A critical examination of the values and ethics of Scotland's Curriculum for Excellence (CfE)

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The PhD Team

I would like to express my gratitude to my Supervision Team: Director of Studies, Professor Calum Neill; Supervisors Dr Jamie Buchan and Dr Stephanie Fohring, and Independent Panel Chair, Dr Sharron Vass. Together they have patiently challenged, assured and developed my thinking, research skills and work output, making the last four years a challenging, convivial, productive and enjoyable experience, despite coinciding with the pandemic. Asked why he didn't engage in polemics, Michel Foucault said because he liked discussions, so when he was asked questions, he tried to answer them. He thought:

> a whole morality is at stake … that concerns the search for the truth and the relation to the other. In the serious play of questions and answers, in the work of reciprocal elucidation, the rights of each person are in some sense immanent in the discussion. (Foucault, 1991b, p381)

This is a good picture of my PhD journey, a "work of reciprocal elucidation". My

Supervisors have consistently exercised their right to remain unconvinced, perceive a contradiction, require more information and emphasise different postulates. The result has been a highly productive, expansive relationship: constructive, critical, thought-provoking and creative.

Thesis Abstract

The thesis offers a new perspective through which to analyse CfE, by focusing on values and ethics, and the value pluralism of Isaiah Berlin.

The record suggests CfE is a blended, instrumentalist mix of values and ethics. I argue that 'joined-up' government policy seamlessly connected education to national political and economic priorities, so that the value of education itself shifted significantly from intrinsic, towards extrinsic neo-liberal ends; moral knowledge itself was instrumentalised.

I suggest a relativistic, 'windowless box' version of pluralism predominates, but that relativism works against social/cultural integration, because it becomes meaningless to ask which of the values are correct. Nonetheless, human differences are bridgeable and human understanding is possible.

CfE expresses no view at all about the good, avoiding the ethical kind of values as if there was something tainted about them. I argue that relativist accounts of pluralism led to ethical neutrality, and to the delegation of social moral values to schools, teachers and children, ultimately resting on a Scottish customary morality. I suggest it is not education's job to tell children what to think, what is good or ethically the right thing to do, but it is, arguably, its job to discuss, explain, adjudicate between options, and make arguments for and against different normative ethical conclusions. It does not appear to do this, however.

I argue further that an assumed 'beliefs-values-action' moral continuum emphasises internalised moral reasoning not moral action, endorsing a cut-down Kantian moral law minus 'duty' and the 'categorical imperatives'. Furthermore, its aspiration for children to develop their own social justice stances is too optimistic, unsupported by Kohlberg's theory.

CfE's delegation and consequent individualising of social moral values, arguably encourages infinite proliferation of moral and ethical viewpoints, making shared forms of social life that much harder to achieve, ultimately promoting the foreclosure of society.

PART I: Introductions and Overview

PART I introduces the thesis itself, the Curriculum, its values, ethics, a quasi-religious moral framework, and an overview of three different approaches to education. It consists of five chapters:

1) The Thesis
2) Curriculum for Excellence
3) Curriculum Values and Ethics
4) Religious and Moral Education
5) Education Overview

Chapter 1, 'The Thesis', introduces the thesis as a specifically ethical project, inextricably enmeshed with *Curriculum for Excellence*. It outlines its genesis, methodology, contribution to knowledge, and my position in relation to key lines of enquiry. It reviews its scope, major themes, the research question, five key concepts, and concludes with a glossary of terms.

Chapter 1: The Thesis

1.1: The Project, its Contribution to Knowledge, and a Controversial Curriculum

The thesis is a critical examination of the values and ethics of Scotland's *Curriculum for Excellence* (CfE). Its disciplinary home is ethics and philosophy, but the research field is education, including aspects of philosophy of education, education policy and developmental psychology. The thesis concerns CfE's values and embedded ethics, taking the Collins English Dictionary (1986), meaning of embeddedness as an object "fixed firmly and deeply in a surrounding mass".

The project was first conceived in conversation with my son, subsequently in conversation with Professor Calum Neill at Edinburgh Napier University. Since 2005 my son has been developing an *Outdoor Education* (O-Ed), programme for his School. His key focus is the development of children and young people's character in challenging adventurous situations. The programme has since expanded to become a popular part of the school curriculum for S1 to S3 pupils (ages 12 to 15).

His problem, however, was that good teaching materials were almost non-existent, forcing him to research and develop as he went along, despite an already busy teaching schedule, and the 'never-done' politics of carrying parents and the staffroom. Both issues – course content and parent/colleague support – led to our resolve to develop O-Ed materials to support busy teachers, focusing on children's ethics and character development.

This led to the need to deepen and broaden our understanding of school ethics in the Scottish context, which became part of a discussion with Calum Neill in 2019, at an interview to consider my PhD candidature, out of which emerged a project with a working title to understand the embedded ethics of *Curriculum for Excellence.*

Contribution to Knowledge.

My account proffers a clearer understanding of CfE's embedded ethics; what they are, how they work, and where they may be problematic. It offers a new perspective through which to examine CfE, by analysing the ethics that may underpin it, focusing in particular on the value pluralism of Isaiah Berlin. I argue that value pluralist theory can be seen as something of an elephant in CfE's (meta) ethical room, because according to the documentary record, CfE focuses strongly on issues of cultural and social diversity, but does not discuss

value pluralist concepts, complexities, and confusions which I suggest sit behind the diversity agenda. I argue further that Berlin's objective-pluralist thesis has much to offer Scottish education, because it can help us understand and more positively navigate, decreasing social homogeneity, prevailing moral uncertainties, and contemporary relativist accounts of ethics and pluralism.

I will argue that Berlin's oeuvre provides thoughtful, self-critical, reflexive analysis of cultural pluralism, and a plurality of incommensurable values it arguably assumes. His espousal of communitarian liberalism also offers an antidote to individualist, neo-liberal views about values. Young people realising that the search for perfection, or any absolute standard, however well-meaning or carefully applied, will always end up trampling over *some*one's values, seems fundamental to the plural society they are inheriting. In light of this, I contend that today's clashing cultural, social moral viewpoints, precisely demand Berlinian kinds of compromises, trade-offs between incompatible values, and conceptual tools to promote considerate, decent society, at what he calls the human horizon, while avoiding intolerance, prejudice, sectarianism and discrimination.

The research is relevant for the practical application of ethics in Scottish schools, and children's character development. Children get their ethics in all kinds of ways and places, informally and spontaneously, formally and conceptually, from each other as well as parents, and interaction with the wider world, including school. They are likely to carry some of the ethics they pick up at school with them for the rest of their lives, but very little work, if any, seems to have been done examining and understanding CfE's ethics, and their likely impact on children and society. This is the gap the thesis works in, and the novel contribution to research I hope to make.

My Project Proposal argued that since the age of the European Enlightenment, with its emphasis on reason, nature, scientific progress and a rejection of church/state paternalism, our social moral dilemma has become ever more acute, secular and pressing. This involves on the one hand resisting paternalism – that I do not want to be told how to live my life – and on the other hand relativistic human values that see ethics, like beauty, as something merely in the eye of the beholder. But without an ethics and human goodness, how can we treat each other fairly, act virtuously, live well and flourish as members of just and decent society?

A Controversial Curriculum.

CfE's launch in 2004, and roll-out 2004 – 2011, sparked a broad Scottish academic critique (see for example, Paterson, 2003 and 2020; Humes, 2013; Priestley, Minty, & Eager, 2014; Biesta, 2013; Gillies, 2006 and 2013, Macallister et al, 2013); each in different ways questioning an under-conceptualised, theoretically weak, unargued-for Curriculum. Humes (2013), sees a "focus on operationalising … rather than consideration of alternative educational philosophies" (p20). Priestley and Biesta (2013) see a focus on competencies and capacities, and an instrumentalist focus addressing a common complaint about education that it does not prepare children for the real world. They argue that it led to a disjointed curriculum, which fails to adequately address questions about educational purposes, or what good education and good teaching might look like.

MacAllister et al (2013), think CfE "lacks a coherent underpinning philosophy" (p154), and question the notion of excellence itself, asking what it actually means in a curriculum which claims in its very title to be 'for excellence'. Drawing on the work of Hirst, Peters, MacIntyre and Aristotle, they ask whether epistemic excellence, understood as "having a deep grasp of valuable knowledge" (p153), should be education's only purpose. Opening the question of ethics, they argue that excellence should be regarded as one educational purpose among others, suggesting that schools should promote virtue at least as much as excellence, because virtues can shape children's character for the long term.

Hedge and MacKenzie (2016), take a different approach, arguing that a "socially embedded autonomous person permeates the curriculum" (p2); that autonomy, rights, dignity and self-respect are evident, albeit implicit, premised on principles of personhood. They think teachers could and should salvage CfE and the *Four Capacities*, from accusations about lack of coherence, through ongoing professional debate, and by making CfE and the *Four Capacities* work better. They argue for what they call relational autonomy, and positive aspects of autonomy, which they characterise as "emotional, embodied, desiring, creative and feeling" (p2).

They too think CfE needs more conceptual clarity, but argue that the *Review Group's* remit was not to provide a philosophical justification for CfE, but to "reflect the values and aspirations of the nation" (p3). It is not clear in their paper however, how the *Review Group* might have achieved that enormous task, or the extent to which they succeeded. I argue in

Chapter 3, that while the *Review Group* (2004) stated that "It is one of the prime purposes of education to make our young people aware of the values on which Scottish society is based" (p11), they (and all subsequent literature) failed to say what they thought Scotland's social values are, or how CfE might realise one of its prime purposes. The language of values and ethics is certainly there in the *Review Group* (2004) document, but ethics swim in deeper waters than words, demanding, I suggest, more than rhetorical or policy references.

Cassidy (2013) identifies a growing instrumentalism and vocational trend, going as far back as the *Primary Education Scotland Report* of 1965 (known as the *Primary Memorandum*). Quoting from it, she observes that it stated that the goal of education must "concern itself with fostering … the qualities, skills and attitudes" (p40), which will make the child "useful to society and adaptable to the kind of environment in which he will live as an adult" (p40). The broad similarity between this 1965 statement and the 2008 Scottish Government/CfE statement that: "The aim of Curriculum for Excellence is to help prepare all young people in Scotland to take their place in a modern society and economy" (*A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, p3), is striking, and suggests CfE's instrumentalist stance was in fact many years in the making.

There were time allocations for five subject areas in 5-14 guidance (CfE's immediate predecessor): English; mathematics; environmental studies (the latter included history, geography, science and technology); expressive arts and religious and moral education. Quoting from 5-14 documents, Cassidy (2013), herself a primary teacher throughout the 1990s, thinks its authors saw the task of education as satisfying "the needs of the individual and society and to promote the development of knowledge and understanding, practical skills, attitudes and values" (p42), equipping children with the skills, knowledge and attitudes that would lead to a personally rewarding life and employment. Clearly, the disjuncture between CfE and its predecessors was not as sharp as sometimes claimed in CfE documents.

Nonetheless, a major emphasis in the *Review Group* "strategy" document (Bloomer, 2016, p12), of 2004, and subsequent roll-out documents, was getting things done; getting change happening on the ground; aligning education with the priorities of its many stakeholders. That is essentially what strategy does, address stakeholder benefits and manage adaptation to a changing environment, and (I shall argue) what CfE is as well as being a school system: a strategy and means for reaching particular economic and political

objectives (I discuss this instrumentalist case in Chapter 6). What is true for education principles, however, is arguably also true for alternative ethical principles and philosophies, which (I will also argue), also dropped below an instrumentalised, political and economic horizon.

Knowledge and skills.

Paterson (2020) sees multiple weaknesses in CfE, but most of all a decline of knowledge. He thinks Scotland's educational establishment became suspicious of knowledge as something for elites, and CfE's mantra became skills: pupils enjoying themselves and seeing immediate relevance in their work. Paterson's view, however, is that children struggling with difficult to understand knowledge is the only way to strengthen long-term memory.

CfE says it is readjusting the relationship between academic knowledge and vocational skills, justifying this by the *National Debate*. The *Review Group* (2004) says the latter engagement programme found that CfE should "achieve a better balance between 'academic' and 'vocational' subjects" (p7).

Knowledge appears sixteen times in the 2008 roll-out document *A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, eight of them alongside skills for work, and appears twice in the *Review Group* document both alongside skills. I will argue that moral knowledge *itself*, in both Junior Phase (the *Broad General Education* or BGE), and Senior Phase, is used as a vehicle for the development of employment skills (examined in Chapter 10). Ethical content has most often appeared either largely implicit, or depersonalised as applied ethics; skills (said to be for learning, life and work), take centre stage and are explicit. The 2020 *National Improvement Plan* makes this new 'balance' particularly clear: "The purpose of Scotland's curriculum is to provide young people with the skills, knowledge and experiences that will prepare them for their life beyond school" (p8). Employment skills come first here, and together with knowledge are instrumentalised to the world "beyond school".

1.2: Source Identification, Methodology and Early Findings

My Project Proposal was accepted (Napier University's Research Degrees RD4 stage), following which Napier's process involved an initial piece of work (called RD5), to confirm or not the (PhD) target degree. I used this to search, sift, categorise, select and review a large number of potential documents and secondary/tertiary sources, generate the research

question(s), and decide whether to adopt a philosophical approach, based exclusively on a documentary analysis, a sociological approach based on empirical research, or some kind of mixed method approach combining the two.

The working title at Proposal stage was *Understanding the Embedded Ethics of Curriculum for Excellence*, providing three search organisers: CfE, ethics, and embeddedness. CfE expanded into education and Scottish education, ethics into moral philosophy, and embeddedness led to values as visible access points for what may be implicit and embedded. My hunch from the outset was that CfE's articulated values might be tips of unseen ethical icebergs, thus the thesis working title quickly evolved into understanding the embedded *values* and ethics of the Curriculum. The Curriculum, obviously, was my focus so this is where I began, with Curriculum documents.

Bell and Waters (2018), identify two main orientations to documents: 'source-oriented' and 'problem-oriented'. I opted for the former, where the feasibility of the project was determined by the nature of existing sources, which meant being led by the material the sources contain. I could not start with an ethical 'problem' I wanted to investigate, or with an argument about CfE's ethics, for the simple reason that I did not know if such an ethics existed, and if they did what they were. The initial RD5 phase was used to try and answer this really fundamental question: does CfE have an ethics and if so what are they?

It quickly became apparent that there was a comprehensive range of CfE-specific documents available to answer the question, as well as an enormous, contested array of ethics and educational sources. To make sense of this I produced the following initial search framework based on my (above) three organisers, to guide the search, classification and selection of early sources:

1. Education, Scottish Education and CfE. What is the general historical context for CfE's approach to the teaching of morals? What have been the main theories of educational values over the past 60 or so years, and how does CfE fit within that framework?
2. Values Education and CfE. What is values education? When and why did it appear in Scottish Education? Does values education manifest in the Curriculum? How?
3. CfE's Values. Does CfE have an ethical values framework? Values are said to underpin the curriculum. How does this work? What kind of values are they? Does the teaching of moral values actually occur in CfE, if so how and where?
4. CfE's Embedded Ethics. What underlying ethics if any are suggested in CfE documents?

If they are, what are their theoretical basis? Does an ethics as such manifest? How? If yes is an ethics consciously taught in CfE? What, then, *is* taught?

Document and Literature Searching.

It had already become obvious (during the Proposal phase), that I was going to be using a range of documents of a specifically 'policy' kind. According to McCulloch (2013), such documents are a significant and underused resource for education researchers. He cautions, however, that while policy documents can reveal assumptions that sit behind education reforms, they also represent "an ideology" (p29), as well as tensions and perhaps contradictions inherent in state education policy. Understanding CfE's ideological context and its official documentary record was going to be important, as was the need to gain a range of different perspectives on them. The latter proved the simpler task given the contested, unavoidably politicised nature of education policy and reform.

With these thoughts in the forefront of my mind, there followed a sustained period of document and literature searching and classification. Search terms and concepts included: Curriculum for Excellence; Curriculum for Excellence *and* values – religious values – pro-social values – ethics – religious ethics – school ethics – values education – moral pedagogy – Kant – utilitarianism – consequentialism – virtue ethics. And: Scottish Curriculum; the Scottish Curriculum *and* values education – religious values – ethics – moral psychology – constructivism – pluralism.

Searches included (but were not limited to): Trainee Teacher Reading Lists, the Scottish Government, Education Scotland (and its forerunners HMIE and LTS), the Scottish Qualification Authority, the Curriculum and Assessment Board, The General Teaching Council for Scotland, all five editions of *Scottish Education* (1999-2018), the Times Educational Supplement, The National Improvement Framework, the Scottish Educational Review, SPICe Briefing Notes, relevant databases Napier's library subscribed to, the print media, the OECD, Reform Scotland, published CfE National 5 and Higher Study Guides, Reference Lists of key documents, articles and books, Google and Google Scholar. This produced around 250 documents, papers, articles, books, book chapters and other potential sources, each allocated to one or more search organiser. I then separated out the primary CfE documents.

The vast majority of CfE-specific documents were inadvertently produced by the

everyday functioning of the education system, and contained both witting and unwitting evidence. Printed sources for both CfE-specific documents and secondary/tertiary literature were the main data type, keeping open the possibility of finding images, film or other non-written sources.

The task then was controlled selection, using the above search framework. A simple high, medium, low relevance was used to select documents and sources that most clearly addressed my organisers (categories), eliminating around forty per cent lower significance items. This left around ninety higher significance sources, and fifty or so others, which became the focus of initial analysis asking:

- What kind of document/source is it?
- What does it actually say?
- Who produced it?
- What was its purpose?
- When and in what circumstances was it produced?
- Is it typical or exceptional of its type?
- What values and ethics, if any, are assumed?

CfE-specific documents were primary, books and papers *about* CfE secondary, and all other sources/literature became tertiary. The following highest significance documents relating to CfE's values and ethics emerged:

- *A Curriculum for Excellence, The Review Group* (2004), launching CfE. Page 11 of this document is by far the clearest statement available in the record about CfE's values.
- *Religious and Moral Education* (RME), and *Health and Wellbeing* (HWB) Es&Os, (Experiences and Outcomes/Benchmarks). Es&Os expanded to include brief corresponding teacher Benchmarks in 2016/17. The BGE (infant/Junior Phase) Es&Os for each of the eight subject areas are a framework for what is taught.
- RME and HWB *Principles and Practice Statements* for Practitioners. These statements introduce and contextualise each subject area, including RME and HWB.
- *Religious, Moral and Philosophical Studies* (RMPS) Nationals Course Specifications and Support Notes. These documents explain, set up and contextualise National 3, 4 and 5, Higher and Advanced Higher syllabus/qualifications.
- The *Four Capacities* statement (Successful learners, Confident individuals, Responsible citizens, Effective contributors), and eight (so-called) SHANARRI Indicators: safe, healthy, achieving, nurtured, active, respected, responsible and included. From the outset these appeared largely aspirational and visionary, rather than embedded in pedagogy, and appeared to lack any clear learning progression.

- *A Statement for Practitioners*, Education Scotland, 2016. This was a Curriculum 'Refresh', produced following the 2015 OECD Report, which was somewhat critical of the way Es&Os were being used, and of the *Four Capacities*. The OECD thought the *Capacities* lacked justifying metrics, and needed more robust and systematic evidence of student progress. This document affirmed my early suspicions about the *Four Capacities* Statement being largely an aspirational vision.
- A series of five *Building The Curriculum* documents rolling out the new policy between 2004 and 2011:
    1. *The Contribution of Curriculum Areas*, 2006.
    2. *Active Learning in the Early Years*, 2007.
    3. *A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, 2008.
    4. *Skills for Learning, Skills for Life, Skills for Work*, 2009,
    5. *A Framework for Assessment*, 2011.

Initial Evaluation and Findings.

The final step before putting pen to paper on the RD5 essay, was an evaluation of the values and ethics content of the (immediately above) CfE-specific documents of highest significance. At this point I was starting to look for more focus, but still asking what kind of research approach best fitted the sources. The results of the following exercise also started to suggest that the record would in fact support a documentary analysis, if that was still the preferred option after the RD5 process had run its course.

Based on the early findings below (and subsequent essay preparation), CfE's RME-based approach to values and moral issues started to emerge, plus embryonic versions of most of the key themes of the thesis. I was also able to assess the nature and general terrain of the project, tease out the most fertile and promising lines of enquiry, gain familiarity with different categories of potential evidence, and formulate a research question(s).

The results of this initial analysis are set out in the following three Tables, alongside the evidence for them. They are good examples of the methodological approach I used to interrogate/evaluate sources generally. Many such 'working tables' were produced during the course of the project, across many topic heads, to support analysis. In due course they also facilitated transition from source-led exploration to argument-led thesis. The findings underpinned my first major analysis, and (looking back) set the tone of the thesis, covering: (1) 'Generic' findings spanning a full age range 3-18; (2) 'BGE' (Junior Phase) findings, age 3-15; and (3) 'Senior Phase' findings, age 16-17:

Table 1.

Generic initial findings, Early Years to Senior 5 (age 3-18).

	Early Finding	Documentary Sources/Evidence
i.	*Religious and Moral Education* (RME) in the BGE, plus *Religious, Moral and Philosophical Studies* (RMPS*)*, its Senior Phase progression, appear by far the most important subject area focus for values and ethics, and apart from HWB Es&Os with a specific 'wellbeing' emphasis, the only one so far found (this remained the case).	No other set of documentary sources found covered planned, 'taught', specifically moral/ethical content. BGE/RME (age 3-15) progresses from 'Early Years' to 'Senior 3'. See *Benchmarks Religious and Moral Education, 2017*, and RME *Principles and Practice*.
ii.	Cultural and religious pluralism is suggested. No one way is the right way.	Children must "establish their own stances on matters of social justice and personal and collective responsibility" (Review Group, 2004, p11).
iii.	Christian, liberal values are privileged. Respect for others, cultural and religious diversity are strongly urged.	RME *Principles and Practice*, p2, answers the question "why is Christianity emphasised"?
iv.	Morals are embedded in a religious (RME) framework. Teacher guidance states that religion and belief should be used as a platform from which to explore alternative moral values.	"when exploring a religion's moral values or response to a social issue also explore corresponding or alternative moral values which are independent of religious belief" (RME Principles and Practice, p3).
v.	'Issues of belief' and applied ethics are called 'moral issues', and are said to be matters of opinion and debate.	See RME Benchmarks, p9 (Note), p13 (Note), and p15 (Note).
vi.	Values are exemplified for teachers, not defined or mandated.	"A value might include, for example principles such as selflessness, respect, equality" (RME Benchmarks, p7).
vii.	Pedagogic developmentalism is strongly evident in many documents. CfE calls it 'Active Learning' and 'good practice in learning'.	*A Framework for Learning and Teaching, 2008, says* children will progress to "learning at the next level … to match the level of cognitive, emotional and physical demand at the different stages" (p24).
viii.	As the years progress learners are increasingly asked to think critically and reflectively about religious beliefs and moral issues (applied ethics).	Beliefs include "life after death" and "the usefulness of prayer" (RME Benchmarks, p9. Moral 'issues' are "for example euthanasia, abortion" (p15).
ix.	The language of the *Four Capacities* is vaguely reminiscent of Aristotelian ontology, children 'becoming' responsible citizens, etc. But it seems to float above pedagogy, because they have no *Experiences and Outcomes* (Es&Os) guidance.	No *Four Capacities* learning progression was found.
x.	Strong statements about extrinsic, work-related and economic benefits of education, suggested a consequentialist ethic.	For example *A Framework for Teaching and Learning*, 2008, p3. Where the "aim" of CfE is said to lie beyond school.

Table 2.

BGE initial findings, Early Years through Primary to 3rd Year of Secondary (ages 3-15).

	Early Finding	Documentary Sources/Evidence
i.	The threefold RME Es&Os structure is: Beliefs; Values & Issues; Practices & Traditions.	See RME *Benchmarks*, 2017.
ii.	BGE/RME Es&Os/Teacher Benchmarks are short documents, and only a subject guide for teachers, who are asked not to be hidebound by them, and to choose their own lesson content, including what is actually taught.	See RME *Benchmarks*, 2017, p4. *Statement for Practitioners*, 2016, p2.
iii.	There is a 'Personal Search' approach to pupil learning in RME, spanning early years to the third year of secondary. This seemed to favour a rationalist approach to morals, and a 'personal' individualist stance.	See Nixon, 2008, p494.
iv.	The fourfold Es&Os structure for the *Health and Wellbeing* (HWB) subject area is: Planning for Choices and Changes, Physical Activity and Health, Substance Misuse, and Relationships, Sexual Health and Parenthood. HWB refers occasionally to human rights, and focuses mainly on physical and mental health.	See HWB *Benchmarks*, 2017.
v.	There are 5 BGE/RME 'Levels'. At every level the value of respect for other people with different opinions and beliefs, is seen as of fundamental importance. Children show respect by being compassionate towards others, and by caring about them.	See RME *Benchmarks*, 2017, pp5-20.
vi.	Diversity is strongly stated. A key way children can show respect for others is by being tolerant of their beliefs, traditions and values.	See RME *Es&Os/Benchmarks*, 3-02a 3-07a, p15. RME *Principles and Practice*, p1.
vii.	Scotland is said to be a Christian, religious society – RME language suggests most people have religious beliefs and values.	"all children and young people will develop an understanding of Christianity, which has shaped the history and traditions of Scotland" (RME *Principles and Practice*, p2).
viii.	RME exemplified values include values such as fairness, equality, love, caring and sharing, honesty, respect and compassion. They are stated as examples for teachers not Curriculum moral standards.	RME Benchmarks, Level 2, 2-02b, 2-09c.
ix.	A *beliefs/values/actions* moral continuum seems to be assumed. Beliefs precede values, and human action is assumed to reliably flow from personally adopted values.	RME Benchmarks, for example "Analyses the relationship between own beliefs and actions", 3rd Level, p13.
x.	Society is assumed to be not as just, equal, compassionate or tolerant as it should be, but there is no argument to support this.	See RME Benchmarks, 3rd Level, p15.

Table 3.

Senior Phase initial findings, 4th, 5th and 6th Year of Secondary (age 16-18).

	Early Finding	Documentary Sources/Evidence
i.	RME becomes RMPS in the Senior Phase, with a threefold structure: *World Religions*; *Morality and Belief*; *Religious and Philosophical Questions* (RPQ).	National 5 RMPS *Course Specification,* 2019, pp4-9; Support Notes, pp20-21. National 5 *Specimen Questions/Marking Instructions*.
ii.	The *Morality and Belief* component of RMPS is applied ethics (issues of special ethical concern), with no obvious normative ethical component.	National 5 RMPS *Course Specification*, 2019, p7. National 5 *Specimen Questions/Marking Instructions*.
iii.	RMPS is more prescriptive than BGE/RME because of independently assessed content for National 5 and above.	National 5 RMPS *Course Specification*, 2019, p1, and pp11-17.
iv.	Despite point iii above, teachers still choose much of what is taught, selecting from broad syllabus options. They select one *World Religion* (from a list of six: Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism and Sikhism), and one *Morality and Belief* option (from a list of five applied ethics topics: justice; relationships; environment and global issues; medicine and the human body; conflict), and one RPQ option from a list of four – origins; existence of God; the problem of evil and suffering; and miracles.	National 5 RMPS *Course Specification*, 2019, pp5-9. For *Morality and Belief* the checklist includes: • Factual information about moral issues (applied ethics). • Religious and non-religious viewpoints • Principles behind religious and non-religious viewpoints • Examples of religious and non-religious responses • Comparison of viewpoints p63.
v.	The *World Religion* component facilitates a range of religion-specific values and views from the perspective of the chosen religion.	National 5 RMPS *Course Specification*, 2019, pp39-62. National 5 *Specimen Questions/Marking Instructions*.
vi.	The *Morality and Belief* component considers applied ethics topics (such as abortion, or crime and punishment), from different ethical perspectives selected by teachers including 'religion', 'consequences'; 'duty'; 'human rights' and 'authority' (the State, the Church or experts decide).	An example of language used is "Candidates could consider … viewpoints based on the importance of consequences" (National 5 Course Specification, p27). Teachers are free to identify and use unlisted and non-religious perspectives, however.
vii.	The RPQ component is philosophy of religion, with no apparent normative ethical content.	National 5 RMPS *Course Specification*, 2019, pp8-9.

From quantitative presence and discursive (documentary) detail, religious moralities immediately appeared highly privileged in both RME and RMPS. Six world religions are covered, each with their own morality system, and each religion's foundational beliefs, practices and values are described and explained. Conversely, no description, content or justification of the normatively 'ethical' or moral philosophy was found; values were not

defined and the 'good' never seemed to be mentioned or discussed.

Early research/analysis suggested that apart from (four) HWB Es&Os human rights references, some exemplified basic values, and religion-specific moral codes, there may in fact not be an ethics as such in the Curriculum, unless individual schools and teachers (and children) choose them. Three early conclusions started to suggest this, all of which strengthened as the study progressed:

1. The moral tended not to be seen as something objective to be taught (learned), but one of a range of education tools to help learners analyse a subject, think critically and decide what values they want to adopt. Normative ethics as right and wrong personal behaviour, or good and bad actions, did not appear to be discussed.

2. Leaving aside around 16% of children in Roman Catholic schools with different guidance, from Primary 1 to Senior 3, non-denominational school and teacher choice over RME content seemed to be near total. Furthermore, 90% of Scottish children (2018), did not go on to RMPS for Nationals (the – 10% – statistic includes the Roman Catholic cohort which I thought was likely to be quite a large element). This data was supplied by the *Scottish Qualifications Authority* following a specific information request, and was supplementary to the *Summary Statistics for Schools in Scotland* compendium released on 11th December 2018.

3. Teachers rather than the Curriculum largely seemed to decide what values are discussed in (BGE) RME/HWB. There were human rights (referenced in a new *Health and Wellbeing* topic, but not discussed as an ethical framework), a plethora of policy and educational values all schools must implement, and a significant applied ethics component in the later years of RME and throughout RMPS, but there seemed to be little or no mention of normative ethics, and no mention at all of the good and bad.

Looking back, these early findings largely withstood further research, interrogation and analysis. They mostly became, in fact, essential components in a developing narrative of relativism and individualism, underpinning a neutral ethical stance, and what Schiro (2013) calls a 'Social Efficiency' ideology. Schiro's *Social Efficiency* thesis (discussed in Chapter 2), is that schooling exists to meet the needs of society; the education focus is on competencies and skills, and educators are managers tasked with finding the most efficient way of producing an educated product.

1.3: A Philosophical, Documentary Approach, and Positionality

Following early investigations and essay preparation, I opted for a philosophical study for a number of reasons. Firstly, empirical and sociological data could certainly have yielded

something interesting (and was my preferred option when I started, pursuing this to formal submission to Napier's *Research and Integrity Committee* for qualitative, semi-structured school/teacher interviews). I wanted, however, to focus on ideas and their underlying philosophical/theoretical assumptions, to get behind phenomena (things that exist and happen). It had become clear that such underlying Curriculum assumptions were almost certainly going to be implicit, probably opaque, and conceptual in character.

Furthermore, according to Pring (2012), philosophy of education needs to be reclaimed for educational research because (he argues), educational controversies have come to be seen as only resolvable empirically. He contends, rather, for philosophical research *because* philosophical questions including ethics, ethical virtues, standards and knowledge, "permeate almost every aspect of educational research, policy-making, educational practice and deliberation" (Pring, 2012, p153). Chiming strongly with the embedded nature of CfE's ethics, Pring's concerns impinge upon "implicit and unexamined" (p155) values, which dodge the ethical issues intrinsically involved in educating the young, and which assume the issues are "ethically neutral" (p157). This 'dodging' the ethical, and ethical neutrality is a key point, and goes to the heart of my thesis. It was CfE's 'implicit and unexamined' values and ethics I wanted (and still needed) to find, and understand.

Secondly, during the course of initial document analysis and evaluation, there were indeed glimpses of philosophical ethics (albeit tentative, partial and implicit), which pointed towards possible Kantian rationalism, consequentialism/utilitarianism, as well as neo-Aristotelian virtues and moral character. This suggested a philosophical approach would be needed to understand and evaluate what might be there, but largely hidden. For example if, as seemed possible (and became increasingly apparent), there were unarticulated assumptions about how children make sense of experience in the learning process, Kant's rational arguments for purely formal properties of concepts, and a noumenal world of things in themselves (but located outside the world of all possible knowledge (Warnock, 1987)), might be needed to understand them. The same was true for palimpsests (that is, concepts that have been worked over and altered, but are still recognisable), of Aristotelian ethics, consequentialism, utilitarian ethics and pluralism. I thought philosophical/theoretical concepts and categories were going to be needed.

Together these considerations – concepts prior to phenomena, the importance and

relevance of philosophy of education, the implicit, embedded nature of what I was looking for, and the philosophical nature of many early indications – suggested a philosophical approach. The question then, was whether this would be based exclusively on a documentary analysis, empirical data, or a mixture of both, and which ethical texts would be used.

A Documentary Analysis.

Two key aspects of my decision to go for a philosophical analysis, also suggested a documentary analysis: concepts prior to and underpinning phenomena, and the hidden, embedded nature of the ethics I was looking for. Why construct a valid sample of 'instances' of experience (and I was not certain this was possible), if their underlying theoretical significance was in fact my target? The RD5 essay also pointed clearly to the latter, and my initial findings strongly suggested that CfE documents would amply support it. Thus an exclusive documentary analysis was chosen.

Focus and Positionality.

RD5 preparation and essay writing had identified key sources and literatures. The need now was focus, and a still unsolved difficulty of achieving this before knowing clearly what CfE's ethics actually were. In fact this classic 'chicken and egg' problem rumbled on for some time, and was only really settled when value pluralism and Isaiah Berlin's thesis emerged and became a central meta-ethical focus.

Nonetheless, parking the 'focus' problem for now, provoked a number of theoretical detours into Lacanian ethics and his *Seminar VII*, Foucault's bio-power thesis, Kant's Second Critique (of *Practical Reason*), *Plato's Dialogues* and a number of tertiary education texts. Frustratingly, this reading broadened research horizons further at the very time I was trying to find focus (the breadth of reading nonetheless proved very useful in later phases of the project). I had already read/used Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, Hume's *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, Mill's *Utilitarianism, On Liberty* and *The Subjection of Women*, and many articles in *'Scottish Education'* editions one to five, during the project's Proposal phase. A (meta-ethical), value pluralist theme now started to emerge, eventually becoming an ethical prism through which to understand and examine CfE's values and ethics. This quickly led to the work of Isaiah Berlin, arguably the foremost post-war theorist of value pluralism in Britain, and someone, in fact, I had read twenty-five years before.

Preconceptions and Biases?

My biases as a researcher of CfE's values and ethics, perhaps come from some aspects of my academic and professional background. A decade prior to my 1990s Humanities and Philosophy degree, I completed four years theological training with the *Evangelical Movement of Wales*, to become a Baptist Minister, followed by a period on the editorial team of the *Evangelical Times* Newspaper. Soon after completion of theological training however, I became agnostic, left the church, joined local government, and finished formal working life (in the heyday of New Labour public policy) as Partnerships, Policy and Communications Director for a Hertfordshire Council. Leaving the Church had led to a (now) long-standing interest in philosophical ethics, including Isaiah Berlin; a belief that what is good is prior to faith (as Plato argued in the *Euthyphro*), and an ongoing search for a coherent non-religious ethics to underpin compassionate and just society.

This personal trajectory may have influenced how I approached CfE's decision to embed the moral in a religious framework, as well as how I view and approach policy issues (and rhetoric) arising in CfE/government documents. Two things perhaps mitigate potential bias. First, being deliberately (and necessarily), source-led at the outset, ensured CfE data shaped the project not my preconceptions. This helped to ensure that data collection led to argument(s), not the other way round. Secondly, it had become clear that RME/RMPS was CfE's core element for moral learning, and had therefore largely selected itself.

Discussing the nature of educational research, Coe (2012) adopts a pragmatic, eclectic approach, and identifies three key characteristics: "the nature of reality (ontology), how we can know about it (epistemology), and the different values (axiology) that might underpin enquiry" (p5). All three philosophical issues feature prominently in my study; thus my approach might also be described as pragmatic and eclectic in Coe's sense. He postulates a comparison between positivist-quantitative research characteristics, and constructivist-qualitative characteristics. Of the fourteen 'differences' between them he identifies, my thesis approximates to four on the positivist side, including: "The world of phenomena are real and exist independently of perception" [and] "there is truth and objective knowledge about the world" (Coe, 2012, p7). It approximates to a further ten on the constructivist side, including the key idea that: "Research is inductive ... Hypotheses and theory emerge … critically tested and refined against data and theory. Researchers aim to avoid making

assumptions before collecting data. Human beings are active participants … interacting with their environment … bringing their own meanings" (p7). The latter is a very good description indeed of my approach to document and textual analysis.

Coe also makes the point (paraphrasing Pring (2000)), that the choice to adopt one particular paradigm, or way of seeing the world over another, "cannot in principle be justified logically" (p8), because such an argument must be made from within a particular paradigm. This too, helps to illuminate my positionality, because many of the questions about ethics I am asking (and proffering answers to), within an education setting, have existed for millennia in one form or another within one or more moral philosophy paradigm. Tension between ethics and education appeared early on and did not abate throughout the project period.

1.4: Project Themes and Research Questions

Having identified key sources, the project could in principle move from being source-led to being argument led, with the arguments themselves critically tested and refined against documentary data and theoretical texts (Coe, 2012, p7). A number of key themes had by now emerged, including glimpses of three kinds of philosophical ethics, and a possible value-pluralist meta-ethic. The initial findings and emergent themes then prompted the research question and sub-questions (set out below the themes); the themes were:

- Quasi-religious moralities. Non-confessional, comparative religion in non-denominational schools (in practice other than Roman Catholic schools), emerged as the BGE *Experiences and Outcomes* framework for CfE's approach to the moral.
- Developmentalism emerged as a/the major pedagogic influence. A cognitive developmental emphasis, expressed in CfE as *Active Learning*, pointed to child-centred learning and moral developmental theory. Kantian rationalism/autonomy seemed evident in the requirement for children to develop their own beliefs and values through a *Personal Search* RME programme.
- Aristotle. A possible Aristotelian ethics and ontology, primarily in the *Four Capacities* statement, setting out twenty-nine character-based capacities, attributes and capabilities, and the adoption of some neo-Aristotelian agent-based language, including the *Excellence* (*arete*, virtue) title component of the Curriculum itself.
- Consequentialism/Instrumentalism. A probable consequentialist component, associated with a very clearly articulated vocational emphasis on children's economic potential, Scotland's *National Priorities* and economy. This was expressed as skills for learning, life and work, and for young people to "take their place in Scotland's modern society and economy" (*A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, 2008, p3).

- Social Moral Values. A heavy stress on values of all kinds. CfE was said by *Education Scotland* to be a "values-based" Curriculum (*Statement for Practitioners*, 2016, p4). It identified wisdom, justice, compassion and integrity as primary policy values, and a large range and type of educational values. There are discursive pointers to the moral kind of values, but as examples only. A '*beliefs-values-action'* continuum in RME assumed that human action is largely a matter of choosing in line with one's beliefs and values.
- Value Pluralism. A pluralist approach to different ways of living and religions gradually emerged. Many sets of equally correct beliefs and evaluative standards were probably being assumed in very clear, strong RME/HWB statements around diversity, respect and tolerance.

Research Questions.

The research question was now finalised: *what ethics if any, are embedded in Curriculum for Excellence, based on the evidence of Curriculum documents?* Five sub-questions quickly followed:

1. Values. What do CfE's social moral values tell us about the ethics they apply?
2. Developmentalism. How does cognitive-developmental theory impact CfE's ethics?
3. Quasi-religious moralities. What impact, if any, is Scotland's rapidly fading Christian heritage having on CfE's values and ethics?
4. Kantian, Aristotelian, Humean, and Consequentialist/Utilitarian ethics. To what extent can CfE be said to assume and/or support these major systems of ethics?
5. Value pluralism. In what ways does value pluralist theory impact CfE's values and ethics?

1.5: A Specifically Ethical Project.

The thesis approaches the Curriculum from the perspective of ethics. Ethical theory is written very precisely, but the practical solutions ethical theory tends to suggest to the ethical problems of life, are often imprecise and contested. Following Berlin I take political philosophy to be a branch of ethics in fact (Berlin, 2013a, p2, and 1998, p193), and do not adopt any particular political stance, using theory from all sides of political debate. I assume education is a major public good, reflecting a very wide range of political views. I also assume a small 'p' politics of human understanding, rather than traditional left-center-right polemics. I take a Berlinian middle way in meta-ethics (between relativist and objectivist standpoints), and a middle way politically. Such political and ethical 'middles' tend, however, by their very nature to be hard to define and hold, because they (necessarily) exist in tension, and can be

attacked from both sides.

The Moral and the Ethical.

The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (2016) says the "morality of people and their ethics amount to the same thing" (p315). CfE largely seems to follow this line, defining neither term and taking no position on them, leaving the space vacant (I shall argue) for schools, teachers and children to fill. Following Berlin (2001 and 2013a), I adopt an objective position in relation to values and ethics, but assume that young people challenging and thinking for themselves about ethics is a good in itself (see for example Millar, 1972, and Gramsci, 1971/1999, below), with the potential, therefore, that they may adopt a subjective position.

The 'moral' (*moralis*), relates to law, custom, rules and obligations; moral actions children should do or refrain from; something sacrosanct; often encoded in culture and/or society if no longer on tablets of stone. When I speak about the 'moral kind' of values, and CfE's *social moral* values, this is what I mean.

I adopt Berlin's view of ethical thought: the "systematic examination of the relations of human beings to each other, the conceptions, interests and ideals from which human ways of treating one another spring, and the systems of value on which such ends of life are based" (Berlin, 2013a, p1). Berlin focuses strongly on the human beings the values affect, and how they treat each other. When I refer to ethics 'as such' this is what I mean.

Bernard Williams too, thinks values play an important role in ethics and human actions. Williams (1995), says "Moral philosophy is the philosophical, reflective study of certain values that concern human beings. A sense of ethical values informs people's lives, directly in deciding what to do, and in their comments and judgements on people and actions, including their own" (p546). This too, helps to draw boundaries around my project, because if he is right (as with his Oxford colleague, Berlin), the ethical cannot be understood apart from "certain values" concerning human beings.

To value something is to "advance it as a consideration in influencing choice and guiding oneself and others" (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p493). I take a value to be an ideal, something desirable which broadly explains why an action might be good or bad. In a secular, scientistic, plural society however, ethics seem to have become hard to apprehend and we massively struggle to agree what they are, or even if they exist at all. Plato's Euthyphro

dilemma shows, however, that our difficulty of knowing what the good for human beings is, and where it comes from, is by no means a new or easily solved puzzle. It may even be the case that if a Plato/Aristotle telos, Thomist divine purpose, and utilitarianism's one simple principle are all ruled out, and humans really are the measure of all things (as Plato's Protagoras thought), relativistic, plural societies such as ours may never again agree what ethics are (if 'society' collectively ever did).

If, however, ethics are concerned with the conceptions and ideals that underpin the way human beings treat each other, as Berlin (and following him) I take them be, it must to some extent also be a work in progress, and a never completed one at that, because no-one knows the future. Ethics must, therefore, to some extent entail the discomfort of not knowing exactly how to act in advance of any particular future ethical choice.

Also following Berlin, I take relativism to be the doctrine that the judgements of people or groups are the expression of taste, emotional attitude or outlook, with no objective correlate determining their truth or falsehood; all ends and values are relative to the chooser, and therefore equal. Some writers distinguish sharply between cultural and individual relativism, where the latter taken to the limit becomes subjectivism. Berlin does not and I shall not.

I adopt the view that all sides of political debate remain deeply dissatisfied with a world that cannot live up to their moral ideals, and dreams of harmony and perfection (Popper, 1945). No single political system, set of values or ethics has a monopoly of the good for human beings, just as no one person does. The thesis therefore uses texts from communism, postmodernism, liberalism and conservatism. Common themes connecting them include a desire for the human good, human understanding, integration and communication; what Antonio Gramsci referred to as 'good sense' rather than 'common sense', to:

> work out consciously and critically one's own conception of the world and thus, in connection with the labours of one's own brain, choose one's sphere of activity, take an active part in the creation of the history of the world, be one's own guide, refusing to accept passively and supinely from outside the moulding of one's personality. (Gramsci, 1971/1999, p627).

Incarcerated in Mussolini's prison, Gramsci is putting culture and language before uncritical political struggle. The thesis adopts this expansive view in relation to CfE's values

and ethics; for children to think for themselves, be their own master and above all not be prisoners of other people's ideas.

1.6: Five Key Concepts

Five key concepts are present in almost all chapters, and run throughout the thesis: *relativism* about plural values led (I will argue), to *neutrality* about the good, to the *delegation* of the moral kind of values to schools, teachers and children, and consequent *individualizing* of school ethics. In addition a general blendedness, or *eclecticism* seems to characterise CfE's approach to ethics. The following summarises these and some of the evidence for them:

- *Relativist accounts of value pluralism*. Lack of agreement about how society should judge moral issues seems to have led to moral plurality, and a relativism that says it is all, now, just a matter of opinion (Haydon, 1993, p4), see also Haydon (1997). CfE's values and ethics have seemed to reflect what one writer (Warnock, 1996), called the rampant relativism of the age.

