester / polyethylene / polyurethane	(179)
	~ 5.5 lg CFU	After 24 h: ~ 5.4 lg, after 48 h: ~ 5.2 lg, after 5 d: ~ 5.6 lg / after 24 h: ~ 5.3 lg, after 48 h: ~ 3.8 lg, after 5 d: 0 lg	Aluminum / copper	(196)
<i>A. fumigatus</i>	4-5 lg CFU	1 to > 30 d / 5 to > 30 d / > 30 d / 5 to > 30 d	Cotton / polyester / polyethylene / polyurethane	(179)
	~ 6.8 lg CFU	After 24 h: ~ 6.3 lg, after 5 d: ~ 6.4 lg, / after 48 h: ~ 6 lg, after 5 d: ~ 1.7 lg	Aluminum / copper	(196)
	~ 6.5 lg CFU	> 30 d / > 30 d / > 30 d / 27 d	Cotton / polyester / wool / silk	(94)
<i>A. niger</i>	4-5 lg CFU	3 to > 30 d / > 30 d / > 30 d / 2 to > 30 d	Cotton / polyester / polyethylene / polyurethane	(179)
	~ 5.3 lg CFU	After 4 d: ~ 5.2 lg, after 24 d: ~ 5.5 lg / after 4 d: ~ 5 lg; after 5 d: ~ 5.1 lg, after 24 d: ~ 5.4 lg	Aluminum / copper	(196)
<i>A. terreus</i>	4-5 lg CFU	2 to > 30 d / 2 to > 30 d / > 30 d / 12 to > 30 d	Cotton / Polyester / Polyethylene / Polyurethane	(179)
<i>C. albicans</i>	4-5 lg CFU	1-3 d / 1 d / 5-6 d / 4-5 d	Cotton / polyester / polyethylene / polyurethane	(179)
	6 lg CFU	< 7 d	Stainless steel (dry) / moist agar without nutrients	(185)
	6 lg CFU	Survival after 2 d: ~ 1 %, after 3 d: ~ 0.2 % / 0.3 %, after 7 d: 0 %	Stainless steel / glass	(197)
	~ 7.5 lg CFU	After 5 d: ~ 6.5 lg / after 6 h: 5 lg, after 24 h: 0 lg	Aluminium / copper	(196)
	6.5 lg CFU	6 d / 6d / 12 d / 12 d	Cotton / polyester / wool / silk	(94)
	~ 6.1 lg CFU	6 d	Glass	(198)
	~ 4.8 lg CFU	48 d	Textile	
5-6 lg CFU	after 7 d: 6.3 lg / after 7 d: 5.1 lg	Polymer without silver / with silver	(36)	

<i>C. auris</i>	6 lg CFU	Survival after 7 d: ~ 38 % / ~ 93 %	Stainless steel (dry) / moist agar without nutrients	(185)
	~ 4.8 lg CFU	After 4 d: ~ 3.5 lg, after 14 d: ~ 0.4 lg	Plastic	(199)
	8 lg CFU	After 14 d: ~ 4.3 lg (biofilm formation)	Plastic	(200)
<i>C. candidum</i>	~ 6.5 lg CFU	21 d / 6 d / 12 d / 6 d	Cotton / polyester / wool / silk	(94)
<i>C. glabrata</i> (<i>Nakaseomyces glabratus</i>)	6 lg CFU	Survival after 7 d: ~ 60 % / ~ 90 %	Stainless steel (dry) / moist agar without nutrients	(185)
	~ 4.8 lg CFU	12 d / 97 d	Glass / Textile	(198)
	~ 6.5 lg CFU	> 30 d	Cotton / polyester / wool / silk	(94)
<i>C. krusei</i> (<i>Pichia kudriavzevii</i>)	4-5 lg CFU	1 d / 8 d / 3-7 d / 4 d	Cotton / polyester / polyethylene / polyurethane	(179)
	~ 6.5 lg CFU	3 d / 6 d / > 30 d / 21 d	Cotton / polyester / wool / silk	(94)
<i>C. parapsilosis</i>	4-5 lg CFU	9-27 d / 27 to > 30 d / > 30 d / > 30 d	Cotton / polyester / polyethylene / polyurethane	(179)
	6 lg CFU	Survival after 14 d: ~ 1.3 % / ~ 4.1%	Stainless steel / glass	(197)
	6 lg CFU	Survival after 7 d: 60 % / 100 %	Stainless steel (dry) / moist agar without nutrients	(185)
	~ 4.7 lg CFU	After 21 d: ~ 2.5 lg, after 28 d: 0.4 lg	Plastic	(199)
	~ 6.5 lg CFU	> 30 d	Cotton / polyester / wool / silk	(94)
	~ 6.1 lg CFU	55 d	Glass	(198)
<i>C. tropicalis</i>	4-5 lg CFU	1-2 d / 1-8 d / 7-18 d / 6-12 d	Cotton / polyester / polyethylene / polyurethane	(179)
	~ 6.6 lg CFU	3 d / 9 d / > 30 d / 21 d	Cotton / polyester / wool / silk	(94)
	~ 6.1 lg	8 d	Glass	(198)
<i>Cryptococcus neoformans</i>	~ 6.5 lg CFU	> 30 d	Cotton / polyester / wool / silk	(94)
	~ 6.1 lg CFU	27 d	Glass	(198)
<i>Fusarium solani</i>	~ 5.8 lg CFU	After 5 d: ~ 4.4 lg / after 6 h: ~ 3.6 lg, after 24 h: 0 lg	Aluminium / copper	(196)
<i>Mucor</i> spp.	4-5 lg CFU	20-24 d	Cotton / polyester / polyethylene / polyurethane	(179)
<i>Paecilomyces</i> spp.	4-5 lg CFU	< 1 d / 5 d / 4 d / 11 d	Cotton / polyester / polyethylene / polyurethane	(179)
	~ 6.1 lg CFU	40 d	Glass	(198)

<i>Rhodotorula rubra</i>	~ 4.8 lg CFU	205 d	Textile	
<i>Saccharomyces cerevisiae</i>	6 lg CFU	After 48 h: 3.9 lg / 1.5 lg	Plastic / carton	(144)
	1 CFU	Recovery after 72 h at 22 °C: 5 CFU / 2.1 lg / 3.3 lg / 4 lg / 5 CFU 2.9 lg	Dry mattress cover / wet mattress cover / dry trilaminate drapes / wet trilaminate drapes / dry bed sheets / wet bed sheets	(113)
Legend: CFU = colony forming units, lg = decadic logarithm, min = minute, h = hour, d = day, wk = week, mon = month				

392

393

394 Replication capacity of protozoa

395 Protozoa are unicellular heterotrophic eukaryotic organisms. They are considered to be a subkingdom
396 of the kingdom Protista, although in the classical system they were placed in the kingdom Animalia
397 (201). The cultivation techniques for protozoa differ from that used for bacteria and fungi, involve highly
398 complex and require different culture parameters depending on the life cycle stage (). The RC
399 distinguishes between the vegetative form of protozoa, the trophozoite, and the inactive infectious form,
400 the oocyst or cyst (Table 6).

401

402 **Prevention and** The interruption of infection chains are the main strategies in the field of combating
403 **protozooses.** Depending on habitat, hygienic measures for water and sewage and personal hygiene
404 are of particular importance. Against this background, understanding the RC of protozoa relevant to
405 human medicine is of particular interest.

406

407 *Giardia (G.) intestinalis* is the commonest cause of parasitic diarrhea in high-income countries, the most
408 common enteric protozoan infection in the US, and is also prevalent in middle and low-income
409 countries. Amoebiasis is the third leading cause of death from parasitic diseases worldwide, with
410 greatest impact in low-income countries. Cryptosporidiosis is becoming more prevalent in both
411 developed and developing countries among patients with AIDS and among children aged less than five
412 years (202, 203). However, there are several other protozoa of relevance for the hospital setting. Several
413 outbreaks of diarrheal diseases caused by *Cyclospora (Cy.) cayetanensis* have been reported recently
414 (204, 205). *Trichomonas vaginalis* is the most common non-viral sexually transmitted disease
415 worldwide (206), but transmission via fomites is rare ().

416 *G. intestinalis* and *Cryptosporidium (Cr.)* spp. survive in both aquatic and terrestrial environments.
417 *Giardia* cysts may remain infectious for months in water or in cool damp areas (207). At temperatures
418 below 15 °C *Cryptosporidium* oocysts can maintain high levels of infectivity in water for at least 24 wk
419 (208-211) and up to 120 d in soil (212). The survival of oocysts of *Cr. parvum* and *G. muris* was
420 inversely correlated with the storage temperature and porosity of the surface (Table 6). Under various

421 test conditions, the overall trends of the *Cryptosporidium* oocysts die-off were similar to the one of
422 *Giardia* cysts (213). Outbreaks of *Cryptosporidium* spp. and *G. intestinalis* generally occur via drinking
423 water and food which were if inadequately treated to kill or to remove these parasites (214). Other less
424 frequent water-associated outbreaks include *Entamoeba (E.) histolytica / E. dispar*, *Balantidium (Bal.)*
425 *coli*, *Cy. cayetanensis*, *Microsporidium* spp., *Toxoplasma (T.) gondii* and the free
426 living *Acanthamoeba* species. *Cryptosporidium* spp. can also be transmitted nosocomial via hands and
427 indirect via surfaces (215). In China, an outbreak of cryptosporidiosis was associated with HAI by *G.*
428 *intestinalis*, *Enterocytozoon bieneusi* and *C. difficile* infection. Poor diaper changing and hand hygiene
429 were probably responsible for this multi-pathogen outbreak (216).

430 Survival of anaerobic *Entamoeba* spp. in environments is highly dependent on temperature. Survival
431 was determined in faeces and soil at 28-34 °C for 8-10 d, in water and sewage sludge at 0-4 °C for 60-
432 365 d, in surface water resp. wastewater at 20-30 °C for 15 d resp. 10 d (217).

433 Multiple experiments in soils showed that *T. gondii* oocysts may remain viable for at least 1 year when
434 covered and in cool temperatures (4 °C). Under warm climate conditions in dry soils from Kansas, USA,
435 oocysts remained viable for 18 mon. In fresh or marine waters, oocysts were shown to be viable for at
436 least 4.5 and 2 years, respectively, reviewed by (218). To determine the survival dynamics 2.5 g of soil
437 are inoculated with 1 ml of suspension containing 2×10^5 oocysts. The proportion of oocysts surviving
438 after 100 d was estimated to be 7.4 % under dry conditions and 43.7 % under damp conditions (219).

439 *Babesia (B.)* spp. are intraerythrocytic protozoan parasites transmitted primarily by tick vectors, rare
440 also congenital and by blood transfusion (220). Normally, it has its origin in endogenously infected
441 blood donors. A nosocomial transmission in blood products is only indirectly imaginable during the
442 preparation process of blood products in blood bank via hands contaminated from surfaces.
443 Refrigeration decreases the parasite numbers, but parasites survive 31 d at 2-4 °C and yield high end-
444 point parasitemia, proofed by inoculation of hamsters (221). *B. microti* survives in red cells at 4 °C in
445 EDTA-coated blood collection tubes for at least 21 d. Blood held at room temperature did not infect any
446 hamsters (222). Under normal blood bank conditions, a 35-day-old red cell unit was cause of a

447 transfusion transmitted babesiosis (TTB) (223). Similarly, TTB case reports implicating cryopreserved
448 red cell units indicate that *B. microti* can survive indefinitely in the presence of glycerol cryopreservation
449 (224, 225), but in the absence of cryopreservation, the parasite is rapidly killed by pathogen reduction
450 technology, which uses riboflavin (RB) and ultraviolet (UV) light (226). Theoretically, a single parasite
451 is capable of transmitting infection. Experimental studies, however, have shown that 30 organisms
452 infected about 2 / 5 inoculated hamsters, and 300 organisms infected all animals (227).

453 Protozoa play a minor role in HAI, but in our increasingly complex healthcare environment with a
454 growing proportion of immunocompromised patients they should be respected, because certain protozoa
455 may cause morbidity and even mortality in both normal and immunocompromised patients (204).
456 Furthermore, climate change with increasing temperatures and heavy rainfall could promote their
457 nosocomial potential in future. There is also the possibility that HAI could be missed because the
458 incubation period may be days to weeks (wk) and the parasite is endemic. It is likely that nosocomial
459 transmission of protozoa may be an even greater problem in tropical hospitals, where comprehensive
460 hygienic measures are costly or otherwise more difficult to maintain and growth conditions more
461 beneficial for the protozoa. Up to 1 % of HAI were caused by parasites depending on geographic region
462 (228), but in this estimation no distinction was made between protozoa and other endo- or ectoparasites.
463 Jarrin et al. (229) assumed that intestinal parasites can cause diarrhoea in 12-17 % of nosocomial
464 epidemics and 1 % of endemic outbreaks, especially on surgical wards. Immunosuppressed patients and
465 those with prolonged antibiotic courses are at higher risk. Enteric protozoa, especially *Cr. parvum*, *G.*
466 *intestinalis*, *E. histolytica* / *E. dispar*, *Bal. coli*, *Cy. cayetanensis*, and *Cystoisospora belli* (syn. *Isospora*
467 *(I.) belli*) are the most common species involved in nosocomial outbreaks (229).

468 Spread of enteric protozoa in developing countries usually occurs through fecal contamination due to
469 sewage exposure, poor quality of water and zoonotic exposure, but also via transplantation (230-232).
470 The 50 % infectious dose (ID₅₀) of *C. parvum* has been estimated at 132 oocysts; with some infections
471 followed by ingestion of 30 oocysts (233). Ingestion of at least 10 to 25 *G. intestinalis* oocysts can cause
472 infection in humans (234, 235). Infection after ingestion of a single oocyst has been reported (233). The
473 small ID, the faecal-oral route of transmission, and prolonged environmental survival in water allows

474 *Cryptosporidium* to spread in healthcare facilities as well as child-care centers. *Cryptosporidium* can
475 transmit by hands after contact with contaminated environmental surfaces (236). The cysts are highly
476 resistant to environmental conditions and most of the disinfectants commonly used have low or none
477 antiparasitic activity (236). For *Giardia* and *Cryptosporidium* spp. person-to-person transmission is
478 possible (237, 238). For *Cryptosporidium* spp. transmission is primarily found among children and staff
479 members in nurseries, day-care centers, and schools (239). HAI by direct and indirect person-to-person
480 transmission is documented, causing secondary cases among roommates (237). In an outbreak of
481 giardiasis at two day-care nurseries *G. intestinalis* appeared to be transmitted person to person
482 (240). Conversely, ingestion of approximately 200–49,000 oocysts at healthy volunteers did not
483 experience gastroenteritis, and no oocysts were detected in any stool samples over the following 16 wks
484 (241). Therefore, there is minimal risk of nosocomial transmission. Sporulated oocysts of *I. belli* can
485 survive for years in the environment (242). Although the transmission of protozoa via surfaces in
486 hospitals is negligible for most species, awareness of surface persistence is important for assessing the
487 risk of surfaces as a reservoir for food, water, and hands (table 6). *Cr. parvum* oocysts survived in stool
488 on wood up to 72 h, and differed between stool samples (210). Survival was shorter than in water,
489 because other fecal microorganisms such as bacteria may be associated with the shortened survivability
490 (243). Also, the presence of ammonia, which may be present in faeces in high concentrations. This is a
491 significant inactivation agent for oocysts (244, 245). Oocysts have been shown to survive for hours on
492 wet surfaces, including stainless steel, but they resist desiccation and die rapidly on dry surfaces (246).

493 For virgin girls with high prevalence of trichomoniasis resulting in multivariate analysis, the only
494 statistically significant risk factor for trichomoniasis was inconsistent use of soap. The authors postulate
495 that the high prevalence of trichomoniasis in virgins in Ndola is due to non-sexual transmission of
496 trichomoniasis via shared bathing water and inconsistent use of soap (247).