- *Neutrality about the good.* Terms usually used in relation to ethics – good, bad, right and wrong, are never used, and appear nowhere in the documentary record (see RME *Experiences and Outcomes*, 2017, Early Years to Fourth Level. See also RMPS Nationals *Course Specifications*).

- *Delegation of ethics to schools, teachers and children*. CfE does not set the moral kind of standards. There is "little uniformity of practice" in non-denominational school RME (Matemba, 2018, p356). The *Review Group* (2004), says the basis of children's specifically moral stances are Scottish social values, but it nowhere says what those values are. Within the general remit of policy and educational values, a growing human rights agenda and a handful of exemplified basic RME values for younger children, schools, teachers and children appear to decide what these mysterious Scottish social values are. This can also be seen as a 'customary morality'; handed down moral principles defined by social dynamics.

- *Individualising of schools, teachers and children*. Foucault (1991a) argued that "modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question" (p265). He argues that there is a masked tendency towards individualism in modern Western societies. CfE's delegation of morals to individual schools, teachers and children fits very well into such a prior condition of modern society.

- *Ethical eclecticism*. I argue that the Curriculum facilitates access to a wide range of suppressed/repressed ethical and meta-ethical perspectives, concealed beneath a surface, and appearing (in particular) in RME and HWB *Experiences and Outcomes* (2017), and the *Four Capacities*. These include Kantian rationalism, quasi-

  Aristotelian ontology, consequentialism and value pluralism.

My research suggests that palimpsests of at least four kinds of ethics are discernible in the documentary record: value pluralism, consequentialism, Kantian rationalism and quasi-Aristotelian ethics. These, arguably, are not necessarily conflated, although that is a constant possibility (and danger). What I will call CfE's *ethics 101+* is, I suggest, a basket of options for schools and teachers to take up or not as required. The problem for ethics, however, is that they manifest in the record as fragmented parts of whole systems, minus extremely important concepts their theory needed to make them practical.

1.7: Glossary of terms

The following terms used in the thesis have the meanings here briefly ascribed to them:

Consequentialism. The bearers of ethical value are good states of affairs, assessing the worth of actions in terms of their tendency to bring about those states, sometimes called the teleological view (Williams, 1995).

Customary morality. The handed-down, every day, common sense moral principles of the majority, shaped by society dynamics rather than ethical theory or philosophy.

Developmentalism. Moral development viewed as a gradual psychological progression from egocentric through a period of conformity, to the formation of moral principles, focusing on cognitive reasoning.

Education. Children coming to understand their world, learning to enjoy it, gaining the independence they need to control it. Education should impart to them a distinctively human ethical dimension, including the capacity to think, reason, feel, and appreciate things from another's point of view (Warnock, 1998).

Ethics. Conceptions, interests and ideals underpinning how human beings treat each other, and the systems of value on which human ends of life are based (Berlin, 2013a).

Good. The ethical objective; seeking human goodness. A sort of 'living and faring well' (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics).

Instrumentalism. Learning undertaken not for its own sake but for some other purpose, and an emphasis on skills for work in the later stages of the secondary school, focusing on the concepts of consumers, individualism and competition (see Schiro, 2013).

Known unknowns. Modal epistemic logic (reasoning about knowledge). Things we know exist, but we do not know what they are, such as Scottish schools' individual ethos, teachers and children's values, or attitudes to faith.

Metaethics. The study of moral thought and language.

Morality, the Moral, *Moralis*. Relates to law, rules, custom and obligations; moral actions children should do or refrain from; something sacrosanct; often encoded in culture and/or

society if no longer on tablets of stone. In relation to religious obligation: survivals of earlier conceptions of ethics which no longer survive (Anscombe, 1958).

Naturalism. The view that everything is natural, belonging to the world of nature, subject to scientific investigation. Ethical naturalism rejects non-natural properties and the idea that ethics is unique (a *sui generis* subject which cannot be reduced to a lower concept or included in a higher).

Objectivity. Subjectively conceived values and ends can have meaningful objective correlates because humans pursue things for their own sake, to which other things are means (Berlin, 2013a).

Quasi-Aristotelian. The letter and some of the language, but not the spirit of Aristotle's ethics, CfE remaining vague and non-committal about human good and the virtues.

Quasi-religious. Non-denominational schools pursue a largely sceptical, quasi-religious trajectory in secular Scotland; it is just another academic subject and more about process than product (Matemba, 2018).

Realism. The view that ethical sentences express propositions which *can* be true or false. To be non-cognitivist is to think that ethical sentences cannot be true or false, sometimes leading to the view that moral knowledge is therefore not possible.

Realism (Internal). A combination of Isaiah Berlin's value pluralism (that all genuine problems are specific to their unique human circumstances), and his account of objectivity (that subjectively conceived values and ends can have meaningful objective correlates).

Relativism. The doctrine that the judgements of people or groups are the expression of taste, emotional attitude or outlook, with no objective correlate determining their truth or falsehood; all ends and values are relative to the chooser, and therefore equal.

Social Efficiency. Schooling exists to meet the needs of society. The focus is on competencies and skills, and educators are managers tasked with finding the most efficient way of producing an educated product (Schiro, 2013).

Social moral values. An agent's viewpoint defining social facts and moral values. The emphasis is internal and rational, on reflection, perspective-taking, and autonomous choice (Kohlberg, 1976).

Truth. Berlin (1991a and 1998) thought defining truth is not possible, neither universal nor the same for everyone, but scepticism is self-refuting, ending up sceptical about being sceptical. Williams (2002) thought there was a pervasive suspicion that there is no such thing as truth, and if there is it is merely relative. Williams (2002) thought it was an intellectual objective (finding out the truth), and a cultural value (telling it).

Unknown unknowns. Things we do not know exist such as individual school or teachers' values and/or faith, AND we do not know what they are if they do exist.

Value pluralism. Problems of value are not solvable. All genuine problems are specific to their unique circumstances. Ideals of a perfect person or perfect society are not possible, and human values can be incompatible: a gain in one often entails a corresponding loss in another

(Berlin, 2001 and 2013a).

A Value. To value something is to "advance it as a consideration in influencing choice, guiding oneself and others" (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p493). An ideal, something desirable which broadly explains why an action might be good or bad, right or wrong.

Values education. The promotion and development of specifically ethical values in the context of education, to help children live well as responsible members of plural society.

A Virtue. Neither a passion or a capacity. A state of character concerned with choice (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics).

1.8: The Thesis, Concluding Remarks

Chapter 1 has introduced a specifically ethical project, enmeshed in *Curriculum for Excellence*, noting significant controversy CfE generated from the outset. Many Scottish writers argue that it was under-conceptualised, theoretically weak and unargued for, with an instrumental focus on workplace skills, and the world beyond school. CfE does not call itself a knowledge-focused Curriculum, emphasising skills.

I suggest the thesis offers a new perspective through which to examine CfE, by analysing the ethics it assumes, focusing in particular on the value pluralism of Isaiah Berlin.

The research began 'source led' not 'argument led'. Until I thought I knew what CfE's values and embedded ethics were, it was not possible to examine or understand them. Initial literature/document searching, analysis and evaluation, led to key themes and research questions. The process also led to a decision to opt for a philosophical study based exclusively on documentary analysis. Only then was I able to move to becoming argument-led.

I have identified RME as CfE's organisational/educational focus for the moral, and introduce five key thesis concepts: relativist accounts of value pluralism; neutrality about the good; delegation of ethics to schools, teachers and children; consequent individualising (of schools, teachers and children), and ethical eclecticism. What I am calling CfE's *ethics 101+* is introduced: glimpses of four kinds of ethics: value pluralism, consequentialism, Kantian rationalism and quasi-Aristotelian ethics.

This completes Chapter 1. Chapter 2 introduces the Curriculum itself.

Chapter 2: Curriculum for Excellence

Chapter Abstract

Chapter 2 introduces the Curriculum and its organising framework. I make use of Michael Schiro's (2013) thesis to understand more about key education ideologies that may underpin the Curriculum. All four of his 'modes of thinking' are identifiable in CfE.

Education Scotland is very clear that schools and teachers must "identify what will be taught" (Statement for Practitioners, 2016, p5), to "provide" the curriculum (p4). CfE is not seen as a traditional, specified Curriculum; *Experiences and Outcomes* (Es&Os), set outcome targets for children, teachers select the inputs.

CfE has a basic Broad General Education/Senior Phase structure. The OECD had recommended that learning should be for students not subjects, and be more engaging and motivating for them. In CfE knowledge has seemed implicit not explicit, significantly shaping eight subject areas. Priestley and Biesta (2013) think a new kind of neo-liberal curriculum (and progressivism) emerged across the Anglophone world around the time of CfE, which embraced constructivist pedagogies, focusing on skills, employability and a perceived need for an unambiguous economic focus.

Many writers (see Priestley and Humes, 2010; Priestley and Biesta, 2013; Sinnema and Aitken, 2013;), have thought such neo-liberal trends significantly strengthened in CfE.

The chapter provides a brief overview of post-war Scottish education history, noting that despite a unique Scottish theme of widening access for all butting up against comprehensivisation of the 1960s (Paterson, 2003), CfE largely continued rather than began a drift away from knowledge for its own sake towards extrinsic vocational skills. Paterson (2003) sees education reform coming up against a Scottish "inherited belief that true education was academic and general" (p108), provoking opposition from vocationalists, for whom academic education was a distraction from the needs of the economy.

I introduce CfE's much strengthened vocational focus and its approach to practitioner freedoms. The latter are basic in CfE, and loudly proclaimed in the record, alongside provision of experiences and skills said to contribute to the child's own learning, and to destinations beyond school. I also discuss CfE's strengthened child-centred stance, thought by some theorists to favour children from middle class backgrounds.

2.1: The Curriculum

The *Review Group* (2004), says it was tasked with identifying the purposes of education 3-18, and principles for the design of the curriculum, taking account of views expressed during the 2002 *National Debate on Education*. CfE was duly launched in 2004 with the document *A Curriculum-for-Excellence: The Curriculum Review-Group,* introducing CfE in terms of values, purposes, and principles, rather than a traditional aims and objectives curriculum model.

Pupils, parents, teachers, employers and others took part in the *National Debate*; in all it is claimed up to around 20,000 people were involved. According to Munn, et al (2004), 1,517 written responses were split roughly between pupils (29%); organisational responses (school boards etc., 19%); parents (17%); teachers (12%); other (23%).

Summarising a Report on the *National Debate* from the *Parliamentary Committee for Education*, Munn et al (2004), say there was widespread support for a "broad view of educational purposes including the promotion of positive values" (p444). The need to improve behaviour featured prominently, including concerns about children's motivation to learn, attitude to school, literacy, numeracy, ICT, foreign languages, craft and design, money management, sport, young people's statutory rights, parenting skills, sexual health, and drugs. Universities Scotland thought pupil capacity for abstract thought needed improving, as well as their ability to take responsibility for their own learning and motivate themselves to study.

A Programme of Educational Change.

By 2011 all schools were working to the new framework, introduced as "one of the most ambitious programmes of educational change ever undertaken in Scotland" (*A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, 2008, p8). Two key policy drivers were the HM Inspectorate of Education (HMIE) Report: *Improving Scottish Education: Effectiveness of Education Authorities* (2006), and an Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Report, *Quality and Equity of Schooling in Scotland* (2008). The Scottish Government had asked the OECD to examine in depth the performance of the current school system. Acknowledging many strengths, the OECD and HMIE identified four main challenges for Scottish education:

1. An achievement gap associated with deprivation.
2. Too many children and young people not developing necessary competencies,

capabilities and values.
3. Insufficient rigour around essential skills, particularly literacy and numeracy.
4. Too few relevant, lively and motivating learning opportunities.
(*A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, pp8-9).

To address these and other challenges CfE says it aspires to help children develop *The Four Capacities*. Fundamental literacy and numeracy are said to be skills not knowledge. Scotland's '*National Entitlements'* for children form a basic structure:

- A coherent curriculum from 3 to 18.
- A Broad General Education (BGE), 3 to 15 (Early Years to S3).
- A Senior Phase, 16 to 18, (S4-S6).
- Development of skills for learning, life, and work.
- Personal support moving into positive and sustained destinations beyond school.
(*A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, p11).

There are four *Contexts for Learning*: Curriculum Areas and Subjects; Interdisciplinary Learning; the Ethos and Life of the School, and Opportunities for Personal Achievement, and eight subject areas, or skill-sets, three – Health and Wellbeing (HWB), Mathematics and Languages – are the responsibility of all. Others are Expressive Arts, Science, Social Studies, Technologies, Religious and Moral Education (RME). In the (Junior Phase) BGE (age 3-15), there are Es&Os (*Experiences and Outcomes*), and in 2016/17 brief teacher *Benchmarks* were added. Es&Os span five Levels: Early Years (Nursery-P1) age 3-6; First (P2-P4) age 7-9; Second (P5-P7) age 10-12; Third (S1-S2) age 13-14; Fourth (S2-S3) age 14-15. Es&Os set out learning targets for children, "what learners need to know and be able to do to progress through the levels" (RME Es&Os, p2). 'Doing' skills, thus join 'knowing' things in CfE.

In a 2016 Curriculum 'Refresh', Education Scotland stated that CfE aspired to: "to raise standards, close the poverty related attainment gap and prepare children and young people for their future" (Statement for Practitioners, 2016, p4).

Values and moral issues are said to arise informally in all BGE subjects, but are planned components in RME, to a smaller extent HWB, and in Senior Phase RMPS. The moral and applied ethics are progressed in RME, the mainstay of CfE's values education. Es&Os stop after S3 when Senior Phase Nationals take over. Philosophy is taken by a very few (269 pupils across Scotland in 2018). Junior Phase RME gives way to Senior Phase RMPS, but only for the 10% of pupils who choose it (2018 figures). Externally accredited SQA awards/ qualifications are graded N3 to Advanced Higher, N3 and 4 are 'content free' (school assessed), N5 is said

to be roughly equivalent to the old Standard Grade. *Personal Search* is seen as an important principle in RME, where children learn 'about' religious stories and customs, and are encouraged to learn 'from' them as well, that is, find their own meaning, drawing their own conclusions through a perceived "genuine encounter" in the classroom (Nixon, 2013, p494).

BGE (Junior Phase) Experiences and Outcomes.

Es&Os for the eight subject areas are written from the child's perspective, requiring schools and teachers to decide what is taught based on the learning targets. Ninety-six short, bulleted RME outcome statements, and twenty-eight linked practitioner Benchmarks, constitute BGE guidance for teachers from age three to fifteen, for example: "Through exploring the lives and teachings of Jesus and other figures in Christianity, I am increasing my knowledge and understanding of key Christian beliefs" (RME Second Level, 2-01b). Pupils must achieve this by the end of P7; teachers decide inputs to achieve the outcome(s).

Es&Os are said to complement the *Four Capacities*, and avoid what the OECD had called rigid learning structures, resulting in "learning for subjects and not students" (*A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, p23). Es&Os and subjects are consequently said to not be "structures for timetabling" (p23). Es&Os are not long documents. Discounting preamble, RME runs to 16 pages spanning all five skill Levels (ages). 'Experiences' and 'Outcomes' mean:

- "Experiences set expectations for the kinds of activities which will promote learning and development".
- "Outcomes set out what the child or young person will be able to explain, apply or demonstrate" (*A Framework for Learning and Teaching,* p23).

Benchmarks were added in 2016/17 to help teachers avoid rigid adherence, plan learning, teaching and assessment. Es&Os aim to engage and motivate children "nurturing their talents and enabling them to develop the skills they will need for life and work" (*A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, p24), explicitly connecting them to the *Four Capacities*.

Senior Phase RMPS.

Es&Os stop at age 15, at the end of the BGE. RMPS teachers choose one from six 'world religions': Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism and Sikhism, and one from five applied ethics topics: Justice (crime and punishment), Relationships, Environment and Global Issues, Medicine and the Human Body, and Conflict (War). Teachers choose their own interpretive sources, and the Scottish Qualification Authority (SQA, to be replaced by a new

qualifications body in 2025), exemplifies (not stipulates), a menu of conceptual stances teachers might choose from to interrogate the applied ethics issues, and prepare pupils for assessment: human rights, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics and religious authorities. Teachers are free however, to choose any relevant conceptual stance to meet assessment requirements.

CfE's Schools and Teachers Create the Curriculum.

A very important way CfE differs from 3-5 and 5-14 (previous), curricula guidance, is its approach to teacher freedoms. A key statement is that "The curriculum framework sets out what a child or young person should be able to do, and the experiences that contribute to their learning, rather than detailed definitions of content" (*A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, 2008, p5). Again we see 'doing skill' rather than 'knowledge content'. In its 2016 Refresh*,* Education Scotland reiterated the key teacher role: "Teachers and practitioners provide a curriculum that is coherent and flexible [identifying] what will be taught", taking account of local context (*A Statement for Practitioners*, 2016, pp4-5).

The following statements suggest the extent to which CfE leaves the subject matter of knowledge (and moral knowledge) to school and teacher choice and decision. Such empowerment was needed, however, because they were now Curriculum creators, and creators, clearly, need freedom to be creative and the power to create:

- "It is quite scary for teachers now, to think that they have this freedom to plan. I want to give them that freedom, but I think we need some kind of skeleton there behind the skills progression". (A Primary headteacher, Hulme et al, 2009, p9).
- "CfE's strength is the fact that it does not prescribe certain methodology. In actual fact, it gives a goal that leaves it open for an imaginative and varied approach." (Secondary RME teacher, Hulme et al, 2009, p8).
- "Unlike previous attempts at a national curriculum, CfE defined the characteristics leaving it to schools and teachers to create … a curriculum to achieve these goals" (Pickard, 2008, p223).

Comments about 'freedom to plan', an open goal for teachers to aim at, and teachers who must 'create' the curriculum, demonstrate significant new choices and decisions schools and teachers would now have. Accordingly, practitioner guidance (Es&Os) seems to place the emphasis on only very general knowledge acquisitions, leaving schools and teachers to

provide detailed content.

A central point in the above statements, is that lack of content guidance leaves teachers with little alternative but to decide for themselves what to actually teach, to meet broad outcome targets. Hulme *et al,* in their 2009 *British Education Research Association* (BERA) *Conference* Report note (unsurprisingly given 5-14 controlling antecedents), that delegates generally welcomed the re-introduction of professional autonomy.

Specifically in relation to RME Es&Os and moral knowledge, Matemba (2018), describes CfE as an "open Curriculum" without "specific guidance for how and what to teach" (p356). Matemba argues that a variety of religious and moral perspectives are taught, partly influenced by their own religious and/or philosophical viewpoints, or none. Observations of this kind form part of ethical neutrality, delegation and individualism arguments to come.

2.2: Curriculum for Excellence Theory and Policy

To make sense of CfE's values and ethics, it was necessary to be aware of educational debates shaping their context. According to Schiro (2013), a fourfold ideological framework stretches back over a hundred years to the early twentieth century. Although he discusses a specifically American context, his thesis is thought to be relevant for schooling and curriculum studies in Britain. Indeed, all four of his 'modes of thinking' are broadly identifiable in CfE. His four visions, what he calls ideologies of education, are: 'Scholar Academic', 'Social Efficiency', 'Learner Centred' and 'Social Reconstruction'. In brief he defines these as follows:

> Scholar Academic. Structured around the academic disciplines of universities, and the "accumulated knowledge" (p4) of the culture, including its conceptual frameworks and ways of understanding knowledge and intellectual development. The curriculum is the means for the transmission of knowledge to pupils.
>
> Social Efficiency. Schooling exists to meet the needs of society, "to train youth in the skills and procedures they will need in the workplace and at home" (p5). The focus is on competencies and skills, and educators are managers tasked with applying "the routines of scientific procedure to curriculum making" (p5), to find the most efficient way of producing an educated 'product'.
>
> Learner Centred. The needs and concerns of the student are paramount, learning must be enjoyable, the purpose of education is the "growth of individuals, each in harmony with his or her unique intellectual, social, emotional, and physical attributes" (p5). The construction of meaning is individual; therefore the curriculum consists of the learning environment and the people (teachers and children) who create it.

Social Reconstruction. Views curriculum from a social perspective; society is currently unhealthy, lurching from crisis to crisis, therefore "the purpose of education is to facilitate the construction of a new and more just society" (p6). Truth and knowledge are seen as cultural assumptions which can and must be changed to avoid the 'crisis'.

Schiro reviews a historical perspective for each ideology, identifying various 'workers' involved such as curriculum practitioners, disseminators, evaluators, advocates, developers and theorists. He says he takes ideology as his organising framework, distinguishing between ideology and philosophy, because philosophy is often "contradicted by actual behaviour" (p10). He says his thesis, conversely, concerns motives (which he roughly identifies with ideology), that underlie the actual behaviour of curriculum workers, not their verbalised beliefs (verbalised beliefs and actions are roughly identified with philosophy). His explanation of curriculum ideology includes curriculum "visions, philosophies, doctrines, opinions, conceptual frameworks, and belief systems" (p8), which underly the actions of educators, but which they are often not conscious of.

Schiro's approach to philosophy is interesting, because in the UK philosophy is often identified with underlying conceptual questions and doctrines, rather than practices and actions, which are often thought to follow from them. For example, beliefs and values (that is, conceptions, interests, ideals etc.), are often identified with motives to action (CfE seems to do this in its RME subject area, examined in Chapter 11). Discussing research methods in education, Coe (2012) thinks "the philosophical position you adopt determines the kind of research that is worth doing, the kinds of questions you can ask and the methods you will use" (p5). Identifying ideology with motives, Schiro's usage perhaps assumes someone's ideology underpins their philosophy, which then underpins their behaviour, but it is not clear that this is what he means.

Schiro's four 'ideologies' nonetheless do important descriptive work, helpfully explaining currents of thought readily identifiable in CfE, two of which – Scholar Academic and Learner Centred are discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter 5. His Social Efficiency ideology correlates closely with CfE's neo-liberal emphasis and instrumentalism (discussed in Chapter 6). Under this head he sees education existing to meet the needs of society, to train young people in the skills they need in the workplace and home. His focus on competencies and skills chime strongly with CfE Es&Os emphasis on outcomes for children and skills. His

Learner Centred ideology seems particularly appropriate, where he says the needs and concerns of students are paramount, and learning must be enjoyable. This is arguably true in CfE's *Active Learning* approach, where the construction of meaning is largely an individual, inside-out process (discussed and examined in Chapters 8 and 11), and the learning environment seen as of paramount importance.

Curriculum scholars have been critical of the conflation of 'learner centred' ideology with 'social efficiency' curricular. The workplace not the child is central in the latter, and Schiro's clearly articulated 'four-fold' thesis helps to avoid such elision. His 'Social Reconstruction' vision, where "the purpose of education is to facilitate the construction of a new and more just society" (Schiro, 2013, p6), also correlates well with CfE. RME Es&Os, for example, say that "Having reflected upon Christian responses to issues of morality, I can discuss ways in which to create a more just, equal, compassionate and tolerant society" (RME 3-02a), repeated at Level 4. Correlation with Schiro's analysis across all four of his 'ideologies of education', affirms their usefulness as a tool to understand important aspects of CfE's underlying policy and its application.

CfE's Definition of 'Curriculum'.

There are many ways of defining a curriculum. The Oxford Dictionary of Education gives: "The content and specifications of a course or programme of study" applying to all pupils in the nation (p69). Schools reviewed online tend to adopt a position that whatever approach is taken, everyone involved should know what is trying to be achieved. CfE's definition of Curriculum is:

> the totality of experiences which are planned for children and young people through their education, wherever they are being educated. It includes the ethos and life of the school as a community; curriculum areas and subjects; interdisciplinary learning; and opportunities for personal achievement.
> (A Framework for Learning and Teaching, 2008, p20).

Comparing this with curriculum statements from two (randomly selected) Primary schools, one in Ilford, East London, another in Stoke Newington, London, lends support to two aspects of CfE: lack of specific guidance for what to teach, and the extent to which it leaves the subject matter of knowledge and moral knowledge to schools and teacher decisions. First, Churchfields, Ilford:

> Our curriculum is the body of knowledge that our pupils learn while at Churchfields

Junior School. It is best explained through the answers to three questions:

- **Intent:** What should children know by the time they leave Churchfields?
- **Implementation:** How do we teach our curriculum?
- **Impact:** How do we know how well pupils have learnt the curriculum? (https://churchfieldsjunior.com).

Then William Patten, Stoke Newington, on literacy specifically:

Intent

We have a rigorous and well organised English curriculum that provides many purposeful opportunities for reading, writing and discussion … to enable all children to:

- read easily, fluently and with good understanding
- develop the habit of reading widely and often
- acquire a wide vocabulary, an understanding of grammar and knowledge of linguistic conventions
- appreciate our rich and varied literary heritage
- write clearly, accurately and coherently, adapting their language and style
- use discussion in order to learn
- be competent in the arts of speaking and listening

These aims are embedded across our literacy lessons and the wider curriculum. We will provide the means for children to develop a secure knowledge-base in Literacy, which follows a clear pathway of progression as they advance through the primary curriculum. Rigorous assessment and review will ensure that we are able to provide targeted support so that all children experience success in literacy.
https://www.williampatten.hackney.sch.uk/our-school/

In CfE's statement knowledge is implicit; at both Churchfields and William Patten it is explicit. CfE talks about experiences, and does not mention or identify a 'body of knowledge' children should know, as understood by Churchfields, or the 'secure knowledge base' identified by William Patten. In CfE, identifying taught knowledge to meet outcome targets is largely the task of individual schools and teachers. CfE is not, then, a specified, knowledge-focused curriculum; it is better described as learner-centred, and describes itself as such.

Neo-Liberal Trends.

According to Priestley and Humes, CfE is essentially a 'mastery curriculum' (classes moving through a topic in linear fashion until most master it), expressed in the language of a process model. They and other Scottish writers (e.g. Paterson, 2003 and 2020; Humes, 2013; Gillies, 2006 and 2013), identify a lack of conceptual clarity, questioning a theoretically weak unargued for Curriculum. Few if any Scottish writers appear to argue the opposite case.

Priestley and Humes (2010), review three archetypal curriculum planning models

discussed by A.V.Kelly: curriculum as content and education as transmission; curriculum as product and education as instrumental; and curriculum as process and education as development. CfE, they argue, is a mixture of them all but they live in considerable tension, simultaneously viewing knowledge as something constructed by learners and teachers in the BGE, and a "prespecified, essentialist body of knowledge to be acquired and tested" (p358), in the Senior Phase. The balance and tension between CfE's treatment of knowledge acquisition, and subsequent assessment, thus quickly became (and remains) contentious.

Blendedness as a Curriculum characteristic emerges in Priestley and Hume's analysis, in a combination of traditional subjects, vocational skills and a mixture of three curricula policy architypes. CfE's blended character will appear again and again, especially in its values and ethics. Critical issues identified by Priestley (2013) are: whether it is as "original, innovative and radical" as claimed (p34); uncertainty about whether it takes account of curricular theory in "forming a conceptual frame for educational practices" (p34); and "whether the aspirational goals of CfE are realisable in practice" (p34). Many of the aspirational goals Priestley refers to appear in the *Four Capacities* (set out in *A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, p22, and the *Review Group* document, 2004, p12).

Priestley and Biesta (2013) describe a complex situation in relation to curriculum studies in Britain, following the introduction of the UK National Curriculum of 1988 (during the so-called Baker Reforms). They discuss perceived inadequacies, and an ensuing "pattern of continual crisis" (p2), mirrored to some extent by 5-14 guidance in Scotland (which they think failed to fully embed), and in the 'Unit Standards' approach in New Zealand, abandoned there in 2001. They think a new kind of curriculum (and progressivism) emerged across the Anglophone world around the time of CfE, which although differing in some respects, also had much in common, including child-centred, constructivist pedagogies, a focus on employability, and a claimed need to respond to globalisation which, they argue, dovetailed with a perceived need for a clear economic focus, strongly influenced by the economic development policies of the OECD. This trend towards neoliberal curricula, focusing on employability and national efficiency, also appears in supranational discourses emanating from UNESCO and the OECD.

Sinnema and Aitken (2013), identify areas of commonality emerging in Anglophone

curricula between 2004 and 2012 in Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and New Zealand (all small-sized states), as well as the influence of changes to curricula in England, Australia and the United States of America, including curriculum policy reform, and revisions to existing curricula. They identify common goals of curriculum improvement in these countries, such as equity, future focus (relevance) and coherence, and common emphases on competencies for lifelong learning, values (in teaching and learning), increased emphasis on pedagogy, student involvement in decisions affecting their education, strengthened partnerships with parents, reduced prescription, and consequent school-level autonomy.

According to Sinnema and Aitken, other "system elements" (p159) are however needed if the aspirations of such curricula are to be realised. They include the role of assessment (qualifications), teacher training, ongoing professional learning, professional standards, and school leadership. They too, see such curricula emphasising instrumentalist goals in relation to respective national economies and the global marketplace, and tension between these (competency-based approaches) and discrete subject boundaries. They think the trend towards reduced prescription can be seen as too vague, leading to widely different interpretations of, for example, child-centred pedagogy, shifting the improvement burden from those designing to those implementing it. CfE seems a clear case in point in relation to these trends, but equally, Scotland was clearly not alone or unique in stressing learner centredness, and economic instrumentalism in its education policy aims.

Knowledge Downplayed.

Reviewing similar developments around the world, Priestley thinks common features are a structure of outcomes sequenced into linear levels, and a focus on generic competencies and capacities instead of a detailed specification of knowledge content. Such curricula, he argues, have been criticised for "stripping knowledge out of the curriculum" (Priestley, 2013, p35). With the *Four Capacities* and Es&Os specifically in mind, Priestley and Biesta (2013) argue that CfE marked a turn from "curriculum as a description of the content of learning to curriculum as a description of what they should be and become" (p42). A key 'being and becoming' text is the *Four Capacities*, discussed and examined in Chapters 3, 6, 10, 11 and 12 from various perspectives. The next sub-section briefly reviews the post-war history of Scottish education.

2.3: Brief Historical Introduction

Many historical writers trace a uniquely Scottish democratising theme, in which gradually widening access for all became something like a national heritage. A useful summary is offered by James Scotland as he saw it in 1969: "Steadfast devotion to the concept of education, democracy in the classroom and academic bias, conservatism in curriculum and teaching methods, the central position of the teacher, a constant close relationship between education and religion" (p272). Scotland thought a "militant democracy" (p265), was part of the Scottish tradition, as well as devotion to education, tracing back to a Presbyterian past. Chapters 1 and 2 so far, however, suggest CfE continued a trend towards shedding the academic bias and conservatism in the classroom, which James Scotland saw in Scottish education in 1969, while retaining the close relation to religion.

Post-war education reform, in particular the 1965 comprehensive programme, has been seen as clashing with the Scottish belief that education should be academic rather than vocational. Paterson's (2003) thesis chimes with Scotland's above, tracing an ongoing academic/vocational debate which CfE seems to have moved significantly towards the latter; on the one hand maintaining eight subject areas, on the other emphasising vocational skills; widening access, but becoming more learner-centred and less knowledge-focused.

Despite this specific Scottish perspective, abolition of selection while controversial at the time, achieved wide acceptance. The passing of heavy industry had undermined an "assumption that academic education and examination qualifications could be reserved for a quarter or a third of the population" (Anderson, 2013, p248). In fact a broad consensus in support of comprehensivisation occurred (unlike in England), as well as "an end to traditional authoritarian discipline and rote learning in the Scottish classroom" (Kerevan, 2013, p266).

Paterson (2003) thinks the ending of selection quite quickly reduced social class segregation, but that it did not end, and rose again in the 1980s partly because of unemployment, and partly because parents were given more choice about which school children attended. Discussing the "role of myth", he thinks that by 2000, debates about secondary education were similar to that which had dominated throughout the century: "how to democratise access to broad, academic study" (Paterson, 2003, p153). He concludes that the Scottish form of comprehensive education was "not the one introduced by the post-1965 reorganisation, but one arising out of an older and traditional form of Scottish education", i.e.

a perceived tradition of academic learning.

The Munn and Dunning Reports of 1977 (on 'curriculum' and 'examinations' respectively), recommended significant changes to the secondary curriculum, with new courses and examinations for all S3 and S4 pupils replacing 'Ordinary' Grades designed for the 30 per cent (Pickard, 1999). The proposals led eventually to the introduction of *Standard Grade* in 1982, based on eight modes of learning (which took until 1986 to implement due to a long running teacher dispute 1984-86). The influence of R.S. Peters' and P. Hirst's theory of knowledge disciplines has been seen in Munn's 'academic' stance (Priestley and Humes, 2010; Gillies, 2013). Gillies also says of Munn (with CfE in mind), that it was probably the last time a curriculum development "would rely on philosophical ideas, as opposed to 'best practice'" (2013, p252).

3-5 and 5-14 Curriculum Guidance.

CfE's immediate predecessor(s) – the so called '3-5', and '5-14' curricula – developed during the early 1990s, were not national curricula, but came to be seen as such. According to Adams (1999) they had two linked origins: centralising political pressures in which government wanted more control over the curriculum with a limit to "teacher autonomy" (p349), and (corresponding) greater clarity for parents about standards. Gillies, too, thinks that in the development of 5-14 guidelines from 1987 onwards, government sought to "reassert control over curriculum structure, progression, time allocation and assessment", in the wake of what had been seen by the authorities as a "somewhat patchy" implementation of *The Primary Memorandum* (2013, p254).

5-14 has also been seen as a slightly less prescriptive, softer version of the English *National Curriculum* (Priestley and Biesta, 2013). In its claim that education should meet the needs of individuals and society, promote practical skills as well as knowledge, and lead to productive employment and active citizenship, 5-14 also seems to have articulated principles which subsequently appeared and strengthened in CfE, however.

Child-centredness.

Cassidy (2013) thinks 5-14 retained Piaget's "notion of learning through stages" (p42), and that the primary curriculum had found it "difficult, impossible even", to move away from a Piagetian notion of progression from one level to the next. Discussing primary education

she says the *Memorandum* clearly promoted child-centred philosophy, and the need to focus on active participation of children in their own learning, and the role of the child at the centre of learning. She sees parallels with Rousseau's *Emile, or Education*, for whom "freedom, not power, was the greatest good and this ability to do as one desires" (p40), was a fundamental maxim. Cassidy makes connections between Rousseau's notion of the child at the centre and the *Memorandum's* espousal of Piaget's developmental psychology theory of stage maturation. Quoting from page three of the *Memorandum*, she says the advice for teachers was that they must "appreciate the stages through which the child is passing in his development towards adulthood, and attempt to provide … the environment, experiences and guidance which will stimulate progress along natural lines" (Cassidy, 2013, p40). A strong developmental stress and child-centredness, was clearly an aspiration if not yet fully a feature, of Scottish education forty years before CfE.

Paterson (2003), contrasts Scottish child-centredness in theory and in practice, however, stressing a more aspirational reality in and after the *Memorandum*. He describes a "compromised adoption of child-centredness" (p118), in the years after 1965, due mainly to the shaping effect of Scottish education history, and what he calls tensions within a national tradition. He thinks we would be wrong to see *The Memorandum* as the "eventual implementation of the most radical ideas on child-centredness that the new educationalists were advocating in the 1930's" (2003, p115). He cites a number of post-war, pre-1965 reports, trying to reconcile child-centred theory with a Scottish belief in the value of what he calls 'structured learning', resulting in a uniquely Scottish version emerging in the decades after 1965. He cites a 1975 survey by the principle of Jordanhill College describing the Scottish approach as a "third style" (2003, p117), in which children have areas of freedom and opportunities for active learning, but with the teacher retaining an important shaping role "within an organised framework … progressively more taxing of their skills" (Bone and Morrow 1975c, cited by Paterson, 2003, p117).

Paterson's narrative arguably chimes with a Vygotskian structured/social learning approach, as well as Piaget (see for example Boyd, 2008b). The post-war part of his history depicts Scottish primary education becoming gradually but cautiously more child-centred. He sees reforms coming up against an "inherited belief that true education was academic and general" (Paterson, 2013, p108), however, provoking opposition from vocationalists for

whom academic education was a "diversion from the needs of industry" (p108). He raises a number of issues directly relevant to CfE's values and ethics: a growing but qualified child-centredness; an ongoing 'academic' versus 'vocational' debate, and socio-political questions about the societal aims of education, including its underlying moral/ethical purpose.

These various remarks by Adams, Gillies, Paterson and Cassidy, suggest authors of the *Primary Memorandum* were clearly influenced by child-centred theory, but with a somewhat erratic implementation in the decades immediately after, with 3-5 and 5-14 generally seen as more clearly developmental than Standard Grade. At any event, what seems clear is that child-centred assumptions emerging as *Active Learning* in CfE, were present in the rhetoric long before. Arguably, however, CfE applied the theory to all phases of schooling, and implemented it more comprehensively.

2.4: A Learner (Child) Centred Curriculum

CfE claims that it became significantly more learner/child-centred. The post-war trajectory of increasing child-centred learning theory in Scotland reviewed above, led to one *Review Group* member, Brian Boyd, describing Scottish education as having undergone something like a radical conversion to Piaget's child-centred ideas (Boyd, 2008a, p326, discussed in more detail in Chapter 8). Launching the Curriculum, T*he Review Group* (2004), say they took account of the different ways children learn. They say that a formal approach to learning and teaching had developed, but that DAP, "developmentally appropriate practice, is most conducive to effective learning", taking account of the needs of children as they develop (*Active Learning in the Early Years*, 2007, p6).

CfE's *Active Learning* is, then, child/learner-centred. Learner-centredness seems to have come to prominence in the 1960s, making the child's personal, social and physical needs central. It has been roughly traced back through Erik Erikson, Jean Piaget, Maria Montessori, John Dewey, to Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It assumes education should focus on the child's interests, and be based on experience, activity and discovery, rather than be topic or content based. The basic idea is to support the child's own construction of knowledge, through social facilitation, rather than didactic teaching. Learner-centredness has many similar characteristics, putting a learner's self-determination, emotional, psychological and creative interests and aspirations first. Learners (ideally) take responsibility for their own learning, and teachers facilitates rather than 'dispense' knowledge (Oxford Dictionary of Education).

CfE defines *Active Learning* as engaging and challenging "children's thinking using real-life and imaginary situations" (*Active Learning in the Early Years*, p5). It includes spontaneous play; planned, purposeful play; investigating and exploring events and life experiences; focused learning and teaching, supported when necessary through sensitive intervention.

Active learning policy arguably reflects recommendations set out in a Report by Stirling University's *Institute of Education*, commissioned by the *Scottish Executive* during CfE's roll-out phase. The Report's author says her commission was to "explore the scope for a more learner-centred" early years approach (Stephen, 2006, p7). Stephen affirms the continuing impact and enduring significance, of two pioneering figures for Western education: Vygotsky and Piaget. It foregrounds many CfE-specific concepts such as active learning and DAP, and suggests CfE might make a further shift towards learner-centred education. Stephen describes DAP as the "default perspective" (p9), in childhood pedagogy in Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Paraphrasing from her Report, DAP can be roughly summarised as:

- A balance between children's self-initiated learning and practitioner guidance.
- Children making meaningful choices between activities offered.
- Scope to explore through active involvement.
- A mix of small group, whole group and independent activities.
- Play as a primary medium for learning in the early years.
- Adults demonstrate, question, model, suggest alternatives and prompt reflection.
- Systematic observation of children's learning and behaviour.

Stephen's Report concluded that there was a need to debate curriculum balance in the early stages of the primary school, and consider whether play and self-directed learning opportunities were under-represented. CfE seems to have adopted these recommendations.

Child-centredness: An Opposing View.

There are opposing views about child-centred learning, however. Some think that catering for all individual child needs, prioritises relevance and 'process' over content, and legitimises a "translation of individualism into normative conceptions of development" (Burman, 2008, p282).

Drawing upon feminist, psychoanalytic and poststructuralist ideas, Burman (2008), thinks child-centred education enforces a specifically liberal model of learning, and a model of society composed of "rational, freely choosing, isolated, equal individuals" (Burman, 2008,

p265). She thinks children seen as isolated individuals is a major problem; child development is (and should be), socially constructed, rather than re-establishing what she calls moral values such as wholeness, social control, choice, individualism and regulation.

Burman thinks the existence of social inequalities cannot but lead to unequal choice options, with children and parents nevertheless required to assume ever more responsibility. Her critique chimes loudly with CfE's *Four Capacities*, which require children to take more responsibility for their own learning, be more responsible, independent and autonomous. Burman offers five key terms to explain what she sees as the main tenets of the child-centred approach:

1. Readiness. The child must be ready to learn.
2. Choice. Learning should be directed to the child's individual interests.
3. Needs. Children's fundamental needs include prevention of ill health.
4. Play. Should be enjoyable, self-directed, for emotional wellbeing and autonomy.
5. Discovery. Learning takes place through individual, personal experience.

All five of Burman's tenets feature strongly in CfE's documentary record. *Active Learning in the Early Years*, states that three-year olds entering pre-school education "will already have had significant learning experiences in the family and community" (p8), learning to share, taking steps towards independence. But have they all had significant learning experiences? The statement makes little allowance for thousands of children stuck in Scotland's so-called education attainment gap; many multiply deprived, under developed, under-performing children with chaotic home lives, lacking parental/care-giver facetime. According to McCluskey (2017), in fact, children living in the most deprived areas in Scotland are "6 to 13 months behind their peers in problem-solving at age 5; 11 to 18 months behind their peers in expressive vocabulary at age 10; and around two years of schooling behind their peers at age 15" (p1).

This is arguably Burman's point; some children enter school more ready than others, with supportive parents which child-centredness seems to assume, leaving behind the disadvantaged. Furthermore, CfE absolutely aspires to "allow more choice to meet the needs of individual young people" *(Review Group*, 2004, p7); *Active Learning* certainly exploits opportunities for spontaneous and purposeful play; while children's physical and mental wellbeing absolutely became a new CfE subject.

Characterising child-centredness as difficult to apply and worse than unhelpful, Burman identifies four limitations:

1. Designating intervention as authoritarian oppression leaves teachers unable to criticise or regulate children's behaviour.
2. Uncertainty about how to recognise when a child is 'ready'. Middle class children are more ready than working class.
3. Glorification of play ignores its coercive and cruel aspects.
4. Fostering autonomy, it denies the teacher's power relation with the child.
(Burman, 2008, pp264-265).

Burman thinks child-centred learning leads to ad hoc judgements by schools and teachers, and undermines the teacher's role. Her claim that hegemonic liberal individualism, supported by developmental principles, leaves deprived children behind, gains support from an ever widening Scottish education attainment gap. £2 billion (in 2021 and 2022) was allocated to close it, but it remains to be seen if CfE's learner-centred approach is capable of instilling the necessary knowledge and intellectual development disadvantaged children so badly need from school. Lacking home-based support, perhaps disadvantaged children would respond better to something more structured?

2.5: More Vocationally Focused

CfE states that it shifted the emphasis away from academic towards vocational knowledge (what CfE calls destinations beyond school), and is significantly more focused on employment. Outcomes emphasised here include: "more skills-for-work options for young people, robustly assessed and helping them to progress into further qualifications or work" (The Review Group, 2004, p4); the introduction of "new skills-for-work courses for 14 to 16 year olds" (p5); "achieve a better balance between 'academic' and 'vocational' subjects"; and "a wider range of experiences to equip young people with the skills they will need in tomorrow's workforce" (p7).

Viewed from a strategic government perspective not merely from education, it seems inevitable that workplace skills might be seen to have a more immediate impact on national economic growth and productivity, than learning for its own sake, if for no other reason, because government exists for those ends. CfE's vocational focus is clearly in evidence in the following statement, where the *Review Group* answers the question why the curriculum must change:

> [W]e face new influences which mean that we must look differently at the curriculum. These include global, social, political and economic changes, and the particular challenges facing Scotland: the need to increase the economic performance of the nation; reflect its growing diversity; improve health; and reduce poverty. In addition, we can expect more changes in the patterns and demands of employment, and the likelihood of new and quite different jobs during an individual's working life.
> (The *Review Group*, 2004, p10).

Instrumentalist links to *National Priorities* are arguably assumed in statements such as "the need to increase the economic performance of the nation". Scottish education – along with many other public sector bodies at that time – was required to 'join up' with government's economic and political agenda, arguably resulting in Scottish education moving significantly closer to the political centre). CfE certainly became more focused on the world of work, and government's (National) political and economic priorities.

Scottish schools were now delivering national as well as educational priorities. I suggest it is largely in this sense that CfE emphasises the extrinsic and economic at the expense of the intrinsic and academic. Once the extent and impact of this is realised, many otherwise hard to understand questions about the 'moral' start to fall into place:

- The instrumentalising of moral/ethical knowledge.
- Wellbeing and other key values seen in consequentialist terms.
- Education refocused strongly on vocational skills beyond school.
- Moral knowledge itself becoming an instrumental means to getting a job.
- Preparing children to contribute to the economy becoming a strategic aim of Scottish education.
- Largely unstated intrinsic ethical purposes of education, such as children's capacity to think, reason and feel and take control of their lives, contemplate the ends worth living for and how to achieve them, providing a distinctively human moral dimension.

I will argue, therefore, that CfE's vocational focus significantly impacts its ethics through an instrumentalist policy framework (reviewed in Chapter 6), and a consequentialist shift from intrinsic to extrinsic value (examined in Chapter 10).