497 *Acanthamoeba* are one of the most common protozoa in soil, and frequently found in fresh water and
498 other environmental habitats such as pools, lakes, brackish water, seawater, heating, ventilating, air-
499 conditioning filters and medical equipment, such as gastric wash tubing and dental irrigation units (248).
500 An important habitat and vector for infection are hydrogel contact lenses, resulting in contact lens

501 associated keratitis caused by *Acanthamoeba* and *Fusarium* (249), particularly since the contact lenses'
502 moist condition supports survival protozoa. *Acanthamoeba*, *Vahlkampfia* and *Vermamoeba* spp. have
503 been detected in dust on internal, surgical and open heart surgery intensive care units (ICUs), on
504 equipment, doors and in the air conditioning system (250). *Acanthamoeba* cysts are double-walled,
505 highly resistant dormant stages that remain viable (and infective) for several years (251, 252) and in a
506 state of desiccation up to 21 years (Table 6).

507 **TABLE 6** Replication capacity of protozoa from inanimate surfaces (pathogens with “fomite-borne risk”, characterized by an increased nosocomial risk for
508 transmission from inanimate surfaces, are marked in blue; for additional data and details of recultivation and environmental conditions, see supplementary
509 material)

Pathogen	Initial inoculum	Replication capacity	Surface	Reference
<i>Acanthamoeba trophozoites</i> morphological group II	Large numbers of trophozoites	2-21 years	After amoebae differentiated into cysts, agar plates were tightly wrapped with parafilm	(248)
<i>Cryptosporidium parvum</i> oocysts	(Oo)cysts	Survival at 25 °C: > 60 d / > 24 d / > 60 d / > 60 d	Stainless steel / skin / formica / fabric	(213)
	Oocysts	Recovery at 21 °C up to 75 d	Water	(253)
	6 lg / ml oocysts	Recultivation rate after 0 h: 76.3 %; after 2 h: 3 %; after 4 h: 0 %	Glass slide	(210)
	7 lg oocysts	After 30 min: 4.1 lg; after 60 min: 3.2 lg; after 90 min: < 3 lg	Stainless steel	(254)
	≥ 100 oocysts	After 24 h desiccation: no infectivity after 1 – 4 d	Cryptosporidia-laden calf faeces	(255)
<i>Giardia muris</i> cysts	(Oo)cysts	Recovery at 25 °C: 45 d / > 24 d / 21 d / 21 d	Stainless steel / skin / formica / fabric	(213)
<i>Trichomonas vaginalis</i> trophozoites	2-3 lg for human samples; 3-4 lg from culture	Recultivation rates after 120 min: 5.1 % / 30.5 %; survival 24 h	Textil / plastic	(256)
	Trophozoites	Recultivation rates after 15 min at 26 °C: < 10 %	Water	(257)

Legend: lg = decadic logarithm, min = minute, h = hour, d = day

510

511

512 **Replication capacity of viruses**

513 To determine the RC of viruses, applied material was removed from the germ carrier by scraping or
514 rinsing in cell culture medium; sometimes combined with vortexing and transfer of the sample usually
515 into cell culture. Recultivability is determined, based on the number of infectious virus particles, by
516 growing the remaining virus particles with subsequent determination of the virus titre. In contrast,
517 molecular biological detection alone does not allow any conclusions regarding infectivity. For hepatitis
518 B virus (HBV), infectivity was proven by application of the rehydrated inoculum in chimpanzees due
519 to lack of cultivation in cell culture in the past. Nowadays, it can be analyzed in a HBV susceptible cell
520 culture system using hepatoma cells expressing the Na⁺- taurocholate co-transporting polypeptide
521 (NTCP)-HBV cell entry factor (258) (Table 7). However, this method is only available in specialized
522 laboratories and cannot be used routinely.

523 Gastrointestinal transmissible viruses remain infectious on inanimate surfaces. The longest has an
524 average of 1 - 6 w, followed by blood-borne (average 1 to 6 w), respiratory (average 1 to 3 d) and
525 sexually transmitted viruses (2 h to < 7 d) (table 7).

526 Non-enveloped viruses are more resistant to extreme pH, heat, dryness, disinfectants in general and
527 some can intrinsically resist certain disinfectants such as the parvovirus or hepatitis A virus (HAV). In
528 contrast, most enveloped viruses such as herpes viruses (cytomegalovirus), human immunodeficiency
529 virus (HIV) and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) are less environmentally stable since they possess an
530 outer lipid bilayer membrane. Small viruses, e.g. hepatitis B virus (HBV) or the members of the
531 picornavirus or parvovirus family, are much more resistant than larger complex viruses, e.g. members
532 of the herpes or retrovirus families (259). Some non-enveloped viruses, such as enteroviruses belonging
533 to the picorna viridae, are sensitive to drying, e.g. dried inoculum of the Coxsackie B4 (CVB4) virus
534 was easier to recover when CVB4 was spiked in media containing any concentration of NaCl instead of
535 protein load (260).

536 The relevance of surfaces in healthcare facilities as a contamination source for viruses is even more
537 difficult to prove than for bacteria and fungi, because surface isolation is more complex. Virus infection
538 can so far only be indirectly deduced by tracking the spread of the virus from the patient and its presence
539 in the patient environment, as the ID is not known with a few exceptions. However, in both situations

540 the risk of infection increases with higher RC. A few examples illustrate the importance of surfaces for
541 the spread of viral infections. After discharge of patients with norovirus infection, the number of new
542 cases has continued to rise, most likely due to the low ID of norovirus (1 to 10 to 100 virus particles)
543 (261). A large outbreak due to noroviruses infections could therefore be controlled by closing the
544 affected departments, implementing extensive disinfection measures, and reducing the exposition risk,
545 i.e. from infected healthcare workers (262). However, if recognized at an early stage, most norovirus
546 outbreaks can be controlled easily without these intensified intervention strategies. A retrospective
547 cohort study showed a very low risk of general infection by only 2 of 1106 exposed patients had acquired
548 the identical norovirus strain from the discharged patient (263). Although the direct hand transmission
549 dominates nosocomial transmission of rotaviruses, surfaces are also relevant for spread (264). A
550 simulation experiment on virus inoculated over surfaces using Cauliflower mosaic virus showed that
551 the virus was detectable on 41 % of the sampled surfaces within 10 h outside of the isolation unit (265).
552 Whether this amount was sufficient to transmit infection was not investigated. After the emergence of
553 MERS-CoV, although the origin is zoonotic, the risk of further spread via surfaces was investigated.
554 The contamination with viral RNA was detected in the environment of hospitalized ventilated patients
555 despite a strict disinfection regimen and negative pressure ventilation. Due to the RC of up to 9 d and
556 the detection in the patient environment, the authors concluded that careful surface disinfection,
557 especially near the patient, can help with prevention (266). Thus, detecting RNA does not necessarily
558 coincide with infectivity.

559

560 Other viruses from the gastrointestinal tract such as Astrovirus, HAV, Polio- and Rotavirus can retain
561 their infectivity at RT for quite a long time, with the spectrum varying from several hours to 3 mon.
562 HBV belonging to the group of blood-borne or sexually transmitted viruses play a very high stability
563 with a RC of 50 % of more than 22 d at 37 °C and a persisting infectivity for up to 9 mon at 4 °C (258).
564 In contrast, most respiratory viruses retain their infectivity on inanimate surfaces for a few days only
565 (Table 7).

566

567 Herpes viruses such as cytomegalovirus, mainly transmitted through contact with infectious body fluids,
568 e.g. through breastfeeding, kissing, sexual contact, herpes simplex virus (HSV) type 1, mainly
569 transmitted via contact, and HSV 2, mainly transmitted during sex, have been shown to persist from
570 only a few hours up to days (Table 7).

571

572 *Mpox virus (MPXV)*

573 Since summer 2022, non-travel associated outbreaks of monkeypox have occurred in several non-
574 endemic countries. Person-to-person transmission can occur through exposure to close contact with
575 respiratory secretions, infectious skin lesions (e.g. via ruptured blisters) of an infected person, or recently
576 contaminated objects (sex toys) and surfaces (267); nosocomial infections are described as well (268-
577 271). Recently, the WHO recommended using a new preferred term ‘Mpox’ as a synonym for
578 monkeypox (272). Investigations with the vaccinia virus – a virus related to the MPXV – showed that
579 this virus can remain ‘infectious’ on surfaces for up to 56 d (67). Stability on textile fibers was also
580 investigated for the vaccinia virus. Accordingly, this virus could still be recovered from wool fabric
581 after up to 4 wk and from cotton after four to 8 d; textiles contaminated with virus-containing dust even
582 remained infectious for up to 12 wk (273, 274). Adler et al. indicates that in some patients the virus
583 could be detected in the throat swab by PCR test for up to 3 wk (in one case from 2018 even up to 41 d)
584 after diagnosis (275). Whether this was only ‘residual nucleic acid’ or infectious virus was not
585 investigated. However, viable virus was identified in two (50 %) of four samples selected for viral
586 isolation, including air samples collected during bedding change via air and surface sampling for MPXV
587 in a UK hospital (276). In another study, there was no statistical difference ($p = 0.94$) between MPXV-
588 WA PCR positivity of porous (9 / 10, 90 %) vs. nonporous (19 / 21, 90.5 %) surfaces, but there was a
589 significant difference ($p < 0.01$) between viable virus detected in cultures of porous (6 / 10, 60 %) vs.
590 nonporous (1 / 21, 5 %) surfaces. These findings indicate that porous surfaces (e.g., bedding, clothing)
591 may pose more of a MPXV exposure risk than nonporous surfaces (e.g., metal, plastic). Viable MPXV
592 was detected on household surfaces after at least 15 d (277). Therefore, the CDC recommends
593 minimizing the spread in household by cleaning and disinfection laundry, hard and soft surfaces, carpet
594 and flooring when exposed to an infected person (278).

595 ***SARS-CoV-2***

596 Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus type 2 (SARS-CoV-2) demonstrates how infection
597 control of a new infectious disease can be established, and continuously adapted, at breathtaking speed
598 based on hospital hygiene strategies using RC, biocide resistance and transmission. Similar to other
599 coronaviruses, SARS-CoV-2 has been detected on surfaces (279) with a correlation between patient
600 proximity and surface contamination (280), so that the risk of further spread due to RC of up to 7 d on
601 surfaces (Table 7) could be prevented by disinfecting surfaces (281, 282). Even simple wiping with hard
602 water or detergent-based cleaning are effective decontamination strategies against SARS-CoV-2 (283).
603 This applies to all materials (Table 7), even if their influence on RC varies (284). Depending on the
604 exposure time, the recoverable virus quantity decreases almost linearly and is not critical on plastic after
605 72 h, stainless steel after 48 h, cardboard after 24 h and copper after 4 h (285). Since the ID is unknown,
606 the risk assessment remains open. In a case report, the detection of SARS-CoV-2 on surfaces in the
607 household is interpreted in such a way that transmission from surfaces is possible if they have recently
608 been contaminated by coughing or sneezing, touched and subsequently transferred to mouth, nose or
609 eyes (286). In this investigation, transmission via the respiratory tract cannot be ruled out in the few
610 other cases where transmission via surfaces is suspected (287). Presumably, however, the risk of
611 infection is not very high, because in swab samples from surfaces in an emergency ward and an
612 infectious disease sub-intensive care ward, small amounts of SARS-CoV-2 RNA were detectable in
613 only two of 26 samples and did not cause cytopathic effect in cell culture (288). It is possible that
614 residues of surface disinfectants used were able to reduce RC. In contrast, it is also possible that residues
615 of disinfectants may induce tolerance. Similarly, quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) studies
616 indicate that the risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection via the surface transmission route is low and generally
617 less than 1:10.000, meaning that the probability of infection for each contact with a contaminated surface
618 is less than 1:10.000 (289-291). These results suggest that transmission of SARS-CoV-2 via surfaces in
619 public areas is irrelevant (292). In isolation units / rooms for patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection and
620 in units or rooms for suspected patient cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection, surface disinfection and cleaning
621 is indicated based on the observation that SARS-CoV-2 can be detected in the entire patient
622 environment. Moreover, the RC is up to 7 d, although the infectivity of the surfaces is apparently only


623 low. In a retrospective questionnaire-based study, it was shown that even at home the use of protective
624 masks and daily use of chlorine- and ethanol-based disinfectants for surface decontamination and hand
625 antisepsis significantly reduced the risk of infection (293). Santarpia et al. (294) deduced from the data
626 that in cases of suspected or confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection within the last 24 h in the household,
627 surfaces should also be decontaminated.

628 **TABLE 7** Replication capacity of viruses after isolation from inanimate surfaces modified from (70) (pathogens with “fomite-borne risk”, characterized by an
629 increased nosocomial risk for transmission from inanimate surfaces, are marked in blue; for additional data and details of recultivation and environmental conditions,
630 see supplementary material)

Pathogen	Initial inoculum	Replication capacity/ residual virus titer	Surface	Reference
Predominant transmission through contact				
Adenovirus	~ 7 lg CCID ₅₀	> 12 wk; after 8 wk: 3.4-5.7 lg	Glass / plastic / porcelain / stainless steel	(295)
	2000 PFU	< 49 d; after 14 d: ~ 8 % / ~ 3 %	Plastic / aluminum foil	(296)
	~ 6 lg PFU	15 d / 15 d / 30 d / > 30 d	Aluminum / porcelain / latex / paper	(297)
Adenovirus type 3	~ 7 lg TCID ₅₀	> 9 d: 4.2 lg	Polystyrene	(298)
Cytomegalo-virus	4-6.9 lg PFU	1-2 h / 4-8 h	Cotton / plexiglass	(299)
Ebola virus	4-6 lg TCID ₅₀	At 4 °C > 50 d: 2 lg	Plastic / glass / stainless steel	(300)
	7 lg PFU;	6.2 d	Paper	(301)
	7.3 lg PFU	> 5.9 d: 4 lg	Glass / silicone / aluminum	(302)
	6-7 lg TCID ₅₀	14 d / 8 d / 11 d	Tyvek / stainless steel / plastic	(303)
	7 lg TCID ₅₀	> 192 h / > 192 h / < 24 h / > 192 h; 3-4 lg	Stainless steel / surgical mask / cotton / plastic	(304)
Hendra virus (HeV)	~ 6.25 lg TCID ₅₀	60 min; after 30 min: ~ 2.7 lg	Polystyrene	(305)
Lassa virus	7.1 lg PFU	> 9.7 d: 4 lg	Glass / silicone / aluminum	(302)
Mpox	Household setting after disease	At least 15 days: ≤ 2 lg / 0-≤ 2 lg	Porous surfaces / non-porous	(277)
Marburgvirus	4-7 lg TCID ₅₀	> 50 d: 2 lg	Plastic / glass	(300)
Nipah virus (NiV)	~ 6.25 lg TCID ₅₀	After 60 min: ~ 2.7 lg	Polystyrene	(305)
Sindbis virus	7.2 lg PFU	> 14.6 d: 4 lg	Glass / silicone / aluminum	(302)

Vaccinia virus	7 lg CCID ₅₀	> 4 wk: 2 lg	Glass	(295)
	8 lg CCID ₅₀	14 wk: 3 lg / up to 10 wk: 3.5. lg	Wool / cotton	(273)
	8 lg CCID ₅₀ / ml	1 wk: 4 lg	Cotton	(274)
	2.8 lg TCID ₅₀	14 d: < 1 lg	Gauze bandage	(306)
	8 lg PFU	< 56 d: ~ 4.5 lg	Stainless Steel	(307)
	6-6.5 lg KID ₅₀	< 20 wk: 4.3 lg	Glass	(308)
Transmission by contact, starting from the gastrointestinal tract (+ surrogate viruses)				
Adenovirus type 40	5-5.7 lg IU	> 7 d: 3.8 lg	Paper / porcelain	(309)
Astrovirus, serotype 4	5-5.7 lg IU	60 d / after 7 d: 1.7 lg	Paper / porcelain	(309)
Coxsackie virus	6.8 lg CCID ₅₀	2 wk: 2 lg	Glass	(295)
	6.5 lg TCID ₅₀	< 6 wk	Petri dish	(310)
Echovirus	max. 300 PFU	42 h	Cellulose	(311)
Feline calicivirus	9 lg PFU	> 7 d: 2 lg	Laminate / ceramic / stainless steel	(312)
	7 lg TCID ₅₀	90 % reduction in viral titers: up to 24 h	Computer / brass / telephone	(313)
	6 lg PFU	< 15 d / <3 d / < 7 d	Wool / nylon / glass	(314)
Hepatitis A virus (HAV)	6 lg PFU	> 1 mo	Wood / stainless steel	(315)
	3-4 lg PFU	4 h to > 7 d	Stainless steel	(316)
	5-5.7 lg IU	After 7 d: ~ 3.3 lg / ~ 5 lg	Paper / porcelain	(309)
	6.4 lg	After 90 d on PVC: 10 % of initial loading	Stainless steel / PVC	(317)