2.6: Curriculum for Excellence, Concluding Remarks

Chapter 2 has introduced the Curriculum, consisting of a *Broad General Education* with Experiences and Outcomes (and since 2016 corresponding teacher Benchmarks), and a *Senior Phase* with (for N5 and above) externally assessed Nationals. CfE was announced as a major programme of educational change. Some aspects of the latter have been questioned, but one key aspect – perhaps the biggest of all – is that CfE is not a traditional, specified

Curriculum; schools and teachers create it.

Michael Schiro's fourfold ideological framework has helped to locate CfE's instrumentalism within what he calls a *Social Efficiency* ideology. His *Learner Centred* ideology also chimes strongly with CfE's developmental pedagogy, what CfE calls *Active Learning*. All four of his 'ideologies' can in fact be read in CfE documentation, while his *Social Efficiency* thesis accords with CfE's well-documented neo-liberal emphasis on employment and national economic priorities.

I note that CfE is not a knowledge-focused Curriculum. Knowledge is not part of its definition of 'curriculum', and is implicit not explicit, and various Scottish writers have thought it downplays knowledge in favour of skills.

The Chapter provides a brief historical overview, situating CfE within key trends and concepts in relation to its values and ethics, noting that the disjuncture with earlier curricula is not as marked as often claimed. Two further trends in particular have attracted significant academic critique: its learner/child centredness and its vocational focus.

This completes Chapter 2 introducing the Curriculum; some of the challenges it sought to address, and how it set about addressing them. Chapter 3 introduces its values and ethics.

Chapter 3: CfE's Values and Ethics

Chapter Abstract

Chapter 3 introduces CfE's values and ethics. I review its values education approach, and argue that it adopts a fundamental neutrality in relation to good. British schools were required to promote core British values within a 'PREVENT' program, following the 2005 London bombing attacks. Education Scotland was critical of this, arguing for what it called safer language, and for the idea of shared national values.

There are many different kinds of values, and many kinds in CfE. I focus on three: policy values, education values, and the moral kind of values. I make an argument that the specifically moral kind are largely delegated to schools, teachers and children. A handful of basic, largely religious values for younger children are exemplified in RME, but CfE resolutely declines to say they are 'good', or adopt a position in relation to good. RME Es&Os define what a 'belief' is, and what a moral 'issue' is, but not what a moral value is, adopting a neutral stance in relation to archetypal ethical terms such as good, bad, right and wrong, which never seem to be used.

This exemplified approach, and an emphasis on skills rather than ethics, is also present in HWB Es&Os, only less often. There is one list of items in HWB Es&Os that look very much like ethical values or virtues (including tolerance, empathy, loyalty and kindness), but for some reason CfE calls them skills not values. But why would CfE want to call 'kindness' a skill?

Borrowing Millian terminology, I argue that CfE's social moral values are in fact, secondary principles for Scotland's twenty-first century customary morality, without a philosophical grounding. Mill never says his secondary principles are values, but I argue that they certainly look and sound like what we call values. I suggest CfE's values can be seen as everyday moral principles without any justifying standard, reflecting contemporary, largely relativist views about values, moral standards and ethics.

I identify glimpses of four kinds of ethics implicit in the language of various documents: value pluralism, consequentialism, developmental (Kantian) ethics and a kind of quasi-Aristotelian ethics, which I collectively refer to as CfE's *ethics 101+*.

Finally, an emerging CfE discourse of children's rights is discussed. Many writers have seen significant difficulties for human rights in relation to ethics, however.

3.1: CfE's Values Education Approach.

Five years before CfE's launch, former Glasgow Headteacher David Betteridge thought questions concerning values a formidable difficulty for Scottish education, because there was no "established discourse for values education … teachers spent little time considering the processes involved in acquiring knowledge and understanding and reaching a personal values stance" (1999, p386). His claim assumes schools should promote both values intrinsic to learning (via knowledge acquisitions), *and* the moral kind of values (personal values stances). The former were long part of Scotland's educational heritage, the latter have traditionally been embedded in religious education. Two things have seemed to converge in CfE in relation to this: a shift away from academic knowledge acquisition (see Chapter 2), affecting values intrinsic to learning; and national religious decline, placing a question-mark over religion as a viable vehicle for moral learning (see Matemba, 2018; Nixon, 2008; Betteridge 1999).

CfE rarely talks about values education as a discrete area of learning, one clear statement has been found, referring to values education as a complex and challenging area involving many influences as well as the school. This states, "the school can play an important role in developing personal values – political, social, environmental and spiritual – through the experiences it offers and through sustained emphasis on responsible behaviour and concern for others" (*Education for Citizenship*, 2006, p3). This emphasises wider societal and family connections, and concern for others, and roughly approximates to the (now disbanded) UK *Values Education Council* definition of values education. The latter defined values education as: "the promotion and development of values in the context of education as a lifelong process, to help individuals develop as responsible and caring persons and live as participating members of a pluralist society" (Halstead, 1996, p8).

CfE's approach is not entirely dissimilar to some aspects of the *English National Curriculum*, where *Spiritual, Moral, Social, and Cultural development* (SMSC), encompasses a broad range of values, beliefs, and experiences said to shape an individual's identity and understanding of the world. English SMSC is said to promote social cohesion, and contribute to children's overall wellbeing and happiness. It forms an inspected part of Ofsted's framework for English schools, who must promote SMSC development of their pupils (Votes For Schools, 2023, *SMSC IN Education)*.

A more controversial English curriculum policy was the introduction of core British

values in education, following the 2005 London bombing attacks. The UK government introduced a number of initiatives aimed at promoting British values, including the *PREVENT* program designed to tackle radicalization and extremism. Schools had to make learning about British values an integral part of children's experience, to be reflected in all aspects of school life. The values in question are sometimes referred to as *Fundamental British Values,* or *Core British Values.* In brief they are:

1. Respect for the rule of law. That everyone in society is treated equally and fairly, and that everyone follows the same rules and laws.
2. Individual liberty. For people to pursue their own goals and interests, providing they do not harm others.
3. Democracy. Based on the idea that everyone should have an equal say in how their country is run, and that government should be accountable to the people.
4. Mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. To promote understanding and acceptance of people from different backgrounds and with different beliefs, to help create a more inclusive and diverse society.

Such values were seen by the UK Government as fundamental to British society, as a way to help protect children from extremist ideologies, and help prepare them for life in a modern society. The policy generated significant education comment however, and *Education Scotland* produced a *PREVENT Language and Terminology Guide* aimed at safeguarding "vulnerable individuals" (part of the Guide's title), contrasting what is called 'safe language' and perceived 'problematic language' of PREVENT. Education Scotland's purpose seems to have been to set out appropriate and inappropriate terminology "used when discussing the themes, topics and groups who feature across the spectrum of violent extremism and terrorism both in Scotland and internationally." (Terminology Guide Preamble). This states:

> Education Scotland and the Scottish Government recognise the importance of using appropriate and accurate language when leading discussions with children and young people, and this is particularly important when exploring current global social and political issues. Doing so minimises the risk of any individual feeling targeted, offended, stigmatised and/or unfairly represented (Terminology Guide Preamble).

In passing, this seems like a thoroughly pluralist statement. The Scottish Government thought the language used in English Curriculum guidance was not always 'appropriate'. In the Scottish guidance under the heading 'values', 'British values' is designated as problematic language "because the concept of British values can cause offence and could play into the

hands of groups who seek to assert that there is an inherent conflict between being British and being Muslim" (p2). 'Safe language' is said to encompass the idea of *Shared Values*:

> Curriculum for Excellence defines and supports learning about the values and attitudes that our children and young people need to become responsible citizens who respect other people, different beliefs and cultures. Young people learn how these are fundamental in both local and global communities (p2).

The thesis makes the argument, however, that while the *Review Group* say they want to make children "aware of the values on which Scottish society is based" (p11), CfE exemplifies a few indicative, largely religious values, but leaves Scottish social values for schools, teachers and children to decide. It nowhere "defines" Scottish values, or what an ethical value is, and asks children to "establish their own stances on matters of social justice and personal and collective responsibility" (*Review Group*, p11). It is questionable, therefore, whether they "learn" them, or what exactly it is they "establish" for themselves, if anything. We simply do not know. Furthermore, "learning about" something – a value – is not anyway quite the same thing as believing in it, owning, living and acting by it.

In relation to shared values, in Chapter 7 I argue that notions of consensus are themselves problematic, because from a value pluralist perspective any set of shared values is inadequate (such as those identified in England by the *National Forum for Values in Education and Society*), because it probably assumes there can be a final, ultimate standard for human values applicable to all children. Value pluralism denies this. Berlin argues that despite even the best of motives, problems of value are quite often not solvable, and problems of pluralism go much deeper than discriminatory attitudes and lack of tolerance. I will argue that this is a problem for any particular 'value-set', British, shared, social or Scottish; ultimately someone could be ignored and/or oppressed.

Values 'in' Education.

Many education, sociology and philosophy writers theorise close, arguably symbiotic connections between values and education (*cf* Peters, 1968; Gribble 1969; Halstead, 1996; Pring, 1996; Durkheim, 1968; Warnock, 1996 and 1998; Berlin 2001; Haldane, 2004). The conceptual approach of R.S. Peters, and the functionalist approach of Emile Durkheim (for example), differ in important ways, but both recognise the centrality of ethics for schools,

education and society (differences include their source, nature, role and application). Pragmatist (and child-centred learning advocate), Dewey (2011), for whom the only ultimate education value was "the process of living itself" (p126), thought education involved such values as sociability, companionship, aesthetic taste, and sensitivity to the rights of others.

These debates probably sit behind Betteridge's pre-CfE claim above; in short, how should twenty-first century schools grapple with values and ethics? In Scotland, Carr (1999) distinguished between values intrinsic to education, and a developing values education movement in England which, he argued, gained momentum in the 1990s because the *National Curriculum* had failed to adequately recognise the importance of values and ethics. Carr refers to the concept of values education somewhat negatively in fact, as "little more than a pleonasm" (1999, p298), because education could not, he thought, be anything other than a communication of values (i.e. academic education). This is what I am referring to as values 'in' education. Carr identifies three underlying reasons for the values education movement: "public panic" (p296), at a perceived breakdown of morality related to liberal individualism and consumerism; educational reforms more concerned with economic than moral benefits; and concern about a lack of common social purpose "in that problematic fusion between cultural pluralism and liberal individualism" (Carr, 1999, p296).

Each of Carr's points touch topical but often difficult issues for schools and CfE. A perceived breakdown of morality probably refers to the views of some parents and politicians; undue economic emphasis opens onto the academic/vocational debate itself, and intrinsic/extrinsic value; lack of common purpose touches on perennial debates about liberal and communitarian views of education and plural society. Since the beginning of compulsory education in Scotland in 1872, schools have arguably reflected the values of contemporary society however, owing their existence to the fact that society values education, and through it seeks to influence its own future development (Durkheim, 1968; Halstead, 1996; Gillies, 2013, all refer). Values and ethics seem inextricably tangled up in these complex debates.

Some writers such as Halstead (1996), hold together values implicit in curriculum subjects (Carr's values intrinsic to education), *and* the moral kind of value, arguing that values in education are central to both the everyday activities of schools (i.e., the moral values teachers allow in their classrooms), as well as children's learning. Halstead thought general

educational values included things like "rationality", and a "concern for precision" (Halstead and Taylor, 2000, p176). He was, however, also concerned about the need for a specific, agreed ethical basis for education, and suggested three broad parameters: a basic respect for justice and social morality; acceptance of a common system of law, and a commitment to toleration implicit in the notion of pluralism itself. I return to Halstead's 'broad parameters' approach in Chapters 7 and 9.

Other writers, however, distinguish sharply between educational and the moral kind of values. Worried about what he saw as indoctrination and children's rational autonomy in a plural society, Haydon (1997) for example, argued that "the *only* acceptable educational approach to values might be enabling and encouraging individuals to be clear about their own values" (p135, his emphasis). CfE – almost certainly taking account of these debates – seems to have adopted aspects of both perspectives (values intrinsic to education itself and the moral kind), retaining eight discrete subject areas, while articulating the idea that children must decide their own value stances.

3.2: CfE's Values

Education Scotland calls CfE a "values-based" curriculum (*A Statement for Practitioners*, 2016, p4). There are of course many different kinds of values, and many kinds in CfE. There is a plurality of values out there not just one set, and value holders will not always be able to consciously know or articulate what their values are. That said, in order to distinguish between specifically ethical values and some of the other kinds, I focus on three kinds arising in the language and policies of CfE documents: policy values, education values and its social moral values (the moral kind).

To value something is to "advance it as a consideration in influencing choice and guiding oneself and others" (*Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,* p493). This very general definition can (for that reason), be applied across the board to the three kinds of CfE's values I identify. Specifically in relation to what I am calling CfE's social moral kind, however, I have taken a value to be an ideal, something desirable which broadly explains why an action might be good or bad, right or wrong.

CfE's Policy Values.

There are obviously a very large number and range of policy values in any large

organisation and/or public service. CfE clearly identifies four key policy values:

> the starting point for this process of change is the set of values which should underpin policies, practice and the curriculum itself … Wisdom, justice, compassion and integrity: the words which are inscribed on the mace of the Scottish Parliament have helped to define values for our democracy (Review Group, 2004, pp10-11).

These are the values that have been used to develop the new curriculum, and will underpin how the business of education will be conducted (and wishes to be judged). Why these four in particular is not stated, and they are not justified or argued for. The winner of the mace competition for the new Scottish Parliament, Silversmith Michael Lloyd, had in fact inscribed them on his mace entry. Nonetheless, they do the work of grounding CfE the organisation in a set of values. In the absence of any argument or discussion about them, it would be possible to question why these particular ones, but if not these there could have been others. This seems to have been the kind of thinking behind the adoption of Michael Lloyd's set (argued in Chapter 12).

CfE's Educational Values.

The *Four Capacities:* confident individuals, successful learners, responsible citizens and effective contributors*,* are said in many documents to be its educational "purpose", and a definitive statement of its educational values (*A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, 2008, p22). The *Four Capacities* are CfE's "aspiration for all children and for every young person" (*A Framework for Learning and Teaching,* p12); the curriculum should provide the "structure, support and direction to young people's learning [to] enable them to develop" the Capacities (p12), complementing contributions of families and communities. The Capacities are thus said to encapsulate CfE's core educational purposes.

Other prime examples of educational values include eight *Health and Wellbeing* indicators (emanating from the *Four Capacities*), shown in the following graphic:

Figure 1 *The Health and Wellbeing (HWB) Wheel showing eight so-called SHANARRI Indicators.*



(HWB, Principles and Practice, p2).

HWB *Principles and Practice* states: "Learning through health and wellbeing promotes confidence, independent thinking and positive attitudes and dispositions. Because of this, it is the responsibility of every teacher to contribute to learning and development in this area" (p2). They have been dubbed 'SHANARRI' indicators, and appear in other areas of Scottish social policy such as GIRFEC (Getting It Right for Every Child). Other examples of general educational values include:

- a single curriculum 3-18, supported by a simple and effective structure of assessment and qualifications.
- greater choice and opportunity, earlier, for young people.
- more skills-for-work options.

- ensure that young people develop literacy, numeracy and other essential skills.
- more space for sport, music, dance, drama, art, learning about health. (*Review Group*, p4).

CfE's Social Moral Values, the Moral Kind of Values.

CfE chooses not to define its social moral values. A generic definition exemplified in Scottish trainee teacher reading lists (see Capel, et al, 2013), largely follows Halstead and Taylor's (2000), formulation: "the principles and fundamental convictions which act as general guides to behaviour, the standards by which particular actions are judged to be good or desirable. Examples of values are love, equality, freedom, justice, happiness, security, peace of mind and truth" (p169).

Some of Halstead and Taylor's examples are exemplified by CfE as guides for practitioners (but called 'skills' in HWB Es&Os), but they are not defined or argued for. To understand how CfE's moral kind of values work we need to consider the key values statement given by the *Review Group,* 2004:

> It is one of the prime purposes of education to make our young people aware of the values on which Scottish society is based and so help them to establish their own stances on matters of social justice and personal and collective responsibility. Young people therefore need to learn about and develop these values. The curriculum is an important means through which this personal development should be encouraged. (p11).

This is quite clear. The basis of children's specifically moral stances are Scottish social values. Young people therefore "need to learn about and develop" them. Leaving aside the rather dogmatic sounding nature of this unargued-for claim, this seems fine too; all we need now is to know what they are and we will be on our way. This is the problem; CfE does not, and cannot possibly know what they are. How can anyone know what the social moral values of around five million people are? The Curriculum is silent here, obviously.

One of the prime purposes of Scottish education is to make children aware of pro-social Scottish values, about which (apart from a handful of exemplified customary, largely religious values for younger children, which arguably everyone could accept in a liberal democracy), it has no specific knowledge, and which it cannot list, describe or state. The all-important question begging, is how CfE's schools and teachers are going to achieve one of its "prime purposes", to make children aware of these values, if they do not know what they are? There are four high status policy values, clearly stated educational purposes and values,

and human rights (discussed below), all of which schools are expected to work within, and which taken together might steer towards the ethical, but there is no ethical statement of intent, statement about the human good, and nothing in the record remotely like a list of Scottish social values.

The answer, I suggest, is as simple as it is neat and surprising. CfE's Scottish social values are the social moral values of its schools, teachers, and children themselves, in every city, town, village and locality; a customary morality; the everyday handed down values of a multitude (to borrow John Stuart Mill's terminology). Paraphrasing Pring (2012), this neatly dodges ethical issues intrinsically involved in educating the young, assuming the latter is "ethically neutral" (p157). CfE largely seems to delegate the task to 4,500+ schools and early learning establishments, 54,000+ teachers, and 790,000+ children and young people.

CfE cannot of course, tell schools and teachers (or children), what their personal, specifically moral values and stances are, and does not try; a vast range of plural values itself would make that impossible. Within the general guidance of its policy and educational values (including the *Four Capacities*, and subject-specific Es&Os), a developing human rights agenda (discussed below), and a handful of (RME) exemplified basic values for young children (discussed just below), Scottish schools and practitioners largely decide what moral kind of values children "need to learn about and develop" (Review Group, 2004, p11).

CfE's social moral values are, then, the values of its schools, teachers and children. This key thesis premiss is supported by many other pieces of evidence, including the following RME (Es&Os) exemplified values, and HWB strange reinterpretation of them as 'skills'.

RME Experiences and Outcomes (Es&Os) Exemplified Values.

CfE/RME values such as fairness, equality and sharing, have the indicative not imperative mood, and are expressed in 'such as', or 'for example' terms:

- "I can share my developing views about values such as fairness and equality and love, caring, sharing and human rights" (RME 2-05b, 2-o2b).
- "I can explain why different people think that values such as honesty, respect and compassion are important, and I show respect for others" (RME 2-09c).

Moral 'issues' and 'beliefs' are both defined, but moral values, morality and ethics are not. An issue of belief is "any aspect of belief over which there might be discussion and debate, for example: How did the Universe begin? Does God/do gods exist? Etc." (RME Es&Os,

p13N). A moral issue is “any view/belief about morality around which there is debate and discussion – for example, euthanasia, abortion etc.” (RME Es&Os, p15N). The moral kind of values, however, are not defined but exemplified: “A ‘value’ might include, *for example* principles such as selflessness, respect, equality” (RME Es&Os, p7N, my emphasis). CfE could very easily have defined what it thinks moral values are, many examples are available such as Halstead’s above, but it chooses not to, leaving I suggest, the space empty for schools, teachers and children to occupy.

> The following values are exemplified in RME’s Christian/World Religion context:
>
> Early Years, age 3-6: "respect, fairness, caring, sharing and cooperation” (Es&Os, p5).
>
> First Level, age 7-9: “the key values of Christianity [and] World Religions” (Es&Os, p7).
>
> Second Level, age 10-12: “moral values as expressed in Christianity and World Religions” (p10); “fairness, equality, love, caring, sharing and human rights” (p11); “honesty, respect and compassion” (p11).
>
> Third Level, age 13-14: “the values of Christianity [and] World Religions” (p15); “respect, honesty, compassion” (p15).
>
> Fourth Level, age 14-15: “the values of Christianity [and] World Religions” (p19); “respect” (p19).

Young children are introduced to basic Christian, World Religion and prosocial values. Older young people consider non-religious values chosen by schools and teachers (not identified obviously), and applied ethics. Third and Fourth Levels, for example, discuss moral “issues … such as euthanasia and abortion” (Es&Os p15). Fourth Level young people “apply philosophical enquiry” (Es&Os, p19), to applied ethics moral issues. RME basic values are examples; young people’s applied ethics issues are considered from various (discretionary) viewpoints, including Christianity, Kantian ethics, utilitarianism and human rights.

HWB Experiences and Outcomes Exemplified ‘Skills’.

The exemplified approach is also present in HWB Es&Os, only much less often. There is one list of items in HWB Es&Os that could have been moral or even ethical values, but which are called skills, under the heading *Relationships, Sexual Health and Parenthood/Positive Relationships* (Second Level, P5-P7, age 10-12), this is: “I am identifying and practising skills to manage changing relationships and I understand the positive impact this can have on my emotional wellbeing.” (HWB 2-45a, p13). The corresponding teacher Benchmark is: “Identifies the skills required to manage changing relationships, for example, tolerance,

empathy, loyalty, kindness, resilience, mutual trust and respect." (p13).

The Fourth Level outcome under the same head is: "I am developing skills for making decisions about my relationships and sexual behaviour. I am able to apply these to situations that may be challenging or difficult." (4-46c, p24), and the corresponding teacher Benchmark is: "Demonstrates the skills needed to manage challenging situations within relationships, including sexual relationships, for example, compromise, empathy, decisiveness." (p24). This approach seems a clear example of how CfE 'dodges' ethics in Pring's sense, in this case calling tolerance, empathy, loyalty, kindness, resilience, trust and respect, skills not values.

To repeat, a value is an ideal which broadly explains why an action might be good or bad, right or wrong, guiding and influencing choice (see Chapter 1, glossary). HWB tolerance, empathy, loyalty, kindness, resilience, mutual trust and respect are all values which people hold that do precisely this. In some situations their application probably also requires skill, but I can only be skilful in applying a value I hold, and have personally adopted. Why, then, call them skills?

Aristotle argues that moral virtues are acquired by repetition, and come about "as a result of habit, whence also its name ēthikē is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit)" (Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a, discussed in more detail in Chapter 12). His intellectual and moral virtues are not the same thing as twenty first century western moral values, but he was clear that we get the moral virtues by habit not by teaching; by exercising a natural disposition towards virtue. My point here, is that CfE seems to sidestep this all important evaluative dimension, leapfrogging over values, character and virtues, to their practical application, and then calls them skills. But why?

The question can therefore fairly be asked, why does CfE skirt around moral/ethical values like this? Here was a perfect opportunity to say something clearly moral and/or ethical, but instead it calls respect, loyalty, etc., skills. The next sub-section considers this 'dodging' (paraphrasing Pring, 2012), of underlying ethical principles, using Millian logic.

CfE/RME Social Moral Values Viewed as Secondary Social Principles.

According to Crisp and Slote (1997), until the second half of the twentieth century utilitarianism was one of two dominant traditions of ethics in Britain, the other being Kantianism. In Mill's utilitarian system the customary morality – "that which education and

opinion have consecrated" (Mill, 1998, p159) – is described as a superstructure, consisting of everyday, common sense, intermediate, secondary or "subordinate" principles of morality (Mill, 1998, p157), sitting between his ultimate moral standard (the utility principle), and ethics; constituting what he calls the ethical life of the multitude.

Are Mill's 'Secondary Principles' What We Call Values Today?

In his essay *Utilitarianism*, when stating the kind of proof which can be found for the utility principle, Mill argues very strongly that "virtue" is a thing to be desired as part of human happiness (1998, pp169-171). Throughout his essay he claims that the utilitarian system upholds principles such as "a sense of dignity" (p140), "mental cultivation" (p145), "good character" (p152), "moral character" (p159), and the "general cultivation of the nobleness of character" (142). He never calls principles such as virtue, values, but they certainly look and sound like what we think of as values and virtues.

Defending utilitarianism and the utilitarian standard against the charge of expediency (as opposed to moral principle), Mill states that principles of "veracity" and "truth" support "social well-being" (p154), lack of which he thinks resists civilisation and virtue, and "deprives mankind of the good" (p155). Again, veracity, virtue, social well-being, truth and the good seem quintessentially what we might think of as moral or ethical values.

Mill is also defending utilitarianism against the charge that in reality there is no time to 'calculate' consequences of actions. He argues back that there has been the whole history of humanity for people to have learned ordinary (common) questions of good and bad, right and wrong, leading him into a discussion of the customary morality, which he thinks is the moral rules of the many (multitude), and for philosophy too until it improves upon them. The crux of his riposte is that: "Whatever we adopt as the fundamental principle of morality, we require subordinate principles to apply it by: the impossibility of doing without them, being common to all systems" (Mill, 1998, p157). He uses a number of metaphors to make his case about (customary) subordinate or secondary principles: they are like traveller's signposts, used by everyone in the same way a sailor uses the nautical almanack before setting off across an ocean (p157).

What are Mill's subordinate principles and moral rules? He does not say they are values, but he calls them a customary 'morality' and "the rules of morality for the multitude"

(p156), involving questions of good and bad, right and wrong, and rules to inform moral philosophy. He says they lead to "all rational creatures" (p157), making their minds up about right and wrong, wise and foolish. Values do precisely these kind of things, and CfE argues in fact, that they therefore reliably lead to moral action (argued in Chapter 11, CfE's beliefs-values-action moral continuum). It seems to me impossible for Mill's secondary principles, moral rules and customary morality, not to include what we today call values, and CfE's social moral kind of 'customary' values in particular.

Furthermore, Mill's principles play a role very similar indeed to the role values play in Berlin's definition of ethical thought, the "systematic examination of the relations of human beings to each other, the conceptions, interests and ideals from which human ways of treating one another spring, and the systems of value on which such ends of life are based" (Berlin, 2013a, p1). Why cannot Mill's moral principles be thought of as a 'system of value' on which the 'ends of life' of the multitude are based, in Berlin's sense?

The *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* (2016) defines values as features of things taken into account in making decisions, and to advance such features as considerations in "influencing choice and guiding oneself and others" (p493). Mill certainly does think his secondary, subordinate principles influence choice and guide human decisions and actions. He likens them to "precepts of every practical art" (p156), and refers to them as "beliefs about the effects of some actions on happiness" (p156), "intermediate generalisations" (p156), and "landmarks and direction-posts" (p156). He thinks that based on the secondary principles "all rational creatures go out upon the sea of life with their minds made up on the common questions of right and wrong, as well as on many of the far more difficult questions of wise and foolish" (p157). The evidence for Mill's secondary principles including, if not actually *being* what today we call values, seems to me compelling.

A Superstructure Without Coherent Philosophical Grounding.

His logic concerning the structure of ethics 'common to all systems', and relationship between secondary principles and the ethical life, can, I suggest, help us get CfE's values into some kind of perspective. CfE's social moral values have neither Mill's one ultimate principle, or any stated ethical system, or principle, by which to understand or justify them, other than Scottish society's values. CfE exemplified values such as honesty, caring and sharing are not

argued-for, justified in any way, or placed within any kind of logic; they just appear, there in the text as givens, assumed to be acceptable and necessary for children's education.

Deeply immersed as CfE/RME values are in Christian and other religious contexts, one possible (unstated) assumption is that an underlying first principle upon which they rest is God's (Biblical) commandments. If so CfE is surreptitiously promoting a divine-command ethics, that honesty etc., are right (justified), because God says they are. But confessional Christianity/religion is the very thing Scottish non-denominational schools do not now do (argued below in Chapter 4: Millar, 1972, p120; Nixon, 2008, p557; Matemba, 2018, p356), so we have to look elsewhere to understand CfE/RME basic values.

Ruling out gods, two possibilities remain; either the basis of RME values lies in one or other major ethical system, or they do not have any underlying conceptual principles apart from today's customary morality, and just exist as secondary, intermediate generalisations; a free-floating social moral superstructure minus philosophical grounding/foundation. The values in fact "on which Scottish society is based" (*Review Group*, 2004, p11).

There is no evidence at all that CfE/RME rests its values on any particular ethical system, but there is evidence that it does not. A 2017 *Education Scotland*, RMPS PowerPoint presentation for practitioners titled *Overview of Course Assessment, Understanding Standards,* states: "There is no requirement to teach religious authority or utilitarianism … no questions referring specifically to moral stances … a requirement only to know religious and non-religious perspectives". If, therefore, CfE's moral kind of values are not based on gods, or ethics, they must arguably be seen as customary moral principles lacking deeper philosophical justification. Their indicative, largely quasi-religious character and status adds support to this conclusion. This would then be equally true (but more obviously), for the social moral values of its many thousands of schools, teachers and children.

CfE's values can, then, be seen as everyday moral principles minus justifying standards; a superstructure without philosophical grounding. As such, they are more like *self*-justifying ideals, and reflect (I will argue below), contemporary relativist views about values and moral standards, as well as the problem of ethical authority in Scotland's plural society.

The evidence for relativism is assembled and applied in Chapters 7 and 9. Within a broad array of policy, educational and other kinds of values, and a growing human rights

agenda, I suggest CfE in part acknowledged contemporary relativist accounts of values and ethics by delegating them to schools, teachers and children. It seems to have tackled the authority problem partly through the construction of a consensus (of sorts) in the *National Debate on Education,* and partly by passing the ethical baton on to schools, teachers and children themselves. The *National Debate* was not a consensus around values, but viewed strategically CfE was able to claim justification for its approach on that basis (for example, the following statement, but other similar statements could be cited):

> In 2002 the Scottish Executive undertook the most extensive consultation ever of the people of Scotland on the state of school education through the National Debate on Education. In the debate, many people – pupils, parents, teachers, employers and others – said that they valued and wanted to keep many aspects of the current curriculum. Some also made compelling arguments for changes to ensure all our young people achieve successful outcomes and are equipped to contribute effectively to the Scottish economy and society, now and in the future. (*Review Group*, 2004, p6).

The *Review Group* can be said to be demonstrating (to stakeholders) in this statement, that its decisions were based on democratic engagement and social agreement. The very grand title, *National Debate* itself suggests 'authority', consensus and democratic decision.

CfE's Moral and Ethical Neutrality.

CfE's avoidance of ethics is perhaps most clearly seen, however, in its adoption of a neutral position in relation to good. The terms usually used in relation to ethics and personal conduct: good, bad, right and wrong, are never used. They never appear in RME/HWB Es&Os, the principal vehicles for religious, moral and social education, or in RMPS or the *Four Capacities,* or anywhere else in the documentary record. Basic values are exemplified but they are never said to be good, and nothing is ever said to be bad.

CfE largely seems to have follow a principle articulated by Halstead (1996), that children "need to learn basic values before tackling controversies" (p10). CfE seems to do precisely this: basic religious values are followed by applied ethics controversies such as abortion. Halstead argued that current thinking (in 1996) tended "to favour eclecticism" (p10), and CfE's blended values and ethics do seem quintessentially eclectic. The seeds of its moral neutrality, however, can perhaps be clearly seen three decades earlier in Scotland's Millar Report (1972), which according to Conroy (1999), marked the beginning of a new era in Scottish religious and moral education.

Discussing implications for schools, Millar thought moral and religious education is "much wider than a 'subject'" (p68). Arguing against an authoritarian school structure and tone, he thought values such as "freedom, responsibility, tolerance, and concern for others can be genuinely advocated only within an organisational structure which itself is informed by them. Schools should therefore be moving as quickly as they can to a situation of less authoritarian structures" (p68). Millar (1972) wanted schools and RE teachers to help children reach their own conclusions, and make their own commitments "with as much insight and responsibility as possible" (p69).

CfE's children too must reach their own conclusions. Thirty two years later this was still a good description of CfE's (2004) general values stance. One major difference, perhaps, is the extent and pace of religious decline compared to 1972 (for example declining church attendance and year-on-year increase in people with 'no religion', discussed below in Chapter 4). Millar assumed the presence but diminishing authority of religion and RE teacher moral authority, but wanted to be more open and tolerant of other viewpoints, less certain and didactic in tone. In 2004 however, CfE could arguably only assume the merest residue of authority for religion (and RE teachers). Its moral/ethical neutrality, and delegation of morals to all schools and teachers seem to have resulted. Future chapters look in more detail at the implications of some of these underlying characteristics of CfE's values.

A further important aspect of CfE's values is human rights, and the growing impact of the *United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child* (UNCRC), in Scottish education.

Human Rights.

The UK Government ratified the UNCRC in 1991. In June 2019, Scotland's First Minister committed to incorporating it into Scottish law. Incorporation passed unanimously in the Scottish Parliament in 2021, but has not yet become law because the UK Supreme Court ruled that parts of its provisions went beyond the Scottish Parliament's legal powers. That said, an emerging discourse of children's rights has become dominant in Scottish Education, affecting school-based curriculum and inspection regimes.

UNCRC sets standards for health care, education, legal, civil and social services, and the right of all children and young people to have access to appropriate health services, and have their health and wellbeing promoted. This is arguably reflected in two of CfE's Health

and Wellbeing (HWB) topic sub-headings: *'Action in Unsafe Situations'*, and *'Relationships, Sexual Health and Parenthood'*. Rights feature in four HWB Es&Os/Benchmarks statements, for example: "Explains own rights and responsibilities in relation to abuse" (Teacher Benchmark to 2-49a), and "I am aware of my rights in relation to sexual health including my right to confidentiality, and my responsibilities, including those under the law. (Es&Os 4-48a). Its corresponding Benchmark states: "Understands the rights and responsibilities required for safe and enjoyable sex" (p24).

Education Scotland guidance, *A Children's Rights-based Approach: a Guide for Teachers*, sets out the Scottish Government's requirement that schools "embed a children's rights-based approach and effective learner participation" (p2), into their practice, for the protection, welfare and development of children. The International Treaty itself, "applies to all children from birth to 18, and is universal, unconditional, indivisible, inherent and inalienable; children do not have to 'earn' rights through behaving in a particular way – rights should not be linked to responsibilities." (p2). Adults (schools and teachers) are duty bearers, and children are rights holders. The four UNCRC 'general principles' are:

1. Non-discrimination, the UNCRC applies to all children: Article 2.
2. The best interests of the child: Article 3.
3. Every child has the right to life, survival and opportunities to develop to their full potential: Article 6.
4. Every child has a right to be heard and for their views to be taken into account in matters that affect them: Article 12.

The fundamental (Kantian) principle of respect for persons, to treat all persons as ends in themselves and never a means, can be said to be enshrined in the UNCRC, and CfE indeed makes the respect value perhaps the major RME principle (examined in Chapters 4 and 11). UNCRC affirms "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small" (Preamble). Clearly, the assumption is that where governments make basic political and economic commitments to uphold them, human rights apply to all human beings and as such are an ethical aspiration made on behalf of their respective communities. Isaiah Berlin refers to rights as "goods" (Jahanbegloo, 2000, p39, cited in Burtonwood, 2006, p9), that are in the interest of all human beings.

On the other hand writers from many different perspectives have seen significant

difficulties for human rights in relation to ethics. Discussing rights in relation to Lacanian (psychoanalytic) subjectivity and ethics, Neill (2011) argues that rights are not only created by, but are also "creative of the community who would endorse them" (p199). He argues that in practice they have serious limitations, because they have to be interpreted each time in the light of particular human situations and circumstances. He thinks that this often involves interminable "subjective choice" and corresponding interminable "response" (p204).

Also viewing rights from a Lacanian perspective, Nobus (2019) thinks that as a type of law they articulate human needs that have to be respected, "yet in doing so … contribute more than anything else to the creation and preservation of desire", or as Lacan put it "the freedom to desire in vain" (p147). Certainly for many, probably most people in the world today, rights remain aspirations rather than realities, and horrific human rights violations are sadly all too common (Grayling, 1997). From a purely practical point of view, whether human rights are as 'universal, unconditional, indivisible, inherent and inalienable' as intended and claimed, largely seems to depend on the extent to which they are upheld by each separate political society.

From a strictly ethical point of view, to demand a right for oneself or one's group seems an essentially self-regarding claim, but personal ethics is also based on the idea that selflessness and altruism are possible, and situations where self-*denial* rather than self-assertion might be required, because other people can, and arguably sometimes should be more important than the self. That said, CfE's human rights agenda does seem to establish a kind of quasi-ethical framework of 'good', which all schools and teachers are required to work to. In the light of the UNCRC requirement that rights should not be linked to responsibilities, it could, however, review the HWB Es&Os outcome (4-48a, p24), and the Review Group document (p11), linking rights to responsibilities.

The next Section introduces the ethics that could have but do not ground CfE's values, what I am calling CfE's *ethics 101+*: value pluralism, consequentialism, developmental (Kantian) rationalism, and glimpses of quasi-Aristotelian ethics. CfE's values and ethics largely seem to coexist in parallel rather than organically, conceptually or theoretically connected.

3.3: CfE's Ethics 101+

In this Section I identify four kinds of ethics implicit in CfE (there may of course be others):

value pluralism, consequentialism, developmental (Kantian) rationalism, and quasi-Aristotelian ethics. Value pluralism, I will argue, is a dominant theme of Scotland's surrounding neo-liberal society; consequentialism can be seen as an ethical corollary of CfE's instrumentalism, manifesting in a shift in emphasis from the intrinsic worth of education as an end in itself, to an instrumentalised focus on destinations beyond school. Kantian rationalism probably underpins most versions of RME's moral developmental pedagogy, and an ambiguous quasi-Aristotelian ethics vaguely manifests in the *Four Capacities*. Each of these are briefly introduced here, and critically examined in PART III.

RME in CfE's non-denominational schools is enigmatic, and I have referred to it as quasi-religious. It nonetheless occupies a prime, uniquely statutory position as one of eight subject areas, and is the framework for young children's basic values, yet it follows a largely sceptical religious trajectory. Chapter 4 looks at this in more detail.

I am borrowing and adapting the *'101'* idea from Roger Crisp's philosophy 101. In 2002, he was asked what he would say to a sceptic who says we have tried for thousands of years to achieve convergence on ethics and failed; it is time to give up. Crisp replied that we should keep trying, because we have not actually done very much searching for consensus during those millennia. Had we been doing that, he thought: "I'd perhaps think that we'd have to go for some kind of pluralism and that there might be something to be said for several of these positions, and we just have to judge in particular cases which should apply" (Crisp, 2002, p41). He called his three ethical positions *Philosophy 101* (a play on George Orwell's 1984 Room 101, a prison chamber used by the ministry of love), comprising utilitarian, Kantian, and virtue ethics. I have adapted Crisp's idea, calling it CfE's *ethics 101+*, replacing utilitarianism with consequentialism, and adding value pluralism because it seems to be the inescapable social moral context of the other three. I refer to Crisp's virtue ethics as CfE's quasi-Aristotelian ethics, because while it employs some virtue-like language it does not embrace virtue, or connect values to virtue, moral character or the good.

Value Pluralism.

I will argue that value pluralism is an inescapable part of Scottish society, manifesting in CfE in three main ways: a plural approach to ethics itself facilitating a 'basket' of options for schools and teachers (the *ethics 101+*); a strong emphasis on cultural and value diversity; and delegation of the moral kind of values to thousands of schools, teachers and children.

The weight of evidence (reviewed in Chapter 7, Section 1), is that the meta-ethical view of value pluralism CfE's adopts is probably relativist.

RME (majorly), and HWB (minorly), together with their supporting *Principles and Practice* guidance, stress the importance of cultural, religious, sexual and ethnic diversity and tolerance, arguing against discrimination, intolerance and prejudice. Many theorists (*for example* Burtonwood, 2006; Haydon 1993; Halstead, 1996), identify and discuss specifically plural aspects of diversity in relation to education. Notions of value pluralism, I will argue, sit somewhere behind these debates.

The third factor, CfE's delegation of social moral values to schools and teachers, seems a clear acknowledgement of the reality (and confusions) of pluralism and plural society generally. A basic tenet of value pluralism, that human values clash and when they do there is no guaranteed way to resolve the incompatibility, demanding some kind of trade-off, is arguably addressed head on. This is because it facilitates school, teacher, and children's (local, school-based and individual), scales of values, rather than setting standards centrally, and is, I suggest, part of CfE's response to the difficulties and uncertainties of pluralism and ethics.

Value pluralism is, I will also suggest, a default assumption in Scotland's neo-liberal society, and an ever-present contextual element of CfE's ethics, directly impacting schools and the lives of all teachers and children.

Consequentialism.

I suggest CfE's consequentialism manifests in two main ways: in some of its key values, in particular the wellbeing value, and in a major shift in emphasis from the intrinsic worth of education and learning as an end in itself, to an instrumentalised vocational focus on destinations beyond school.

During its roll-out phase (2004-2011), *A Framework for Learning and Teaching* (2008), stated that the Scottish Government's principal purpose was to "create a more successful Scotland with opportunities for all to flourish through increasing sustainable economic growth" (p3). Then it says: "We believe *Curriculum for Excellence* can play a significant role in achieving our … strategic objectives. The aim of *Curriculum for Excellence* is to help prepare all young people in Scotland to take their place in a modern society and Economy" (p3). Foremost among CfE's consequentialist 'good states of affairs' are, then, that young people

should obtain employment and contribute to the economic growth of the nation.

CfE's wellbeing value is one of its most important; part of a cross-cutting subject area which together with literacy and numeracy, is the responsibility of all. Wellbeing is, I will argue, largely a vehicle for the promotion of pupil health and enjoyment, and a means to more final ends such as children's confidence, effective learning, and their "capacity to benefit from educational opportunities" (*Being Well, Doing Well*, p3). It is also a means for the promotion of "confident individuals", one of CfE's *Four Capacities,* and the basis of the SHANARRI indicators. As such I argue that it is a consequentialist value.

The shift towards extrinsic ends and purposes was announced by the *Review Group* (2004) launching CfE, stating that it had "introduced new skills-for-work courses for 14 to 16 year olds … developing work-related and other skills" (*Review Group*, 2004, p5). It had been asked (during the *National Debate on Education*), to "achieve a better balance between 'academic' and 'vocational' subjects" (p7), and in response had included "a wider range of experiences to equip young people with the skills they will need in tomorrow's workforce" (p7). I suggest these factors and sets of evidence – national economic growth, extrinsic value and vocational aims – form the basis of CfE's consequentialism (and a good example of CfE using the *National Debate* as a kind of consensus to justify its decisions).

Developmental (Kantian) Rationalism.

Many Scottish writers as well as the *Review Group* itself, think CfE represents the clearest expression of developmental theory yet to appear in Scotland (for example Cassidy, 2013; Boyd, 2008a and 2008b; the *Review Group*, 2004). I will argue that a Piaget/Kohlbergian cognitive moral psychology is an assumed part of CfE's developmentally appropriate practice and pedagogy, enshrined in RME/HWB Es&Os, manifesting in five development Levels matching "the level of cognitive, emotional and physical demand at the different stages" (*A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, p24).

CfE/RME can be seen to follow a stage-based developmental trajectory from moral heteronomy in young children, towards moral autonomy in older, theorised by Lawrence Kohlberg and before him Jean Piaget. Piaget was categoric, however, that he was not discussing moral behaviour as moral philosophy would generally understand it, but the cognitive and developmental processes of children's observed moral thought. For Kohlberg,

the most obvious characteristic of developmental theory was its use of stage concept; he called it a "notion of age-linked sequential reorganisation in the development of moral attitudes" (1976, p48).

Developmentalism opens wider CfE's doors to Kantian rationalism, because both Piaget and Kohlberg built their systems on Kant's ethics. The latter has been summarised as acting out of a good will; a determination to do what it is one's duty to do, according to a rationally self-imposed moral law. Then and only then is the action morally good, or comes into the sphere of the moral at all (Warnock, 1998). CfE says nothing about Kant's categorical imperatives, duty, or a good will however, focusing on moral reasoning about applied ethics.

Children reason about moral issues (applied ethics), rather than focus on a content-rich personal ethics such as virtues. Kohlberg specifically rejected what he called 'the bag of virtues' approach to moral development, concentrating on processes of moral thought and reasoning. Both he and Piaget emphasised Kantian, formalistic moral reasoning, Kohlberg stating that "moral stage is related to cognitive advance and to moral behaviour, but our identification of moral stage must be based on moral reasoning alone" (Kohlberg, 1976, p32). I will argue that CfE roughly applies this pedagogic approach throughout the five Levels.

Quasi-Aristotelian Ethics.

The title of CfE's *Health and Wellbeing* topic is suggestive of a key Aristotelian concept: eudaimonia (wellbeing, happiness). Some of the language and the structure of the *Four Capacities*, and the very name of Curriculum for *Excellence* (*arete,* virtue), also tap into an Aristotelian idiom. Although wellbeing is one translation of Aristotle's eudaimonia concept, (flourishing is more common), I will suggest CfE's *Health and Wellbeing* topic is not very Aristotelian, concentrating on human rights, and children's health and happiness as a means to effective learning, rather than Aristotle's human good or final end.