	~ 6 lg PFU	> 60 d / > 60 d / > 60 d / > 30 d	Aluminum / porcelain / latex / Paper	(297)
Hepatitis E virus (HEV)	~ 4 lg FFU	After 28 d: ~ 1 lg / 1 lg / 0.4 lg / 0 lg	Plastics / ceramics / stainless steel / wood	(318)
	3.9 lg FFU	D value: 5.95 d	Stainless steel	(319)
<i>Escherichia</i> virus (MS2 phage)	6 lg PFU	D value: 19.8 d / 13.2 d	Wood / stainless steel	(315)
Murine hepatitis virus and (MHV) Transmissible gastroenteritis virus (TGEV)	4-5 lg PFU	MHV: after 5 d 3 lg; TGEV: after 3 d 2 lg	Stainless steel	(320)
Murine norovirus	4-4.5 lg PFU	> 120 min except copper; after 120 min: 3.1 lg for stainless steel	Copper 100 % / 95 % / 70 % / stainless steel	(321)
Poliovirus type 1	4.4 lg PFU	> 90 min; after 20 min: 2.6 lg	Worktop	(322)
	~ 6 lg PFU	3 d / 1 d / 30 d / > 30 d	Aluminum / porcelain / latex / Paper	(297)
	max. 300 PFU	42 h	Cellulose	(311)
	~ 12 lg PFU	> 3 wk on all surfaces; 99 % reduction after 5.2 d / 7.4 d / 5.9 d	Steel / cotton / plastic	(323)
	3-4 lg PFU	12 h	Stainless steel	(316)
Poliovirus type 2	8.1 lg PFU	After 14 d: > 3 lg	Glass	(295)
	5-5.7 lg IU	> 7 d	Paper / porcelain	(309)
Rotavirus	~ 6 lg PFU	> 60 d	Aluminum / porcelain / latex / paper	(297)
	3-4 lg PFU	< 90 min	Worktop	(322)
	7 lg PFU	> 10 d	Glass / smooth plastic / rough plastic	(324)
	5-5.7 lg IU	> 7 d	Paper / porcelain	(309)
Tulane virus (Rhesus enteric calicivirus)	4.7 lg PFU	D value: 18.8 d / 13.3 d	Acrylic / stainless steel	(325)
Respiratory and/or aerogenic transmission (+ surrogate viruses)				
Endemic human coronaviruses	5.7 lg TCID ₅₀	HCoV-229E: > 12 h, >12 h, >6 h; HCoV-OC43: > 3 h, > 1 h, >1 h	Aluminum / cotton / latex	(326)

	3 lg PFU	3 d / 5 d / ≤ 40 min / 120 min / 30 min	Silicone / PVC, ceramic, glass, steel / brass / 70 % copper / 90 % copper	(327)
	~ 7 lg TCID ₅₀	48 h: 2 lg	Polystyrene	(298)
Influenza A virus	3.1 lg TCID ₅₀ (A/NC-H1N1); 4.8 lg TCID ₅₀ (A/Br-H1N1)	7 d	Stainless steel	(328)
	5.5 lg TCID ₅₀	> 24 h / > 48 h / > 24 h / 8 h	Stainless steel / wood / plastic / cotton	(329)
	5.3 lg TCID ₅₀	≥ 60 min / 30 min / 15 min / < 15 min / < 15 min	Cotton / formica / vinyl / stainless steel / facial tissue	(330)
	5 lg TCID ₅₀	< 5 d	Petri dish	(310)
	4-6 lg PFU	After 7.3 d / 17.7 h / 34.3 h 99 % reduction	Stainless steel / cotton / microfiber	(331)
	3-4 lg TCID ₅₀	48 h / 72 h / 24 h / 24 h / 12 h	Plastic / stainless steel / magazine / cotton / paper	(332)
	6 lg PFU	2-9 h	Telephone receiver / wood / keyboard / stainless steel / dishcloth	(333)
	6 lg TCID ₅₀	< 4 h	Stainless steel / plastic	(334)
Influenza B virus	4 lg TCID ₅₀	48 h / 48 h / 8 h / 12 h / 8 h	Plastic / stainless steel / magazine / cotton / paper handkerchief	(332)
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)	6 lg TCID ₅₀	< 72 h	Stainless steel / plastic	(334)
Parainfluenza virus	3.2 lg TCID ₅₀	4 h	Stainless steel / laminate	(335)
Respiratory syncytial virus	5 lg TCID ₅₀	8 h; ~ 2.5 h; ~ 5.3 h; 1 h; 1 h	Laminate / cotton-polyester / rubber / paper / hands	(336)
Rhinovirus type 14	7 lg PFU	< 25 h; TCID ₅₀ : 0.55 h	Stainless steel	(337)
Rhinovirus type 2	2 lg PFU	After 3 d: ~ 0.6 lg	Stainless steel	(338)
SARS-CoV- 	6 lg TCID ₅₀	4 d / 4 d / 4 d / 5 d / 5 d	Wood / glass / paper / metal / textile /	(339)

	7 lg TCID ₅₀	28 d: ~ 2 lg	Plastic	(340)
	3.4 lg TCID ₅₀	72 h / 48 h / 8 h / 8 h	Plastic / stainless steel / paper / copper	(341)
	6 lg TCID ₅₀ / ml	1 h / 24 h / 2d	Paper / cotton / disposable gown	(342)
	7 lg TCID ₅₀	After 13 d: 2.3 lg	Plastic	(340)
	~ 7 lg TCID ₅₀	After 9 d: 2 lg	Polystyrene	(298)
	6 lg TCID ₅₀	4 d / 4 d / 4 d / ≥ 5 d / ≥ 5 d / 4 d	Plastic / wood / glass / metal / cloth / paper	(339)
SARS-CoV-2	5.5 lg TCID ₅₀	D values: ~ 6 d / ~ 6.9 d / ~ 9.1 d / ~ 6.3 d / ~ 5.6 d / ~ 6.3 d	Stainless steel / paper / polymer / glass / cotton / vinyl	(343)
	7.9 lg TCID ₅₀	After 7 d: ~ 2.7 lg / 2 lg / 2.8 lg / not detectable / 2.3 lg / 2.3 lg / 1.1 lg / not detectable	Stainless steel / face shield / nitrile glove / chemical glove / N95 mask / N100 mask / Tyvek suit / cotton	(344)
	3.6 lg TCID ₅₀	72 h / 48 h / 24 h / < 4 h	Plastic / stainless steel / cardboard / copper	(341)
	7.8 lg TCID ₅₀	< 3 h / < 3 h / < 2 d / < 2 d / 4 d / 4 d / < 7d / < 7 d / 7 d	Paper / handkerchief / wood / clothes / glass / paper / stainless steel / plastic / surgical mask	(345)
	6.2 ± 5.9 lg TCID ₅₀	13 min at 0.3 W / cm ² : 90 % reduction	Stainless steel	(346)
	6.5 lg TCID ₅₀	< 20 min exposed to sunlight	Stainless steel	(347)
	~ 2.8 lg TCID ₅₀	≤ 18.6 h	Stainless steel / plastic / nitrile	(348)
	5.23 lg TCID ₅₀	2 d: ~ 1.2 lg	Glass	(349)
Predominant sexual transmission				
Herpes simplex virus type 1	7.9 TCID ₅₀	After 2 h: 6.7 lg	Plastic / chrome	(350)
		After 2 h: 5.2 lg		(351)
	5.6 lg PFU	After 1 d: 4 lg	Glass	(295)
	~ 7 lg TCID ₅₀	After 9 d: 1.9 lg	Polystyrene	(298)
Herpes simplex virus type 2	4.2 lg TCID ₅₀	4.5 h: 2.9 lg TCID ₅₀	Polystyrene	(352)
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)	Liquid / dry inoculum: 128000 / 25000 cpm / ml reverse transcriptase	> 20 d / ~ 10 d	Petri dish	(353)
Papillomavirus	~ 100-434 FFU	< 7 d	Pipe / cotton / microcentrifuge tube	(354)

Transmission through blood				
Hepatitis B virus (HBV)	0.1 ml HBsAg positive plasma	1 wk	Silanized tube	(355)
	0.1 ml HBV-positive blood	> 2 wk	Stainless steel / cotton swab	(356)
	> 6 lg TCID ₅₀	After 28 d: ~ 10 % reduction	PCR tubes	(258)
Hepatitis C virus (HCV)	4-6 lg IE	>40 d	24-well plates	(357)
	~ 4.75 lg TCID ₅₀	After 7 d: ~ 1.5 lg	Stainless steel	(358)
<p>Legend: cmp = counts per minute, D value = time in which the virus titer is reduced by 1 lg, Z value (thermal death time) = number of degrees the temperature has to be increased to achieve a 10-fold decrease in decimal reduction time (D-value), ATCC = American Type Culture Collection, BSA = bovine serum albumin, CCID = cell culture infectious dose, CPE = cytopathic effect, d = day, FFU = focus forming units, h = hours, HBsAg = Hepatitis B surface Antigen, HBVcc = HBV derived from cell cultures, IU = infectious units, lg = decadic logarithm, min = minute, mon = month, N/A = not available, PBS = phosphate-buffered saline, PCR = polymerase chain reaction, PFU = plaque forming unit, PPE = personal protection equipment, PVC = polyvinyl chloride, RH = relative humidity, RIA = Radioimmunoassay, RT = room temperature, TCID₅₀ = 50 % tissue culture infectious dose, US = ultrasound, W = watt, wk = week</p>				

631

632 **Factors influencing the replication and infection capacity of microorganisms, protozoa**
633 **and viruses in the environment**

634 **Microbiological test conditions:** For bacteria, surface desiccation on the surface after contamination
635 (rapid or slow), relative humidity (RH) and temperature during storage, recultivation conditions, and
636 stage of cultivability (VBNC) are of influence on RC (Tables 3 and 4). The origin of the pathogen is
637 also influential. *A. baumannii* strains isolated from clinical settings were more often resistant to
638 desiccation than ATCC strains (Table 3). As expected, the RC is influenced by the initial bio-inoculum
639 of faeces, demonstrated for *E. faecalis*, MRSA, *A. baumannii*, *C. jejuni* (table 3), *E. coli*, *P. aeruginosa*
640 of recovery (Table 4), *C. albicans*, *C. auris*, *C. krusei (Pichia kudriavzevii)*, *C. parapsilosis* and *C.*
641 *tropicalis* (Table 5). Similarly for viruses smaller inocula were associated with shorter RC, e.g. for
642 transmissible gastroenteritis virus, mouse hepatitis (320) and SARS-CoV-2. The latter lost infectivity
643 after 2-4 d (341, 345) compared with longer times of 21 d (344) or 7-28 d (343) for larger inocula (Table
644 7). Finally, the RC depends on recovery method (Tables 3-7).

645
646 **Surface material:** The RC of bacteria, fungi and viruses was significantly shorter on copper surfaces
647 than on textile materials, plastics and steel, due to the oligodynamic effect of copper ((359, 360); Table
648 7).

649 On porous surfaces, e.g. coronavirus, influenza virus, avian metapneumovirus, poliovirus type 1 and
650 human enteric adenovirus type 40 (297, 361), survival is longer than on non-porous surfaces (Table 7).
651 One reason may be the lower virus elution during recovery from porous materials (362). A recently
652 published scoping review comes to the same conclusion (). The capillary effect within the cavities and
653 the faster evaporation of the aerosols could also be influential (363).

654
655 **RH:** Gram-positive bacteria tolerate dry conditions better than Gram-negative bacteria due to cell wall
656 properties (364). *S. aureus* persisted longer at low RH (365), while survival kinetics for *E. faecalis* were
657 lower at 25 % RH than at 0 % RH (366). *Acinetobacter* spp. suspended in distilled water survived
658 significantly longer at room temperature (RT) at RH of 28-34 % and 93 %, respectively, compared to
659 10 % RLF, while survival did not differ between 28-34 % and 93 %, respectively (72). Survival of

660 Gram-positive bacteria was reduced most at RLF of 50-70 %, while death rates of Gram-negative
661 bacteria were highest at RLF of 50-70 % and 70-90 %, respectively (364).

662

663 Enveloped viruses, especially respiratory viruses such as influenza, parainfluenza, corona-, respiratory
664 syncytial, measles and rubella viruses, but also herpes simplex and varicella-zoster viruses, retain their
665 RC longer with a low RH of 20-30 % (364). Only cytomegalovirus is isolated more frequently from
666 moist surfaces (367). Non-enveloped viruses such as adenoviruses, enteroviruses and rhinoviruses are
667 replicable for longer at 70-90 % RH (table 7, (368)).

668

669 **Temperature:** Constant temperatures > 24 °C seem to reduce the replication and infection capacity of
670 airborne bacteria, shown for representatives of Gram-positive, Gram-negative and intracellular bacteria
671 (364).

672

673 For 15 yeast species, the survival time increased when the ambient temperature was reduced. Overall,
674 the survivability of the species studied was longest at 4 °C and 1 % RH and shortest at 37 °C and 96 %
675 RH (198). The situation is different for the release of bioaerosols indoors. At 25 °C, more fungi (mainly
676 *Fusarium* and *Penicillium* spp.) were released than at 37 and 15 °C, whereby the composition of the
677 mould species differed significantly across these three temperature ranges (369).

678

679 The viral genome (viral DNA or RNA) is sensitive to the surrounding temperature. Indeed, temperature
680 is an important factor influencing the RC of several viruses. Higher temperatures affect / impact viral
681 proteins and enzymes, as well as the viral genome. In general, DNA viruses are more stable than RNA
682 viruses; yet high temperature will also affect DNA integrity. For most viruses, such as astro-, adeno-,
683 polioviruses, herpes simplex and HAV, low temperatures (4 °C) are associated with longer duration of
684 replicability (65). For enteric viruses, RC in water increased with increasing temperature > 20 °C (370,
685 371). For **rota-**, poliovirus and HAV, RC was higher at > 80 % RH (297). This was confirmed for
686 poliovirus in that stability was significantly greater at 95 % RH than at 25 % RH (316). For
687 coronaviruses, the influence of RH was different with higher RC at 20 % and 80 % and comparatively

688 lower RC at 50 % (320). For SARS-CoV-2, interfering substances, temperature (20 or 35 °C) and RH
689 were only of moderate influence (Table 7). Morris et al. (372) developed an original prediction model
690 of how temperature and humidity alter RC by using a mechanistic quantitative approach that was based
691 on testing the stability of SARS-CoV-2 on an inert surface for a range of temperature and humidity
692 conditions. SARS-CoV-2 remained infectious longest at low temperatures and extreme humidity (up to
693 85 %). The estimated mean half-time of RC was > 24 h at 10 °C and 40 % RH, but ~ 1.5 h at 27 °C and
694 65 % RH. The model uses basic chemistry to explain why the sensitivity of enveloped viruses increases
695 with higher temperatures and has a U-shaped dependence on humidity. The model accurately predicts
696 existing results on the influence of temperature and RLF for five different human coronaviruses. This
697 suggests that common mechanisms may influence the stability of many viruses.

698

699 **Light conditions:** Light, especially sunlight, or lack of it influences the RC. The survival time of *C.*
700 *albicans* and *Rhodotorula rubra* on smooth glass surfaces doubled when they were kept in darkness
701 compared with daylight and extended from 44 to 98 d for *C. albicans*(198).

702

703 Under the influence of simulated sunlight, 90 % of SARS-CoV-2 applied to the surface in artificial
704 saliva were inactivated every 6.8 min during simulated summer exposure, but every 14.3 min during
705 winter exposure (346). In contrast, no significant decrease was detectable within 1 h in the dark (Table
706 7; (346)). The effect of sunlight was also reproducible in aerosol, while RH alone (20-70 %) had no
707 influence (373). Irradiation (distance 3 cm) with UVC (dose 1.048 mJ / cm²) completely inactivated
708 SARS-CoV-2 (infectious titre of 5 × 10⁶ TCID₅₀ / ml) after 9 min, while UVA (dose 292 mJ / cm²)
709 reduced the titre by only 1 lg after 9 min (374).