The strongest Aristotelian connections appear in the *Four Capacities*, where each Capacity is described using vaguely ontological language: i.e. learners who become successful; individuals who are confident; children becoming citizens who are responsible. The Capacities also attach practical skills (capabilities), to desirable character traits and attributes which, if one tries hard, are roughly comparable with Aristotle's character-based ethics.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle linked virtue (human excellence), directly with

character, choice and practical wisdom, and he constantly stressed the importance of habit and education in the formation of character. CfE adopts some of these ways of speaking, but makes no mention of Aristotle, or the virtues as Aristotle understood them when, for example, he says "Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean … this being determined by reason" (1107a). On the other hand, while the *Four Capacities* do not connect virtue with the development of children's settled character in Aristotle's sense, they do focus on specific character traits perceived to be important for what it calls 'learning, life and work', so there are *some* undeveloped albeit implicit links.

Very different to CfE however, Aristotle is crystal clear that there *is* a good for human beings. The human good was in fact the subject of his inquiry in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and is, he says, generally agreed to be happiness (eudaimonia), which is to say, virtuous activity. CfE conversely, avoids all discussion of good.

Objectivist and relativist

Three elements of CfE's *ethics 101+*: consequentialism, developmental ethics and quasi-Aristotelian ethics, tend not to be relativist. Comparative religious moralities, furthermore, tend towards universalism because a deity's commands are generally taken to apply universally. I will argue that value pluralism as CfE construes it, however, tends to be largely relativistic, and tends to emerge between the other ethical systems. This is probably because it is embedded in a largely relativist socio/customary morality, or rather is in large part *the* customary morality. But value pluralism has also been conceived objectively.

Kant's moral law was universal in its structure and application; we should act rationally in accordance with a universalizable moral law. Consequentialism is not usually seen as relativist but naturalist. Aristotle's ethics are usually taken to be objectivist, because for him right and wrong were neither culturally determined, or simply what someone believed them to be. Aristotle's position is not so clear, some scholars claiming he denied universality (e.g. Brown, 2009), however Aristotle argues strongly for the objectivity of the moral virtues, and against the idea that morality was merely a matter of convention or opinion.

Value pluralism need not be relativist, but I argue that it tends to be seen as such in Scottish education and society. Berlin's form of objectivity, and his objective pluralism thesis (discussed in Chapter 7), is not straight-forwardly ethically realist, or naturalist in the sense of

values being a real part of the world. For Berlin values are created and attributed by humans, but are nonetheless objective for them.

3.4: Curriculum Values and Ethics, Concluding Remarks

Chapter 3 introduces CfE's values and ethics, which have appeared complex, plural, ambiguous and, to use Halstead's (1996) rather dismal description of school ethics, 'less than totally clear'. Scottish writers have seen difficulties in the general concept of values education, asking how schools might grapple with values and ethics, questioning the language of the English PREVENT values programme.

CfE's avoidance of an ethical good has emerged, and its neutrality in relation to good evidenced by its delegation of the moral kind of values to schools, teachers and children, and because terms usually associated with ethics such as good, bad, right and wrong are never used.

Not telling children 'what' is good and right seems rationally entirely appropriate, and accords with much ethical theory. Not explaining and discussing normative ethics with them on the other hand, seems to go too far, because it is perfectly possible to discuss human goodness and badness without telling children what to think.

Among a large number of different kinds of values occurring in CfE documents, I focus on three: policy values, educational values and the moral kind, because these kinds help to illuminate CfE's values and ethics. Where CfE/RME talks about values they always have the indicative not imperative mood, however, and are expressed in 'such as', or 'for example' terms. Where CfE/HWB talks about values (much less often) it too avoids normative ethics, strangely calling tolerance, empathy, loyalty, kindness, resilience, trust and respect, 'skills' rather than values.

A social moral kind of values has emerged, which I identify with a twenty first century form of Mill's everyday customary morality, defined largely by (Scottish) social dynamics (what CfE refers to as "the values on which Scottish society is based", Review Group, 2004, p11), rather than philosophical principle or argument. I make an argument for equating Mill's 'secondary principles' with what today we usually call moral values.

An emerging discourse of children's rights has become increasingly dominant in

Scottish Education, affecting such things as school-based curriculum and inspection regimes. I discuss this discourse noting significant difficulties for human rights in relation to ethics.

The chapter introduces four kinds of ethics implicit in various documents – what I am calling CfE's *ethics 101+* – value pluralism, consequentialism, Kantian rationalism and quasi-Aristotelian skills and capacities.

This completes Chapter 3, introducing CfE's values education approach, its values and implicit glimpses of four kinds of ethics. Chapter 4 considers the *Religious and Moral* topic (RME) itself, CfE's principal organising framework for the moral.

Chapter 4: Religious and Moral Education (RME)

Chapter Abstract

Chapter 4 introduces CfE's *Religious and Moral Education* (RME) framework, identifying a continuing retreat of Christianity, and scepticism about religion. The RME topic is an incredibly compacted subject area, including CfE's approach to religion, morals and diversity. Religion is retained but not belief in God (Matemba, 2018). Considerable tensions and complexities are evident, therefore, both as a field of knowledge and vehicle for moral education.

Discussion of morality for some reason continues to be embedded in a religious framework. I argue (again) that RME is the core of CfE's values education, exemplifying a small number of basic values for young children, majorly facilitating the social moral values of schools, teachers and children. I argue further that tacit attribution of young children's basic values to gods, probably helps CfE avoid relativist problems of 'whose' values honesty, love and compassion are, and why these?

Religion and religious belief in Scotland are in rapid decline, a trend seen to have profound implications for social norms and public services such as education. The removal of religious moral authority was a significant worry in Scotland's 1972 *Millar Report*, because without it schools and teachers would operate largely on the basis of their own moral authority. I argue that CfE turned this religious and moral necessity into a Curriculum virtue.

RME in the BGE is by definition 'broad and general'. Around ten per cent of young people currently choose RMPS for Nationals. For around ninety per cent of school leavers, therefore, apart from ad hoc ethics arising in other subjects, RME is the basis of their taught moral education. I suggest, however, that retaining a quasi-religious framework, a complex array of socio-cultural factors ends up facilitating a trajectory of doubt and moral scepticism. According to the *ScotCen Social Attitudes Report* (2017), around 80% of 16 to 34s (in 2023) discard religious faith as a way of life.

Linking morals so closely with religion in the early years, however, has been seen to risk adolescent abandonment of ethics too. Millar (1972) thought we can expect this, since morality was largely based on religion in the formative years.

4.1: The RME Framework

CfE's RME subject, like much else about CfE, is arguably an evolution of earlier iterations rather than a radical new approach. Hartshorn (2008) thinks, however, that change has been both structural (becoming an 'inspected' subject alongside others), and professional (content and assessment becoming connected to whole-school policies). Conroy (1999), Hartshorn (2008), Nixon (2008), and Matemba (2018), all make mention of the strategic importance and influence of the Millar Report of 1972, which redirected Scottish RE away from a Biblical and confessional Christianity, towards a more open, questioning approach. I return to the Millar Report to help ground some parts of my arguments about ethics. Although many writers recognise Millar's strategic importance for RE, he also raised many specifically ethical issues still hotly contested.

The Education (Scotland) Act 1980 enshrined religious instruction and observance for all children in Scottish law with two exceptions: RE was to be locally determined, and there was to be a right of withdrawal, the so-called conscience clause (Matemba, 2018). Hartshorne (2008) thinks however, that the clause has sometimes led to an RME curriculum afraid of being "either innovative or controversial" (p375).

In 5-14 guidelines (1992), RME became one of five main subject areas, comprising three sub-headings: 'Christianity', 'World Religions', and 'Personal Search', with a 10% allocation of curriculum time. 5-14's framework of knowledge-based assessment targets, has been seen as a mixed blessing by RME practitioners however, because of RME's claimed, unique, affective, spiritual (listening, responding, reflecting and questioning) dimension, where "Personal Search is neither linear nor susceptible to simple measurement" (Hartshorn, 2008, p376). The latter, he thinks, leading to fragmented delivery across the sector. Minus a time allocation, CfE/RME retained an emphasis on Christianity and World Religions, in its 'Beliefs' and 'Practices and Traditions' sub-heads, dropping Personal Search as a sub-heading, but retaining it as a pedagogic tool, adding 'Values and Issues' as a new third heading.

Both Hartshorn (2008), and Nixon (2008), thought CfE's RME (being rolled out at the time), would include the *Four Capacities* in some way. In the event RME Es&Os made no mention of them, a surprising decision given their moral and ethical aspirations such as "secure values and beliefs", and "communicate their own beliefs and view of the world" (Confident individuals), and "understand different beliefs and cultures" (Responsible citizens).

Especially this seem so, in the light of subsequent OECD criticism of lack of metrics doing justice to the aspirations of the *Capacities,* and the need for a more robust evidence base if the aspirations were to be realised (OECD, 2015 Report, Executive Summary).

Ten years further on Matemba (2018), identifies a socio-religious context for Scottish primary RE, as being largely a consequence of "secularisation, religious diversity, immigration and liberal education policies" (p353), and an increased sociocultural religious visibility (although not belief in God). She thus emphasises the religious and cultural diversity aspect of the topic, and traces CfE's dual approach – i.e. Roman Catholic (RC) schools, and non-denominational schools – back to RC and Episcopalian refusal to be part of Scotland's 1872 education settlement, and a subsequent 1918 Act which gave them both freedom to manage their own schools, including full RC control over RE.

In today's non-denominational schools, the moral remains firmly embedded in a quasi-religious comparative framework, majorly consisting of *Religious and Moral Education* (RME), and minorly, Senior Phase *Religious, Moral and Philosophical Studies* (RMPS). I say 'quasi' because RME is just another academic subject (Matemba, 2018), and is really now a personal search for the meaning of life (Nixon, 2008), not about believing in God, nurturing a faith or inculcating religious values in the same way, for example, as denominational – *de facto* RC – schools, promote the Catholic Church, its faith and a specifically Christian morality.

RME: Compacted, Complex and Controversial.

Barnes (2011) discusses RE with reference to Northern Ireland, where the subject of religion can be particularly controversial, extending (there) to the place of compulsory RE in the curriculum. He thinks pluralism has significant implications for the subject, while the British model (he argues), misrepresents the nature of religion, and does not develop respect between individuals from different ethnic and religious groups. His point about pluralism and cultural diversity seems important in relation to CfE's diversity agenda, and the value pluralism (I will argue), it assumes, which I develop in Chapter 7.

There are considerable tensions and complexities in CfE/RME as a curriculum area (both as a field of knowledge and a potential vehicle for moral education), quite apart from those affecting ethnic groups, Catholic and Protestant, religious and non-religious world views, religious and philosophical ethics, or the 'religious' and 'moral'. Robinson and Franchi

(2018, p491), cite a 2013 study by Conroy et al (called *Does Religious Education Work?*), arguing that "the terms of reference within which Religious Education operates and its consequent objectives are so multiple, diffuse and fluid as to make it well-nigh impossible to offer anything like a comprehensive answer" (Conroy et al, 2013, p220).

According to Robinson and Franchi, an entirely appropriate shift away from confessional Christian RE did not just allow the subject to evolve into a distinctive exploration of religion as an important expression of human culture and society, but "shattered it into countless, often poorly considered iterations of 'RE'" (p491). Chiming with this, Matemba (2018), finds little uniformity of practice in Scottish non-denominational schools, with some classes focusing on Christianity, some on World Religion, some on "the Simpson's and morality, Australian Aborigines and ancient Egypt" (p356). The latter is also a good example of CfE's schools and teachers (and perhaps children), now deciding religious and moral content.

Such tensions are further complicated however, by contemporary emphasis on religious and cultural diversity, and (I argue in Chapter 7), the value pluralism which 'diversity awareness agendas' arguably assume but rarely seem to discuss. Certainly, religious and cultural diversity became very significant in CfE/RME (see RME Es&Os, 0-07a, 1-07a, 2-07a, 3-07a, 4-07a and 4-09c). These tensions, I suggest, include underlying theoretical issues of moral/ethical authority, objectivity, relativism, and questions about truth, the human good, and how children learn and develop. Add these long-standing, highly contested issues to the RME mix, and an incredibly dense, controversial, compacted RME subject area emerges.

The Core of CfE's Values Education.

That moral learning – i.e. not just religious education or religious moralities – is embedded in RME/RMPS is, however, largely why it must be seen as the core of CfE's values education, one of eight subject areas with built-in Es&Os/Benchmarks learning progression, and Nationals assessment (for the small minority who select RMPS).

I have argued above in Chapter 3, that RME Es&Os largely facilitate the social moral values of schools, teachers and children. Outcome statements exemplify a handful of values of the religious and moral kind, such as (RME Level Two, P5-P7, age 10-12):

- "Through investigating and reflecting upon the lives and teachings of Jesus and

key Christian figures, and drawing upon moral values as expressed in Christianity, I am beginning to understand how these have influenced Christian morality" (RME 2-02a, repeated for world religions).

- "A value might include for example principles such as selflessness, respect, equality" (RME Es&Os, p7N).

In Chapter 3 I also argued that RME values are indicative not mandatory, and not a specified list. They are given as examples of the kind of values society in general, Christianity and World Religions urge upon the world. Children are asked to share their "developing views about values such as fairness and equality and love, caring, sharing and human rights" (RME 2-05b, 2-02b). As well as basic values for younger children, RME values can be seen to open up a space for arguably the major source of the moral kind of values in CfE, those of 4,500+ establishments, 54,000+ teachers and 790,000+ pupils. Part of the delegation argument is that RME exemplified values function as enabling entities; the visible top of a much larger social moral iceberg.

Locating and embedding social moral values in a quasi-religious framework however, and tacitly attributing them to gods – albeit gods an ever decreasing minority of Scottish people, and even fewer young people take seriously – CfE can be seen to go some way towards avoiding the problem of 'whose' values honesty, love and compassion are in pluralist (and I shall argue largely relativist) society, and why these particular values and not others. It makes little difference that the gods are largely no longer believed; everyone knows and accepts that the Christian God (for example), had views about morality and love. Any vantage point above Edinburgh City arguably demonstrates this. Visitors are confronted with the most striking visual impression of an enormous number of spires and towers protruding even now above the modern city. They would be forgiven for thinking secular Scotland was still a Christian country; it once was and this is, I suggest, a key socio-cultural factor in relation to CfE's RME basic values for younger children.

Because non-denominational schools embed much of their taught ethics within this quasi-religious framework, it seems necessary to briefly review the position in Britain/Scotland in relation to religious faith.

4.2: The Retreat of Christianity

As a nation we largely no longer believe in God. That briefest of phrases, carries

enormous implications for ethics and education, because (according to the 2019 British Social Attitudes Survey, discussed below), the retreat of Christianity is a major transformative social trend affecting the whole of society. Christianity has of course, been retreating for decades, centuries even. Nietzsche notoriously thought God had long died by the time of his late nineteenth century; Elizabeth Anscombe (1958) thought Christian morality no longer survived in the British 1950s; Scotland's (1972) Millar Report thought the decline by then was so marked, that it was time for root and branch changes to the religious curriculum. As the new millennium dawned, religion largely no longer informed and shaped how we live and behave in society: Christianity had retreated and continued to. Despite this, CfE for some reason largely tied the moral to religion.

Bringing things up to date, Curtice et al, in the 2019 *British Social Attitudes* (BSA) Report: *Britain's Shifting Identities and Attitudes*, begins:

> we see a continuation of one of the most important trends in post-war history: the steady decline in religion and belief among the British public. This decline is not simply a private matter for individuals and families, but rather a trend with profound implications for our social norms as well as our public institutions (p1).

The decline of religion, BSA argues, is generational, each successive one is less likely to identify as religious than the one before (Curtice et al, 2019). Key Findings of the Report cite analysis by Voas and Crockett (2004), illustrating the mechanics of the decline, that while two non-religious parents will transmit their lack of faith to their children, two religious parents have only a 50/50 chance of doing so (Curtice et al, 2019).

Page 1 of the Report's *Key Findings* cites Wilson (2016), arguing that there are now alternative ways of interpreting and understanding the world, linking decades of religious decline and social change to industrialisation, and the rise of liberal democracy, a shift away from religious worldviews, and people's growing confidence in science and technology. Since the 1960s, secularisation, along with the women's and LGBT movements, has "brought about fundamental changes in our moral framework for sex and relationships, as well as a decline in traditional, religiously informed understandings of the proper role of men and women in society" (Brown, 2012, cited by Curtice et al, 2019, p1).

The ethical impacts of secularisation are enormous, changing not just long held social and sexual values, but how we think about ethics and treat each other. The Report asks: is

Britain now a "nation of secular, liberal rationalists, with beliefs, attitudes and behaviours driven by empiricism and logic?" (p1). We are living through all of this, making it hard perhaps, to see it for what it is; history may better understand its true cultural significance. We do, however, seem squashed between a rapidly fading Christian heritage, a confusing array of ethical systems, and relativist accounts of plural values. Furthermore, the Scottish Curriculum is absolutely a key public good in the BSA sense, and as such must have been powerfully influenced and shaped by this rapidly changing cultural scene.

The Millar Report.

I introduced the 1972 *Millar Report* in Chapter 3. Summing up his findings on *Moral and Religious Education in Scotland*, he asked if religious education should henceforth aim to provide a firm framework of ideas and beliefs, or "encourage an enquiring attitude"? If teachers were now to challenge pupils to explore new dimensions in life:

> what is the role of the teacher? What is his authority, or does he need no authority beyond the honest declaration of his own convictions? ... It is clear that agreement on moral issues is very difficult to reach … How should schools respond to this uncertainty? It cannot surely try to hide the fact that honest and sincere men and women disagree on many points. But is it at all helpful simply to point out that there *are* disagreements? Must it simply be a case of saying: 'Here is the evidence; you must make up your own mind on this one'?' How can pupils be safeguarded from teachers' prejudices? (p120).

Millar's Report came thirty-two years before CfE. The above passage shows however, that some key issues he raised are as relevant today as then, and remain largely unresolved. These, I suggest, include:

- The teacher's moral authority once God is no longer in residence.
- The difficult, highly contested nature of ethics, especially for schools. Individual teachers (of course), holding different personal moral viewpoints.
- If not God, is anyone in society now willing or able to take responsibility for children's moral upbringing? Should schools have a role? If so what?
- If it is now a matter of individual school and teacher moral choices and viewpoints, how if at all, can children be protected from personal moral prejudices?

Although acknowledging religious decline in society, Millar found that the great majority of parents still wanted their children to have RE. Adolescents, conversely, were asking about the relevance to them of religious education (which Millar saw as consistent with developmentalism, since it implied a need for a stage-appropriate approach). Older pupils

were asking not “Did it happen in Genesis?, or What does it mean? But What has this to do with us?” (p64). That was thirty-two years before CfE. One can only assume CfE architects thought children should (morally?), despite well documented adolescent antipathy, be taught about religion, and despite Millar recommending three decades earlier that moral and religious education should not be confined to “special periods and special teachers” (p68).

Some of the changes in attitudes and practices Millar proposed do, however, seem to be reflected in CfE. These include:

- Teachers no longer teach generally accepted religious or moral facts.
- Children must reach their own conclusions about religious and moral beliefs.
- Today’s society demands tolerance, with children exposed to different religious and moral points of view “without the weight of ‘authority’ being thrown behind any of them” (Millar, 1972, pp68-69).

Among Millar’s eighteen *Problems in Future Development*, two are of particular significance for CfE’s values and ethics: the question of moral authority, and the impact of teachers’ private moral judgements and opinions once God’s authority is removed. He thought the latter was an unavoidable consequence of Christianity’s decline, and large-scale removal of moral authority. It was a significant worry for him, because without an overarching religious moral framework, or standard, schools and teachers would have no choice but to operate largely on the basis of their own moral authority. Thus, he suggested teachers should at the least make an “honest declaration of their own convictions” (p120), to avoid being seen as pushing private opinions and personal prejudices onto pupils.

The view that government and religion should be kept separate is secularism. In its delegation of social moral values, CfE arguably went some way towards turning this secular necessity into a Curriculum virtue, resulting, I suggest, in the prejudices and private moral viewpoints of empowered schools and teachers (sometimes referred to as the ‘informal’ or ‘hidden’ curriculum), arguably becoming the very basis of its social moral values.

Making this claim (evidenced here, in Chapter 3 and future chapters), I am differentiating between ethics ‘as such’ (ethical thought as articulated by Berlin (2013a), and social moral, cultural, educational, organisational, spiritual and aesthetic values, as well as other frameworks with a claim to ethical status such as human rights. Millar’s concerns about teacher prejudices for this very reason seem to raise still live ethical issues, ultimately

impacting how schools approach the moral and the ethical. Within the orbit of formal educational requirements such as teaching standards and human rights, organisational and educational values, it seems likely that school and teacher scales of value determine, for example, whether they choose utilitarianism, Kant, the Bible or other religious books, rights, the Simpsons, or any other moral or ethical stance of their choosing, to interpret, for example, euthanasia, crime and punishment, human conflict and environmental ethics.

The *British Social Attitudes Report* (2019), forty-seven years on from Millar, thus largely confirms the trends he saw developing. His fundamental problem of moral authority and personal moral prejudices are unlikely to have gone away or been resolved. Nothing has since replaced the moral authority of God (the Church) in British society, and CfE never mentions the issue of school and/or teacher personal prejudices.

Furthermore, CfE is not a specified Curriculum. Millar simply assumed (because at that time he seems to have had no reason not to), that a specified curriculum would be in place, setting out religious-moral content. He was categoric that every aspect of "method and content … must be governed and tested by educational aims and educational criteria" (Millar, 1972, p68). That largely no longer holds in CfE. Its near content-free approach and empowerment of schools and teachers effectively remove Millar's "governing and testing of criteria". Who, or what governs and tests non-denominational school/teacher moral/ethical choices, content selections and decisions? In the absence of specified faith-based criteria (such as obtain in RC schools), and within generalised frameworks of rights, organisational and educational values, schools, teachers and children themselves largely seem to govern, test, select and decide what the "values on which Scottish society is based" (Review Group, 2004, p11) are. This, I suggest, is the *de facto* position.

4.3: General Statistical and Theoretical Analysis

CfE asserts that RE is an essential part of every child or young person's educational experience: "Children and young people must become aware that beliefs and values are fundamental to families and to the fabric of society in communities, local and global" (RME, Principles and Practices, p1). Learning in RME is defined as: "a process where children and young people engage in a search for meaning, value and purpose in life. This involves both the exploration of beliefs and values and the study of how such beliefs and values are

expressed." (RME, Principles and Practice, p1), and relates to RME's *Personal Search* programme (described in more detail in Chapter 11).

The bald numbers are just that, however of 96 RME outcome statements spread across five Levels, 64 are wholly religious, 13 refer to both religious and non-religious values and issues, 14 adopt a religious/general diversity theme, and 5 are wholly non-religious. While the moral has not simply been conflated with the religious in '*Religious and Moral*', the framework within which the moral is discussed remains overwhelmingly religious. RME *Principles and Practice* in fact state:

> The experiences and outcomes relating to the development by children and young people of their own beliefs and values do not form a separate context for planning, but should be intertwined with the experiences and outcomes for Christianity and the world religions selected for study (p2).

This is quite clear. CfE says to teachers: "when exploring a religion's moral values or response to a social issue, also explore corresponding or alternative moral values which are independent of religious belief" (Principles and Practice, p3).

Around ten per cent of young people currently choose *Religious, Moral and Philosophical Studies* (RMPS), in Nationals, thus for around ninety per cent of school leavers, apart from values and ethics arising ad hoc in other subjects, Junior Phase RME is the core of their taught morals and ethics. RME, however, is by definition broad and general. Religious and cultural diversity, tolerance, respect and inclusivity are the major themes (*cf* RME Benchmarks 2-07a). Six world religions – Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Sikhism, Buddhism and Hinduism – form the basic comparative framework from which RME teachers will usually select two, within which the religion's values are discussed. The threefold RME Es&Os structure is:

'Beliefs'; 'Values and Issues' and 'Practices and Traditions'. The following examples suggest how they work, taken from RME Es&Os Second Level, (P5-P7, age 10-12), pp9-12:

<u>Beliefs</u>

"Through investigating and reflecting upon biblical and other Christian stories, I can show my understanding of these stories" (repeated for world religions).

<u>Values and Issues</u>

"Through investigating and reflecting upon the lives and teachings of Jesus and key Christian figures, and drawing upon moral values as expressed in Christianity, I am beginning to

understand how these have influenced Christian morality" (repeated for world religions).

Practices and Traditions

"I can describe the practices and traditions of Christianity and have considered the way these have influenced Scottish society".

RME Teacher *Benchmark*s consist of 28 statements linked to corresponding Es&Os outcome statements, supporting the professional judgement of teachers. For example:

> Investigates, describes, explains and expresses an opinion on at least one value from Christianity, at least one World Religion, and at least one belief group independent of religion. Discusses and expresses views about the importance of values such as honesty, respect and compassion (Es&Os, p10).

RME is religious with a minor non-religious dimension: it is *Religious* and Moral, not *Moral* and Religious; running against all social and cultural secular trends, religion dominates. Reflection, perhaps via RME *Personal Search,* is encouraged; children are encouraged to learn 'from' as well as 'about' largely religious beliefs, values, practices and traditions.

I argue in Chapter 8 that Junior Phase RME largely adopts moral psychology in what CfE calls "developmentally appropriate practice" (*Active Learning in the Early Years*, 2007, p6), or *Active Learning*, while Senior Phase RMPS uses philosophical tools and methods to analyse World Religions and applied ethics. Chapter 11 examines RME's blending of psychology and philosophy, where I argue that they are, however, hard to combine.

The 2017 *ScotCen, Scottish Social Attitudes Research,* found that 74% of 18-34's (58% in the whole population), had no religion (increasing roughly 1% a year, thus around 80% and 64% respectively in 2023). Teachers are asked in fact, to "recognise that in this process of personal reflection, not all children will adopt a religious standpoint" (Principles and Practice, p3). *ScotCen Social Attitudes* analysis suggests that currently around 80% will not.

Unlike secular United States of America, where values education places more emphasis on democratic education (Halstead, 1996), in Scotland religious education has historically been the major vehicle for moral education. By 2008, however, (and chiming with Millar), Nixon thought Scottish RME had for some time been an opportunity to conduct children's "own search for meaning in life with no presupposition of the merit of a particular set of answers" (p561). Matemba (2018), similarly, thinks curriculum reforms from the 1980s onwards "helped to transform Scottish RE into an academic subject" (p1).

The Partial Impact of Millar.

I touched on this in 4.2 above. Recommendations in the *Millar Report* (pp118-123), covered:

- RE teaching methods, practices, relevance and content
- The syllabus
- Teacher-pupil relationships
- The difference between a broadly 'religious' and 'Christian' education
- Parental views of RE
- Whether, and if so how, other religions should be taught
- Discussion of Roman Catholic/Protestant differences

As suggested earlier, thirty years on CfE (and its immediate predecessors), seem to have addressed some of these issues, including relevance, the syllabus, other religions, and Catholic/Protestant differences. Many of his specifically ethical problems remain however, these include:

- The fundamental difficulty of morality as a topic.
- Whether to provide moral/ethical answers or raise doubts.
- Linking RE with morals (risking adolescents abandoning religion and ethics with it).
- The moral authority, or not, of the teacher.
- The risk of exposure to the moral prejudices of teachers.
- Whether there are basic values everyone in society could agree about.

With Millar in mind this might suggest three things: CfE's essential continuity with earlier curricula (as Priestley observes in relation to curriculum policy); affirmation of moral/ethical blendedness; and a fundamental problem for schools in secular plural society: how to teach children about right and wrong without telling them what is right and wrong. At any event, CfE's RME subject area is quasi-religious rather than faith-based; is most often seen as being process rather than content driven, becoming just another academic subject.

4.4: A Trajectory of Religious and Moral Scepticism

The seeds of CfE's religious scepticism can also be seen in Millar's Report. He mentions the ongoing impact of the *Honest to God* debate of the time (based on a 1963 book by John Robinson, Bishop of Woolwich, which aroused a storm of controversy on publication), questioning and criticising traditional Christian theology. Millar concluded in its aftermath, that religious instruction "must yield to a more open-ended examination of experience" (1972, p64), arguing that questioning and doubting biblical documents and doctrines could, and should now be part of any new developmental approach to RE. CfE's stance largely seems to

reflect this 'questioning and doubting' approach.

Millar thought that religious decline required that children should be taught to question the basis of the Christian faith. He asked:

> Should religious education aim to provide a firm framework of ideas and beliefs, or should it encourage an enquiring attitude. Should it give answers or raise doubts? Perhaps the answer lies between these two extremes, or involves a differing emphasis between them at different stages of a child's development? (1972, p120).

The following analysis suggests that CfE/RME moves from one to the other of Millar's two options during the Junior Phase. It starts by giving young children answers within a firm framework of religious ideas and beliefs, then encourages an enquiring and questioning attitude as they develop, culminating in philosophical analysis and doubt in the Senior Phase. The trajectory is from a firm framework of beliefs, towards doubt and scepticism. Situating the moral within this schema seems problematic for ethics however, because the basis and framework of moral learning is largely a discourse of (religious) decline, scepticism, doubt and devaluation. This seems to take something like the following path:

1. Gives answers. Early Years through to Level 2 (ages 3-12): "investigating and reflecting upon the lives and teachings of Jesus and key Christian figures, and drawing upon moral values expressed in Christianity, I am beginning to understand how these have influenced Christian morality" (RME, 2-02a), repeated for 'world religions'. And: "As I explore Christian stories, images, music and poems, I am becoming familiar with some beliefs Christian people have about God and Jesus." (Early Years, age 3-6, repeated for World Religions, repeated at First Level).
2. Raises doubts. Levels 3 and 4 (ages 12-15), older children question the existence of God, and God's authority, and consider some non-religious points of view. Religious belief is now said to be any aspect of belief "over which there might be discussion and debate such as does God exist?" (RME, Level 3, Notes).
3. Questions. In the Senior Phase (ages 16-18), young people philosophise about "The Existence of God"; "Origins"; "The problem of Suffering and Evil", and "Miracles" (National 5, RMPS Course Specification, pp8-9).

Other examples could be cited. A structure of religious ideas and beliefs in the early years becomes junior questioning and doubt, culminating in religious scepticism for seniors, who learn philosophical methods, and apprise the sources and foundations of the largely religious morality they started out with in their formative years. Non-denominational schools largely seem to follow such a path of general scepticism, the kind of scepticism and doubt RC schools for example, do their utmost to avoid.

Doubting and questioning the framework of ideas and beliefs laid down in the formative years, arguably leaves young people needing to rethink the basis of their ethics, without its (soon to be for 80%), discarded religious foundations. This seems a significant social, ethical and educational opportunity missed. The missed opportunity is not children being didactically 'taught' morals, Christian ethics, or CfE's pro-social values, but being part of a conversation with schools and teachers, and with each other, about ethics, the good, and associated social issues such as pluralism, which could be explained, discussed, balanced and teased out ("worried out" as Berlin puts it, 1978, p25).

Millar asked if it was wise to link morals so closely with religion for this very reason. An adolescent rejecting religion, he argued "may also consider that to be consistent he has to abandon morals as well. We can expect this since we have based morality on religion" (1972, p118). The irony of course, is that helping children to question and doubt Christian ethics and the foundations of Christianity, arguably makes it more likely that they will miss, or fail to value, any moral and ethical good they may have earlier seen in faith-based ways of life and systems of morality and ethics.

The Problem of Radical Doubt.

Discussing school ethics within a philosophical (Aristotelian) rather than spiritual perspective, White (1997), thought an underlying problem was that because religion was finally disintegrating as a credible moral framework for society and schools, we needed a new kind of value-framework which everyone can confidently believe (p20). He thought "radical doubt" (White, 1997, p23), was an enemy to avoid at all costs, and that schools should (therefore), confidently instil virtues and values such as honesty, promise-keeping, temperance, good habits, character formation, and the avoidance of harm in the building of these dispositions in children. In similar vein, Millar earlier suggested that "a pedagogically viable justification for morality independent of the Bible, separate from religion or the supernatural", could evolve (1972, p118). His Report constantly reversed the two terms in fact, speaking throughout about *moral and religious education*, instead of *religious and moral*. If Millar was right, a problem for Scottish schools in relation to morals and ethics, is that a pedagogically viable, independent justification for morality and ethics for some reason has not evolved, and currently shows no signs of doing so. But an opportunity for Scottish education might indeed be to do exactly that going forward.

White's thesis can be seen as part of a so-called 'turn to virtue' in British moral philosophy, following Elizabeth Anscombe's ground-breaking 1958 essay, *Modern Moral Philosophy*, a turn that is, towards a neo-Aristotelian emphasis on virtue and moral character. Anscombe's point was that following the rapid decline of faith as a moral framework, legal notions such as obligation make little sense, because there is no lawgiver to justify or enforce conformity.

My argument is essentially a kind of exegesis of Anscombe's conclusion. A fundamental tension in CfE's approach is arguably that retaining a disintegrating religious organising framework, it may have had little choice but to promote a doubting, vacillating, sceptical version of quasi-religious practices and beliefs. Its valiant efforts in the face of widespread atheism and agnosticism may end up largely self-defeating however, because ideals – tolerance, caring, equality, love, etc. – in the crucial formative early years were largely dressed up in religious clothes, which according to ScotCen research may ultimately be cast off by 80% of children. This trajectory of scepticism arguably characterises CfE's quasi-religious moralities, following which most children seem likely to abandon what probably comes to be seen as a religious straight-jacket; the same religious constraint that is, which the adult world they are joining is also rapidly discarding.

I am not arguing that CfE's non-denominational schools push Christian morality (or any particular ethical viewpoint for that matter), onto children, or that they should, but the exact opposite; that it uses Christianity and World Religion as a basic framework for moral values, then removes the scaffolding. The obvious question is why do it at all? Why lead children down a quasi-religious moral pathway (switching metaphors), which social analysis suggests for most young people will peter out during or soon after adolescence? It is neither one thing or the other; without spiritual benefits and certainties faith can arguably provide, and without human benefits a secular, independent ethics detached from religion and state could provide.

RME a Logical Non-Sequitur.

Part of the answer to my question – why do it at all? – (as Millar also pointed out), may be that religion is at least a frame of reference for morals most people in a liberal democracy seem able to accept; less so in 2023, but (as Nietzsche, Anscombe, Millar, the BSA Report and

many others argue), a culturally and historically ingrained part of Western society.

In fact, CfE's argument for religion in RME *Principles and Practice* is precisely constructed on this 'fabric of society' premise. It begins with a general, uncontroversial philosophical claim that people hold a wide range of beliefs about things including religion (premise 1). It then argues that such diversity provides a context for children and young people to develop their own beliefs and values, recognise and understand diversity (premise 2). It then concludes that religious and moral education is an essential part of children's educational experience, who must become aware that beliefs and values are fundamental to families and to the fabric of society in communities, local and global.

The basic flaw in this argument is that the conclusion does not follow; it is a logical *non-sequitur*, the premises do not lead to the conclusion that religious and moral education should therefore be part of education, or that beliefs and values are fundamental to families and the fabric of society. Either *may* be true, but this argument does not show that they are, because it is not logically valid. People holding different beliefs about things, and the benefits of learning about them, does not lead to the conclusion that schools should therefore teach religion. Some beliefs that people hold can and do lead to very different conclusions indeed, such as that schools should *not* therefore teach any particular religious system (as in secular United States of America, for example).

4.5: Religious and Moral Education, Concluding Remarks

Chapter 4 has argued that religion in non-denominational schools is used as the primary framework for moral learning, in a rapidly secularising society in which, arguably, no other socially acceptable ground existed. The latter may be why it remains the core of CfE's values education, one of eight subject areas with built-in Es&Os/Benchmarks progression, and Nationals assessment (for the small minority who select RMPS).

Many writers have seen considerable tensions and complexities in RME as a curriculum area however (both as a field of knowledge and a potential vehicle for moral education). The moral has not simply been conflated with the religious in '*Religious and Moral*', but the framework within which it is discussed is overwhelmingly religious. The problem is that in an era of rapid religious decline, it arguably becomes a vacillating, sceptical ground for morals which, according to the findings of social analysis such as the BSA and

ScotCen, will be rejected by most young adults. I argue that it therefore seems unlikely it provides – in principle or in practice – a satisfactory moral foundation for children to build their own values and lives (as CfE states and hopes).

The fact that as a nation we largely no longer believe in God, has been seen as one of the most important trends in post-war history, with profound implications for social norms and public institutions. Nonetheless, embedding moral values in a quasi-religious framework, and tacitly attributing some of them to gods (various), arguably helped CfE avoid problems of 'whose' values love, compassion etc. are, in a largely relativist society, because everyone knows God had views about values.

In 1972 Millar thought every aspect of RE method and content must be governed and tested by educational criteria. But who 'governs and tests' RME content in CfE's non-denominational schools? It is not a 'specified' curriculum; within generalised frameworks of rights, policy and educational values, schools and teachers create the RME curriculum, governing and testing content. Thus, I argue that the 'informal' or 'hidden' curriculum became the basis of CfE's social moral values, arguably contributing to tensions and complexities many writers have discussed.

If the argument made in this chapter concerning scepticism and doubt is correct, it seems reasonable to ask whether the Scottish government wants schools to teach normative ethics to children at all, and if so, what are the realistic options going forward in an increasingly secular society? It could, for example (returning to Millar and his arguments for 'moral and religious' rather than 'religious and moral'), simply locate the religious within a meaningful discussion of ethics.

This completes Chapter 4, CfE's *Religious and Moral Education*, Chapter 5 introduces and reviews three general education contexts.

Chapter 5: Education Overview

Chapter Abstract

Chapter 5 summarises three approaches to education, selected for their perceived relevance to arguments about CfE's values and ethics: classic liberal education, Durkheim's functional analysis, and a blended academic/vocational approach.

I assume Mary Warnock's education thesis that children should be able to understand their world, enjoy it, and gain the independence they need to control it. I argue, however, that ethics are a largely suppressed, unargued-for category in CfE policy statements, but are nonetheless a necessary (some theorists such as R.S.Peters and Richard Pring think 'inherent'), ingredient of education whether academic or vocational.

Education is of course theorised in many different ways. It has been viewed conceptually as intrinsically worthwhile – the bearer of intrinsic value – in the analytic tradition, entailing the idea of 'reform'. Durkheim sees things empirically rather than conceptually, in relation to its underlying social system, meeting society's needs, reflecting but not abstracting from social existence.

Must education be either intrinsic or extrinsic, however? Pring argues for a middle way, striking a balance between conceptual/academic and social/vocational, because if theorised well both can empower children to think, reason and evaluate.

I argue that CfE moved education markedly away from conceptual/academic ends, towards social/vocational purposes, probably taking education to be grounded and justified instrumentally and socio-politically. The Curriculum talks about values of all kinds, but this does not do all of what matters for an ethics, because (I argue), the ethical involves a personal (and inter-personal) evaluative dimension; that is, I assume children's personal ends and fundamental convictions underlie their human values and how they treat each other.

5.1: Academic or Vocational?

To 'educe' is to draw out, develop human potential and make connections between people as well as objects and events. As such it seems impossible not to see education as itself a fundamentally ethical project, because it seems axiomatic that the development of human potential cannot but involve (human) interests, ideals, and systems of value which education also builds on.

A good starting point is Mary Warnock's (1998) summary of what she called the common goals of education, as being children able to understand their world, enjoy it, and gain the independence they need to control it. Isaiah Berlin (2001) too, argues that children have a right to the development of their capacities for thought and feeling, of the critical intellect and unfettered imagination.

Espousing classic liberal education, Peters (1972), thought an educated person was someone "capable of delighting in a variety of pursuits and projects for their own sake" (p9), and whose life would be transformed through the understanding education provides. For him and his colleagues at the London *Institute of Education* in the 1970s, a basic principle of education was its inherent worth or value; something of value had to be passed on. On this view the standards and ends of education are built into the very concept (Gribble, 1969).

Arguing from a pragmatist (instrumentalist) position earlier in the century, Dewey (2011) on the other hand, thought life itself was fundamental, and education was identical with the process and "operation of living a life" (p132).

Another way to approach things distinguishes 'schooling' and 'education'; Carr (2003) does this, arguing that the debate between instrumentalists and non-instrumentalists confuses the two kinds. Similar to Peters, Carr describes education as an "initiation into intrinsically valuable forms of rational knowledge and understanding" (p15). On this view, education as a philosophical concept is basic, rather than education as a social construct (which he calls schooling), and not unlike Warnock, education should give children an understanding of themselves, their world and how to relate to others. He sees schooling on the other hand, as a publicly funded social institution and therefore accountable to taxpayers and their representatives. CfE has been seen to cut across these approaches, building around what it calls a 'values, purposes, and principles' model, rather than a traditional aims and objectives curriculum approach.

Sounding very CfE-like, setting education within a psychological as well as philosophical and social framework, Jarrett (1991), argues that schools should see values as the central notion of education. For him its main purpose is not to convey knowledge, but to make children's lives "rich in values" (p9). Writers such as Jarrett (and Noddings discussed in Chapter 9), think the most important thing about making values rather than knowledge

central, is that they believe children will thereby live a better life and enjoy it more. It is somewhat obscure in Jarrett's arguments however, how an education policy resting on values rather than knowledge will lead to better lives. Be this as it may, his emphasis on values and enjoyment rather than knowledge correlates well with CfE.

The following briefly reviews three approaches, selected for their relevance to thesis arguments: classic liberal education, Emile Durkheim's functionalist approach, and a blended academic/vocational approach. A great deal more could be said in each case (and about many other approaches outside the scope of this study), and their purpose is mainly to help describe elementary education/ethical base-lines.

5.2: Classic Liberal Education

Liberal educationists stress the intrinsic worth of education. R.S. Peters (1968) for example, thought education was different from ordinary activities such as looking, or achievements such as winning a race, because it entails judgements of value. To be education it must be worthwhile and morally unobjectionable in its delivery. Peters (1972) likened education to reform in the sense of children being made better, which he thought was a unifying concept for the various processes involved, and which taken together led to an educated person. He also thought his analysis took him to the heart of ethics, because it raises questions about what is valuable. He asks: "In the realm of 'the good' what makes pursuits so worthwhile that children should be initiated into them? … What sort of justification can be given for the pursuit and possession of knowledge and understanding?" (Peters, 1972, p15).

Classic liberal theorists are very clear that education is worthwhile as an end in itself – the bearer of intrinsic value – and in itself an ethical undertaking, acknowledging that it therefore raised ethical questions still being debated. For them, what sets education apart from other things is that it asks questions about value, which is an essentially ethical and philosophical enterprise. According to Carr (1998), Peters located education within a broad analytical tradition in educational philosophy that built on the work of Wittgenstein, Austin and Ryle. Peters himself describes his work on the aims of education as essentially a 'conceptual enquiry'.

5.3: Durkheim's Functionalist Approach

An important pioneer of modern sociological methodology, Emile Durkheim theorised

education empirically not conceptually, seeing it in terms of a vital relationship to its total social system, meeting its needs. Massive changes were happening in industrial societies in Durkheim's time, and he thought that "never was sociology more needed by educators, in their attempt to understand what societal needs education was to meet" (Durkheim, 1968, p22). He examines various definitions of education (by J.S. Mill, James Mill and Kant), and concludes that they all wrongly assume the possibility of "an ideal, perfect education, which applies to all men indiscriminately", which is then defined conceptually (1968, p64).

Almost the inverse of Peters, Durkheim thought conceptual approaches to education were an "abstraction from concrete social existence" (1968, p65), and that it assumed education was what he called "a pure system of *a priori* concepts" (1968, p65). But this, he argues, ignores that education systems are products of each separate society and its customs, and therefore cannot be a generic set of conceptual principles. He thought we cannot raise our children just as we want, because if they do not conform to society's customs, as adults they will not be able to coexist with their peers, and will find themselves "outside the conditions of normal life" (Durkheim, 1968, p66). Each separate society and its morals underpin Durkheim's approach. His cultural/societal difference argument has been seen as culturally relativist, and is not for that reason generic or universal.

Each society according to Durkheim, sets up what he calls an ideal of man which then becomes the focus of its education system. The object of education is to "arouse and to develop in the child a certain number of physical, intellectual and moral states which are demanded of him by both the political society as a whole and the special milieu for which he is specifically destined" (1968, p65, p71). For Durkheim, society and society's needs rather than Philosophy are education's ground and purpose, and the prevailing cultural milieu (including politics), its inescapable context. Nonetheless "moral states" were still a focus.

Introducing Durkheim's *Essays on Education*, Pickering (1979), thought he was increasingly being recognised as the founder of the sociology of education, because education is largely governed by "social needs and social ideals [and is] a function of the social organisation of society" (p99). According to Fox (1968), Durkheim was a "precursor" (p18), of later functional analysis (i.e. by Talcott Parsons and others). Introducing Durkheim's papers on education, Fox identifies four themes, the first, sociology of science and knowledge, leads him to an overview of Durkheim's functional analysis.

Fox argues that Durkheim's concept of societal and individual needs is intrinsic to what became functional sociology (institutions working together to ensure social order). Durkheim thought education creates what he called the social being, by teaching children to constrain, control and resist themselves, fashioning in its image their "will and understanding" (Durkheim, 1979, p127). Despite differing in obvious ways to Peters' conceptual approach, it is interesting that Durkheim's stress on constraint and control has ethical similarities to Peters' notion of reform. He thought society not individual consciousness shape individuals, but that institutions such as schools and work places should provide necessary social glue, social solidarity, and a sense of belonging.

According to Durkheim therefore, an important part of the role of education was to transmit to children the mores of their culture and society, as well as broader physical and intellectual aims. CfE arguably takes a not dissimilar line in respect of the "values on which Scottish society is based" (*Review Group*, 2004, p11), which might be seen as another way of describing socially derived pro-social values, mores and cultural norms.

5.4: A Blended Academic / Vocational Approach

Why however, must there be the perennial clash between 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic'; why must it be an either/or choice? Pring (1996), poses this question, charting a middle way between conceptual-academic, and social-vocational, suggesting that vocational values and purposes can be incorporated *within* a liberal education. Critiquing both academic and vocational positions, he argues that the liberal ideal is too narrow, focusing too much on a world of ideas, ignoring the world of industry and commerce, writing off too many young people as ineducable. Vocational training on the other hand, is often not the same thing as education; it can, but often does not empower the individual to think, reason or evaluate. Vocational learning, he says, can ask teachers to "deliver someone else's curriculum" (p110), jeopardising more academic activities which may be seen as lacking immediate occupational relevance. Furthermore (and correlating strongly with CfE), the use of concepts from the business world (such as outcomes and performance indicators), can reduce learning to mere lists of competencies.

Pring notes that Peters had argued that the 'practical' is not necessarily a disqualification, because it need not be pursued instrumentally. He largely agrees with Peters, while advocating the harmonisation of academic and vocational aims via education of the

whole person. Clearly, Pring's middle way chimes with the language of CfE, which aims to "achieve a suitable blend of what has traditionally been seen as 'academic' and 'vocational'" (Review Group, 2004, p10). On the other hand the practical in CfE is absolutely pursued instrumentally, employing lists of competencies and benchmarks as the framework of choice for learning and teaching.

The debate between academic and vocational education will rumble on. Pring however, moves the parameters towards an ethical premiss largely missing in CfE, when he identifies distinctively human, whole-person ethical concepts and qualities he thought were needed for children to have fulfilled lives. From the perspective of ethics would it matter terribly if education were largely academic or largely vocational, if throughout their school years Scotland's children came to:

- know, understand and reason, and gain different "forms of knowledge through which experience is organised and made sense of" (Pring, 1996, p112).
- see themselves and others as persons, and "distinct centres of consciousness" with the capacity to think, reason and feel, and able to "appreciate things from another's point of view" (Pring, 1996, p112).
- take control of their lives, "contemplate ends worth living for", and how to achieve them, providing a "distinctively human moral dimension" (Pring, 1996, p113).
- develop the personal and social qualities which enable them to live "productively and responsibly within society". (Pring, 1996, p114).

Chiming strongly with Warnock and Berlin, Pring's arguments identify ethics as a necessary ingredient of education whether conceptual or vocational. CfE established a new balance between academic and vocational, becoming significantly more instrumental. What it did not do is articulate with anything like Pring's clarity, a distinctively human, ethical dimension. Talking about values of various kinds does not do all of what matters, because the ethical involves non-material human interests, ends, and fundamental human convictions underpinning the values. This of course is ethics which, I will argue, needs acknowledging and tackling, discussing and understanding, in order to nurture children's 'distinctively human' capacities. But CfE for some reason does not seem to want to acknowledge or do this.

5.5: Education Overview, Concluding Remarks

Chapter 5 has briefly reviewed three approaches to education that help to draw moral and ethical education base lines for my study, these are conceptual-liberal, functional-

empirical and academic-vocational. A start-point for understanding and perhaps locating CfE somewhere within the orbit (or not) of these approaches, can be made by recalling Priestley and Humes' discussion of curriculum studies (discussed in Chapter 2). They think CfE is a combination of traditional subjects, vocational skills and a mixture of three different curricula policy architypes. This suggests CfE, at least to some extent, may also cut across the three viewpoints I have discussed, perhaps blending and combining elements. I will argue in Chapter 6 in fact, that such 'blending' is both a function and result of classic, top-down, strategic policy-making.

On the other hand, CfE is first and foremost an education system. The education approaches considered in Chapter 5 have seemed to suggest that education and ethics might best be seen as mutually inter-dependent categories, rather than two sides of a different coin. If so, this suggests that an ethics could indeed grow out of a philosophy of education. Some Scottish writers however (for example Gillies, 2006 and 2013; MacAllister et al, 2013), argue that CfE does not have a readily identifiable education philosophy foundation. Absence of the latter may, then, be a contributory factor for CfE's apparent refusal of ethics.

This completes Chapter 5: overview of three educational approaches. It also completes PART I introducing the thesis, the Curriculum, its values and ethics, its quasi-religious organising framework, and three base-line theories of education. PART II reviews three major contextual elements and their relevant literatures.

PART II: Contextual Review

PART II of the thesis looks in more detail at three major contextual elements of the values and embedded ethics of the Curriculum, and starts to apply relevant theory and literature. PART I is largely source led, whereas PART II acts like a fulcrum around which the thesis turns to become argument led. I argue that instrumentalism is a significant shaping concept for CfE's education policy, as well as its values and ethics; that value pluralism is a major conditioning influence for Scotland's and CfE's customary morality, and that developmentalism largely shapes the 'how' of moral learning. There are three chapters:

Chapter 6: Instrumentalism
Chapter 7: Value Pluralism
Chapter 8: Developmentalism

Chapter 6: Instrumentalism

Chapter Abstract

Chapter six identifies a significant neo-liberal critique of education (and CfE), what one writer (Whitty, 2002), refers to as a 'discourse of marketisation'. Scottish writers too, have argued that choice and privatisation were common themes in both Scotland and England during the New Labour years (Arnott and Ozga, 2016).

Many unequivocal statements in the documentary record, that CfE wants to equip young people with skills they will need in tomorrow's workforce, and increase the economic performance of the nation (*A Framework for Learning and Teaching*), suggest that in CfE an unabashed economic emphasis strengthened significantly, completing a trend building over many years in Scotland. A key part of CfE's stated purposes (the *Four Capacities*), was to prepare young people to be 'effective contributors', to the economy.

I argue that a superbly executed, top-down strategic development process, joined up education with *National Priorities*, leaving CfE largely instrumentalised to the good of society and the economy. Within this strategic framework, I suggest the *Four Capacities* are part of a continuous policy pathway from New Labour's 'new' stakeholders, through schools and classrooms, to Government's strategic, economic and political objectives.

In the rebalancing of academic and vocational purposes however, value moved decisively away from intrinsic to the extrinsic worth of education. Skills for tomorrow's workforce and increasing Scotland's economic performance became the strategic focus. This is fully consistent with what has been seen by Williams (1973), as the consequences public institutions bring about being seen as justification for their very existence.

Viewed from this perspective, the Curriculum can be seen as the education part of a much larger government strategy. The strategic motif, I suggest, is one of the keys to understanding CfE's skills emphasis, and the utilisation of knowledge for extrinsic ends.

6.1: CfE's Instrumentalism

The Scottish Government wants to: "equip young people with the skills they will need in tomorrow's workforce" (*Review Group*, 2004, p7); respond to "new global social, political and economic influences [and] increase the economic performance of the nation" (p10). *A Framework for Learning and Teaching* states that the Government's principal purpose is to

"create a more successful Scotland with opportunities for all to flourish through increasing sustainable economic growth" (p3). Children and young people's flourishing is emphatically connected with Scotland's economic performance, making the economy and their part in it a key criterion of their future wellbeing. The *Review Group* said the Curriculum should play a significant role in achieving Scotland's principal purpose and strategic objectives. *A Framework for Learning and Teaching* says "The aim of *Curriculum for Excellence* is to help prepare all young people in Scotland to take their place in a modern society and economy" (p3). These unequivocal statements suggest an unabashed, instrumentalist, economic emphasis strengthened significantly in CfE, completing a trend building over many years in Scotland (see for example Gillies, 2008 and 2013).

The *Oxford Dictionary of Education* defines instrumentalism as learning undertaken not for its own sake but for some other purpose. It identifies all vocational education as instrumental, together with an increasing emphasis on skills for work in the later stages of the secondary school, rather than a liberal model of education. This almost exactly describes CfE. Judged against such criteria, CfE's "better balance between 'academic' and 'vocational' subjects" (Review Group, p7), and its focus on generic competencies and capacities instead of a detailed specification of knowledge content (Priestley, 2013), situates Scottish education as a paradigm example of an instrumentalist education policy. Knowledge is no longer centre-stage as it was in the liberal model; skills dominate. Scottish writers have seen multiple weaknesses in CfE, but most of all a decline of knowledge (Paterson, 2020).

Viewed from a political-economic perspective, however, how could any taxpayer funded education system not be instrumentalist? Gillies (2013) makes this point, according to whom education systems in the developed world are "dominated by neo-liberal ideas about the knowledge economy" (p116), and therefore by the need for a clear economic focus. The problem for ethics, is where, if anywhere, they can find room in a functionalised political and economic universe. This is because viewed strategically, from a vantage point beyond education itself as *the* end of schooling, the most obvious benefits of education are social, economic and extrinsic, located as in fact CfE states 'in a modern society and economy', rather than personal development, or the moral or ethical goodness of citizens and future citizens. Ascendant consumerist ideologies seem to squash ethics to the margin and beyond.

Neo-liberal Critique.

Discussing sociology and education policy, Whitty (2002) builds his thesis on Karl Mannheim's contention that individualism and competition are significant threats to society and liberal democracies, exposing them to the danger of being "captured" (p21), by a "discourse of marketisation" (p21). If so, he argues, sociologists can and should point to other, better, perspectives. A key part of his thesis is that schools cannot change society on their own, or its deep-rooted patterns of disadvantage and inequality: "Genuinely equal opportunities for all will only be achieved as part of a broader strategy of social and economic change" (2002, p12). Ethics are most often implicit in Whitty (2002) rather than explicit, but arguably, are a constantly assumed framework, either by indirect reference to an ethics of the marketplace (assumed to be able to overcome structural and social disadvantage, he argues), or simply by a lack of clear ethical articulation in neo-liberal thinking about the benefits of choice and competition.

Arnott and Ozga (2016) focus on the period 2007 onwards (and the SNP), three years after CfE's launch. They explore developments in SNP education rhetoric, suggesting it effectively exploited embedded education assumptions in Scotland in order to mobilise "resources of nationalist sentiment, while also pursuing modernising, economy-focused goals" (p253). They cite Novoa (2000, p46), that "education is, by definition, the space for the construction of national identity" (Arnott and Ozga, 2016, p255), and argue that a narrative of a "journey to independence" (p253), was thereby supported by embedded myths about the democratic nature of Scottish schooling, and its role in the construction of community.

Arnott and Ozga (alongside many others), argue that choice and privatisation were common themes in both Scotland and England during the New Labour years. They cite the Scottish Executive's 2004 'Ambitious Excellent Schools' programme as an example, echoing English based reforms introducing "diversity in provision" (Arnott and Ozga, 2016, p256), but maintaining the principle of comprehensive provision. Such 'dual referencing' they argue, has been criticised as "speaking social democratic and acting neo-liberal" (p259). Chiming with Whitty's call for a broader 'social policy' approach, they observe that Scotland had come almost last of 24 comparator 'western' countries in the OECD *Index of Children's Well-being*, which included suicide rates, dental health, child poverty and teenage pregnancy rates.

Such statistics were/are a concern for all public services. CfE was in fact already on the

'wellbeing' case when the SNP came to power, however, identifying (in the period 2002-2004), the new *Health and Wellbeing* subject area, intended to tackle these very issues (involving topics such as 'Physical activity and health', 'Substance misuse', and 'Relationships sexual health and parenthood'). That said, I argue in Chapter 10 that viewed from an ethical perspective, the *Health and Wellbeing* topic too assumed a largely instrumental, consequentialist character.

Arguing for a better balance between consumer rights and citizen rights in education policy, Whitty (2002) suggests that in the 1980s and 1990s "a fundamental repositioning of education in relation to the state and civil society" (p27), occurred in England and Wales. This, he thinks, followed the Thatcher government's *National Curriculum* use of academic subjects to prepare children for their future lives in society and economic life (continued and widened during John Major's administration). Policies included school autonomy and parental choice agendas, such as the Assisted Places Scheme, state schools outside Local Government control, City Technology Colleges, and Local Management of Schools. Local Government itself, and many publicly funded services were subject to various outsourcing, quasi-privatisation regimes. Whitty refers to these arrangements collectively as the "marketisation of the public sector" (2002, p48), and thinks that alongside an immediate 'choice and diversity' focus, they transferred power from local to central government. The "hidden curriculum of the market" (p92), he argues, undermined community values while constructing new kinds of consumerist identities.

According to Wilson (2003), when New Labour came to power in 1997, the *Assisted Places Scheme* was scrapped, but most of the other arrangements remained in place, and some were expanded. On the other hand, as with other public sector bodies, Local Education Authorities and schools, were at the same time subject to greater central government regulation, and were required to set themselves a plethora of strategic targets and benchmarks through their respective audit and inspection regimes. This included the much vaunted 'Best Value' programme and Inspectorate, and Audit Commission Inspection for local Councils. Benefits and Fraud services, Fire Services, Constabularies, Social Services, and of course Standards in Education (OFSTED), were all affected.

Part of CfE's clearly stated focus is to prepare young people to be 'effective

contributors' to the knowledge economy (one of the *Four Capacities*), responding to new global social, political and economic influences. Its aim to increase the economic performance of the nation suggests CfE was part of Scotland's version of New Labour's strategic agenda, albeit without the bulk of quasi-market reforms. Education was a key devolved area in the new Scottish Parliament, and according to Gillies (2008), "any major break in the broad political consensus on the state system" (p89) seemed unlikely. Nonetheless he thought a continued move away from public sector ideology occurred in Scotland too, "towards a paradigm which focuses instead on the concept of consumers and private gain" (Gillies, 2008, p87). He too, argues that a general principle of 'consumer sovereignty' and individualism had come to dominate, grounded in the belief that competition improved services, improving the "wealth-producing potential of the economy" (p80). This kind of market oriented education rhetoric he thinks, was most prevalent in Britain, the United States of America, New Zealand and parts of Australia.

The relevance of Schiro's *Social Efficiency* thesis seems clear in all of this, where schooling exists to meet the needs of society, "to train youth in the skills and procedures they will need in the workplace and at home" (Schiro, 2013, p5). Paraphrasing him, in CfE, competencies and skills moved to centre-stage, to find the most efficient way of producing an educated 'product'.

A 'Strategy' and a 'Mission Statement'.

CfE's policy rhetoric arguably reflects this neo-liberal, instrumentalist perspective. Kier Bloomer was an original *Review Group* member; at that time (2004) a Local Government strategic educationist and Chief Executive of Clackmannanshire Council. In 2016 (writing for *Reform Scotland*), he said:

> The original strategy paper [i.e., the 2004 *Review Group* inaugural Document] was published almost twelve years ago ... It was a slim document … containing only broad principles without practical advice as to how they might be carried into effect. In essence it was a mission statement, setting out four purposes [the *Four Capacities*] ... In other words, Curriculum for Excellence has given Scotland a generally agreed and long-term strategic vision, albeit at a very high level of generality (Bloomer, 2016, p12).

CfE was set going by a "strategy", with a mission statement, providing "strategic vision" (p12). It was developed during the heyday of the Blair years, driven by New Labour's

central push towards local, community oriented, multi-agency approaches to service delivery, where the state – steering but not rowing – exerted control, while appearing to hand over power. Under New Labour, public sector strategic outcomes and targets were constantly being demanded and articulated, and duly became the very language of CfE's Es&Os (i.e. outcomes for children); but government drove the agenda from the centre. The methods not just the language of strategic business planning, became a central New Labour archetype, providing sets of tools to drive public sector improvement.

6.2: An Education Business Plan

There are many views about what strategy is. de Wit and Meyer (1998), identify three things appearing in every strategic problem: strategy process (how it happens); strategy content (the product), and strategy context (contextual circumstances). They observe that "Making a strategy is not an end in itself, but a means for reaching particular objectives" (de Wit and Meyer, 1998, p12). In what follows I argue that viewed as a strategy one of CfE's objectives was joined-up government, and as a developmental 'method' it became an instrumental means to reach largely neo-liberal objectives.

CfE arguably mirrors de Wit and Meyer's three dimensions and purpose. Viewed strategically its process and product are by no means confined to education, and (argued above), include political and economic as well as social and educational purposes. Viewed from the perspective of strategy, its form can be said to largely follow that of a private sector business plan; with strategy values, strategic vision, mission statement, action plans, experiences, capacities, learning targets and outcomes for children.

What then is the business management strategy process? A clearer view of this, popular among government agencies and managers at the time of CfE's development, clarifies much about CfE's instrumentalism. Hax (2000), defines strategic process as:

> a fundamental framework through which an organisation can assert its vital continuity, while at the same time purposefully managing adaptation to the changing environment to gain competitive advantage. Strategy includes the formal recognition that the recipients of the results of a firm's actions are the wide constituency of its stakeholders. Therefore, the ultimate objective of strategy is to address stakeholder benefits – to provide a base for establishing the host of transactions and social contracts that link a firm to its stakeholders (p32).

If one reads this as if it were a definition of the Curriculum, correlation is very strong

indeed:

- CfE's "**fundamental framework**" includes the 2004 *Review Group* document: *A Curriculum for Excellence, the Curriculum Review Group*, and five *Building the Curriculum* documents rolling it all out, 2006 to 2011:
  - *The Contribution of Curriculum Areas*, 2006.
  - *Active Learning in the Early Years*, 2007.
  - *A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, 2008.
  - *Skills for Learning, Skills for Life, Skills for Work*, 2009,
  - *A Framework for Assessment*, 2011.

- A statement of "**vital continuity**" was made by the Minister for Education and Young People (on page 1 of the inaugural document): "Scotland's … well-respected curriculum for 3 to 5 year olds, its broad 5-14 curriculum, Standard Grade courses and the National Qualifications structure have been carefully designed to meet the needs of pupils at different stages". And *The Review Group* document itself was "a starting point for a continuous cycle of reflection, review and improvement" (*The Review Group*, 2004, p5).

- Managing "**adaptation to a changing environment**" is paramount in the *Review Group* document, which asks: "Why must the curriculum change? Like other countries, we face new influences which mean that we must look differently at the curriculum. These include global social, political and economic changes, and the particular challenges facing Scotland: the need to increase the economic performance of the nation; reflect its growing diversity; improve health; and reduce poverty. In addition, we can expect more changes in the patterns and demands of employment, and the likelihood of new and quite different jobs during an individual's working life" (*The Review Group*, 2004, p10).

- The need to maintain "**competitive advantage**" is associated with the need to stay ahead of changing stakeholder opinion, as well as curriculum 'best practice'. This is strongly articulated by the *Review Group*, saying it must:
  - Reduce over-crowding in the curriculum and make learning more enjoyable.
  - Better connect the various stages of the curriculum from 3 to 18.
  - Achieve a better balance between 'academic' and 'vocational' subjects, and include a wider range of experiences.
  - Equip young people with the skills they will need in tomorrow's workforce.
  - Make sure that assessment and certification support learning.
  - Allow more choice to meet the needs of individual young people. (*The Review Group*, 2004, p7).

- The task of addressing "**stakeholder benefits**" and the "transactions and social

contracts" that link Scottish education to its stakeholders, began the whole development process, CfE says: "In 2002 the Scottish Executive undertook the most extensive consultation ever of the people of Scotland on the state of school education through the National Debate on Education" (*Review Group*, 2004, p6). Pupils, parents, teachers, employers and other "stakeholders" participated.

Making these connections strongly suggests that it was through a rigorous, highly effective application of classic business and strategic management processes, that Scottish education was super-efficiently joined-up with political and economic (National) Priorities. Importantly for CfE's ethics, the new Curriculum arguably became an overtly instrumentalist means to extrinsic political and economic ends, reflecting the purposes of strategy identified by de Wit and Meyer.

In full sympathy with a top-down strategic approach, in CfE this translates among other things, into *Experiences and Outcome* (Es&Os) guidance; lists of learning competencies unattached to conceptual arguments (philosophy, curriculum theory etc.), that might have helped to make them more effective. In fact, practitioners have not found them an easy tool to apply. Education Scotland's 2016 *Refresh* found itself having to tell schools and teachers "what to do" and "what to avoid" for the Experiences and Outcomes (Statement for Practitioners, 2016, p2). Teacher Benchmarks were also added in 2017 to help schools interpret them.

The next Section uses a military metaphor to understand more about development processes driven by 'higher' governmental strategic purposes, rather than bottom-up education philosophy or curriculum theory. 'Strategy' and being strategic was a key New Labour mantra, presented in the language of 'joined up government', using buzzwords such as 'targets', 'partnership', 'benchmarks', 'co-operation', 'networks' and 'league tables' (Leach et al, 2011). Behind the rhetoric, however, was a burgeoning performance management regime providing discipline to make the strategy work (calculated to demonstrate improved delivery to a watching public).

6.3: Joining It All Up

A military strategy is toothless without the tactical; the planned but contingent actions supporting and delivering higher level strategy. As CfE was being conceived, Scotland's Lab-Lib coalition headed by Jack McConnell (former teacher and schools minister from 2000), had

survived the 2003 elections. Peter Peacock, who took the schools brief in 2003, wanted CfE to develop "within the Scottish tradition" (Pickard, 2008, p222), rather than follow the English model of outsourcing school funding, but found that his Labour-dominated Councils "had to ignore long-held ideology and accept public-private partnerships as the only way to unlock cash" for new buildings (2008, p222). Devolution had occurred but New Labour steered the ship of state. This was New Labour's way, a language of empowerment (even actual devolved administrations), allied to constricting central controls. Budge et al (2004), note resentment even among Labour MSP's at the time, over interference and "covert influence" (p262) from London. According to Mitchell (2003), Labour devolutionists (Gordon Brown prominent among them), were arguing that the UK was still bound together by common values, again stressing close ties with Westminster. There was of course still a Secretary of State for Scotland in the British Cabinet with a remit to manage Scottish affairs.

Tony Blair, and his Chief Strategist Alastair Campbell, sat at the top of this strategic pyramid. Viewed from there, Scottish education is, I suggest, analogous to a military field of operations; a tactical theatre, with the actions of Scottish education supporting and delivering government (National) political and economic priorities. This (strategic-tactical) analogy can be deduced from statements by the Scottish Executive, that it believes "Curriculum for Excellence can play a significant role in achieving our principal purpose and strategic objectives" (*A Framework for Teaching and Learning*, 2008, p3); stating that purpose to be: "a more successful Scotland" (p3), with flourishing individuals contributing to "sustainable economic growth" (*A Framework for Teaching and Learning*, 2008, p3).

Tactical actions have a significance beyond the immediate theatre of operation. What teachers teach and children learn is in this sense a tactical theatre; schools are theatre commanders; teachers are the field officers without whom there can be no targeted engagement, no gains and no tactical outcomes contributing to overall strategy. Viewed thus, what we are calling *Curriculum for Excellence* can be seen to be part of a much larger joined-up, high level government strategy, instrumentalising education to higher extrinsic ends. Brush too quickly past this fact, and its skills emphasis and utilisation of knowledge for extrinsic ends and purposes are harder to understand.

Joined-up Government.

According to Bogdanor (2005), during its first two terms (1997 to 2005), the Blair administration took business management strategy and tactics to a new level of systematic organisation and policy connectedness. Previous governments had used tactics such as the purchaser/provider split and output indicators, but Blair's *Joined-up Government* mantra became a label "for a very old doctrine in the study of public administration" (p2), going back at least to Bentham's *Constitutional Code* of 1820. The development of holistic or joined up government (JUG), was a central feature of Blair's 1999 white paper, *Modernising Government*, stressing the need for delivery partnerships between central and local government, private and public sectors. Blair said in 1998: "The days of the all-purpose authority that planned and delivered everything are gone … It is partnership with others – public agencies, private companies, community groups and voluntary organisations – in which local government's future lies" (cited by Wilson, 2003, p272).

JUG was a central government strategy for bringing together government departments, private and voluntary bodies, who were asked to work across organisational boundaries towards common goals. The application of sociology, economics and cultural theory to public sector reform generated more effective service delivery, or so the story went. Previous Conservative public management methods had largely sought to reduce the size of the state. New Labour made use of similar managerial tools to tackle so-called "wicked issues" (Bogdanor, 2005, p6), such as social exclusion, drugs and crime, and to try and change a perceived inward-looking, fragmented public sector culture.

According to Budge et al (2004), JUG was trying to overcome departmentalism, and get more coordination across Whitehall departments. It has also been connected to the replacement of Cabinet government by a form of prime ministerial presidential government, and a perceived need for stronger central control, badged as better service delivery (Foster, 2005). This picks up centralising trends that, according to OECD Reports (2015 and 2021), arguably positioned Scottish education too close to the political centre.

All this was in the air as CfE was being conceived and developed, giving momentum to an already strong Scottish centralising tendency. Humes (2013) for example, notes that since the 1960's Scottish education policy development had increasingly been undertaken by public quangos such as the *Scottish Funding Council*, the *Scottish Qualifications Authority*, the

General Teaching Council for Scotland and *Learning and Teaching Scotland*. He also thinks schools and local authorities in Scotland traditionally "looked to the centre to take a lead in educational matters" (p99). The current centralised state of affairs clearly had a long lead-in. It seems fair to argue that Scottish education was able to be quickly and seamlessly connected to government priorities, because semantically it was probably already almost there.

A key challenge for central policymakers, however, was the complexity of domestic social policy in important public services areas such as education (health, crime, local government and transport). The need to show joined-upness not just in policy, but in coal-face delivery was much harder, leading to the creation of such things as a *Delivery Unit*, *Performance and Innovation Unit*, the *Modernising Public Service Group*, *Primary Care Trusts*, and many other bodies too many to list; an ever multiplying list of agencies and arms of government needed to manage performance and demonstrate effective strategic delivery to New Labour's so-called 'new stakeholders'. Outcome targets claiming to localise choice and diversity were trumpeted, but central bureaucracy grew enormously to manage them.

Thus education was joined up vertically with national priorities, and asked to do so horizontally across public service boundaries. Schools and teachers on the other hand, must have been left in no doubt by the *Review Group,* and five *Building the Curriculum* documents rolling it all out, that "The transformation in education that Curriculum for Excellence aims to achieve extends beyond schools" (A Framework for Learning and Teaching, p3). The latter document set out considerations "critical to its adoption … for those involved in planning the curriculum" (p3), i.e. schools and teachers.

Vision, Substance and Delivery

OECD Reports of 2015 and 2021 questioned the centralising tendencies it perceived in CfE, among other things seeking clarification on aspirations in the *Four Capacities*. The above discussion (of strategy process) suggests the OECD might be identifying symptoms more than causes, however, because a major reason the Capacities lack learning progression is they were arguably more about vision and strategic planning, as pedagogic substance. They largely seem to float above pedagogy, and as Bloomer (who helped develop them) says, they are in fact a 'mission statement'.

The point here, is that vision/mission statements are aspirational pictures not

operational delivery frameworks. As with military type 'targets', in education they seem utterly incongruous, because children's learning is often a messy bottom-up human enterprise, not at all like a neat strategic plan with fixed performance indicators, and easily measured targets and outcomes. CfE however, is basically a strategic plan (as indeed Bloomer suggests), and the *Capacities'* lack of (tactical) pedagogic progression, is therefore likely to be partly a result of the strategic development process that produced them.

Staying with the military analogy, neither is theoretical and conceptual detail the role of strategy; the top must remain above tactical melee. Viewed from there it was arguably strategic planning of the highest order, redolent of the skills Alastair Campbell brought to No 10 as Blair's chief strategist and trusted confidant.

Campbell's thesis in government was that leaders must manage constant tactical threats, by articulating a clear and simple strategy couched in short, simple phrases (see Campbell, 2007). Brands must be strategic he argued, because in the internet age it is no longer just about implementing a plan. Narrating a strategy in real time and being able to explain a credible story to stakeholders, meant "communicating the values and mission of the organisation as well as its operational performance" (Campbell, 2014, cited by Parsons, 2014, para 15). Campbell's dictum is a very good description and near mirror image of *Curriculum for Excellence,* as set out in the *Review Group* document of 2004, see page 11 and following, and subsequent literature.

CfE has (Campbellite) 'values of the organisation' (wisdom, justice, compassion and integrity), and a 'mission of the organisation' (the *Four Capacities*). Tactical 'operational performance' is achieved through Es&Os outcome statements (precisely 'short, simple phrases'), the learning targets for eight subject areas, supported by subject-specific *Principles and Practice* documents. Viewed thus CfE is arguably a very good example of Campbell's strategic analysis.

An important element of New Labour strategy of the time, touched on in passing above, was the creation of a new *Delivery Unit,* in 2001, to drive faster progress on public service reform, following significant government investment in education, health and transport. The Unit was euphemistically labelled 'deliverology' (by Nicholas Macpherson) for its relentless, instrumental pursuance of outcomes. Prime Minister Blair was its Chairman.

According to Clement (2022), this "tied in" his time (paragraph 19), through regular stocktake meetings with key Whitehall departments. Fully consistent with New Labour's strategic approach, it was underpinned by rigorous performance monitoring, designed to promote accountability for the implementation of departmental targets. Clement notes too, that it nonetheless attracted criticism for what some saw as "an inflexible target-led culture of top-down policymaking, from No. 10 to departments" (paragraph 21), again, reinforcing the 'top-down' argument, and a very high 'top' indeed.

Education was one of the key departments involved in the new Unit. Launching exactly in the (2001-2005) time window of CfE, the latter must have been affected by the outcomes-focused culture being promoted, which has been seen as significantly shifting the paradigm from traditional policy formation, to 'action' implementation (i.e. delivery). It was part of the political milieu into which CfE was born, and cannot but have impacted questions about the performance of Scottish education reforms going on at the time.

Given all of this, the *Four Capacities* can be seen as part of a strategic pathway from claimed stakeholder consensus (the so-called *National Debate)*, through classrooms and schools, to Government's political/strategic objectives and Scotland's economy. From the learner's perspective sitting in the middle of it all, final value lies well beyond the school environment; the latter is merely an intermediate step along the way to bigger strategic ends. Such rampant instrumentalism seems fine for government and the market, and in some respects perhaps, society, but judging by its relative absence in key documents, ethics and the human good seem to have been marginalised, at best delegated to schools, teachers, and learners themselves, at worst largely unarticulated or perhaps not there at all.

6.4: CfE's Instrumentalism, Concluding Remarks

Chapter 6 has located CfE's instrumentalism within a wide-ranging neo-liberal critique of education, chiming with Michael Schiro's *Social Efficiency* education vision, where schooling exists to meet the needs of society.

CfE has been likened (by one of its architects) to a strategy, with a mission statement and outcome targets. I have argued that viewed strategically, its purpose was to 'join up' Scottish education with *National Priorities*, as part of New Labour's 'Joined Up Government' policy. Demonstrating service delivery moved to centre-stage politically at that

time, impacting all public services, and I have suggested that CfE's instrumentalist language and rhetoric, including the much vaunted *Four Capacities*, became as much or more about vision and political accountability – that is, transparent delivery – as theoretical substance and coherence.

We seem however, almost, to have described a twenty-first century Gradgrind-ian world dedicated to the pursuit of profitable enterprise, and the global marketplace; modernised and made palatable by promoting pupil enjoyment rather than uncomfortable knowledge struggles.

CfE talks often about economic benefits, but it never talks about human goodness and badness. This is not to deny the benefits and importance of work, or the benefits (and perceived necessity) of economic growth to fund improved public services, but to question whether they are *so* important that they should come to dominate children's learning so completely, arguably pushing deeper human needs, satisfactions and specifically ethical aspects of children's personal human development to the margins and beyond.

Neo-liberalism and its capitalist economy, in this sense perhaps provides what Marx called political emancipation, but not human emancipation. His point was that in the political state man "treats others as means, degrades himself to a means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers" (Marx, 1843/2000, p10). Human emancipation, he thought, recognizes man as a social being, and brings his world back to himself. The argument made in this chapter is that CfE stresses the political and economic significantly more than it does the human.

This completes Chapter 6, contextualising CfE's instrumentalist policy framework. The next chapter proposes and discusses a value pluralist context, with a specifically human focus.

Chapter 7: Value Pluralism (and Isaiah Berlin)

Chapter Abstract

Chapter 7 contextualises CfE's diversity agenda, arguing that relativist accounts of value pluralist theory arguably sit behind the variety and decreasing homogeneity in Scottish society. I suggest that ambiguity and lack of clarity about plural values, became part of CfE's surrounding educational and social scene, impacting its values and ethics.

Diversity, and what the *Review Group* calls 'social justice', seem to have become extremely important for children today. At least two aspects of this appearing in the literature affect CfE's ethics: cultural diversity itself; visceral and visible, and a meta-ethical issue of relativist value pluralism which is largely theoretical, and hidden.

I introduce Isaiah Berlin and situate him in the thesis, arguing that his 'objective' pluralism oeuvre has much to offer Scottish education, in its navigation of today's cultural and sexual diversity. Berlin's value pluralism is the view that the ideal of the perfect person or society is not possible; problems of value are not solvable, and human values can be incompatible: a gain in one often entails a corresponding loss in another. Values clash: there is no pattern or principle by which to decide between them, leading some writers and people to relativist conclusions.

George Crowder for example, thinks that if there is no way of choosing between clashing values, relativism persists in practice. Leo Strauss too, thinks Berlin carves out a difficult to hold middle ground between pluralism and relativism. Berlin's position, however, is that pluralism is not relativism, because we know conflicts between ultimate values occur (Gray, 1995), and we know they are incommensurable. 'We' here, arguably refers to all sides of relativist/objectivist debate. Berlin thus uses something like Wittgenstein's idea of objectivity as publicness arising from common forms of life, in his arguments against relativism.

An objective value for Berlin is one pursued "for its own sake, to which other things are means" (Berlin, 2013a, p12). I oppose Berlin's objectivity with J.L. Mackie's argument against all objectivity of values; for Mackie they are not part of the fabric of the world therefore they are not objective.

I argue further that civilised communication at the human horizon, is part of Berlin's

case against relativism. We share a common humanity, orienting and facilitating human interaction; transcending culture, differing values, tastes and circumstances. His emphasis, I suggest, is on reasons, communication, sympathy, understanding and integration, rather than unreasoned opinion, concealment, disruption, indifference and separation.

7.1: CfE's Value Pluralist Context

I argue here that value pluralist assumptions sit behind pluralist accounts of society and diversity, that they are an inescapable part of the contextual framework in which CfE's values and ethics work, and an extremely important, if largely assumed, part of children's lives in contemporary society. The record suggests that two main aspects impact CfE's ethics: a social-political dimension of cultural diversity, and a meta-ethical issue of moral value relativism. Three key statements are representative of the first of these, manifesting in CfE's value diversity agenda:

1. "Scotland is a nation whose people hold a wide range of beliefs from the many branches of the Christian faith represented throughout the land to the world's other major religions and to beliefs which lie out-with religious traditions. Such diversity enriches the Scottish nation and serves as an inspiring and thought-provoking background for our children and young people to develop their own beliefs and values." (RME Principles and Practice, p1).
2. HWB builds on the work of Health Promoting Schools to underline "the importance of a 'health enhancing' school ethos – one characterised by care, respect, participation, responsibility and fairness for all" (HWB Principles and Practice, p1).
3. CfE aspires to create "a positive ethos and climate of respect and trust – one in which everyone can make a positive contribution to the wellbeing of each individual". (HWB Principles and Practice, p3).

The second aspect, the meta-ethical status of moral values, seems to have led to many Scottish writers bringing pluralism, RME, and cultural diversity into question. Roger (1999) asked what the purpose of RE in Scotland now was in a modern, open, and pluralist society. Lennon (2008) thought "pluralistic, liberal, democratic societies" (p388), and Scotland's teaching profession continues to struggle with the central issue of values. Hartshorne (2008), saw perennial issues for the relationship of religion and education in a "secular education system serving the needs and interests of a diversely plural society" (p379). Nixon (2008) thought CfE's RME topic was struggling with the challenge of "religious and philosophical pluralism" (p557).

The connection is not always explicit, but in all these instances (and very many others),

the terms pluralism, plural, and pluralist seem to represent something problematic about the status of the plural values, and about the religious framework in which they are embedded. Ambiguity and lack of clarity about plural values, do seem to have become part of CfE's surrounding educational and social scene.

Lamenting the fact that no indicators of goodness were included in the HMIE document *How Good is our School*, Stirling Headteacher Frank Lennon (2008) argues that:

> Any attempt at such an inclusion might well have been greeted with howls of protest from one quarter or another. For pluralistic, liberal, democratic societies like Scotland in the twenty-first century, then, there may be major disagreements over values which may result in publicly funded state schools being unable to assume the truth of, far less 'promote', any particular set of values (p388).

Such statements, often by front-line practitioners, cited as evidence for arguments to follow, seem to summarise a general perception among educationists at the time of CfE's birth, that relativistic plural values had become a problem. Schools, minority groups, religions and a plethora of individual identities might 'howl' in Lennon's sense, because values are relative to me, to us, our religion, our society, our group, my identity; so why are you prioritising these values?

General Education Context.

Graham Haydon at London's *Institute of Education* published a paper in 1993 trying to understand more about what it means for education to impart moral values, and whether it can help with the 'problem' of plural values. Haydon sets a pluralist scene in terms of both cultural diversity and relativism. He argues that philosophy can help to understand what he calls a crisis in values (he defines 'crisis' as a "turning point in human affairs which calls for important judgements to be made" (1993, p4)). He sees the crisis in terms of "the co-existence of differing values within one society" (p2). It includes the cultural diversity theme identified as problematic by so many writers, but goes further, arguing that ethnic diversity itself reflects a wider issue; namely a lack of agreement about the basis (i.e. the value-basis), by which society should judge such issues as abortion, the exploitation of natural resources, war and human conflict (in passing, these social moral 'issues' became the basis of CfE's own applied ethics agenda).

Haydon's point is that regardless of clashing religious/secular viewpoints, plural society itself lacks a shared sense of basic values. This is how he put it:

> the fact is that the plurality is now, and surely irreversibly, 'in the open'. It is no longer possible for society to get by on the assumption that really there is homogeneity of moral outlook … Moral plurality stares us in the face; but from an historical perspective, we seem to be still at the stage of recognising this and having to adjust to it. (1993, p3).

It was not then, just religious, ethnic or cultural diversity that Haydon was worried about, significant though that was, but the underlying status of the values themselves, making his Paper doubly relevant.

Reflecting his view that pluralism meant values were for many people now "all just a matter of opinion" (Haydon, 1993, p4), he thought the idea that education should straight-forwardly transmit values was unhelpful. Given a plurality of values, teachers might not like the idea because it suggests passivity by children and indoctrination by schools. Consequently, Haydon thought children should be taught about plurality as well as morality. Whether or not Haydon's fears about indoctrination were well-founded – and there is debate around that – his point that teaching children about plurality seems significant, especially given that moral value pluralism (as he puts it), cultural diversity and its effects, seem to have become the everyday experience of schools, children and young people.

Haydon's answer was that philosophy as a discrete subject can help schools understand and deal with his perceived crisis, and in fact, ten years later CfE did precisely give philosophy a major new role in its *Religious, Moral and Philosophical Studies* (RMPS) Nationals topic. The main point I wish to make here, however, is that he too thought cultural diversity and moral value pluralism were significant problems for schools, because for some people the perceived plurality led them "to the kind of relativism or subjectivism which says that it is all just a matter of opinion" (Haydon, 1993, p4). Although coming ten years before CfE, the issues Haydon identifies – lack of moral homogeneity, relativism, religious and cultural complexity – arguably grew, becoming more not less significant throughout the 1990s.

Shared Social Values?

There seems to have been a general social – i.e. not just academic – climate of perplexity about values, however, in the wake of widespread popular perceptions about pluralism. Halstead and Taylor (1996), thought the task schools faced "discussing and

clarifying their values and making them public" (p8), was hugely complex because they now had to take account of value diversity in society at large. Similarly, in an essay *Shared Values in a Pluralist Society?* Talbot and Tate said that at every meeting on moral education they attended, teachers were asking rhetorically: "whose values are we supposed to instil", striking "at the heart of school's confidence in the teaching of values" (1997, p1). The evidence suggests that lack of confidence, ambiguity, lack of clarity, and the merely provisional nature of plural values in society and among schools and teachers, became part of the social and educational scene. If so, it is seems implausible that it was not a fundamental issue for CfE's architects, or that it did not in some way condition CfE's approach.

Talbot and Tate (for example), thought in fact that if it could be shown that there were common, shared values, it would go some way towards restoring teacher confidence as moral educators. This was precisely the solution emerging from the 1996 *School Curriculum and Assessment Authority* (SCAA) Conference, from which the *National Forum for Values in Education and the Community* (NFVEC), was established to:

1. Discover whether there are any values upon which there is common agreement within society.
2. Decide how schools might be supported in the important task of contributing to pupils spiritual, moral, social and cultural development.

It is significant that the NFVEC felt the need to clarify that its remit was to decide if there were any values that were 'agreed upon across society', not whether there were any that *should* be agreed: "The only authority claimed for these values … is the authority of consensus" it said (Talbot and Tate, 1997, p10). In relation to value pluralism however, it is questionable whether any set of shared values is ultimately acceptable as a basis for schools; acceptable that is, in principle, because it assumes there can be some kind of final, ultimate standard, or set of standards or human values applicable in education. The point is that (moral) value pluralism categorically denies this, arguing that "all genuine questions are of necessity specific … ends, patterns, meanings, causes differ with the … needs of the questioner, and can be correctly and clearly formulated only if these are made part of the question" (Berlin, 2001, pp100/101). Given the impossibility of knowing specific circumstances in advance, and the possibility of even one child with values not on the NFVEC list, arguably no consensus is valid. This is one reason why value pluralists such as Berlin argue that problems of value are not solvable, and a key reason why the problems of pluralism go

much deeper than diversity agendas and a lack of tolerance and respect.

There are 54,000+ teachers in Scotland, and many more than that in England and Wales. What the NFVEC and its antecedents seems to show, is that problems of value pluralism did not exist solely, or even mainly among an education policy community, among moral philosophers or education writers and academics, but in society at large; among what Mill called a "multitude" (1998, p156), reflecting a culture's "customary morality" (Mill, 1998, p159, argued in Chapter 3). In *Utilitarianism*, he describes a customary, inherited, common-sense morality; a set of received moral principles defined by society's institutions, traditions and cultural beliefs; the often implicit social attitudes and norms that guide the multitude in any society, he argues (specifically mentioning education).

Before moving on it is worth underlining that my argument (here and in earlier chapters) is that this 'customary morality' fits very well CfE's delegated social moral values; and the *Review Group's* "values on which Scottish society is based" (p11); that is, the values of all of its schools, teachers and children.

When Mill spoke of the customary, or every-day morality, he was talking about the moral judgements of ordinary people, the inherited rules and social feelings they use to decide what he called the "common questions of right and wrong ... wise and foolish" (Mill, 1998, p157), the rules of morality for ordinary people and their received code of ethics. Haydon, 1993 and 1997; Halstead, 1996; Talbot and Tate, 1997; Lennon, 2003 and 2008; Nixon, 2008; Hartshorne 2008 and many others, strongly suggest that as CfE was being conceived, the rules and social feelings ordinary people were using to decide common questions of right and wrong (paraphrasing Mill), were problematically pluralist and the problem seems to have been relativism.

Mill's customary morality was something "education and opinion have consecrated … the only one which presents itself to the mind with the feeling of being in itself obligatory" (Mill, 1998, p159). His notion helps us understand CfE's relativist plural context, also supported and perpetuated by education and opinion. Social opinion – perhaps a majority opinion if not yet a social tyranny in Mill's 'On Liberty' sense – seems to have assumed something like this problematic account of pluralism. If so CfE's architects cannot but have felt its ideological presence, and a need to respond to it.

I have so far marshalled evidence to support my claim that the problem of pluralism has at least two key underlying elements:

1. Culturally diverse, plural societies holding widely different views about fundamental values.
2. A philosophical, meta-ethical problem of relative values assumed and entailed in the concept of value pluralism.

The first is a largely visible issue of variety, difference, general plurality and diversity; the second is, I suggest, a deeper, largely invisible issue of assumed relativity and lack of objectivity of values. They often seem to occur together but not necessarily; either one can appear without the other. The first manifests largely in lack of homogeneity of values in a single school or classroom, and how to avoid negative effects on children and young people such as inadvertently denying or mocking their values. The second might for example, manifest in assumptions made by schools and teachers about the nature of value diversity and how to manage it successfully. This might include how to avoid negative effects of assuming all human ends are equal (if so, Berlin thought a common point of view may not be obtainable).

Both issues are discussed at length below. The evidence that value pluralism includes (among others), these twin problems, however, seems overwhelming. It includes writers such as Gillies, (2006); Haldane, (2004); Lennon (2008); Roger (1999); Hartshorne (2008); and Nixon (2008) in Scotland; and Warnock, (1996); Haydon (1993 and 1997); Halstead and Taylor (1996); Talbot and Tate (1997); and White, (1997), in England.

Cultural and Value Diversity Part of the Fabric of All Children's Lives.