710

711 **Protein, fecal and urine load:** Desiccation in protein-containing media prolongs persistence, e.g. for
712 *A. baumannii* (table 8), *Escherichia (E.) coli* (102), *Neisseria (N.) meningitidis* (375) and yeasts (198).
713 Fecal load had little effect on the RC of HAV and rotaviruses. For adenoviruses, the RC only tended to
714 increase (Table 7).

715 **TABLE 8** Persistence of different *A. baumannii* strains suspended in water or bovine serum albumin
 716 (BSA) and dried on glass at different RH (modified from (72))

Average persistence	Strain(s)	Conditions (RH 28-34%, RT)
≤ 5 d	American type culture collection (ATCC) 9955	suspended in water
6-10 d	ATCC 17978, ATCC 19606, R 0211019	
> 10-30 d	ATCC 17904, 18, 49, 16 / 48, 16 / 49, R 447	
<10 d	ATCC 9955	suspended in 7 % BSA
> 10-30 d	ATCC 17978, 18, 16 / 48	
> 29-60 d	ATCC 19606, ATCC 17904, 49, 16 / 49, R 447, R 0211019	

717

718 **Biofilm:** Biofilm is the predominate form of life for microorganisms in a nutrient-sufficient ecosystem.
 719 Adhesion triggers the expression of a sigma factor that depresses a large number of genes so that bacteria
 720 within the biofilm are at least 500 times more tolerable against antimicrobial agents (376) as well as
 721 cold atmospheric plasma (377, 378). For example, *K. pneumoniae* remained viable up to 4 weeks in a
 722 dry biofilm, proving the need for robust cleaning regimens (). The reason for the unspecific increased
 723 tolerance is the production of extracellular substances such as polysaccharides, proteins and DNA after
 724 attachment to surfaces. Besides wet surface biofilm in plumbing systems or other wet surfaces, biofilm
 725 on dry inanimate surfaces at room humidity must also be considered (379). The biofilm matrix restrains
 726 water and nutrients and protects the microorganisms against environmental influences (380, 381). Once
 727 formed, biofilms are important for persistence of microorganisms on surfaces in nature as well as in
 728 industrial or medical areas (380-382). The RC on inanimate surfaces is prolonged and depends on
 729 environmental conditions, especially humidity. In addition, biofilms have been demonstrated on several
 730 objects and surfaces in hospitals, such as sterile supply buckets, opaque plastic doors, venetian blind
 731 cords, and sink rubbers, and it is possible to cultivate viable bacteria. Currently, there is insufficient
 732 research to elucidate whether presence or absence of biofilm affects the risk of transmission or
 733 possibility of cross-transmission. However, multi-drug resistant bacteria may not only be protected
 734 within biofilms, but could be the mechanism as to why they persist within the hospital environment
 735 (383). They may also exchange virulence factors among their own species or to other species present in
 736 biofilms (381, 383-385).

737 At present there is limited knowledge about the relationship between viruses and biofilms. Since viruses
738 are strict intracellular pathogens, they will be unable to proliferate in biofilms, but they can persist in a
739 reservoir host due to the advantages conferred by the biofilm structure (386). Biofilms may encompass
740 a set of non-enveloped enteric viruses, including caliciviruses, rotavirus spp., astrovirus spp., and
741 hepatitis A virus, alongside other microorganisms such as Gram-negative bacteria and filamentous fungi
742 (387). Biofilms can enhance virion RC in extracellular environments, such as on fomites and in aquatic
743 sediments, allowing viral persistence and dissemination. Importantly, both virions and virus-infected
744 eukaryotic cells embedded in biofilms have been reported to retain infectivity. A study investigated the
745 enveloped virus herpes simplex virus 1 (HSV-1) and the non-enveloped virus coxsackie virus type B5
746 (CVB5) within fungal *Candida albicans* biofilms (388). Viruses stored in biofilms may be regarded as
747 temporary or long-term reservoirs in the environment (52). The potential of viral spreading via
748 contaminated surfaces depends on the ability of the virus to maintain infectivity while it is in the
749 environment, and biofilms aid protection against desiccation and antimicrobial agents (389).

750

751 **Discussion**

752 The decisive difference to the first systematic review in 2006 (65) on the resilience of pathogens against
753 environmental influences is that the course of the RC over time was calculated based on the quantity of
754 the inoculum on the surface, expressed as lg reduction. This results in more accurate values and explain
755 different values in some cases of the first review. Additionally, the methodological development of
756 laboratory experiments to determine the RC over the last almost two decades also influence the results.

757

758 In general, clinical epidemiological evidence for transmission scenarios beyond outbreaks is lacking.
759 However, studies on RC and evidence for persistence on inanimate surfaces in combination with a
760 conspicuous transmission event are available. It is clear that the inanimate environment plays a relevant
761 role in these bacterial transmission pathways in the everyday situation (Fig. 1). As studies using whole
762 genome sequencing indicate, there is a serious underestimation of transmission events when using
763 standard techniques only (390). These analyses tend to focus on resistant, thus easily recognizable

764 pathogens. However, the quantification of transmission events and thus, an appropriate risk assessment
765 is not yet possible.

766 Beyond the epidemiological evidence, the studies were usually generated under laboratory conditions.
767 This means that not all possible environmental influences in hospital settings can be detected, especially
768 any from antimicrobial residues. In addition, the influence of the simultaneous contamination of hospital
769 surfaces with various nosocomial pathogens, with secretions, excretions and dirt will also be
770 disregarded. A growing number of studies report that enveloped and non-enveloped viruses can spread
771 in groups in so-called 'collective infectious units' (391-393). The vehicles mediating collective spread
772 vary widely and include lipid vesicles, protein matrices, diverse forms of aggregation, and binding to
773 the surface of host or non-host cells (391). It seems reasonable, that units like this or interference may
774 also exist for bacteria and / or fungi and / or protozoa. Laboratory studies do not reflect the clinical
775 situation and represent probably a one-sided worst-case scenario assessing the upper bound of infection
776 risk. Furthermore, they cannot represent the complexity of real-life scenarios. When assessing factors
777 that influence the RC, it must be considered that the results only apply to the species investigated and
778 cannot be generalized. Even more so, resistant isolates are often analyzed compared with wild type
779 variants. Sometimes tested microorganisms are poorly characterized so cannot determine the extent of
780 generalizability. Furthermore, it should be noted that data on the RC are often not median values; the
781 maximum was detected and described and these results can, and should, be used as an upper bound
782 approach. Data suggests that no general prediction about RC independent of genus is possible.

783 Additionally, further influences must be considered. Firstly, the dependence of environmental
784 conditions on the RC has not yet been sufficiently studied under real life conditions. Secondly, there is
785 insufficient data on the behaviour of wildtype and/or sensitive strains and variants within a species.
786 Thirdly, no data exist, on whether certain virulence or RC determinants are genetically present in isolates
787 that are particularly well adapted to the hospital setting.

788 In this review, only the risks due to direct or indirect contact transmission from inanimate surfaces were
789 addressed, not the additional risks by potential aerosolization of pathogens from fomites (394-396).
790 Therefore, it should be considered that the RC in aerosols can be significantly lower than on surfaces,
791 as has been proven for different variants of Ebola virus and Marburg virus (397). It is also the case that

792 high inocula results in longer survival times due to the logarithmic death curve (398), which has been
793 proven for various bacterial species (98, 399) and or fungal spores (198) on surfaces. Considering all
794 background factors, data generated under laboratory conditions can only provide a rough orientation. In
795 case of doubt, the unfavorable situation should be assumed when evaluating the data in Tables 3-7.
796 Despite knowledge on dependency of replication and infection capacity from factors like pH,
797 temperature, humidity, and others, we cannot easily change these surrounding conditions using their
798 preventive potential. For others, e.g. inocula and biofilms, we can use knowledge covering these aspects
799 from common IPC recommendations.