Scottish schools have been seen:

> as sites of social engineering … where perceived social ills have to be righted: schools are now expected to address a long list of troubling social issues such as drug abuse, sexual health, physical fitness, diet, obesity, wellbeing, citizenship, respect, behaviour, racism and social cohesion (Gillies, 2013, p116).

Policies to address all these social issues are clearly visible in CfE. In 2023, arguably, one must add burgeoning gender and perhaps social media issues. The so-called SHANARRI indicators: safe, healthy, achieving, nurtured, active, respected, responsible and included, are probably part of CfE's response. The HWB subject area also focused on them; the latter's organisers are:

- Mental, emotional, social and physical wellbeing

- Planning for choices and changes
- Physical education, physical activity and sport
- Food and health
- Substance misuse
- Relationships, sexual health and parenthood.
  (HWB Principles and Practice, p2).

Cultural and value diversity issues became and remain extremely important; an inescapable part of the socio-political backdrop of children's lives. But very little, if anything at all, is said about the ethical theories and concepts that may sit behind them. This chapter argues that from the perspective of ethics, value pluralism is probably a major underlying factor. If so, we arguably need to better understand some of the meta-ethical theory many of these very significant social issues seem to assume. The remainder of Chapter 7 does this, reviewing Berlin's value pluralism, some of his critics, and opposing viewpoints. Key areas I will discuss are what value pluralism is; its complicated relation to relativism and objectivity, and Berlin's human horizon concept. Theoretical discussion will take things some way from CfE itself. This is unavoidable, but Chapter 9 will return to CfE-specific application.

7.2: Isaiah Berlin and Value Pluralism

Berlin's early influences were in Oxford's analytic philosophical tradition and its linguistic turn, meeting in his rooms during the 1930's for debate with A.J. Ayer, J.L. Austin and S. Hampshire. Ayer embraced logical positivism, Austin, Hampshire and Berlin did not; Berlin publishing specifically against it, and with Austin playing a significant part in what came to be called the ordinary language philosophy movement. Hampshire was naturalist, Berlin was empiricist; Austin wrote on linguistics and linguistic philosophy, rejecting the idea that linguistic meaning can determine truth conditions. Ryan (2015) says Berlin often suggested that he became bored with philosophy as practised at Oxford, however. At any rate, soon after the war he made a move to the history of ideas, having published a significant account of Marx' life and work in 1939. Key formative influences on his post-war output were Russian thinkers such as Belinsky, Herzen and Turgenev, especially the latter, and the years spent researching Marx' underpinned later work on the Enlightenment, Romanticism and the Russian radicals (Ryan, 2015). Berlin was a lifelong secular liberal, whose writings on liberal theory "have had a lasting impression on contemporary political philosophy" (Coady, 1995, p92).

There is near unanimous critical agreement that Berlin's work is indispensable for an

understanding of value pluralism and its challenges. George Crowder (2020), despite problematising Berlin's pluralism, thinks he is "the most influential pluralist in contemporary political thought, certainly in Anglo-American literature" (p11), and Neil Burtonwood (2006), that "contemporary value pluralists identify Berlin as the key source for the development since the 1950s of value pluralism" (p46). John Gray (1995) thinks his ideas are profound yet subversive, and still not sufficiently recognised by professional philosophy, while William Galston (2002), thought Berlin sparked a "full-fledged value-pluralist movement" (cited by Burtonwood, 2006, p46).

Gray's 1995 book *Isaiah Berlin* appeared two years before Berlin's death, providing a comprehensive overview of his ideas. Gray's central Berlinian claim is that human values are objective but unavoidably diverse; conflicting, often uncombinable and incommensurable. Gray refers to radical tragic choices, and losses inevitable in political and moral life, as 'agonistic liberalism', describing what he sees as Berlin's "liberalism of unavoidable conflict and irreparable loss among inherently rivalrous values" (Gray, 1995, p1).

The main reason for Berlin's apparent slight impact on mainstream philosophy in Gray's view, is that he rejected a dominant twentieth century rationalist view of political and moral thought. By rationalist, he meant the view that philosophy does not merely illuminate, but also provides moral and political solutions for the dilemmas faced (much as Haydon above arguably thought possible). Berlin did not think philosophy could resolve such issues.

According to Harris (2008), by the early 1950s Berlin's work had adopted three main aspects: it applied his philosophical views to eighteenth and nineteenth century European intellectual history; it identified practical consequences for the middle years of the twentieth century, and outlined a liberal political theory.

Publication of *The Hedgehog and the Fox* in 1953 (an account of Tolstoy's view of history), roughly marked Berlin's move from philosophy to the history of ideas, political theory and cultural commentary (Ryan, 2015). Tolstoy was a pluralist fox whose genius was to see and write about the infinite variety of things, but he longed to be a monist hedgehog and impose an over-arching single purpose, uniformity, and harmony, on social phenomena.

When Berlin speaks of ideas, he does not mean that history consists of ideas or spiritual forces in a metaphysical, idealist or Hegelian sense; rather, that to understand history

it is necessary to understand the ideas and attitudes of the *people* involved in it. History for Berlin is human history, and the human dimension shapes his entire oeuvre, thus he admired what he called a hard cutting edge of common sense in Tolstoy's historical writing, as well as Tolstoy's rejection of any kind of laws of history. Tolstoy's descriptions of "the vast multiplicity of minute, undiscoverable causes and effects which form that interplay of men and nature" (Berlin, 1953, p21), capture important themes in Berlin's own work.

Key ideas infusing his post-war literary output and thinking include: monism, pluralism, liberalism and their implications for freedom, philosophical determinism, equality, human progress and society. His 1958 lecture *Two Concepts of Liberty* applied these themes to the theory of political freedom. *Two Concepts* distinguished between negative liberty: the right to be "left to do or be … without interference" (Berlin, 1998, p198), and positive liberty; the self-mastery or control which allows someone to pursue their rational ends. Berlin's case against the latter was that it had too often led to the conflation of freedom and reason, so that political coercion no longer counted as a restriction of freedom because it led to a higher freedom.

What Value Pluralism Is.

Berlin's value pluralism is the meta-ethical view that the ideal of the perfect person or the perfect society is not possible; that problems of value are not solvable, and that human values can be incompatible: a gain in one often entails a corresponding loss in another. The following extract from an essay on Alexander Herzen, is one the clearest statements of Berlin's value pluralism:

> the great traditional problems which perennially agitate men's minds have no general solutions … all genuine questions are of necessity specific, soluble only in specific contexts; that general problems such as 'What is *the* end (or *the* meaning) of life?' Or 'What makes all events in nature occur as they do?' Or 'What is *the* pattern of human history?' are not answerable in principle … because ends, patterns, meanings, causes differ with the situation and outlook and needs of the questioner, and can be correctly and clearly formulated only if these are made part of the question. (Berlin, 2001, pp100-101, his emphasis).

He is describing his liberalism and ethics as well as his value pluralism. It is easy to see here how Berlin might want to write about Tolstoy's view of history. Tolstoy thought history "presents only a blank succession of unexplained events" not causes (Berlin, 1953, p15). It is not just that there is no hierarchy in which to place plural human values, but that all genuine

problems are specific to their unique human circumstances. There are no general solutions at all. There is infinite variety; no single end, pattern or principle by which to decide ultimate questions of right and wrong, good and bad.

Two Concepts begins with an argument that social and political theory "spring from and thrive on, discord" (p191), not well-meaning (saintly he says), agreement about the ends of life. Berlin thinks political theory is a branch of moral philosophy, not the other way around, and that essential to government and the governed is a significant individual "free area of action" (1998, p203), coupled with the constant need to restrict authority. These ideas assume that the human condition entails an infinite plurality of ends, and an essential clash of human interests with no single, preordained method of resolution. He concludes *Two Concepts* arguing that hankering after certainty and guarantees about human values, "is perhaps only a craving for the certainties of childhood or the absolute values of our primitive past" (1998, p242).

He thought nonetheless that values are an inescapable part of the human drama Tolstoy described, and part of what it is to be human. But they clash; there is no pattern or principle by which to decide between them, so that value pluralism is not particularly congenial to comfortable patterns of life, in which homogenous society dwells in general harmony, based on generally agreed values.

It follows (he argues), that the outlook, needs, attitudes, conceptions and interests of each and every human being, or questioner, must be accounted for if their ends, patterns, meanings and causes are to be correctly formulated. This focus on the human individual arguably makes his thesis and treatment of pluralism particularly relevant for schools in liberal society. CfE's culturally diverse ends, patterns, meanings and causes differ with the situation, outlook and needs of every child, and (according to Berlin) are soluble only in contexts specific to them. Those circumstances ultimately display infinite variety, with no principle by which to decide who or what is right or wrong, good or bad. Applying such principles in Scottish schools could, I will suggest, support and strengthen CfE's cultural diversity agenda.

Berlin agrees with his communitarian critics, however, that there is an essential communal aspect to life, but unlike some of them, thinks liberal and communal ways of living can and should be reconciled (Gray 1995). This is Berlin's 'communitarian liberalism'

(Burtonwood, 2006). Berlin also agrees with Michael Sandel (and Alasdair MacIntyre), that the human subject, or self, relates fundamentally (constitutively) to its projects and schemes, through the relationships and attachments by which identities are formed. Where he disagrees, is the idea that such identities (what Sandel and MacIntyre called the 'radically situated self'), are "formed by membership of a single moral community" (Gray, 1995, p102). We have many (plural) attachments and allegiances, and belong to many different communities. His sense here seems to be that I am a father, a brother, a friend, a colleague, a sailor, an athlete, a student and so on.

Opposing Rationalist and Monist Viewpoints.

Berlin's value pluralist theory has been questioned from various standpoints. One such comes from Kantian rationalist Thomas Nagel (2001), who thinks Berlin was too pessimistic about the possibility of finding a higher vantage point of evaluation (i.e., from within a hierarchy of values), for clashing noncontingent values – that is, values that clash by logical necessity – while still accepting, as Berlin did, that facts and values are logically incompatible, and without reducing them to a common (monist) denominator. Nagel thinks we should think of ourselves as living in a common moral universe, and keep open the possibility of finding some kind of objective accommodation between clashing values. He adopts a largely Rawlsian, rationalist stance, in which a process of 'reflective equilibrium' (moving to and fro between opposing propositions), eventually brings about an accommodation between values such as liberty and equality.

Gray, however, distinguishes Berlin's liberalism from both the recent thought of Rawls and Dworkin, Hayek, Nozick and Gauthier (which he summarises as a "conception of rational choice", 1995, p8), and an older Kantian, Millian, Lockean and Hobbesian tradition, which he characterises as the promotion of wellbeing. Gray's thesis interprets Berlin's stance as more radical than people think, one of irredeemable conflict between incommensurable rivalrous goods, derived from "the limits of rational choice" (1995, p8). He thinks Berlin's work strikes at the heart of (liberal) utilitarianism, rights and contractarian theories, pointing out that liberalism itself (or any particular political system), cannot be justified by essentially plural values not ordered hierarchically, and with no absolute standard against which to assess them.

Ronald Dworkin (2001), another Kantian liberal, but arguing from a value-monist perspective, also thinks Berlin was too pessimistic about the possibility of finding ways to make pluralism less radical and more congenial. He challenges Berlin's tragic account of incompatibility – that irreparable loss or injury occurs in an unavoidable trade-off between values – arguing that society has not yet, but could and should agree more precise meanings of values such as liberty, equality, democracy and justice, to show what is good or bad about them.

For Berlin, when society forbids murder, the murderer's freedom is curtailed, albeit for good reasons but a curtailment, nonetheless. Dworkin wants instead to redefine freedom, so that when murderers are restrained their freedom as such has not been curtailed, because no harm or wrong is done to society (by the curtailment). He asks: is there anything wrong with society forbidding me to kill my critics? If nothing wrong is done here, then "you will have that reason for rejecting Berlin's account of liberty" (p89).

In Dworkin's (rationalist-monist) view, the argument turns on society being wronged or not, and on that basis Berlin did not adequately justify the inevitability of value conflict. We should not, he argues, give up trying to get broad social agreement about more precise meanings of values such as liberty and equality. Dworkin's 'broad social agreement', however, shifts the emphasis from harm done to the individual (the murderer's freedom), to harm done to the collective (society). This is a seemingly small step but a giant leap from private to public goods. Berlin argued against it in *Two Concepts* when he thought positive freedom had too often led to the conflation of freedom and reason (so that political coercion no longer counts as a restriction upon freedom, because it led to a higher collective freedom).

If all that is needed to avoid an infringement of someone's freedom is a new definition of freedom, what is to stop Orwell's celebrated *1984* case, for example, from being possible in principle, where citizen Smith can be tortured for his own good?

Dworkin assumes the new standard could be changed and then imposed by society. In this respect his monist case is in some ways similar to that argued by Talbot and Tate (above) for schools, that a set of shared values and meanings based on a consensus, the authority of democratic, cultural or social agreement, rather than conceptual reasoning or historical precedent, should be agreed. But how is this different from society deciding what is good for

people (and children)? Or God deciding, or Mill's tyranny of the majority, or the Party, or Orwell's Big Brother on the television on the wall, or any elite, or Rousseau's *General Will,* deciding what is rational and just and what freedom means? This is Berlin's point. The pluralist wants to accept radical variety and incompatibility and negotiate ensuing clashes and claims, not ride roughshod over them assuming that some kind of closure must be possible in the interests of a higher good, and we just have to keep looking till we find it. In passing, given the often fraught, public nature of social justice debate, implemented in schools, understanding that pluralism 'thrives on discord' could arguably transform the atmosphere around, for example, race and gender.

Dworkin asks if we have to understand liberty or equality in the way we currently do, based on their history. Williams (2001), however, thinks political values such as liberty, equality and justice have very significant histories preventing any kind of forced new definition. He cites Nietzsche that "The only things that are definable are those that have no history" (Williams, 2001, p91). Dworkin admits his stance would necessitate a very long complex argument. Practically, this seems an enormous understatement; any such argument about fundamental values such as freedom may be conceptually as well as practically impossible to get going, let alone conclude (given the near infinite complexity, variety and moral flux we see).

In *Two Concepts* Berlin distinguished between two questions: who governs me? and how much am I governed? which he thought were two different senses of liberty. He also thought, however, that the two questions "Who is master? And over what area am I master?" (1969, pxliii), in practice could not be kept completely apart from each other, because no-one is completely self-sufficient; other people put obstacles in our way, therefore "total harmony with others is incompatible with self-identity" (1969, pxliv). His thesis was that historically, positive liberty (who is master), diverged from negative liberty (over what area am I master), the former becoming associated with notions of an ideal or real self, so that what started out as an idea about freedom, became "a doctrine of authority … oppression … the favoured weapon of despotism" (Berlin, 1969, pxliv). Freedom is a key concept for Berlin.

Berlin's ethical thought is not founded on the Aristotelian view of human flourishing (i.e. based on a given type of human nature), but on a radical plurality of different "forms of human flourishing … constituted by choice-making" (Gray, 1995, p36). Gray thinks Berlin's

liberalism diverges from Mill's, because it does not take the ideals of individuality and autonomy as basic, but that the latter presents him with a problem he does not really resolve in his writings in relation to the concept of negative freedom. If values are not comparable by any rational measure, how can freedom be a/the central liberal value?

Part of an answer is that Berlin also thinks freedom itself can be part of any trade-off between values; freedom itself is not absolute. He is not trying to solve the problems of value pluralism but recognise and cope with them. The ideal of the perfect person or society is *not* possible he thought, problems of value are *not* solvable, values clash and there is *no* pattern or principle by which to decide between them. He thought philosophy's task was to clarify and illuminate such puzzles and conflicts, not provide solutions to them.

Debates between different kinds of liberals (and plural/monist; rationalist/empiricist; liberal/communitarian) will continue. Berlin thought "the history of political philosophy is largely the history of changing models, and that the examination of these models is an important philosophical task" (1978, p39), because depending on which model you take, significantly different conclusions will follow. One of the helpful things about Berlin's *Hedgehog and the Fox* thesis, is its function as a model (and analogy), clothing a complex pluralist/monist dichotomy in vivid language. Quoting the Greek poet Archilochus, he says "The Fox knows many things, but the Hedgehog knows one big thing" (Archilochus fragment 201, cited by Berlin, 1953, p1). The pluralist fox (which Berlin thinks Tolstoy was by nature), thus might be seen as a vivid metaphor of his value pluralism.

Ideas ranged over in this Section go to the heart of Berlin's value pluralism, particularly the idea of the human. The next Section looks at the alleged relativism in Berlin's thesis, where the idea of the human also emerges prominently. If there is no overarching theory by which to decide between value choices, is relativism entailed? George Crowder (2020) thinks it is, and that Berlin's notion of the human horizon does not work as a criterion for choosing between goods.

I discuss Berlin's human horizon in more detail in Section 7.4 below; in summary it is that human beings share a common humanity; a horizon encircles human life orientating and facilitating human interaction, transcending culture, differing values, tastes and circumstances. Bridges between people are part of Berlin's case against relativism and

subjectivism. He makes an explicit connection between pluralism, relativism and what he calls the human horizon: "Intercommunication between cultures in time and space is possible only because what makes men human is common to them, and acts as a bridge between them" (Berlin, 2013a, p11). The human horizon is a part but does not exhaust Berlin's case against relativism, contra Crowder, neither did he intend it to be a criterion for choosing between goods; according to Berlin no such criterion exists (Berlin, 2013a, pp13-14).

7.3: The Alleged Relativism of Value Pluralism

In *The Problem of Value Pluralism: Isaiah Berlin and Beyond*, Crowder takes Berlin's value pluralism as his starting point but problematises key aspects of it, in particular whether value pluralism is true, and if it is a form of relativism. He asks: "If values are incommensurable and there is no general rule for ranking them, how do we choose between them when they conflict" (2020, p2).

Crowder thinks Berlin's notion of the human horizon does not work as a criterion for choosing between goods because it is too vague, undeveloped, and therefore incapable of giving clear answers. He says that the human horizon offers only the weakest basis for decision, saying nothing about the priorities and balances to strike when competing values like liberty and equality clash. Berlin offers only brief and unsystematic answers, so that while the human horizon notion shows that value pluralism is not relativism as such, "the problem of relativism persists in practice. The human horizon is so wide that it excludes hardly anything" (Crowder, 2020, p27).

Berlin's theory about the impossibility of ranking incommensurable values when they conflict, grounds Crowder's thesis. His challenge is twofold: the human horizon does not work as a way of choosing between clashing liberal values, and if value pluralism has no absolute standard against which to assess conflicting values, it is left with relativism. An assumption driving Crowder's thesis, therefore, is that liberalism needs a method of choosing between plural values when they conflict, and if one cannot be found, the entire liberal or any other political project can be questioned (the latter was not in fact such an issue for Berlin):

> if pluralism is true it seems to undermine not only the utopianism and authoritarianism that Berlin opposes but also the liberal politics he supports – indeed it seems to undermine the justification of any political position. Without a general rule for ranking, why should we uphold the values characteristic of liberalism (Crowder, 2020, p2).

Crowder makes a qualified case for liberalism, developing various solutions he thinks are suggested but not fully developed by Berlin. His relativism challenge penetrates deeply into Berlin's theory, however. While Berlin himself was very clear that incommensurability was neither relativism or subjectivism, many thinkers and writers at the time and since have thought otherwise. Kateb (1999) is typical. Not unlike Crowder, he starts by accepting that Berlin would probably dismiss his thesis, but argues nonetheless that he sees many aspects of Berlin's work suggesting "radical cultural pluralism" (p109). By this Kateb means cultural relativism, and interprets Berlin as arguing that the latter is an inevitable outcome of his pluralist defence of personal freedom.

Such claims have been countered by Berlin's frequent "assertion of human universals" necessary for decent societies (Burtonwood, 2006, p9). Burtonwood quotes Berlin in an interview with Rahan Jahanbegloo that the idea of human rights "rests on the true belief that there are certain goods – freedom, justice, the pursuit of happiness, honesty, love – that are in the interest of all human beings, as such, not as members of this or that nationality" (Jahanbegloo, 2000, p39, cited in Burtonwood, 2006, p9). Berlin's (and Burtonwood's) point here, is not about the meaning of the values, but that such values are in the interests of all cultures not just one or some of them. The argument against Berlin from cultural difference rests, therefore, on whether one accepts that Berlin is right that some goods are universal and genuinely cut across cultural boundaries and are in the interest of *all* human beings.

Crowder's particular challenge, however, goes further than the cultural difference argument, and refers to the fact that Berlin also claims a deeper level of connectedness, at the level of inter-personal values (this is undeniable, see Berlin, 2013a, p12; 2001, p12). If so, the inability to choose between them must, Crowder claims, result in value relativism. I return to Crowder's case later.

A Middle Ground Between Relativism and Pluralism?

A different kind of relativist challenge was made by Leo Strauss (1989). Strauss saw a crisis in modern rationalism and liberalism, in particular in the ideas of Berlin and Heidegger, and argued for a revival of Socratic rationalism. Not unlike Berlin in fact, he defines relativism as "the assertion that all ends are relative to the chooser and hence equal" (1989, p15). He thought Berlin's pluralism was inconsistent however, because his explicit prioritisation of negative freedom in *Two Concepts* (*cf* Berlin, 1998, p236), is inconsistent with his value

pluralism (he thus agrees with Crowder here, but not that liberalism must be justified). *Two Concepts* seems to Strauss to be an ideological anti-Communist manifesto and rallying cry. He thinks Berlin, despite his avowed pluralism cannot escape the need "to take a final stand" (Strauss, 1989, p17) – i.e., a stand on negative liberty – and that *Two Concepts* characterises therefore, a crisis in liberalism caused by abandoning an absolutist basis, "trying to become entirely relativistic" (Strauss, 1989. p17). From this reading he sees Berlin trying to find an impossible middle ground between relativism and what Strauss calls absolutism.

Strauss' critique is significant but not self-consistent. The absolutism he thinks Berlin abandons, refers to an absolute – that is consistent – pluralism; how so he asks, if negative liberty is a priority value in a system of radically incommensurable values? On the other hand, the middle ground between pluralism and relativism he (correctly) thinks Berlin carves out, does not follow (as Strauss claims), from Berlin's prioritising of negative liberty, but from value incommensurability. In other words, Strauss' critique makes two important points but conflates two different things, one largely political (negative liberty), and one largely meta-ethical (relativism). He rightly thinks Berlin risks abandoning an absolute (consistent) pluralism in prioritising negative liberty, but wrongly calls it an abandonment of objectivity.

Strauss' point about Berlin's inconsistency about negative freedom largely stands. Others have thought the same thing. Gray for example, thinks Berlin's claim that pluralism entails liberalism, *and* that they are logically distinct can both be supported in Berlin's work. He cites Berlin as saying that they are "not the same or even overlapping concepts [and] not logically connected", while also saying "Pluralism entails a minimum degree of toleration" (Conversations with Rahan Jahanbegloo, p44, cited by Gray, 1995, p150).

On the other hand as Aileen Kelly points out, few of Berlin's critics have tried to address his entire argument, concentrating on specific parts of it. Strauss certainly seems to do this, but Berlin's argument consists of many interlocking strands, and an expansive view of the human condition. At any event, Berlin does carve out a difficult to hold middle ground between pluralism and relativism as Strauss rather awkwardly argues, but for different reasons based on better arguments. Contemporary (neo) liberalism may well have been trying to become entirely relativistic as Strauss contends, but Berlin was certainly not arguing for that or for relativism. His categoric assertion is that "nor does incommensurability entail relativism" (2013a, p88).

Why Berlin's Value Pluralism is not the same thing as Relativism

Berlin thought relativism was based on a one-sided view of experience (Kelly, 2001, p8). He meant by this (argues Kelly), that thinkers such as Alexander Herzen, Vissarion Belinsky, Giambattista Vico and Tolstoy, did not stop at an individual, subjective moral stance but applied their moral principles to life, culture and society. Berlin does this, differentiating pluralism from relativism.

In relation to both Crowder and Strauss' challenge, for the avoidance of doubt Berlin's oeuvre is replete with statements categorically refuting the idea that there could, or should ever be a way to decide between conflicting values: see *The Pursuit of the Ideal* (2013a): p13, p14, p17, p18, p20; *The Decline of Utopian Ideas in the West* (2013a): p25, p26, p33, p39, p41; *Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth Century European Thought* (2013a): p82, p83, p84, p86, p88. Many other references could be cited. What then, did Berlin think relativism is, and why did he think pluralism is not relativism?

Berlin thinks there is a plurality of ideals, cultures and temperaments, but does not support the view that "I like my coffee with milk and you like it without; I am in favour of kindness and you prefer concentration camps – each of us with his own values, which cannot be overcome or integrated" (Berlin, 2001, pp11-12). He thinks relativism says the judgements of people or groups are the expression of taste, emotional attitude or outlook, with no objective correlate determining their truth or falsehood; all ends and values are relative to the chooser, and therefore equal.

But are there such things as 'objective correlates'? Berlin (2013a) thinks there are, including: "wholly understandable ends of life" and attitudes which people and cultures "make their own" (p82); "intelligible ends of life for human beings" (p83), and values of "creatures capable of conscious intellectual and moral discrimination" (p86); "peaks of human endeavour" (p87), and "ways of life" normal people find it natural to pursue (p88). I give examples of objective correlates, such as attitudes which people and cultures make their own, and peaks of human endeavour later.

Berlin is arguing that expressions of taste and differences of emotional attitude are bridgeable (Berlin, 2013a, p91), because such human values exist and have objective correlates for their creators, but they do not merely exist in the mind of a single human

subject, they are to an important extent held in common; they can be overcome and integrated.

John Gray interprets Berlin's position as being that conflicting values and their incommensurability are known objective facts, not subjective opinions. Objectivity in Berlin's oeuvre arises from inherited, historical, shared cultural frameworks, forms of life and networks of practice (Gray, 1995, p73). Because, however, the common forms of life and networks are mutually intelligible, they are universal in character not local. The dilemmas generated (i.e. incommensurable clashing values etc.), are indeed unavoidable and indeterminate, and cannot be solved by reason, but they are nonetheless objectively 'known' as dilemmas and mutually understandable. This distinguishes pluralism from relativism because relativism assumes the converse: that the clashing values are relative to the chooser only, not to any universal point of understanding beyond. The 'facts' of shared forms of life and humanity constitute an available vantage point beyond the immediate clash.

To be clear about incommensurability, Berlin's argument is that where ultimate values are irreconcilable, clear-cut decisions are impossible in *principle*. To assume all values can be graded on a single scale, "so that it is a mere matter of inspection to determine the highest, seems to me to falsify our knowledge that men are free agents, to represent moral decision as an operation which a slide-rule could, in principle, perform" (Berlin, 1969, p171). He is arguing that what is right in specific cases cannot be arrived at in a mechanical or deductive fashion, because situations are often unclear, and basic principles confused and unarticulated.

On the other hand pluralism is not relativism because it affirms radical value-conflict as a known fact, a matter of moral knowledge, the denial of which is "a departure from truthfulness" (Gray, 1995, p63). It is not relativism because to be truthful, to be honest and not dishonest, we *know* conflicts between ultimate values occur and that they are incommensurable. Gray thinks Berlin's view of objectivity is akin to Wittgenstein's idea of objectivity as publicness, identifying common social practices. Wittgenstein too thought shared forms of life acted as something like anchoring points for the notion of objectivity. Discussing this view, Hamlyn (1972), argues that if people are to understand each other they must have some agreed appreciation (judgement) of the "criteria of truth" being applied (p106). Not unlike Berlin, Hamlyn thinks questions about objectivity must be raised in the

context of a shared "system of understanding [but] alternative conceptual schemes might be adopted" (Hamlyn, 1972, p105). This is what Gray meant by departure from truthfulness; departure from the criteria of truth being applied.

The simplest definition Berlin gives of an objective value (in some ways like Aristotle's 'final end'), is one that is pursued for its own sake, to which other things are means (Berlin, 2013a, p12). I take this to mean that if a schoolchild pursues music for its own sake, that is, not for extrinsic purposes but for intrinsic properties of the stimulation and fun of making music, the musical instrument and the time set aside are means to that end, and for that child music is an objective value. For Berlin human beings with ends create their values and make them objective by making them an intrinsically valuable 'end' of their life. His definition of ethical thought includes humans being creatures with such ends and purposes.

For Berlin, being alive and being human and unavoidably immersed in shared forms of life is a universal, something everyone participates in, not something we choose or observe from some detached viewpoint. He refers to this human limit as a horizon. The limit, however, is not the subjective self, or culture, or even any particular form of life but a shared human semblance as he calls it; the broadest and widest possible shared horizon.

In one sense for Berlin, any mutually intelligible intrinsic human value is potentially an objective value, because it is people, human beings as objective facts with ends and purposes, that make values objective, not values existing on their own independently of them. There are no certainties only flux and variety; difference and disagreement. This is one reason why he thought hankering after certainty and guarantees about human values, was a longing for the "certainties of childhood" (Berlin, 1998, p242); the human precedes the values they create, if there is no human being with an end, there is no value and no objectivity. He thus lowers the bar of objectivity (as he does for truth), but not to the point of impossibility, indeterminacy or relativism.

Reciprocal Inter-dependent Partners.

Discussing David Hume's is-ought gap, David Wiggins argues that there is "no overwhelming reason to deny all objectivity to practical judgements" (1998, p131). Like Berlin he is not arguing for naturalism, that ethical properties are a real part of the world; objective features of it, but that shared cultural facts such as mountains shape the way human beings

create their values. He sees an inner perspective capable of being conditioned by an outer reality. Imagine someone entranced by the beauty of shimmering blue mountains he says, marvelling how overwhelmingly beautiful they are, “The value of the state depends on the value attributed to the object” (Wiggins, 1998, p105, n19). His shimmering blue mountains can be seen as part of a shared form of life in that locality, shaping the viewer’s values, or as Berlin might say constitutive of an objective correlate.

Wiggins concludes his critique of non-cognitivism with a suggestion about values: “no attempt to make sense of the human condition can really succeed if it treats the objects of psychological states as unequal partners or derivative elements in the conceptual structure of values and states and their objects” (1998, p106). He wants us to see our psychological states and the objects they identify (such as beautiful mountains), as reciprocal inter-dependent partners.

Instead of Wiggins’ mountains, one could instance other ‘objective correlates’ or forms of life such as climate. Eskimo values (such as infanticide) are a way of life they find it natural to pursue (in Berlin’s sense), shaped by their environment; similarly the values of an old man from London’s East End who never leaves Leytonstone, because he gets irritable and uncomfortable in open spaces, an attitude he has made his own in Berlin’s sense; the city and its buildings have shaped him and his values. Similarly (and conversely) the values of a fisherman who refuses to journey from Isla to the mainland, are shaped by his island life, the sea and the sky.

A paradigm example here, is arguably French sailor Bernard Moitessier leading the 1968 Sunday Times Golden Globe Race, the first non-stop single-handed round the world yacht race. After rounding Cape Horn, the third and final Cape going east, he was so entranced by the solitude, peace, and oneness with the elements, that he changed course foregoing the £5,000 prize, and went round again saying “I continue non-stop to the islands of the Pacific, because I am happy at sea and perhaps also to save my soul” (Pelaschier, 2021, paragraph 20); famously letting in Robin Knox-Johnston to first prize. Moitessier’s effort was certainly a peak of human endeavour in Berlin’s sense, and his values were absolutely shaped by the sea, a clear example of Wiggins’ conceptual structure of values and states and their objects.

Berlin refers to different “forms” or “networks” of life (2013a, p12); they are local but

occur within a common horizon. By this he means they are based on independently existing shared cultural artifacts, correlates such as one's family, the prevailing climate and geography/topography. This becomes clearer in relation to his discussion of Giambattista Vico's view of culture, history and society (discussed below with the human horizon). My point here is that Berlin means by this, that to be human is to have culturally shaped ends and purposes "I think these values are objective – that is to say, their nature, the pursuit of them, is part of what it is to be a human being, and this is an objective given" (2001, p12).

I say more below about why value pluralism is not the same thing as relativism discussing the human horizon, but first we need to consider an opposing view.

An Opposing Viewpoint: There Are No Objective Values.

In *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*, J.L. Mackie argues strongly against the objectivity of values. For Mackie (1977), "There are no objective values" (p1), they are not part of the fabric of the world therefore they are not in any sense objective. If there were objective values, they would be completely different from anything else that exists, and we would need faculties "utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else" (Mackie, 1977, p38).

Mackie stands in a long line of moral sceptics, or subjectivists, that goes at least as far back as Herodotus, Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic, and more recently Hume. He argues that values do not have the moral properties people think they do; his scepticism directly challenges moral or ethical realism.

Ethical realism, sometimes called cognitivism, is the view that ethical sentences express propositions which can be true or false, and that "good and bad are properties of situations and people, and right and wrong are properties of actions" (Law, 2007, p112). These are the properties Mackie says do not exist. Ethical properties for the realist are a real part of the world, objective features not subjective opinions. Ethical realists argue that values exist independently from human beings, and are not just attributed or created by them. Berlin's form of objectivity is a species of realism, because while values are subjective in the sense of being created and attributed by humans, they are nonetheless objective for them. Thus it is not Mackie's kind of realism. Values for Berlin are "historic creations, embedded in particular forms of life" (Gray, 1995, p162); his realism is internal to each person. Thus Gray

refers to Berlin's realism as "internal realism" (1995, p72).

That said, Mackie categorically denies what Berlin holds; a world of objective values. He thought there was a fundamental issue about the status of values, arguing that "ordinary moral judgements involve a claim to objectivity which both non-cognitive and naturalist analyses fail to capture" (Mackie, 1977, p48). He concludes that moral scepticism must be explained in terms of what he calls an error theory; that ordinary moral thought and language includes a deep-rooted, but false belief in the objectivity of values. For him objectivity entails realism, and what he calls unconditional cognitivism. His argument assumes that both cultural relativism (point 1 below), and subjectivism (points 2-4), are germane to the case. A well-rehearsed cultural difference argument leads to his anti-naturalist case rooted in Hume's 'fact-value' gap, (*Humes Law*). Summarising his argument:

1. A cultural difference argument. Morality differs from one society to another, one period to another, one group to another, and the sources of these different moral codes are different ways of living, not objectively existing values.
2. An argument from queerness. The metaphysical peculiarity of the supposed objective values mean they have to be intrinsically action-guiding and motivating, we therefore need special faculties to know them, different from how we know everything else.
3. An argument about supervenience. Moral properties of values always correlate with other psychological and natural properties of things, therefore objective values if they existed, must be supervenient upon natural features crossing Humes fact-value divide.
4. An epistemological difficulty. There is a problem accounting for our knowledge of value entities, and their links with the features on which they would be consequential. Which human faculty of understanding allows us to know this?

For the avoidance of doubt, while it is true that one can argue that no value is objectively correct while still arguing that the value objectively exists, that is not the case here. Both Mackie and Berlin are using the notion of objectivity in the same sense of objectively existing human values, or not.

Hume's sceptical argument about a logical 'gap' between facts and values, remains a widely accepted problem for objectivity. For Hume sentiment not reason was the source of morals, morality arises subjectively in each person, not objectively in the world or any objective situation in the world. Morals for Hume are motivating (action-guiding), mere facts

and reasoning about facts are not. Mackie's argument is that if morals exist in a realm separate from humans, in order to be action-guiding, in order to motivate in Hume's sense, they must cross Hume's fact-value logical divide. Moral value objectivity is therefore an illusion we have come to accept. Mackie's key point is that:

> moral distinctions do not report any objective features at all: moral goodness or rightness is not any quality or any relation to be found in or among any objective situations or actions, and no purely intellectual or cognitive procedure can issue in a moral judgement (Mackie, 1977, p2).

He links the argument from queerness to points three and four: asking how objective values could be supervenient upon natural features without crossing the fact-value divide; and (the corresponding) "epistemological difficulty", of accounting for our knowledge of value entities (1977, p49).

He rounds off his case arguing that somewhere along the way moral obligation for whatever reason, religious, conscious or unconscious, crept in unnoticed, and became attached to moral terms such as right and wrong. He is arguing then, that over time something called 'morality' and moral 'obligation' attached itself, so that the idea of objective values came to be part of ordinary thought and language, leading to his error theory conclusion that without being fully conscious of it we all now think like this, but it is false; there are no such things as distinctively moral properties in the world.

Williams (1998), thinks Mackie's error theory "seems, very roughly, to be that of taking moral values to be objective" (p170). The problem for Mackie's argument in relation to Berlin's position, is that Berlin's values although objective, do not exist in a factual realm independently from humans, and do not cross Humes fact-value gap. Berlin the empiricist stays close to Hume.

Hume, Mackie and Berlin.

In Book III (section i.1) of the *Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume asked how an ought can be derived from an is, famously asking if anyone can find "that matter of fact, or real existence" (i.1), of vice in wilful murder? We will never find it he says, until we look into our sentiments, our own "breast" (i.1). He had earlier (Book II, iii.3), summarised a psychology of action; that reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions. Then in Book III, he argues that morals are derived from moral sense, not reason. For Hume moral judgement (i.e.,

sentiment based on human sympathy, what he called the passions), motivates to action while reason on its own cannot. For him reason alone could not, therefore, be the source of morals (famously arousing Kant from his slumbers).

Personal merit says Hume, in *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, consists in "possession of mental qualities, *useful* or *agreeable* to the *person himself* or to *others* … some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species [that] pronounces characters and actions amiable or odious, praise-worthy or blameable" (ix, 1, his emphasis). Berlin's internal realism seems consistent with Hume's internal sense of feeling (and to some extent Moore's 'intuition', argued in Chapter 10) . Values are created by human beings and do not exist in an impersonal objective realm.

Clearly, Berlin does not argue for the ethical realism Mackie denies, that values could be objective in the sense that 'good' and 'right' refer to real properties of things. That said, Mackie categorically denies what Berlin holds: a world of objective values that are part of being a human being. Berlin's argument (that values are subjectively created, but are objective for their creators), is a middle way consistent with the middle way he establishes between pluralism and relativism. This 'middle way' is not an absolute; it is neither black nor white but consists of various shades of grey. As such it could never appeal to either subjectivists *or* objectivists (perhaps this is one reason why his oeuvre is too often neglected). Berlin's 'world' of objective values is perhaps the clue; values are the values of the subject pure and simple, but a 'world' of objectivity opens via shared forms of life, occurring within a common horizon. To pursue culturally shaped ends and purposes is part of what it is to be human, and being human is an objective fact everyone shares.

It is here that his argument moves forward again to the human horizon, and its relevance for decent societies (as he puts it).

7.4: The Human Horizon

Bridges between people are part of Berlin's case against relativism (and subjectivism). He makes an explicit connection between pluralism, relativism and what he calls the human horizon. This final Section of Chapter 7 is an examination and explication of two statements underpinning this notion: first, "Intercommunication between cultures in time and space is possible only because what makes men human is common to them, and acts as a bridge

between them" (Berlin, 2013a, p11), and "Forms of life differ. Ends, moral principles, are many. But not infinitely many: they must be within the human horizon. If they are not they are outside the human sphere" (2013a, p12).

Two key aspects of his argument are that human differences (clashing values), are bridgeable, and that the notion of the human is a foundation on which bridges between people can be built. The bridge itself is human understanding, that human beings can understand one another, they are not condemned to relativist prisons, what he calls windowless boxes, because they are capable of imagining what life might be like for others, by reasoning, communicating, sympathising, understanding and integrating, rather than unsupported opinion, concealment, disruption, indifference, and separation (which he argues leads to human conflict). We may find some values unacceptable, but "grasp how one might be a full human being, with whom one could communicate, and at the same time live in the light of values widely different to one's own" (Berlin, 2013a, p11).

But is intercommunication between cultures and people possible as he states? In one sense it depends, perhaps, on where we begin. If the model, nucleus and basis of my case is the individual human subject, if that is my focus and if that is the point of view I adopt, it may not be thought possible, because the local and particular rather than the universal and generic are likely to be conditioning. But if I begin instead with social and cultural wholes, common forms of life and networks of practice then yes, the possibility opens up because there are now two sides to the human condition: human subjects *plus* the lives they live. Kelly (2001) touches on this, identifying Berlin's "sense of reality" (p17); empathising with "historical situations, values, and forms of life that are not one's own … the interplay of factors too complex, numerous, and minute to be distilled into laws" (Kelly, 2001, p18). Berlin's focus is the concrete, minute, lived experience of cultures and people, what Vico called their "hopes, desires, fears and fantasies" (see below, Berlin, 2001, p60).

A different way of theorising Berlin's human horizon is, perhaps, the idea of a common point of view. Blackburn (2001), for example, argues that there can be no joint understanding unless the reasons I give from my perspective, *can* be understood from your perspective. Unless this was true he says, "conversation about practical matters would seem to be reduced to one side saying 'Me, me, me', and the other side saying the same" (p129). His conclusion is similar to Berlin's: in that case there can be no shared understanding. Blackburn too uses

Hume to build his case for a common point of view, which is interesting because Hume is often used in arguments (such as Mackie's), that ethics has no ground, and is therefore purely subjective, supposing that "the world is exhausted by what *is* the case" (Blackburn, 2001, p29).

Berlin thinks that although we may criticise the values of others we cannot pretend not to understand them or regard them as subjective. This too, is part of his intelligibility, and publicness of human networks argument. Vico, Berlin argues, thought human institutions existed so that people can "communicate, express themselves, create a common structure responding to their beliefs" (Berlin, 2001, p59). For Vico this meant responding to people's hopes, desires, fears and fantasies, so that we can imagine how other people see life, and understand how and why their motives, outlooks and ways of life are grounded in experiences different to ours. Vico thought that unlike formal disciplines such as mathematics and logic, this kind of knowing gave knowledge of reality, "news of what is there" (Berlin, 2001, p60). It relies, he says, on what people have made in order to communicate rather than the writings of historians: i.e. their gods, artifacts, words, art and social institutions; it takes, Berlin says, an inside view as a participant in human life not a remote observer. And it means we can enter into the lives and experiences of people who although different to us, are still human and therefore also doers and communicators.

The Human Horizon and CfE

The relevance of this to CfE's culturally diverse schools and classrooms seems clear. The reality of children's lives in modern plural society often includes round-the-clock online incivility, because social media allows others to criticise without accountability. The problem is not new as Plato's ring of Gyges myth demonstrates, but it is surely enormously heightened? Berlin's ideas can support schools helping children to live in the light of values widely different to their own, discussing values one child find's unacceptable but another does not. If it is true (as I have argued), that important aspects of value pluralist theory sit behind many of the challenges around cultural diversity, it can speak directly into highly sensitized culture, race, gender and sexuality-based issues schools are facing today. Arguably some of the "social justice" (*Review Group*, 2004, p11), issues CfE wants young people to develop their own value stances about.

While children of different identities and backgrounds will probably share some values

(the reverse may also be true), nonetheless in their everyday social lives children's values too will conflict; could they not learn why, and how to manage this clash, rather than, perhaps, become perplexed or forlornly hope they will not, and should not clash. Accused of thinking that history was about human motives and intentions rather than the press of social forces, Berlin replied: "anyone concerned with human beings is committed to consideration of motives, purposes, choices, the specifically human experiences that belong to human beings uniquely" (Berlin, 1969, pxxxiii). The human horizon for schools could include responding to other children's hopes, desires, fears and fantasies, understanding how and why their motives, outlooks and ways of life matter to *them*. It could be imagining, entering into and recognising the lives of others; what it might be like to live their lives and experiences; reflecting on their ways of life and artifacts; making sincere efforts to achieve an inside view, not remaining a detached observer.

Value Pluralism, Relativism and the Human Horizon.

Human beings (Berlin argues), share a common humanity; a horizon encircles human life orientating and facilitating human interaction, transcending culture, differing values, tastes and circumstances. Succumbing to an ever present temptation to ignore the human 'other' risks losing a grip on human understanding. Berlin's emphasis is not on any particular value or set of values, or 'great good' (as he calls them), such as liberty or equality, but their mutually intelligible, communicable plural aspect and character. He is concerned with whether a value system different to mine is something I can conceive someone pursuing while remaining a human being I can communicate with. His clear focus is on human integration and communication. A key question for him is how to promote decent societies *despite* clashing human values. He says in many places what he means by 'decent', explained further in Chapter 9.

What is to be done? he asks: "What and how much must we sacrifice to what? There is, it seems to me, no clear reply. But the collisions, even if they cannot be avoided, can be softened. Claims can be balanced, compromises can be reached" (Berlin, 2013a, p18). This balancing claims, reaching compromises and establishing priorities in concrete cases, is his human horizon in action. He thinks any absolute standard however enlightened, well-meaning or carefully applied, will end up trampling upon someone's values. Hankering after perfection is a recipe for bloodshed he argues, even if it is sought by people with the best of

motives. This (to repeat) is the problem with Talbot and Tate's (NFVEC), well-meaning shared values for schools, ultimately someone can be ignored and oppressed.

He thought some human beings have always preferred the security of imprisonment "to the painful conflicts and perplexities of the disordered freedom of the world beyond the walls" (Berlin, 1998, p185), however. His value pluralism is larger than a 'self'. He calls the larger domain pluralism, developing his position from his reading of Joseph de Maistre, Vico and Johann Herder (among others). What has sometimes been understood as relativism he argues, is actually pluralism covering a larger array of human values not structured hierarchically; no one value taking precedence over another.

An analogy perhaps helps to explain what is going on here. Imagine a wide open savannah, and a sheep pen full of sheep, grazing happily and safely, protected from a dangerous variety of animal life over the wall. Outside, stretching away to the horizon there is danger and mesmerising flux; wild animals of all kinds, hunters and hunted, victors and victims, milling and mingling, killing and being killed, doing what survival demands of them.

Now take down the wall and rebuild it at the horizon. What has happened? The simple agrarian value-set of the sheep no longer holds. The circle of life is perilously enlarged. The sheep find themselves mixing with friends and predators alike, and incompatible value-sets. Life is more complicated, difficult, dangerous and plural. The sheep must take account of values different to theirs, better ones and worse, dangerous ones and detestable. They may even end up fighting to defend their way of life and the values they believe in. Berlin's value pluralism is unavoidably tragic, but it is also not the relativism of the sheepfold because human imagination, interaction, dialogue, sympathy, compassion, compromise and discussion is forced upon them. Life without unending negotiation is impossible. Crowder's wish for a way to choose between clashing values seems to miss this fundamental point about the human predicament: the impossibility of avoiding the need for negotiated settlements.

Value pluralism moved the wall; the sheep pen is a picture of relativism; inward facing, self-contained, enclosed, familiar, safe and comfortable. The enlarged jungle of clashing values is pluralism where the dominant themes are variety, difference and the need to manage conflict. It is almost Hobbesian but not quite because for human beings mutual understanding, compromise and balancing incompatible values is always a possibility. Berlin

does for values what Locke did for social contract theory, through the tempering of human nature. Human beings are not as nasty and brutish as Hobbes thought; therefore society does not depend on absolute authority. For Berlin, human beings *can* move past the isolation, incivilities and walls of relativism to human understanding.

Non-human Values?

If I am a value pluralist I must look past my own familiar way of life to the human horizon, and defend my values against predators, but to thrive I will have to learn how to discuss equally valid value claims with people with whom I may wholly disagree, who I may dislike or even find detestable. I must learn how to reach value compromises and try to soften inescapable collisions. This never-ending process of human understanding, dialogue, compromise and discussion is for Berlin not optional, but a necessary ingredient of pluralism. This is how he put it:

> I came to the conclusion that there is … a plurality of values which men can and do seek, and that these values differ … Nevertheless, of course, if I pursue one set of values I may detest another, and think it is damaging to the only form of life that I am able to live or tolerate, for myself and others; in which case I may attack it, I may even – in extreme cases – have to go to war against it. But I still recognise it as a human pursuit. I find Nazi values detestable, but I can understand how, given enough misinformation, enough false belief about reality, one could come to believe that they are the only salvation (2001, pp11-12).

Despite losing seven members of his wider family to Nazism, he did not think the Nazis were "pathological or insane only wickedly wrong and totally misguided about the facts" (Berlin, 2001, p12), leading to terrible crimes; they and their values were human, nonetheless. This seems one of the great ideas Berlin's value pluralism theory can teach twenty-first century children: values one finds detestable are human nonetheless; not a reason to refuse dialogue, but to negotiate.

Gray sees a tension here however; whether universal concepts and categories structuring the human horizon are truly cross-cultural, or whether they identify a large but not universal family of many different forms of life. Gray describes the human horizon as "a distillation from a vast miscellany of cultures, a description of their family resemblances, not any claim about an essence they all exhibit" (1995, p165). Gray does not say more, probably because Berlin too does not appear to say clearly what a value 'below' the human horizon is.

Kelly (2001) notes that Berlin took from Herzen the notion that there can be no

"eternal norms and standards" (p16), pointing to the existence of a minimum of values which Berlin calls a human horizon. This is consistent with his idea that there must be some possibility of being able to communicate, or "they are not human for me" (Berlin, 2001, p12). The example he gives is that if someone worships wood because it is wood; for no other reason than it is wood and gives no other answer, we do not know what they mean; "If they are human, they are not beings with whom I can communicate" (2001, p12), there is a barrier, because there must be something common or shared. He thought however, that the notion of the sub-human is founded on false empirical beliefs about the nature of the behaviour of "Jews, or Gypsies, or Slavs, or Negroes or whoever it might be" (Berlin, 1978, p21), muddling empirical and philosophical questions. He thought values outside or below the horizon are:

- Values which stop me from communicating with those who hold them (2001, p12).
- Values which are incomprehensible to me and block my understanding of the people who hold them (2001, p12).
- Values which are not recognisable as part of the essence of humanity, what he terms the human semblance (2001, p12).
- Values that take away all freedom from people (2013a, p13).
- Values with which I have nothing at all in common (2001, p12).

As premisses to an argument that human values are many but finite in number, four of the above points are contestable however (omitting freedom); arguably, they may or may not be true. What a non-human value is remains somewhat obscure in Berlin's work. On the other hand neither did he think incommensurability led to relativism, and on this point Berlin has strong arguments, establishing a form of objectivity that does not cross Hume's fact-value gap, and does not adopt straight-forward realism. His notion of objectivity rests on a number of interlinked strands: value-conflict is a matter of moral knowledge the denial of which is a departure from truthfulness; upon the fact of inherited forms of shared public life and networks of cultural practices, and because human beings with ends and purposes pursue things for their own sake (i.e. intrinsic and objective for them), to which other things are means.

A Fox-like Compromise?

Many people today seem sceptical about the possibility of objective truth. Berlin does not share that scepticism, arguing that scepticism is ultimately self-refuting. Like many others however, he thought defining it was not possible. He thought questions about values are

"quasi-empirical" (Berlin, 1969, pliii), not of the natural sciences kind, so they were more likely to be answerable by historians, anthropologists, philosophers of culture and social scientists. He did not think final answers to questions about truth exist however, or can be demonstrated (or intuited). For him there is no "harmonious pattern in which all values are reconciled". (Berlin, 1969, pplv-lvi).

He thought the best we can do is make approximations to truth. He also thought it was something most of us want to believe in, and should therefore not be too lightly set aside. Appealing here (and elsewhere) to what people generally think, Berlin is doing what many philosophers have done. Aristotle for example thought "every art and every enquiry, and similarly every action and choice, *is thought to* aim at some good" (1094a, my emphasis), and starts his enquiry into the human good arguing that it is "*generally agreed* to be happiness" (1095a, my emphasis).

Crowder's relativist challenge is in many ways a challenge to Berlin's value pluralism itself, not just to non-relative accounts of it; but there is perhaps, a sense in which Crowder too, like Tolstoy, is a pluralist fox who wants to be a monist hedgehog.

In his Foreword to *The Hedgehog and the Fox*, Michael Ignatieff thinks Berlin is saying that we are all riven creatures who "have to choose whether to accept the incompleteness of our knowledge or hold out for certainty and truth" (2013, px). Crowder seems by nature a liberal fox holding out for the certainty of the hedgehog. He seems to want closure in respect of the liberal values he supports, but which are essentially incommensurable and not closable or final. As Crowder's book title (*The Problem of Value Pluralism: Isaiah Berlin and Beyond*) suggests, for him value pluralism *itself* is the problem. In one sense it is; a discordant, often agonising, certainly perplexing variety of ways of life and moral standards is indeed complex, challenging and confusing. This is a key reason why I argue in Chapter 9 below, that Berlin's value pluralism theory is not only highly relevant for CfE, but timely and necessary.

7.5: Value Pluralism, Concluding Remarks

Chapter 7 has argued that issues around diversity, inclusion and plural values became and remain significant for schools and children today. So-called 'cancel-culture' is arguably a kind of 'coercion-culture', avoiding dialogue by refusing to allow the challenge of the distasteful idea, rather than engaging with it. If so, young people could learn how to listen,

and engage with alternative points of view, and disagreeable ideas in a Berlinian way, and practice empathy and compromise, because human values clash, moral absolutes are not available, and human understanding therefore demands dialogue and engagement.

One of the great ideas Berlin's value pluralism theory could teach twenty-first century children is, I suggest, that values one finds detestable are human nonetheless, and not a reason to refuse dialogue.

I argue that from a value pluralist perspective, any set of shared values is problematic because it assumes there can be final, ultimate standards for human values applicable to all children, which value pluralism denies. The possibility of sympathetic communication between people is part of Berlin's arguments against relativism, however, and value pluralists must look past familiar ways of life to the human horizon, learn how to reach compromises and soften inescapable value collisions**.**

There are good reasons for thinking Berlin's pluralism is not the same thing as relativism, despite the impossibility of resolving all conflicts of plural values and interests. Burtonwood, Gray, and Berlin himself make strong counter arguments. It is not just that relativism assumes an impossible (or no) external vantage point, but that it strips away incentives to even look for one, or engage in meaningful dialogue.

Chapter 7 has argued that value pluralism sits somewhere behind CfE's diversity agenda, an extremely important contextual elements of its values and ethics, and an equally important part of children and young people's lives today. Chapter 9 will apply relevant parts of these claims to CfE's values and ethics.

This completes Chapter 7. Chapter 8 introduces its moral developmentalism, an important but problematic contextual element of its values and embedded ethics.

Chapter 8: CfE's Moral Developmentalism (and Kantian Rationalism)

Chapter Abstract

I have argued that RME is the core of CfE's treatment of values and ethics. Chapter 8 focuses on the RME topic's underlying pedagogy; the how of learning; what CfE calls 'developmentally appropriate practice', or *Active Learning*. RME Es&Os set out (Junior Phase) progression in five Levels, Early Years (age 3-6), through to Fourth Level (age 14-15), following a stage-based developmental trajectory.

The Millar Report set a developmental scene for Standard Grade, 5-14 then CfE. It identified a common theme among various theorists, that moral development is a gradual progression from egocentric through a period of conformity, to the formation of moral principles. I argue that CfE's five RME Levels roughly follow Millar's five-stage moral trajectory, from heteronomy towards moral autonomy, as theorised by Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg (adapted by Millar).

Piaget and Kohlberg's moral developmental systems are largely content-neutral, however, grounded in Kant's system, focusing on cognitive processes of moral thought and reasoning rather than the content of an ethics. Kohlberg's three levels are structured by what he calls sociomoral perspectives, generating system features for each of six stages. His term 'sociomoral' refers to an individual defining both social facts and sociomoral values or oughts (Kohlberg, 1976). Kohlberg did not depart from Piaget's fundamental emphasis on a form of Kantian rationalism, focusing on moral judgement in relation to obligation, emphasising formalistic moral reasoning.

CfE's moral developmental pedagogy thus can be said to open wider a door to Kantian reasoning, and formalistic rather than content-focused ethics. I suggest it is only a thin version of Kant's ethics however, because it concentrates almost exclusively on moral reasoning; on children's rational autonomy and rights rather than any clear argument about personal moral principles or the moral law. In its blending young children's basic values with developmental rationalism, however, RME treads a precarious (un-Kantian) path between content neutral reasoning, and values external to moral agents.

8.1: Millar, Kohlberg, Piaget and CfE

Many documents and Scottish writers affirm CfE's developmentally appropriate

Practice (DAP), for example: *Active Learning in the Early Years*, 2007, p6 and pp12-13; *The Review Group*, 2004, p10; Stephen, 2006, p9; Stephen 2018, p231; Soltysek, 2013, p404; Boyd 2008a, p326; Cassidy 2013, p40.

CfE can be seen to follow a stage-based moral developmental trajectory from heteronomy in younger, towards moral autonomy in older children, theorised by Kohlberg, before him Piaget, and adapted in the 1972 Millar Report. RME Es&Os set out progression in five Levels, *Early Years* (age 3-6), through to the *Fourth Level* (age 14-15). *A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, (p24), clearly stating that CfE will take children: "through planned progress to the greater demand of learning at the next level … to match the level of cognitive, emotional and physical demand at the different stages with what is known about good practice in learning". When Curriculum documents use the phrase 'good practice in learning', they are invariably referring to a form of cognitive-developmental pedagogy, or developmentalism.

DAP in relation to the moral was explained in the Millar Report on *Moral and Religious Education in Scottish Schools* (1972). Millar refers to Piaget's earlier, and Kohlberg's "more recent" (p55) classification of developmental sequence in relation to children's moral and intellectual growth, observing that developmental ideas were now "widely accepted" (p54). He summarises four stages of Piaget's moral judgement: anomy (without law); heteronomy (law imposed by others); cooperation (the emergence of fair play), and autonomy (self-control). He discusses pros and cons of Kohlberg's six stages of moral development (Millar, 1972, pp55-56), observing that other research had shown that some aspects of moral development cannot be easily fitted into neat stages. In an apparent blending of Piaget's focus on younger children, with Kohlberg's extension to adolescents, Millar proposed the following developmental stages and tasks for Scottish education:

1. The infant. To establish the basis for concern.
2. The toddler. To relinquish the egocentric position.
3. The pre-school child. To establish the elements of control and modes of moral thought.
4. The school child. To reconcile the modes of moral thought and learn social skills.
5. The adolescent. To establish a flexible inter-relationship between the modes of thought, weld these into moral principles, reappraise and adapt earlier methods in relation to adult problems new to the adolescent.

(Millar, 1972, p56).

Summarising, Millar arguably set the developmental scene for *Standard Grade*, *5-14* and then CfE, when he says the common theme in all studies and theorists is that "moral development is a gradual progression from the egocentric, through a period of conformity to the formation of moral principles" (1972, p57). Following Millar's eclecticism, and CfE's lack of theoretical argument, complete disaggregation of Piaget and Kohlberg's theories in CfE's developmental approach is not possible, thus five RME Levels probably adapt the five-stage Piaget/Kohlberg moral trajectory outlined by Millar.

Kohlberg and Piaget.

Kohlberg is the theorist most often associated with moral developmentalism in schools in the years leading up to CfE's development, building on and extending Piaget's work in *The Moral Judgement of the Child*. Piaget had stated that it was not "moral behaviour or sentiments" he would investigate, but "moral judgement" and the "psychology of morals" (1932, pvii). Despite calling it a book on child morality, he is not discussing normative moral behaviour as moral philosophy might generally understand it, or moral actions children should do or refrain from (the usual meaning of *moralis*), but a process of moral development of the human mind. This Piagetian context seems important in relation to CfE's developmentalism, partly because Kohlberg roughly follows a Piagetian developmental sequence, involving what he calls a universal and invariant order of moral thought, hierarchically connected (earlier stages assumed in later ones), and partly because he did not depart from Piaget's fundamental emphasis on Kantian rationalism and moral reasoning.

Kohlberg's work and developmental emphasis has been summarised as "the effort to understand how conceptions of morality are bound inextricably to the overall growth of the human mind" (Lickona, 1976, p240). It rests ultimately on a Kantian conception of the moral law, and is essentially about moral judgement in relation to obligation "Like Kant [Kohlberg] holds a *deontological* meta ethic: morality is about duty and rights" (Tomlinson, 1980, p331). Like Piaget's, his system involves developmental advance from moral heteronomy towards moral autonomy, focusing largely on cognitive processes, not behavioural moral reasoning.

Unlike Piaget however, Kohlberg (alone among moral psychologists according to Lickona), embraced philosophy as essential to defining what is moral as the first step. Tomlinson (1980) in fact, thinks Kohlberg sits "astride the boundaries of philosophy and social science" (p352). Kohlberg himself says: "the unique characteristics of moral structures are

defined by formalistic moral philosophy" (Kohlberg, 1976, p53). Thus he differed from Piaget in his use of philosophical concepts, but like Piaget emphasised (Kantian) formalistic reasoning stating: "our identification of moral stage must be based on moral reasoning alone" (Kohlberg, 1976, p32).

Kohlberg's extension of Piaget included a larger age range and a more elaborate use of stage concept in relation to moral outlook, using a structuralist approach (understanding human consciousness by examining underlying components, and structure more important than function). The most obvious characteristic of Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory, however, was its use of stage concept; he called it a "notion of age-linked sequential reorganisation in the development of moral attitudes" (1976, p48).

Kohlberg's ideas were dominant in the moral developmental field throughout the decades before CfE (Haidt, 2012, p9). He has been described as "the single individual who has exercised the greatest influence on thinking about moral education in the post-war period" (Carr, 1999, p298), under the influence of Piaget and through him Kant. Kohlberg explicitly defined moral reasoning as being about first order moral norms against lying, stealing and murder, and about reasons for defending them when they conflict (consistent with Kant but differing here, for example, from Berlin's value pluralism). According to Haidt (2013), Kohlberg's two key innovations were a research-based quantification of Piaget's observation that children's moral reasoning changed (qualitatively) over time, and that he scientifically justified "a secular liberal moral order" (p9).

Kohlberg's Levels, CfE's RME Levels and Piaget's Framework.

Kohlberg deployed what came to be called his 'moral dilemmas' research method, famously, whether Heinz should have stolen a drug to save his wife. From the results he claimed moral reasoning universally progresses throughout childhood, adolescence and adulthood in six stages and three levels. To summarise how this works, how it links to Piaget's earlier work, and how it roughly correlates with CfE's developmental stages, I have produced three Tables:

- Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning.
- CfE's (RME) developmental Levels correlated with Kohlberg's moral-stages.
- RME progression roughly correlated with both Kohlberg and Piaget's framework.

The Tables are simplified summaries of Kohlberg and Piaget's systems in relation to CfE's framework, not detailed statements. Piaget/Kohlberg data is drawn from Tomlinson, 1980, *Moral Judgement and Moral Psychology*, pp304-358), and Kohlberg, 1976, *Moral Stages and Moralisation: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach*, pp34-35.

Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Reasoning.

The right hand side of Table 4 uses (Tomlinson's) material reproduced from Kohlberg's original 1958 doctoral dissertation, in relation to 'motivation to obey rules'. I have put this alongside Kohlberg's later (1976) framework on the left, to show how it relates to his levels and stages, and what he calls the 'sociomoral perspective'. His earlier numbered stages 0 – 5 were soon replaced with 1 – 6 and there are two stages per level, the second an advance on the first:

Table 4

Kohlberg's moral motivation and action in relation to his stages of moral reasoning.

Levels	**Stages and sociomoral orientation (Kohlberg, 1976, pp34-35).**		**Kohlberg's early research found that motivation for rule obedience or moral action seemed to progress through six stages. (Tomlinson, 1980, p320).**
	Stage	**Sociomoral orientation**	
1. Pre-conventional. Concrete Individual perspective.	Stage 1	Obedience and punishment orientation	Obey rules to avoid punishment
	Stage 2	Naively egoistic orientation	Conform to obtain rewards and have favours returned
2. Conventional. Morality of conventional Role-Conformity. Member-of-society perspective	Stage 3	Good boy orientation	Conform to avoid disapproval and dislike by others
	Stage 4	Authority and social order maintaining orientation	Conform to avoid censure by legitimate authorities and resultant guilt
3. Post-conventional. Morality of Self-accepted Moral Principles. Prior-to-society perspective.	Stage 5	Contractual legalistic orientation	Conform to maintain the respect of the impartial spectator judging in terms of community welfare
	Stage 6	Conscience or principle orientation	Conform to avoid self-condemnation

Motivation for rule obedience is correlated with postulated stages of moral reasoning, for which he used an 'ideal type' of social research, derived from but not conforming precisely to observable reality. By this method he was able to claim evidence for a "sequence of

developmental types of moral reasoning" (Tomlinson, 1980, p318), each stage subsequently tested in longitudinal and/or other kinds of research studies. Each level is structured by what Kohlberg calls a sociomoral perspective, generating key system features for each stage. His 'sociomoral' refers to "the point of view the individual takes in defining both social facts and sociomoral values, or oughts" (Kohlberg, 1976, p33), which correlates well with the *Review Group's* specific focus on social justice (2004, p11).

CfE's Five Developmental RME Levels Correlated with Kohlberg's Moral Stages.

Table 5 correlates CfE/RME's five progression Levels and the *Review Group's* key value statement, with Kohlberg's moral-stage framework and Levels, suggesting broad developmental congruence. Younger children are made aware of prosocial Scottish values, at a time of their lives when developmental moral theory suggests that they perceive (adult imposed) rules as being external to themselves. As they develop they reflect further on social moral (Kohlberg's sociomoral) values, allowing what he calls a 'member of society' perspective to develop. CfE then seems to move significantly beyond Kohlberg's framework however, expecting young people to "establish their own stances on matters of social justice, personal and collective responsibility" (*Review Group*, p11), which Kohlberg thought can only happen at the *post*-conventional level, and only after age 20 (if, and only when post-conventional young adults differentiate the self from the rules and expectations of others, and define values in terms of their own self-chosen principles).

Table 5

CfE's (RME) staged-based five progression Levels and key value statements, correlated with Kohlberg's Levels and moral-stage framework.

CfE's RME Levels	**Kohlberg's Moral-Stage Framework (Kohlberg, 1976, pp34-35).**			
Statements are from *RME Es&Os*, and The *Review Group* document, p11.	**Moral Level**	**Moral Judgement**	**Social Perspective**	**Relationship between self and society's rules and expectations**
RME Early Years, First and Second Levels, age 3 to 12. BGE Junior Phase children reflect on basic values. *"make our young people aware of the values on which Scottish society is based …. Young people therefore need to learn about and develop these values".*	**1**	Stages 1 & 2 Preconventional	Concrete Individual perspective	Rules and social expectations seen as external to the self
BGE Junior Phase Third and Fourth Levels, and Senior Phase, ages 13 to 18. Young People reason about moral issues. *"establish their own stances on matters of social justice, personal and collective responsibility".*	**2**	Stages 3 & 4 Conventional	Member-of-society perspective	Internalised rules and social expectations especially those of authorities
N/A CfE's young people have left school before age 20.	**3**	Stages 5 & 6 Postconventional	Prior-to-society perspective	Differentiates the self from rules and expectations of others. Defines values in terms of self-chosen principles

CfE's older Junior Phase and Senior Phase young people are asked to establish their own stances on matters of social justice, personal and collective responsibility. A correlative gap between CfE and Kohlberg opens here, with CfE asking young people to define their

values in terms of self-chosen principles at Kohlberg's 'Conventional' Level 2 stage, when (he claims), they are still at the level of internalised rules and social expectations of authorities. This is up to 7 years before Kohlberg's research suggests they are capable of doing so. However, it arguably affirms Millar's claim that some aspects of moral development do not easily fit neat stages, suggesting both the significance of Millar's formative influence, and CfE's probable theoretical adaptation.

RME Progression Roughly Correlated with Both Kohlberg and Piaget's Outline Framework.

Piaget developed a process explaining how children's moral judgement develops over time, from the heteronomy of external rules in very young children (what he calls moral realism), towards an ideal (not always reached), of moral autonomy, and an abstract grasp of ideas about distributive justice and reciprocity by early adulthood.

Bringing Piaget and Kohlberg's theories together – as in fact CfE largely seems to do, probably following Millar's Piaget/Kohlberg blend – Table 6 correlates CfE's Early, First, and Second RME Levels with the broad outline of Piaget's moral trajectory, and with Kohlberg's pre-conventional Level 1. Exact correspondence is not possible due to age-range differences, but it does suggest broad congruence with CfE's 'developmentally appropriate practice'.

Table 6

RME progression roughly correlated with Piaget's and Kohlberg's developmental framework.

<table>
<tr><td colspan="7">Outline of Piaget's Moral Framework
(Tomlinson, 1980, pp308-9).</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="7">Age Range 3 to 12</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="7">Heteronomy → Autonomy</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Rules of The Game</td><td colspan="3">Adult Constraint and Moral Realism</td><td colspan="2">The Idea of Justice</td></tr>
<tr><td>Application of Rules (egocentric)</td><td>Consciousness of external Rules</td><td>Clumsiness story pairs. Stealing story pairs.</td><td>Concept of Lying</td><td>Evaluation of Lying</td><td>Retributive Justice</td><td>Distributive Justice</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="7">RME Es&Os Early, First and Second Level, age 3-12, pp5-12)
Young children start to reason about basic values</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="7">Kohlberg Level 1 (Kohlberg, 1976, pp34-35).
Pre-conventional.
Concrete Individual perspective.
Rules and social expectations are seen as external to the self</td></tr>
</table>

The Table suggests that despite important differences of detail and development stages, both systems traverse similar moral terrain, progressing from toddler heteronomy towards adolescent autonomy. It suggests too, how CfE seems to establish a basis for moral concern in infants and toddlers, so that they ideally come to relinquish the egocentric position; then establishes elements of control and modes of moral thought in school children, helping them to reconcile different modes of moral thought and learn social skills. This is broadly consistent with CfE documents and policy statements. Thirdly, it can be seen how CfE's RME development Levels 'Early', 'First' and 'Second' (age 3-12), can be said to fit rather neatly into Piaget's system, albeit that unlike Piaget, RME does not discuss the concept of lying, leaving interpretation of 'honesty' (RME 209c), to teacher judgement and decision.

Tomlinson (1980), usefully summarises what he calls four "empirical-psychological" aspects of the Piaget/Kohlberg approach, demonstrating the enduring significance of Piaget's earlier work, their Kantian foundations and fundamental emphasis on moral reasoning:

I. A description of developmental sequence. Stages typify a Piagetian sequence, invariant, universal and hierarchically related.

II. The developmental process is dependent upon intercourse with the real world.

III. A relationship between cognition (thought) and action. Kohlberg rejects the notion of moral behaviour as virtue, embracing the Kantian viewpoint that a good will defines a good action.

IV. The moral adequacy of the various stages in that morality is essentially about judgement concerning obligation, and a higher stage is a better stage.
(pp326-329).

In a telling conclusion to *Moral Judgement and Moral Psychology: Piaget, Kohlberg and Beyond*, Tomlinson thought he stood on the threshold of a "liberalised version of information-processing skill psychology" (1980, p357), in education, resulting in an interactive model of the subject. He thought it pointed to the future importance of the hidden curriculum of actual values introduced in classrooms, "foremost amongst which one suspects will be the moral educator's own construals and behaviour" (p358). Twenty five years before CfE, Tomlinson arguably identifies three of its most important stances: an emphasis on skills (skill psychology); strong focus on children becoming things in the *Four Capacities* (the interactive subject), and delegation of social moral values to schools and teachers (the hidden curriculum and moral educator's own construals).

Challenges to the Kohlberg/Piaget Story.

Aspects of Piaget/Kohlberg's work have of course been challenged. A detailed review of the many branches of subsequent research lies outside the scope of my project, nonetheless (not unlike Millar's), Tomlinson's early summary asked:

Cognitive and Developmental Perspectives.

i. Are the moral judgement stages true?
ii. Are they an invariant sequence, exhausting the possibilities?
iii. Is stage transition always through conscious equilibration (i.e. interaction/conflict between existing knowledge and new information)?

General Psychological Perspectives.

iv. The general validity of psychological structuralism.
v. An over-independent conception of the moral thinker (at the expense of the social).
vi. Kohlberg's 'structural-rational' purism rejecting what he called the 'bag of virtues' approach.

Philosophical Perspectives.

vii. Kohlberg's scheme does not cover a generally accepted philosophical / ethical range.
viii. Kohlberg's moral hierarchy of the stages confuses ethical and meta-ethical comparisons.
ix. His meta-ethics does not acknowledge the fact that philosophers remain divided over the nature and criteria of ethics.
(Tomlinson, 1980, pp339-354)

Nucci and Gingo's 2014 research also suggests the developmental position may be more complex than Kohlberg thought. A variety of new sub-fields including neuropsychology, philosophy of mind and experimental moral philosophy have emerged. That said Tomlinson's critique arguably did not change drastically leading up to and after CfE. Nucci and Gingo thought in fact, that developmental research on the psychology of moral reasoning was still largely about challenges and responses to the basic Piaget/Kohlberg story. They thought social factors of fairness, human welfare, and issues of affective experience grew, however, ongoing research asking:

- What should be included within the moral domain and is it sequential, stage-like, and a single developmental progression (relates to Tomlinson's points i, ii, vi, vii and ix above).
- How moral cognition interacts with culture and the internal consistency of individuals making moral judgements (relates to points v, vii and viii above).
- Whether morality is a function of rational judgement, or the result of non-rational factors such as emotion and socialisation (points v, vi and ix above).

Piaget/Kohlberg are of course moral psychologists. Moral philosophers, however, have for millennia been asking questions about what is moral, the role and importance of moral reasoning, and is the moral rational or emotional. To take some obvious examples, Kant would probably say the moral is essentially rational, Hume emotional, Aristotle might say both. This reminds us that in ethics we are dealing with live issues still hotly debated for which there may not be any, let alone simple answers. Any critique of CfE's ethics (and developmental ethics), must acknowledge this underlying condition of the subject, and not expect more precision, clearness or certainty than a publicly funded state education system allows (paraphrasing Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1094b). At any event, CfE's RME topic seems to have adopted a stage-based cognitive-developmental moral psychology. Chapter 11 suggests some likely results of this apparent pedagogic choice.

8.2: Kohlberg, Piaget and Kant

A post-war mix of Kantian ethics and liberal, social and political theory, combined with a version of analytic philosophy of education, influencing for example, R.S. Peters and P. Hirst and their academic/liberal approach, seems to have developed. David Carr at Moray House, Edinburgh, for example, argues that the main aim of education was the development of rational autonomy in accordance with Kantian principles of respect, tolerance and diversity. Carr is quite clear that Kant was the key philosophical influence on post-war educational thinking, describing a "rational imposition of rules or principles of pure practical reason on the rough and tumble of human practical experience" (2003, p94).

CfE's developmental pedagogy seems, then, to have opened further the door to Kantian rationalism, practical reasoning and formalistic rather than content-focused ethics. Only a thin, confused, incoherently blended and partial version of Kant's ethics is visible, however (discussed in more detail in Chapter 11). Thin because it manifests in an emphasis on moral reasoning, children's rational autonomy and rights, rather than any clear focus on Kant's moral law; confused because in the very same blended RME Es&Os, CfE talks about basic religious and other values (which Kant never did).

Kant's Ethics.

Both Piaget and Kohlberg were categoric that they were researching and discussing children's observed moral thought and reasoning, not what is good, bad, right or wrong. Their developmental systems are largely content-neutral, focusing on cognitive processes of moral

thought and formalistic reasoning. The emphasis on internalised reasoning rather than external principles of ethics (such as values or virtues), is almost certainly Kantian. Mary Warnock (1998), succinctly sums Kant's moral law in relation to a good will, duty, and categorical imperatives:

> It is only if he acts out of good will, that is, a determination to do what it is his duty to do, according to the moral law he has rationally imposed upon himself, that his action is morally good, or indeed comes into the sphere of the moral at all (p116).

There is arguably a relation of fitting between Kant's content-free ethics, and CfE's delegation of social moral values to schools, teachers and children, and I will have more to say about this and Kant's ethics in Chapter 11, examining CfE's developmental values and ethics.

CfE's RME topic seems to tread a precarious, blended path between Kantian moral reasoning and children's basic values. This is of course conceptually incoherent; the very thing Kant did not do is include values external to the moral agent in the moral law. But RME is the paradigm example of what I am calling CfE's blended *ethics 101+*. It arguably provides schools and teachers with a basket of many options, opening doors to different kinds of values and ethics without actually specifying any. Like the *Four Capacities*, it seems in this sense to be a superb piece of education policy writing (and discursive capture?), enabling and suggesting but not prescribing, facilitating without specifying moral or ethical standards.

8.3: Developmentalism, Concluding Remarks

Chapter 8 has introduced and reviewed a significant cognitive-developmental pedagogic aspect of CfE's values and embedded ethics, identifying a thoroughly blended Piaget/Kohlberg developmental moral trajectory, resting on a Kantian form of moral reasoning.

In developmental psychology, moral development is a gradual progression from the egocentric, through a period of conformity to the formation of moral principles. RME Es&Os duly sets out progression in five Levels, Early Years (age 3-6), through to Fourth (age 14-15), following a stage-based developmental trajectory from moral heteronomy in younger, towards moral autonomy in older children.

Moral developmentalism emphasises formalistic reasoning rather than a content-focused ethics. However, only a thin and confused version of Kant's ethics has been glimpsed.

Thin because (probably following Kohlberg), it emphasises almost exclusively moral reasoning about applied ethics, children's rational autonomy and rights, rather than any clear focus on the moral law; confused because in the very same blended RME Es&Os CfE talks about basic religious and other values.

Three of CfE's developmental characteristics arguably appeared in a remarkably perceptive 1980 analysis by Peter Tomlinson: an emphasis on skills (Tomlinson's skill psychology); a strong focus on children becoming things in the *Four Capacities* (Tomlinson's interactive subject), and delegation of social moral values to schools and teachers (Tomlinson's hidden curriculum and the moral educator's own construals).

This completes Chapter 8 and PART II of the thesis, reviewing three major contextual aspects: instrumentalism, value pluralism and developmentalism, and some of their literatures. Chapter 9 applies some of the value pluralist theory discussed in Chapter 7.

Part III: Critical Examination

In PART III, the thesis moves from context and apparent underlying theory to a more critical examination of CfE's values and embedded ethics. There are four chapters:

9) CfE's Plural Values and Ethics
10) CfE's Consequentialist Values and Ethics
11) CfE's Developmental Values and Ethics (and Kant)
12) CfE's Social Moral Values (and Aristotle)

Chapter 9: CfE's Plural Values and Ethics

Chapter Abstract

I argued in Chapter 7 that while homogeneity of values is reducing, from a value pluralist perspective all attempts at value consensus miss the point, because homogeneity is the very thing value pluralism resists. CfE's facilitation of the social moral values of the many, not the ideal formulations of a curriculum or religion is, I have suggested, an essentially value pluralist stance.

I argued too, that it is not clear that discussing values such as tolerance and fairness, can build understanding about the value pluralism underlying them; how it works, why it is difficult, and how to avoid relativism that works against human understanding. A simple values-based approach does not seem sufficient to tackle the significant confusions inherent in value pluralism which, I suggest, require concrete and positive action, including imagination and participation, dialogue and communication, as well as CfE's tolerance and mutual respect.

Berlin's stress on bridges between people rather than barriers, despite unavoidable discord due to clashing values, and stress on what is held in common, seem pertinent for CfE's diversity agenda. Children understanding that if they want a decent society there have to be trade-offs and real sacrifices is challenging, but seems necessary in plural societies.

I argued in Chapter 7 that relativism became a significant issue for CfE's values and ethics. Here I suggest that managing the incompatibility of plural values is not easy, but becomes significantly harder when there is no reason to, because human beings tend to need reasons to do things. Rules, values and principles must yield to each other in plural societies, but why would, and why should anyone yield if all ends are equal as relativism claims?

Berlin's primary focus was not on any specific value, but how to integrate, understand, balance, prioritise, compromise, sympathise, imagine and reflect. My argument is that children learning more about how his value pluralism works, and why it is not confusion or relativism, can help them better understand how the plural world around them works.

9.1: CfE's Value Pluralism

In Chapter 7 I compared and contrasted Berlin's value pluralism, and views about relativism and objectivity, with opposing viewpoints. Here, I examine CfE's value pluralism in the light of some of those ideas and principles.

Value pluralism is arguably a dominant, if not the dominant underlying meta-ethical current in contemporary plural society, and therefore likely to be an important part of the lives of children and young people. It is a largely unarticulated element in CfE, however. The Curriculum does not appear to discuss it with them, and it is not included in RME Es&Os. The latter exemplifies values such as tolerance and respect, but does not discuss the value pluralism that may underpin them.

Chapter 7 argued that CfE's value pluralism is largely relativist, and that the problem with relativism is that there is little incentive to look beyond the windowless box of one's own likes, tastes and attitudes (working against children's human understanding and integration). Berlin's account of value pluralism on the other hand, and his concept of the human horizon, transcend relativist heterogeneity and cultural difference, promoting communication, human interaction and understanding.

Chapters 3, 4, 7, and 8, have argued from different perspectives that CfE's social moral values are in fact those of its thousands of schools, teachers and children, and that CfE's moral kind of values are essentially what they (individual schools, teachers and children), choose, not what the Curriculum standardly chooses for them. This, I have suggested, is the very essence of value pluralism; recognising, accepting and investing in the values of the many, not the ideal formulations of an education authority, experts, a Curriculum, religion or any particular ethical system. It takes full account of the local; of conservative evangelical Christian values on Harris; traditional social values in many farming communities; Roman Catholic values; increasing secularisation of values in cities, towns and villages, and everything in between. It is, I have suggested, value pluralism writ large.

CfE/RME stays carefully neutral about what is good, defining a 'moral issue' and an 'issue of belief', but not what a moral value is, or what morality and ethics are, leaving their interpretation to schools, teachers, and ultimately children themselves (see Chapters 3, 4 and 7). This is also true for RME basic values such as selflessness and equality; CfE has no particular view about them, never explains or argues for them, but asserts and exemplifies them. This can also be seen as fundamentally value-pluralist, making allowance for incommensurability. Value pluralism does not, however, entail moral or ethical neutrality, but only relativist accounts of it seem to. As argued in Chapter 7, Berlin's value pluralism is objectivist, his '*Great Goods'* exist, and thinking about, discussing and explaining that good and human goodness

exists is not the same thing as telling children what to think or what is good.

In light of this, I have argued that the already complex task of clarifying values and ethics, became for schools even more complicated, because it had to take account of a perceived relativism of plural values in society at large. CfE's response included delegating the ethical task, arguably turning a relativist necessity into a kind of pluralist virtue, facilitating the value construals of the many. Whether this was a conscious choice is hard to say. What I think can certainly be said, is that CfE's stance allowed recognition of very significant issues relating to cultural and value diversity, social justice, social inclusion and religious diversity, as well as relativist doubts about the objectivity of values (I argued in Chapter 6 that recognising these complex connections, blending and embedding them, CfE displayed discursive and strategic excellence).

CfE's Cultural and Value Diversity.

Complex issues of identity, sexuality, social justice, ethnicity, faith and gender are reflected in RME, HWB, and probably elsewhere. In all five Es&Os Levels, children are asked to develop respect for others, and for other children's beliefs and values (RME Es&Os, 3-07a). The Curriculum wants children to learn about school, teacher, and children's – Scottish society's – values, a kind of 'customary morality', and that whatever else they are, the values are plural. Many CfE statements point to this underlying pluralism, expressed in the language of inclusion, autonomy, religious and social diversity, respect, tolerance and equality.

Consideration of a range of faiths and moral viewpoints is, for example, a basic CfE/RME principle, where children are asked to think about and respect the values of others:

- [The Curriculum] "should help young people to understand diverse cultures and beliefs" (*Review Group*, 2004, p11).
- [RME will] "develop awareness and appreciation of the value of each individual in a diverse society … assist in counteracting prejudice and intolerance … sectarianism and discrimination" (RME, Principles and Practices, p1).
- "Through investigating and reflecting upon the responses of world religions to issues of morality, I can discuss ways in which to create a more just, equal, compassionate and tolerant society" (RME Es&Os, 3-05a).

Concern and respect for diverse cultures and beliefs, a diverse society and the values of others, can all be said to assume plurality and legitimise variety. The emphasis it places on cultural and value diversity is clear when it says: "Through developing awareness and

appreciation of the value of each individual in a diverse society, religious and moral education engenders responsible attitudes to other people" (RME *Principles and Practice*, p1).

Such statements I suggest, point to and assume value pluralist theory that most likely underpins them. The significant impact of both cultural pluralism, *and* moral value pluralism, was part of Graham Haydon's thesis (1993 and 1997). He thought a "turning point in human affairs" (1993, p4) had been reached, because of the co-existence of differing values within one society. It was no longer possible, he thought, for society to assume value homogeneity, thus the idea that education should straight-forwardly transmit values, became a significant problem for him and some of his colleagues at the *Institute of Education*.

Whether there ever was true consensus around values, and to what extent an assumed collective agreement was merely the concealed dominance of specific groups and institutions, are of course debatable. What seems undeniable (as Haydon argues), is that homogeneity of social moral values was less in 1997 than 1970 (and less now than 1997), raising the question: which set of values and whose values should schools promote, if any? Part of CfE's response to this challenge (of increasing social, cultural value diversity and plurality), asks children to be tolerant (etc.), of others, other faiths, ethnicities and sexualities, which seems important. But is it sufficient? It is not clear that merely urging tolerance and respect on children, does very much to build understanding about underlying reasons *why* they should be tolerant and respectful. What value pluralism is, how it works, why it is difficult, and how to avoid relativist assumptions that work against the very inclusivity it wants to achieve, are arguably crucial but largely missing.

Why Should Schools Teach Children About Value Pluralism?

My argument, therefore, is that in our increasingly diverse society, children understanding some underlying value pluralist principles, would better support them (and ultimately the general cohesion of Scottish society). For example if, as some theorists argue, society's attitude towards black people is conditioned by, and shaped by a prevailing system of biological classification, sorting out superiors from inferiors, tolerance on its own is unlikely to be enough to effect beneficial change. As Stuart Hall argues, a "kind of mechanistic anti-racist politics" (Hall, 1997, p4), may not be sufficiently thoughtful, self-critical or reflexive. Clearly, issues of social justice go very deep.

Arguably, then, Berlin's value pluralist theory has much to offer here, such as imagining how other people see life, taking an inside view as a participant in life not a remote observer, responding to concrete, lived experiences of people and cultures; their motives, outlooks and ways of life; their hopes, desires and fears. Berlin was a great champion of variety of life and thought.

Neil Burtonwood (writing during CfE's roll-out period), in a sense picks up value pluralist arguments where Graham Haydon's Paper stopped. Burtonwood too, thought that during the 1990s there was much discussion about values in education, and of the role schools should (or should not), play in children's moral, spiritual and social development. He largely seems to agree with Haydon, that cultural pluralism assumes value pluralist concepts and categories. Haydon was certainly part of that dialogue, as was Halstead and Taylor (1996); Talbot and Tate (1997); White, (1997), and in Scotland David Carr (1991, 1998, and 2003); John Haldane (2004).

Whereas Haydon sees moral plurality in terms of crisis, taking the discussion back to underlying meta-ethical problems of moral value relativism, then forward to philosophy as a way of managing it, Burtonwood sees things in terms of a necessary underlying plurality of incommensurable values, and Berlin's view of objectivity. Although for Burtonwood there is tension within liberalism, between individual autonomy and cultural diversity (not all groups value freedom of thought for example), he thinks Berlin's commitment to liberal freedoms *and* to "communitarian emphasis on the value of group identity" (Burtonwood, 2006, p2), provides a useful way of managing it. He argues that Berlin's espousal of "communitarian liberalism", addresses criticisms liberalism cannot otherwise make much sense of.

Burtonwood's (2006) thesis arguably reprises Berlins value pluralism as an antidote to monist, relativist, utopian-idealist views about values, then argues from value pluralism to liberalism, and from liberalism back to values education. He concludes with a case-study of possible ways liberal pluralists might accommodate orthodox religious views of homosexuality. He argues that Berlin's theory speaks directly into contemporary tensions around sexuality, identity and cultural diversity.

Increasing sexual diversity is, then, another reason why Scottish schools might make more specific use of value pluralist theory. I argued in Chapter 7 that clashing moral value

viewpoints precisely demand Berlinian kinds of compromises. According to Burtonwood, orthodox religionists may have to give up aspects of their identity, while liberals may have to adopt something like Williams' (1996) notion of 'indifference' rather than respectful toleration. This is because (Williams argues), there are no grounds for toleration if there are no valid reasons to object in the first place. In support of this kind of approach, Burtonwood (paraphrasing Gilliatt (2002)), thinks compromises are essential, because "passionate commitments to identity groups" (p65), can make peaceful shared living impossible. Again, this affirms the point about race (and unavoidable discord). We are dealing with passionately held, deeply embedded cultural beliefs that demand more than a one-dimensional method based on a few key values such as toleration and respect.

A key question for CfE is how to facilitate shared living and avoid intolerance, prejudice, sectarianism and discrimination, and here the relevance of Berlin's work also seems clear. His positive stress on bridges between people and communities rather than barriers and differences, and on what is held in common – not least a common 'human semblance' as he calls it – *despite* cultural differences, seems pertinent and constructive. He identifies a realistic, fair-minded critique of values which are *not* one's own, and takes up the challenge of not pretending not to understand them (which, he thinks, can be a euphemism for disregarding someone else's opinion as merely subjective).

Children discussing and understanding that if we want a decent society there have to be trade-offs, that is, real sacrifices by participating parties when values clash, is potentially powerful, unendingly challenging, but surely necessary in plural societies? Young people realising that the search for perfection or any absolute standard, however well-meaning or carefully applied, will always end up trampling over *some*one's values, seems fundamental to the plural society they are inheriting. Children discussing and better understanding such issues, might facilitate future human interactions, understanding and communication.

Utilising value pluralist theory in appropriate ways, might therefore help schools (and children), transcend not merely acknowledge and tolerate, diversity, differing values, tastes and circumstances. Fundamental for Berlin, was that wherever possible we should move *beyond* relentlessly conflicting values, towards joint human understanding.

The opportunity for CfE seems clear. Value pluralist theory contains relevant,

theoretical (and practical) learning support, to help schools, teachers, children and young people be more aware, and become realistic in their expectations of each other and the world. Understanding that people hold values different to their own, without feeling pressured to necessarily agree with them is not an easy balance to hold, but it could help children move beyond differences, and not stay immersed in conflict. The aim for schools in discussing value pluralism would not, therefore, be to arrive at definitive answers, but to work with particular issues of personal and social concern, whatever they are in each local school, acknowledging that there is rarely only one way of resolving them, and quite often no final solution available.

Political Balance.