800 Another viewpoint for the risk assessment of surface contamination is the minimal infectious dose
801 (MID) to trigger infection. The lower the ID, the greater the risk of acquiring an infection and further
802 transmission as nosocomial outbreaks. It should be noted that the ID can be reduced by a viral infection,
803 which often leads to bacterial co- or superinfection, especially in cases of respiratory viral infections
804 (400-402). In Table 9, examples of different IDs are summarized, mainly taken from reviews. From the
805 clinical perspective it must be considered that this dose depends on the site of infection or at least
806 contamination allowing short-term contamination. For respiratory transmissible viruses with a MID >
807 10^2 50 % tissue culture infectious dose (TCID₅₀), infection by aerosolization from surfaces is unlikely.
808 In contrast, infection is possible via the surface-finger-eye route for keratoconjunctivitis epidemica due
809 to the low ID (Table 9) and the surface-finger-nose route, particularly in the case of nasal exposure to
810 respiratory viruses with a MID < 10^1 . The same applies to orally transmissible pathogens with a MID
811 < 10^1 TCID₅₀, CFU resp. oocysts. This is supported by the outbreak potential of pathogens with low
812 MID. For fecal-orally transmissible bacteria and mucorales, transmission from surfaces is unlikely with
813 a MID < 10^2 CFU. However, it should be noted that MID studies do not usually consider the fact that
814 the pathogens multiply from an initially acquired small number and the infection only manifests after
815 the critical quantity has been reached.

816 The lower the ID and the greater the RC, the greater the risk to acquire an infection by contact with the
817 surface or indirect by aerogenic turbulence from the surface and following inhalative exposition.
818 Likewise the risk of an outbreak emanating from surfaces increases. In both, the ID is likely to have the
819 greater influence. At the same time, the risk of a fomite-borne HAI is influenced by the patients' immune

820 status. The ID, RC and immune status must be considered when deciding upon targeted surface
 821 disinfection and additional IPC.

822 **TABLE 9** Minimal infectious dose of selected pathogens

823

Infectious dose	Application	Pathogen	Reference
1-100 virus particles, CFU resp. oocysts	Oral	Noro-, Rotavirus, EHEC, ETEC, <i>C. difficile</i> , MRSA, <i>Cr. parvum</i> , <i>G. intestinalis</i>	(66, 233, 261, 366, 403-407)
6.6 virus particles	Inhalative	Adenovirus type 4	(408)
10-100 virus particles	Oral	HAV	(409)
30-40 TCID ₅₀	Intranasal	RS virus	(408)
6 / 71 TCID ₅₀	Intranasal / oral	Coxsackievirus A21	(408)
0.03 / >10 ¹ - 10 ⁴ TCID ₅₀	Intranasal / inhalative	Rhinovirus, different serotypes	(408)
< 10 ³ CFU	Oral	<i>Acinetobacter</i> spp., <i>C. jejuni</i> <i>Klebsiella</i> spp., VRE,	(66, 410)
≥ 10 ³ spores	Chorio-allantois-membran henn egg (equivalent to eye contact)	<i>Lichtheimia corymbifera</i>	(411)
≥ 10 ³ CFU	Oral	<i>Salmonella enteritidis</i>	(412)
≥ 10 ³ TCID ₅₀	Oral	Echovirus	(408)
> 10 ³ TCID ₅₀	Inhalative	Influenzavirus A (H3N2)	(408)
> 10 ³ LD ₅₀	Intranasal	Congo Basin MPXV	(413)
>10 ³ TCID ₅₀	Inhalative	Influenza A (H3N2)	(408)
≥ 10 ⁴ CFU	Dermal	<i>P. aeruginosa</i>	(414)
≥ 10 ⁴ - ≥ 10 ⁷	Inhalative	Influenzavirus B, different serotypes	(408)
≥ 10 ⁴ spores		<i>Rhizopus</i> spp., <i>A. fumigatus</i>	(415, 416)
10 ⁵ TCID ₅₀	Conjunctival	Respiratory syncytial virus (RSV)	(408)
≥ 10 ⁵ CFU	Intravenous	<i>C. albicans</i> , <i>C. auris</i>	(417)
≥ 10 ⁵ spores	Parenteral	<i>Rhizomucor pusillus</i>	(415)
> 10 ⁵ CFU	Oral	<i>E. coli</i> , <i>S. aureus</i>	(418)

> 10 ⁵ LD ₅₀	Intranasal	West African MPXV	(413)
>10 ⁶ TCID ₅₀	Oral	Adenovirus	(408)
>10 ⁶ - >10 ⁷ TCID ₅₀	Inhalative	Influenza A (H1N1), different serotypes	
>10 ⁸ CFU / ml	Intra- peritoneal	<i>P. aeruginosa</i>	(419)
>10 ¹⁰ CFU / ml		<i>S. aureus</i>	
Legend: CFU = colony forming units, TCID ₅₀ 50 % tissue culture infective dose, LD ₅₀ 50% letal dose			

824

825 Disinfecting surfaces in hospitals is generally accepted as a key component of infection prevention (32-
826 35, 71, 420-423). But disinfection can also have an influence on the development of tolerance; it is
827 costly and leads to an ecological footprint. Clearly, every disinfection event requires a clear indication.
828 Disinfection must be implemented in a precise and quality-assured manner, since it offers a valuable
829 contribution towards HAI prevention. Regarding environmental protection, probiotic cleaning agents
830 are a promising alternative to chemical disinfection. Surface contamination with pathogens could be
831 reduced by up to 90 % more with probiotic products compared with conventional disinfection wipes
832 (424, 425). SARS-CoV-2 was reduced significantly more by probiotic cleaning than by chemical
833 disinfection (426). In non-intensive care units, routine surface disinfection did not prove superior to
834 soap-based or probiotic cleaning in terms of preventing HAI (427). Of course, no evidence-based
835 practical approach for systematic surface or probiotic cleaning in hospitals can be derived from the RC
836 of nosocomial pathogens.

837 RC and ID influence the implementation of surface decontamination regarding the extent and the
838 selection of the application concentration and exposure time of the disinfectant. In cases of high RC and
839 low ID, it makes sense to use concentrations that are rapidly effective. For final disinfection after patient
840 discharge, all potential pathogen reservoirs must be eradicated with choice of effective disinfectants. In
841 general, a simple four-step guide for daily decontamination of the occupied bed space can be
842 recommended: Step 1 (LOOK) describes a visual assessment of the area to be cleaned; Step 2 (PLAN)
843 argues why the bed space needs preparation before cleaning; Step 3 (CLEAN) covers surface cleaning
844 /disinfection; and Step 4 (DRY) is the final stage whereby surfaces are allowed to dry. Visible soil
845 should always be removed with detergent and water before using disinfectant (428). Analogous to the 5
846 moments of hand antisepsis (429), 5 moments of disinfecting surface cleaning can be distinguished: **I.**

847 Disinfecting surface cleaning as part of standard precautions (non-targeted disinfection) on near-patient
848 (high-touch) sites during patient care, and targeted disinfection as **II**. Disinfecting surface cleaning on
849 the work surface before performing aseptic activities, **III**. Final disinfecting surface cleaning after
850 discharge of patients, **IV**. Two step disinfection surface cleaning after visible surface contamination
851 (first cleaning, thereafter disinfection) and **V**: Disinfection surface cleaning as part of the multi-barrier
852 strategy to control outbreaks (428).

853 This review can help to reduce the complexity of disinfection choices depending on the range of
854 pathogen properties. At the same time, it proposes the best possible balance between patient and
855 employee safety, i.e. IPC and ecological and economic sustainability. Through a novel classification of
856 pathogens by their fomite-borne potential for transmission - completely independent of the taxonomic
857 approach - a fact-based but also realizable and pragmatic recommendation can be prepared with a view
858 to avoiding transmission. The attempt to classify pathogens by fomite-borne transmission potential
859 should serve only as a first suggestion and should be improved by scientific discussion. In general,
860 further studies should focus beyond the ecological and outbreak assessment –and target real life settings
861 or near real life scenarios in order to emulate endemic settings. There is insufficient evidence regarding
862 the impact of contaminated surfaces for encouraging contact-free transmission risk. Further analysis
863 should cover aspects of ecological sustainability and should weight up the potential benefit for
864 transmission and infection events against the additional ecological footprint from resource consumption,
865 production, and waste management.

866 **Conflicts of interest**

867 None declared

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