There is tension in liberalism between group based cultural diversity and individual liberal freedoms. Burtonwood refers here, to Berlin's "communitarian emphasis on the value of group identity" (2006, p2). This unique balance in Berlin's work might easily be missed in polarising debates between liberals and communitarians. Burtonwood argues that compromises must be sought; values education in schools would at times, therefore, have to look beyond the liberal individual to group-based values. Berlin seems to have recognised this, seeking compromises based on a larger idea of what he called a common human semblance, or humanity.

Recognising and holding this tension, value pluralism is arguably well placed to support minorities of all kinds, religious, cultural or sexual. Platonic-monist, relativist, utopian-idealist views about values, have been seen to accentuate differences, and the 'fact' of incompatibility (Galston, 1991, p72; Burtonwood, 2006, p46). Pluralist, objectivist, tragic/agonistic views about values, somewhat paradoxically suggest ways of moving beyond conflict and clashing values. The tragedies and perplexities of human life are, after all, almost unanimously thought by philosophers of all persuasions to be an inescapable part of the human condition.

To summarise, we live in a society characterised by increasing cultural, religious and sexual diversity. From a value pluralist perspective, however, all attempts to establish a 'consensus' around values and values education miss the point, because value pluralism denies value uniformity and homogeneity. Some key issues for schools seen from this perspective are also reviewed by Burtonwood, including:

- children learning about how we get attached to ideals and how those attachments affect others (De Ruyter, 2003).
- schools stimulating children's moral imagination (Kekes, 1999, and Pardales, 2002).
- children learning that there is often more than one right answer to complicated problems; choices have to made which may not lead to resolution or "an easing of the mind of the chooser" (Burtonwood, 2006, p57).

Neil Burtonwood's thesis looks specifically at cultural diversity and liberal pluralism in schools, relating Berlin's work to education, drawing out some important areas of application for plural society. As Graham Haydon argued, there is also, however, a specifically meta-ethical issue; that of prevailing relativist accounts of pluralism. Berlin thought relativism works against human understanding, because if all ends are equal it becomes meaningless to ask which of the alternative standards is correct. The next Section applies this idea to CfE.

9.2: CfE's Value Pluralism and Relativism

There is persuasive evidence (see Chapters 3 and 7), that moral value relativism, and relativistic pluralism, became significant issues for CfE and plural society generally, affirmed by writers on both sides of the border. I have argued that CfE's delegation of social moral values, and reluctance to define normative, specifically moral values are reflections of this.

In Scotland (St Andrews), Haldane (2004), asked rhetorically in the year CfE was launched, how anyone can be objectivist about values today. He thought that although some questions (and answers), about values were indeed psychological and sociological – e.g., empirical questions about people's actual attitudes, and how and why they might come to hold them – "sophisticated social scientific methods" (p2), cannot settle questions many people ask about 'what' is good, bad, right, and wrong, or what it is for something to be good or bad. In the same vein Gillies (2006), asks some big questions about CfE's values, but finds that he cannot answer them because "objective, absolutist views of knowledge and values are no longer sustainable" (p24).

At Moray House, Edinburgh, David Carr reflected on a general mood of ethical pessimism, asking how moral and civic education was possible in culturally pluralist, liberal democracies. According to Carr, a virtue ethicist:

> the very possibility of moral education depends upon making sense of the idea of moral enquiry; that moral enquiry depends on making sense of moral knowledge; that moral knowledge is dependent upon the possibility of moral truth; and that this, in

turn, requires a substantial account of the objectivity of moral values (1998, p114).

Carr argues elsewhere that Socrates and Plato, and many moral philosophers since, thought moral judgements have some universal or objective status that goes "beyond mere personal preference or social collusion" (2003, p72). Despite this, he laments that for most people any idea of moral objectivity not founded on social agreement now seems impossible.

In England Mary Warnock complained in 1996, that there was nothing so universally mistrusted as a claim to objectivity entailed by a particular point of view, and that the fear of appearing to uphold a universal standard of morals is itself "almost universal and extremely inhibiting" (Warnock, 1996, p47). Warnock too put the problem down to what she called "rampant relativism" (p47), that the facts are thought to have no actual objectivity. A 'particular point of view' and a 'universal standard' in relation to morals and the good is precisely what CfE does not appear to adopt, staying solidly neutral, facilitating the individual morals and scales of value of schools, teachers and children, adopting no position in relation to the moral kind of value. My claim that an assumed moral value relativism largely underpins CfE's values approach is a large one. The supporting evidence, however, is strong.

Avoiding Relativism.

Acknowledging the incommensurability of plural values at all levels: between faith groups, different sexualities and ethnicities, as well as within a single human being, is challenging. Real world examples abound, not least in Scotland's dysfunctional gender debate. It becomes significantly harder however, when there is no reason to do so. Human beings tend to need reasons to do things, therefore anything that dilutes, or worse obscures reasons, is likely to be a problem for ethics (assuming that integration, communication and human understanding are desired outcomes, which may not always be true, because some people and groups have always been separatist, revolutionary even, actively seeking cultural disruption rather than healing or change by degrees). According to Berlin, an important way in which pluralism can avoid lapsing into relativism, is to see that the values and ends of all human beings are objective for them. Chapter 7 critically discussed pros and cons of his case, arguing (with Carr, Haldane and Warnock above), for the importance of holding on to a notion of objectivity if we are going to tackle some of the ill effects of relativism.

If all ends are equal, a limit point relative to each person has been reached, i.e., a limit

relative to the self not the other (obviously), or, therefore, to a joint solution. If the individual limit is where one stops, there is likely to be no integration; human understanding is not reached and may not be possible, because there is simply no more to be said. I continue putting milk in my coffee, you keep taking it without. This is fine for coffee-drinking, but not fine where the clash is between national leaders on the brink of war, or between what Berlin calls *Great Goods* such liberty and equality, or justice and mercy. This is one of the reasons he thought relativism was inimical to decent societies.

The yielding to each other of rules, values and principles is the gritty reality at Berlin's limit, the human horizon; agreeing what can be agreed, agreeing to differ about what cannot, and moving precariously on to an uncertain, always unstable equilibrium. The human predicament demands this, he argues, if we are to avoid "desperate situations and intolerable choices" (Berlin, 2013a, p18). Berlin thought, then, "rules, values, principles must yield to each other in varying degrees in specific situations" (2013a, p18). But how can principles 'yield' if they are not discussed, balanced, argued for and against, clarified and mutually understood? But why would anyone discuss let alone yield if all claims are equal? Continuing his metaphor, why should I put milk in my coffee just because you do? Relativism makes it meaningless; there is no good reason to. This is the problem Berlin and many others have seen in relativism.

Clashing values and opinions cannot be easy concepts to discuss with school children, especially if a main aim is their enjoyment rather than struggling with difficult concepts and knowledge. But unless we raise our children to be able to discuss and debate difficult and disagreeable ideas, how will they know how to deal with them later at university and in society? Distasteful opinions must be faced and discussed as Mill powerfully argued in *On Liberty* (the truth atrophies when error is not debated, he thought). Respect and compassion are absolutely essential, but neither should children grow up afraid to speak or change their minds, or avoid debate and discussion about social and cultural differences.

Berlin's belief that men and women must enter into value-systems *not* their own (that is, alternative, challenging, different, distasteful to some, views of life), but which they can nevertheless see matter to those who hold them, because they are objective for them, is a hard task. Underestimating it does not help, however. Simple avoidance of situations that require real sacrifice will always be easier than confronting issues (and again, there have always been some who want to disrupt, divide and radicalise). It is considerations of this kind

that led Gray to characterise value pluralism as agonistic. But how else can human understanding come about? This is of course why moral imagination matters, and why Berlin emphasises participation in life and its controversies, rather than spectating from a distance, if tolerance and mutual respect are to prevail over ignorance and fear.

Some of this CfE is likely to be aware of. My argument, however, is that underlying issues of value pluralism itself – its theory and practical application – not just values essential to value diversity, important though they obviously are, need also to be discussed.

The Human Horizon Acknowledges but Transcends Relativist Heterogeneity.

The real horizon is a limit and enduring standard in the natural world. Before satellite technology, sailors' sun and star (sextant) sights – celestial navigation – involved bringing the sun or star to a horizon constant, measuring the angle of the celestial body to calculate one's position on the earth's surface. The physical horizon for sailors is, perhaps, analogous to how Berlin's human horizon works in practice – a constant, enduring, objective measuring point, beyond but common to all viewing moral agents, providing essential orientation and understanding, dispelling a sense of moral lostness, hence the possibility of human understanding. He wants us to take a measure from the horizon; to see that despite our differences there can be human decency; to bring to it values widely different from our own, to see that they are values, ends of life, by the realisation of which people could be fulfilled. This is Berlin's human horizon, without which human understanding can too easily lapse into relativism, which (extending the sun-sight metaphor), might equate to being lost on an ethical ocean.

In other words (contra Crowder), the human horizon seems primarily to be an ethical not a political concept, concerned with how human beings treat each other, not who is right, or even what is right in any given case, but how to negotiate and promote human understanding and joint solutions.

An issue for schools, therefore, is arguably that a simple values-based approach seems to be a necessary but not a sufficient strategy, for tackling the significant problems and confusions plural societies face. Merely acknowledging abstract concepts such as freedom, risk, respect and honesty does not seem enough, because despite their obvious importance, on their own they lack traction on the gritty reality of children's lives: on drugs, violence,

obesity, the incivilities of social media and so on. What seems to be needed are more structured, systematic concepts so that learners can organise their thinking and make conceptual progress (see Daniels, 2014, p683; Boyd, 2008b, p132). Understanding plural issues and their complications can be fostered and taught; intolerance, divisiveness, sectarianism and extremism can be combatted in a more focused, systematic dialogue (between children and young people themselves, as well as between teachers and children).

Pluralism and value pluralism do seem to be intrinsically difficult to manage, and to require concrete and positive action, based on but not limited to mutual respect and tolerance. On their own such values can have only limited impact. Tolerance, for example, can be a weak concept of "letting things go when they deserve critical scrutiny" (Pring, 1995, p361). Pring thinks in fact that we should be *in*tolerant of a lack of argument, seriousness and indifference to evidence in education.

Value pluralist solutions have to be tailored to unique situations, but men and women (children and young people), must use their imagination to enter into other people's value-systems. This might involve three generic strands or approaches extrapolated from Berlin's oeuvre:

- Imagination and participation.
- Tolerance and mutual respect.
- Dialogue and communication.

The demand for liberty by oppressed people is at bottom a search for recognition Berlin argues, even more than individual freedom or equality:

> What they want, as often as not, is simply recognition – of their class or nation, or colour or race – as an independent source of human activity, as an entity with a will of its own, intending to act in accordance with it (whether it is good, or legitimate, or not), and not to be ruled, educated, guided … as being not quite fully human, and therefore, not quite fully free. (Berlin, 2001, p195).

Citing Kant (from *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*, 1784), he thought paternalism was the greatest despotism imaginable, because it is an insult to people's conception of themselves as human beings. The following real world historical example helps to clarify some of this.

The Combahee River Collective.

Demand for recognition, and rejection of paternalism were uppermost in the claims

of the *Combahee River Collective* (CRC), a black American, lesbian feminist group of 1977. Their *Statement* is seen as a key document in the history of contemporary black feminism, and theory of intersectionality. It states: "we realise that the only people who care enough about us to work for our liberation are us … This focusing upon our own oppression is embodied in the concept of identity politics" (*The Combahee River Collective Statement*, 1977, p212). Their statement says they are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual and class oppression, and that they came together to clarify their politics, because of disillusionment with the liberation and civil rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s.

The CRC formed with a palpable sense of oppression and demand for liberty; precisely the issues that can be avoided by Berlin's balancing claims and reaching compromises. It would of course have required an exercise of imagination; entering into and recognising the lives of black, female, lesbian women of South Carolina; understanding what it might be like to live their lives, have their experiences (of racist and sexist attitudes), reflecting on their ways of life, their artifacts and words, their art and social institutions, in order to get an inside view and not remain a detached observer. The CRC focus was on their own oppression, on their own dignity and identity, becoming an early example of group plurality and identity politics. It shows very clearly how challenging pluralism can be to monist stances of all kinds (and has come to be seen as an example of how culture itself can be changed from within).

Cultural change is challenging, however, and can be enormously disruptive. Kenny (2004), goes so far as to conclude that finding ways to support and restore individuals who are the "bearers of complex and variable patterns of group humiliation, irrespective of political contingencies" (p173), is an impossible task. He argues instead for rapprochement between liberal principles and social particularity along Rawlsian lines, as a system of cooperation between free and equal persons. This seems not so far removed from Berlin's position in fact, recognising unsolvable value conflicts, identifying priorities, and striking compromises in particular cases.

A Messy 'Middle'.

The *Equal Status Acts 2000-2018*, prohibit discrimination in the provision of goods and services, accommodation and education. They cover gender, marital status, family status, age, disability, sexual orientation, race, religion, and membership of the Traveller community.

Value clashes inherent in such a list, seem inevitable and, as Berlin argues, often unsolvable. But this is precisely the conflicted, clashing ethical and political ground upon which value pluralism operates, and absolutely the kind of real world plural dynamics faced by children in today's culturally diverse schools and classrooms. The problem might be seen in terms of how to hold a messy 'middle' in constant tension, rather than seek a relative security in positions either side.

Perhaps this is why Berlin argues that there can often be no clear reply, and in many cases the best that can be achieved is a constantly threatened "uneasy equilibrium" (Berlin, 2013a, p20). It is, again, the human predicament; an impossible to avoid flux; a world of limited sympathies and limited rationality, and of Hobbesian competition for scarce resources (Warnock, 1971, pp12-26). But collisions even if they cannot be avoided, can be softened, compromises can be reached at the human horizon. This is Berlin's value pluralist point. In the following passage the inescapable realities of value pluralism are palpable:

> so much for liberty and so much for equality; so much for sharp moral condemnation, and so much for understanding a given human situation; so much for the full force of the law, and so much for the prerogative of mercy; for feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, healing the sick, sheltering the homeless. Priorities, never final and absolute, must be established (Berlin, 2013a, p18).

His primary focus is not on any specific value, good, or how to choose between them, but how to integrate, understand, balance, prioritise, compromise, sympathise, imagine, reflect, participate, respond, engage, communicate, respect, take responsibility, and soften (impossible to avoid) collisions of values. This, he thinks, goes to heart of what makes us human. Could deeper discussion of value pluralism at all levels of the school: by leaders, staff rooms, and in classrooms of *all* ages, not help children experience how the plural values shaping their world work, why pluralism is not relativism and why the difference matters?

Soon after Berlin's death, at a 1998 conference organised to consider his intellectual legacy, there was a discussion of his distinction between 'Hedgehogs' and 'Foxes' (where he compared and contrasted the Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment). Richard Bernstein, defending Berlin's Counter-Enlightenment (fox-like) stance, thought Kant's statement of reason (in *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*), was horrendous on the issue of Jews and Judaism. Berlin, he thought was rightly sensitive to the darker sides of things in defence of his version of pluralism, and that "We need a much more complex story than

that happy one of reasonableness, sympathy, and toleration, because the prejudices, at least on the religious issue, are very, very strong" (2001, p68).

Such strength of feeling and deeply held convictions, often handed down over decades or even centuries, arguably make tackling cultural difference, change and diversity particularly challenging. Berlin's work, and his thoughtful, compassionate application of value pluralist theory could, I suggest, speak directly into twenty first century school and education issues around cultural, sexual and religious complexity, and support divergent, heterogenous ways of being, thinking and living.

9.3: CfE's Pluralist Values and Ethics, Concluding Remarks

Berlin's value pluralism, and human horizon concept, are particularly well fitted to address often ingrained prejudices and cultural differences in an ever-shrinking, pluralist society. This could, perhaps, help CfE tackle its own 'more complex stories', in ways directly relevant for children and young people growing up in a new social media age.

Berlin's objectivist oeuvre is strangely neglected today. It could and may yet re-emerge however, as a way for society, schools, teachers and children to disagree without being disagreeable, and respect the human dignity of every child regardless of colour, creed or sexual preference. His human horizon concept could be used by schools as an enduring, measuring point, common to all viewing moral agents, providing essential orientation and human understanding, dispelling a sense of ethical lostness.

Schools could affirm subjectively conceived values that are objective for each teacher and child, rather than feel they have to adopt narrow relativist viewpoints. They could show children how to practice dialogue and debate between conceptual opponents, rather than shun, cancel or coerce each other when they disagree. As Gray (1995) argued however, value pluralism is unavoidably agonistic, and moral imagination is key to the enterprise. Berlin's belief that men and women must enter into (imagine themselves into), value-systems they find challenging and distasteful is hard. But intolerance, divisiveness, sectarianism and extremism, can arguably be combatted more effectively when they are openly debated by protagonists engaging with each other, rather than withdrawn behind relativist (and/or digital) walls.

This completes Chapter 9. Chapter 10 examines its consequentialist values and ethics.

Chapter 10: CfE's Consequentialist Values and Ethics

Chapter Abstract

In Chapter 6, I suggested New Labour's 'joining-up' programme can be seen to have cleared an instrumentalist pathway from so-called 'new' stakeholders, through education, to *National Priorities*. In Chapter 10 I argue that the RMPS topic itself became a useful vehicle for teaching employment skills. I assemble evidence suggesting that a consequentialist role for moral knowledge is emphasised above moral knowledge for its own sake. If so, intrinsic value is likely to have moved significantly from children's moral learning to workplace skills, downgrading the intrinsic worth of moral learning relative to CfE's extrinsic final ends.

I suggest CfE confuses the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. G.E. Moore asked what kind of things ought to exist for their own sake and answered, things we call intrinsically good. If Moore is right, CfE commits the naturalistic fallacy because the good for children (although always implicit), is located in natural objects such as workplace skills and employment. Moral learning seems to have become just another vehicle to do the heavy lifting work of preparing children to take their place in a modern society and economy, rather than trying to answer Socrates' famous question about how we (they) ought to live (The Republic, 351D).

I argue that lack of precision and the sliding linguistic character of CfE's wellbeing term, make it arguably a classic floating signifier. As a value, wellbeing must also be seen in consequentialist terms, because its value-making properties are external to it, grounded in society, conducive learning environments, and children feeling healthy and happy.

CfE thus seems to place a very high premium on the instrumental benefits, social and economic consequences of learning, but has little to say about the benefits of ethics as worthwhile ends in themselves, valuable for their own sakes. I suggest that one of the deepest human satisfactions is mastering something difficult and overcoming self-doubt. Given that our children will spend the rest of their lives struggling with things, why, then, deprive them of the chance to learn how to struggle successfully at school?

10.1: CfE's Consequentialism

Consequentialism holds that the only thing relevant to determining the rightness of an action, are the consequences produced by that action. Quinton (1973) adds the goodness, or the badness, of the ensuing consequences. Williams (1995), defines consequentialism as

"taking the basic bearer of ethical value to be good states of affairs" (p551), sometimes called the teleological view, assessing the worth of actions in terms of their tendency to bring about those states. For Williams utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism, and the latter is "the broader term" (Williams, 1973, p79). He argues too that a consequentialist action's moral value always lies in its consequences, and institutions, laws and practices, if they can be justified at all, are so by reference to their consequences. This is the sense of the term I use.

According to Williams (1973), then, for the consequentialist the rightness of an act derives from the goodness of certain states of affairs, and for the non-consequentialist it is sometimes the other way round; a state of affairs better than the alternatives is so because "it consists of the right act being done" (p87).

The Scottish Government thinks CfE can play a significant role in achieving its objective of creating sustainable economic growth, and a more successful Scotland (*A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, 2008, p3). The latter document says CfE's very aim is to prepare young people to play their part in realising this, quoting, and precisely reflecting high level political and economic drivers beyond education. Government strategic objectives – to make Scotland smarter, safer and stronger, wealthier and fairer, greener and healthier – should, it says, "be the focus of government and public services both nationally and locally". Then it says:

> We believe that Curriculum for Excellence can play a significant role in achieving our principal purpose and strategic objectives. The aim of *Curriculum for Excellence* is to help prepare all young people in Scotland to take their place in a modern society and economy (*A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, 2008, p3).

Comparing the (above) definition of consequentialism with these statements, viewed ethically, consequentialism must be seen as part of CfE's embedded *ethics 101+*. The consequentialist good state of affairs justifying CfE's worth, are its achieving the Scottish Government's "principal purpose and strategic objectives", and in children taking "their place in a modern society and economy" (*A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, 2008, p3).

From Intrinsic to Extrinsic.

Only thirty five years before CfE, Gribble (1969), in his *Introduction to Philosophy of Education*, aligned largely with the work of Peters and Hirst, thought it was inappropriate to view educational activities valuable in themselves, as "merely the means to achieving

extrinsic ends" (p8). Following Peters, his argument was that while it is obvious that science, for example, is related to and beneficial for industry and productivity, the benefits and effects (consequences) are not what make science an educational activity. Rather, it is the *in*trinsic value of science as a way of understanding the world that makes it education. In 1969, Gribble thought a delicate balance between intrinsic and extrinsic worth, was starting to move too far from the former. Sociologists, he thought, were starting to see education merely as a means of providing people with training for employment, while economists and politicians were starting to argue for it as a means of "increasing productivity" (Gribble, 1969, p9). Three decades on CfE largely seems to have fulfilled Gribble's instrumentalist prediction.

Gribble is not of course, discussing CfE. He is rehearsing an age-old debate about the purposes of education, discussed in Chapters 2, 5 and 6, and the extent to which education exists for itself and the intrinsic benefits of academic learning, or for the extrinsic value and benefits of economic and vocational consequences for children and society. What seems clear, is that CfE decisively and significantly moved Scottish education further away from intrinsic, towards the extrinsic view. What the *Review Group* calls a "better balance" (2004, p7), between academic learning and vocational training, became a basic CfE tenet.

CfE certainly prioritises skills and vocational aims alongside – many Scottish writers think above, *cf* Paterson, 2020; Priestley, 2013 – knowledge and learning for its own sake, and focuses strongly on skills training to enable young people to get a suitable job. It is proudly and emphatically presented as a Curriculum viewed by economists and politicians as a means of increasing productivity.

A good example of the coming of age of this strong consequentialist, economic and political trend, appears in Lesley Reid's (2013) discussion of Scottish primary schools and CfE. She observes that the prioritisation of health and wellbeing alongside literacy and numeracy (all three are crosscutting), reflected political and public concerns about children's diet, lack of exercise and emotional wellbeing. She points out however, that the organisation and content of education came to be seen as an "instrument of potential societal as well as economic change by government" (p453). My research has repeatedly affirmed this analysis. The evidence (discussed in Chapter 6) is that with CfE, Scottish education sits ever closer to the political centre, resulting in government and its various arms, such as *Learning and Teaching Scotland*, *Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Edu*cation and the *Scottish Qualification*

Authority, more than education philosophy, being seen to drive the age old academic-vocational debate (see Humes, 2013; Priestley and Biesta, 2013; MacAllister et al, 2013). The balance-point slid way past a broad middle, now sitting close to an extrinsic-vocational limit.

A System of Social and Political Decision.

Williams (1973), argues that by their very nature governments focus on demonstrable outcomes for citizens, and see the consequences public institutions bring about as justification for their very existence. This helps us to see that by delivering, and being seen to deliver, political, social, and economic outcomes for society, CfE reflects (as Gillies and others also argue), that it is state-funded, needing (therefore), to be justified by politicians.

In his critique, Williams thought however, that the founders of the utilitarian system saw it mainly as a system of social and political decision, providing a "criterion and basis of judgement for legislators and administrators" (1973, p135); i.e. government. He thought it was hard to keep the two things ultimately apart.

In fact the grandfather of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, called his famous 1789 book, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, affirming a close relationship between morality and political decision. Bentham's *Principles of Morals* focused on how the principle of utility (that pain and pleasure govern everything human beings do), related to society's legislative practices. He wanted legislators to measure the sum of pains and pleasures so that they could pass laws promoting the greatest happiness for the greatest number. This seems to be partly what Williams means, when he says the fathers of utilitarianism saw it mainly as a system of social and political decision, and the "basis of judgement for legislators and administrators" (p135). He thought the utilitarian spirit in modern government, offered "one of the simplest and most powerful methods for eliciting a result" (Williams, 1973, p136).

According to Williams, a notion of minimum commitment (minimum beyond the general welfare of its citizens), allowed government to ground its decisions on an "unmysterious basis" (1973, p136). Governments hoped to justify their policies based on what people in point of fact want, he thought, "taking its citizenry as it finds them" (p136).

What voters actually want is not, of course, necessarily good for them. Viewed from the perspective of health and happiness, it is arguably not good that Britain is the fattest

country in Europe; or that obesity is now recognised as a significant factor in rapidly rising dementia levels; that over 60 per cent of Britons are overweight or obese (in 2019); that 1 in 5 children are now obese by the age of 12, their life chances significantly impaired (The World Obesity Federation). On the other hand many think legislating against food and drink manufacturers is worse; it is not taking voters as government finds them, or giving them what they want. That said, throughout the relentless rise and rise of obesity levels in Scotland over the past two decades, CfE's *Health and Wellbeing* subject was indeed trying to tackle it. A plethora of policies were put in place around healthy eating and obesity (*Being Well – Doing Well*, 2004; *Better Health, Better Care* Action Plan, 2007; to name but two). Nonetheless, obesity among children and the population at large has simply carried on increasing, and shows no sign of abating.

In fact tackling the obesity crisis may be more a value pluralist issue. Berlin's positive liberty notion (discussed in Chapter 7) involves the self-control to pursue one's rational ends (but ill health is irrational), and negative liberty is the right to be left alone, which government says it respects. This is a balance liberal democracies tend to find difficult, and Berlin too thought it was hard to keep his two concepts apart in real-world situations (1969, pxliii)).

CfE certainly thinks it aligned itself with what people actually want however, stating that during the *National Debate* people wanted greater vocational emphasis, to "equip young people with the skills they will need in tomorrow's workforce" (*Review Group*, 2004, p7). I have argued that the Labour-led Scottish coalition of the time successfully achieved strategic link-up between the new Curriculum, and Scotland's economic and political priorities, partly resulting in CfE's undisguised, instrumental, political and economic policy emphasis.

Political and economic consequences and states of affairs, seen as justification for education's very existence, seem beyond question. The closest possible association (in the same paragraph) of the "aim of the Curriculum for Excellence", with the political need for economic growth (*A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, p3), can be read in this way: as a new Scottish Parliament justifying education expenditure to a watching public. Borrowing a phrase from Williams (1973, p136), arguably, Scottish education might now be seen, almost, as built into a contract of government.

The next Section argues that CfE's wellbeing value is viewed as something *ex*trinsically

good for children; for their education, enjoyment, and future lives in society. If so, it too must be seen as a classic consequentialist value.

10.2: CfE's Wellbeing – a Consequentialist Value

Strong evidence suggests that wellbeing is a consequentialist value in CfE, a means to promote states of affairs best summarised as conducive learning environments; physical and mental states of feeling and being healthy and happy.

Consequentialism holds that whether something is right or wrong depends solely on its consequences. The value-making properties the consequential value supervenes on are external to it, so that the value or the act is extrinsically valuable, or in the language of contemporary axiology 'non-finally' valuable, because final value resides elsewhere. In this sense many of the values embedded in the *Four Capacities* such as children becoming effective contributors, an enterprising attitude, and able to live independently, are consequentialist, albeit probably incidentally.

The wellbeing value stands out from others however, attracting enormous attention throughout the documentary record, giving its name to a new *Health and Wellbeing* subject, where an emphasis falls on 'personalisation and choice' (one of CfE's seven *Principles for Curriculum Design*). Scope for more enjoyment in learning is central, alongside "opportunities for children to make appropriate choices to meet their individual interests and needs" (Review Group, 2004, p10).

A Classic Floating Signifier.

One of the problems for any clear understanding of CfE's wellbeing concept is arguably the term itself, what CfE means by it and its close links with the idea of wellness (Cederstrom and Spicer, 2015). The wellness syndrome, the latter argue, has become an ideology based on market consumerism. Dividing it up does not help much, being well can mean many different things, while 'being' can have ontological as well as existential readings. The first thing about it, therefore, seems to be its slippery vagueness, mysteriousness and lack of perspicuity; its looseness, lack of precision, and discursive (verbal) character as a classic floating signifier.

Trying to ground CfE's wellbeing concept grammatically or ethically, comes apart because there is nothing solid or permanent about it, different people interpret or infer

different things by it, so that it is always changing and sliding, standing in for an indeterminate range of possible concepts and categories. A good example of this as I write, is Scotland's new First Minister saying he wants a 'wellbeing economy', and there will be many more wellbeings to come.

Berlin's interpretation of Joseph de Maistre's view of language perhaps helps us understand more about how this works. In his discussion of the *Origins of Fascism*, and Maistre's attack on eighteenth-century speculations about the origins of language, Maistre thought the systematic language of science was "something degraded" (2013a, pp143/144). This was partly because he denied that language was a human invention for the purposes of communication; for him it was a mystery of divine origin in some ways analogous to the institutions of kingship, marriage and worship, and part of a "universal inscrutable drama of historical existence" (Berlin, 2013a, p143).

For Maistre, to think was to use symbols, it was impossible to think without them; words were the commonest of all symbols and the origins of words were the origins of thought. For these and other reasons, language was not a human invention but part of the divine, shrouded in mystery. Language was for him to a considerable extent "impervious to the disintegrating processes of reason", because "What reason makes, reason can mar" (Berlin, 2013a, p147). By analogy, there seems to be something symbolic and mysterious (in Maistre's sense), about CfE's wellbeing; something that resists rational explanation and precise definition. It is as if notions of 'well' and 'being', and thought about them in Maistre's conflated thought-symbol sense, collapse into a single rationally inaccessible concept resisting reason.

Berlin thinks that for Maistre (and German Romantics), words and language were "a kind of psychoanalysis of the collective unconscious of mankind" (2013a, p145), a digging for hidden knowledge and concealed treasure, representing the conscious and unconscious wisdom of past generations. Even in its Romantic excesses, Berlin thought, language represented a foreshadowing of twentieth century thinking about the meaning of words. The wellbeing term is arguably a good example of this. Wittgenstein, for example, in his *Philosophical Investigations*, argued that the meaning of words were their use in a language, and the commonplace idea that the meaning of a word was an object it referred to cannot be true. His 'private language' argument (that this was not possible), was that thoughts need

words, and words require the existence of other people.

A Consequentialist Discourse of Learning, Health and Enjoyment.

Use of the term as a consequentialist value becomes clearer by answering Williams' (1973 and 1995), questions about states of affairs it brings about in CfE. The HWB subject was new, to promote "confidence and independent thinking" (HWB Principles and Practice, p2). Wellbeing is seen as a channel for the promotion of pupil enjoyment; a means to ends such as children's effective learning, and "capacity to benefit from educational opportunities" (*Being Well, Doing Well*, p3). It is also a means for the promotion of 'confident individuals', one of the *Four Capacities* (and one of CfE's education purposes). Teachers are expected to be sensitive and responsive to "the wellbeing of each child and young person" (HWB Principles and Practices, p3).

The *World Health Organisation* (WHO) positively defines health as: "a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity" (WHO Constitution, p2). CfE adopted the WHO definition, and its wellbeing notion is solidly rooted in concerns about Scotland's physical and mental health, expressed clearly in the *Being Well, Doing Well* (2004) document (which also adopts the WHO meaning of a health promoting school). That document makes clear that concerns about obesity, poor health, poor diet, drug use, families and parenting, rising mental health issues and the poor physical activity levels of Scottish children, underpinned CfE's HWB aspirations. HWB Es&Os headings in fact precisely cover these topics.

The Collins Dictionary defines wellbeing using three rather vague concepts: "the condition of being contented, healthy or successful". This probably comes close to CfE's view; a feeling; a mental state and condition of contentedness. Education values embedded in HWB include children feeling safe, active, healthy, achieving, nurtured, respected, responsible and included (Wellbeing graphic, Chapter 3, Figure 1). Consistent with the dictionary (and CfE's stress on enjoyment in learning), another rather slippery concept that might connect all eight indicators is perhaps pupil enjoyment.

As well as a means to other education ends, CfE's wellbeing notion seems likely to be a state of feeling healthy and happy. HWB *Principles and Practices* in fact states explicitly that children and young people should feel happy, safe, respected and included in the school

environment, and that CfE will promote positive attitudes and dispositions. It says it wants children to feel secure and have "experiences which are varied, relevant, realistic and enjoyable, where children and young people will feel that they are listened to" (p5).

Whether enjoyment and happiness are necessary ingredients for children's learning is questionable. Paterson (2020) for example, argues that CfE's focus on children enjoying their education is less important than their struggling with difficult to understand knowledge. A learning struggle of Paterson's kind can of course mean challenge, difficulty and discomfort; a need to forego immediate contentment for larger or longer term benefits, none of which may be particularly enjoyable for children at the time. CfE eschews this idea of positive struggle; enjoyment and positive feelings are its focus, and enjoyment through learning. It states that if children feel valued and involved, and experience challenge and enjoyment, their confidence will increase with a positive impact on attainment and achievement (*A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, p16). This chimes with a dominant theme emerging in education psychology at that time.

Martin Seligman, previously President of the *American Psychological Association*, in his book *Authentic Happiness* (2002), promoted the idea of positive psychology, and the importance of positive emotions. In 2003, Nel Noddings' thesis (in her book *Happiness and Education*), that "Happiness should be an aim of education, and a good education should contribute significantly to personal and collective happiness" (p1), premised education on the precise opposite of delayed gratification. Observing that many bright and creative people hated school, Noddings attributes such "well documented misery" to the idea that they will one day be thankful for it, and to a glorification of suffering in Christian thought (of her own upbringing she says). Noddings tells us that in five decades of teaching and mothering she has learned conversely, that not only do children learn better when they are happy, but that "Happy people are rarely mean, violent, or cruel" (Noddings, 2003, p2). Her aim was to build a world in which it is possible for children to be good. But what did she mean by good? She makes no serious attempt to justify her claim that happy children are more likely to be good, using Mill's classic utilitarian notion of "pleasure and the absence of pain" (p39), to justify her argument that education should be pleasurable not painful.

Children enjoying their education is mentioned ten times in *A Framework for Learning*

and Teaching. The good states of affairs CfE's wellbeing concept bring about include children's "enjoyment" (*Review Group*, pp3, 14, 16); to make learning "enjoyable" (*Review Group*, pp7, 10); children's capacity to "benefit from educational opportunities" (*Being Well Doing Well*, p3); a pleasant (i.e. pleasurable) "learning environment" (HWB *Principles and Practice*, p5); children's "confidence and independent thinking" (HWB *Principles and Practice*, p2); their safety, active learning, health, learning achievement, and their being "nurtured and respected, responsible and included" (HWB Principles and Practice, p2). The strong evidence is that in CfE wellbeing refers largely to children's health and enjoyment, seen as necessary conditions of effective learning, and for everything else that follows in their education. Wellbeing in this sense seems to be a paradigm example of a consequentialist value.

In relation to the health part of *Health and Wellbeing*, it has long been the case that the physical health (or not) of children – and the population at large – has often been seen by governments as instrumental to their capacities to learn and usefulness as future workers. The introduction of free school meals soon after the beginning of compulsory education in Scotland in 1872; the introduction of public swimming baths and laundries; concern about the health of army recruits during the Boer War, are all examples of government policy being used to promote the health of society.

Other Discourses of Wellbeing.

According to Spratt (2014), wellbeing used in the context of schooling emerged (somewhat confusingly) from various professional and academic practices, each with a different understanding of it. She identifies five discursive themes of wellbeing in education generally (all of which appear in CfE's language): physical health promotion; social and emotional literacy (psychological discourses underpinning education outcomes); care provision for children; a philosophical discourse of flourishing (Aristotle and/or contemporary virtue ethics); and an emerging discourse of sustainability (the environment), (pp39-56).

Brown and Donnelly (2020), see three competing perspectives: skills and competencies (individual children developing universal skills); morals and ethics (resting on values that guide the moral and ethical); capital and identity, (emphasising different sets of resources available to schools and children). They see "Embedded within each perspective … distinct notions of the 'self' and processes of socialisation and identity formation" (p1). Confusion in the framing of social and emotional wellbeing is seen as significant.

Broad congruity between Spratt's five discourses and Brown and Donnelly's three perspectives, in relation to notions of the self and identity formation, is evident. Spratt's 'different understandings' and Brown and Donnelly's 'confusion in the framing' correlate well with wellbeing understood as a floating signifier (especially different interpretations), arguably resisting precise conceptual thought. Both studies identify a significant psychological component, and view fairly negatively education's use of the term as a way of inculcating a 'modern self'. Spratt (2014) describes this emphasis as "a deliberate appropriation of young personhood into the human capital project" (p192).

The notion of human capital is usually thought to involve placing an economic, welfarist value on human potential, aptitudes, health and skills (in Scotland's new wellbeing economy for example). This too seems essentially consequentialist, expressed in the language of achievement and individual economic potential. It is not hard to identify CfE's notion of wellbeing with these ideas. At bottom the ethical point is not whether a government funded system of education is justified in helping children realise their productive potential as members of society. The point is whether (*pace* Seligman and Noddings), CfE is morally justified in moving intrinsic value away from learning for its own sake. Especially this seems true if the extrinsic ends are then seen as overwhelmingly economic.

CfE places a very high a premium on the social and economic benefits and consequences of learning, but has little to say about 'being' and 'knowing' as ends in themselves, valuable in their own right. Furthermore, the fact that immature humans may not appreciate why they have to struggle, is arguably not a reason to deprive them of learning *how* to struggle in a discontented world of perpetual flux, struggle and striving; it is merely a developmental fact about young human beings.

In the same way that Berlin wants us to understand the tragic reality of clashing values, Freud wants us to grasp the ineluctable fact of human suffering, which he thought threatens us "from our own body, which, being doomed to decay and dissolution, cannot dispense with pain and anxiety as warning signals; from the external world, which can unleash overwhelming, implacable, destructive forces against us; and finally from our relations with others" (1941/2002, p15). Contra Seligman, Noddings and CfE, Freud thought the hard task of avoiding suffering and "the dreaded external world" (Freud, 1941/2002, p15), left people having to reassess their claims to happiness. In 2020 there were 3.6 million British children in

separated families (GOV.UK). If Freud is right, children are already coping with this, or will soon have to. Knowing how to struggle successfully seems very necessary, given some of the rather depressing facts of our current social and human predicament.

Confident or Vulnerable?

According to Ecclestone (2013) a widespread view became established among educators that they must pay particular attention to children's emotional needs. Interrogating CfE's 'confident Individuals' *Capacity,* she thinks "deep pessimism" (p77), about children's wellbeing; increased "levels of stress, anxiety, category disorders and poor mental health" (Ecclestone, 2013, p83), lay at its root. She suggests the notion of confidence shifted from being "a common-sense strand in a general ethics of care" (Ecclestone, 2013, p77), to an identifiable emotional subject area teachers now felt they must tackle, becoming a key education goal.

She argues that a strongly psychologised interpretation of the characteristics of confidence, and an overly pessimistic tendency to regard children as emotionally, psychologically, socially and educationally vulnerable, shifted the meaning and significance of confidence from being a result of significant achievement, or mastering something difficult, to being a basic resource and essential form of capital for educators. She thinks the influence of positive psychology played a significant part in this, leading to various countries developing approaches and interventions to promote children's emotional wellbeing. CfE arguably did precisely this in its creation of the *Health and Wellbeing* subject area.

One of the deepest human satisfactions is generally thought to be mastering something difficult, overcoming personal weaknesses, nervousness and lack of confidence. If so, why CfE seems to avoid moral and ethical struggles, or learning and knowledge struggles, is hard to understand. One possible reading is that it can be seen as part of a consequentialist view of modern life, cashed out in monetary and material benefits, something like Cederstrom and Spicer's so-called 'wellness' syndrome, perhaps?

10.3: CfE's Consequentialism In Relation To Moral Knowledge

One of the likely results of CfE's instrumentalist policy and vocational turn, is that intrinsic value moved away from children's moral knowledge learning – principally in RME, HWB and RMPS, but possibly whenever moral learning arises *ad hoc* in other subjects – to

workplace skill consequences. Not unlike the academic-vocational debate itself, this is not a straight-forward either/or argument, but is likely to require balancing competing goods, and again, the difficulty of maintaining an unstable middle in considerable tension.

The significant shift in value is problematic however, because it risks downgrading intrinsic ethical worth relative to extrinsic ends. Pupils may think they are not reasoning about moral 'issues' because of the importance of being personally moral or ethical, or the fundamental importance of tolerance, honesty or how they treat others, but because it will help them achieve some extrinsic end or purpose, be it employment (CfE's strong emphasis), or other extrinsic good. Their reasoning about moral issues may become merely functional, of instrumental value rather than something of intrinsic worth, other people and society.

The Four Capacities Viewed as a Consequentialist Mission Statement.

Chapter 6 argued that CfE was from its earliest conception intended to link Scottish education to a larger national economic picture, strategically beyond the tactical education theatre, and well beyond the aspirations of the *Capacities* viewed simply as statements of educational purpose. Bloomer (2016) seems in this sense correct to call them a mission statement. As such, I have argued that they were probably intended by policymakers to strategically connect educational purposes with governmental (National) priorities and objectives. It may also be part of why New Labour's joining up programme has been seen to have the effect of drawing Scottish education significantly closer to the political centre. The *Four Capacities* aspire for example, for children to:

- Assess risk, make informed decisions (Safer and Stronger Scotland).
- Gain knowledge/understanding of the world and Scotland's place in it (Smarter Scotland).
- Participate responsibly in political, economic, social and cultural life (Wealthier fairer Scotland).
- Evaluate environmental, scientific and technological issues, work in partnership and in teams (Smarter Scotland)
- Use literacy, communications and numeracy skills (Smarter Scotland)
- Use technology for learning (Smarter Scotland.)

(The *Four Capacities* statement, my connections in brackets).

Problematically, it is not nearly as clear looking in the other direction, to children's learning, where the many fine aspirations lead in terms of learning progression. RME and the other seven subject areas have dedicated Es&Os but the *Capacities* do not, sitting out on their own. The 2015 OECD Report thought: "more robust and systematic evidence was needed on

which to base evaluative judgements at all levels of the system … informed by trustworthy evidence of student progress and learning across the four capacities" (p169). The basic problem was a lack of metrics doing justice to the aspirations of the *Capacities,* and the need for a more robust evidence base if their aspirations were to be realised.

Responding to the OECD challenge, Education Scotland produced the 2016 *Curriculum Refresh Statement for Practitioners*, stating "Developing the capabilities and attributes of the four capacities is embedded across all learning" (p4). It is not at all clear however, that the required learning progression was 'embedded' in all Es&Os in the way the OECD meant, or re-emerged there in any planned or structured form. For *Health and Wellbeing* Es&Os, one CfE *Review Group* member thought for example, that "there is a complete lack of progression with a collection of vague aspirational statements being applied to the full 3-18 age range. This is utterly without practical value" (Bloomer, 2016, p16).

In their 2021 Report furthermore, the OECD too did not think the issue had been adequately addressed. Recommendation (1) of that Report stating that CfE should consider updating "some of its vision's core elements and their implications for practice, in particular, the role of knowledge in CfE; and define indicators aligned to the vision to help understand students' progress across all four capacities" (p1).

I have argued however, that the *Capacities* lack progression partly, perhaps largely because they are part of an extrinsic vocational mission, or vision statement. The policy gaze is primarily (finally), outwards on the world of work (as Pring argued, on someone else's curriculum, discussed in Chapter 5), and only instrumentally, non-finally, inwards on the world of knowledge, learning and education purposes. Visions and mission statements are fine, but many education writers and thinkers think knowledge acquisition demands specified pupil progression, and some think more emphasis on knowledge and difficult knowledge struggles.

RME, RMPS and Philosophy Course Specifications.

National 5 RMPS and Philosophy *Course Specifications*, exemplify the movement of intrinsic value from the thing itself to extrinsic benefits. The RMPS course develops a range of cognitive skills in the process of investigating religious, moral and philosophical issues (applied ethics). Candidates learn to express viewpoints and "develop a wide range of important and transferable skills including accurate recording of information, researching resources,

analysing and evaluating beliefs and values, and expressing reasoned personal opinions" (Course Specification, p3). Skills must be built into the course including literacy; health and wellbeing skills; employability, enterprise and citizenship skills; as well as thinking skills such as applying, analysing and evaluating (p10). Moral knowledge (depersonalised as applied ethics issues and responses to them) is there, but shares, perhaps concedes the limelight to skills. Moral and ethical knowledge itself became a vehicle and means to extrinsic ends.

The *Philosophy* course is rarely taken (269 of 51,865 eligible S4 pupils across Scotland in 2018). For those that do however, utilitarian and Kantian ethics, similarly, are seen as useful for the development of "reasoning skills" (Course Specification, p2). Complex abstract concepts and philosophical problems are said to develop "critical thinking, analytical and evaluative skills important in education and employment" (p2). This dual stress on skills needed for learning and employment is a prime focus in CfE's Senior Phase; ethics (moral philosophy) and moral knowledge are no longer studied as things valuable in themselves, but also for their vocational benefits. And when they are, the focus for the vast majority (i.e. not counting N5 Philosophy's 269), is, to repeat (because CfE does not make this important distinction), on depersonalised issues such as euthanasia, not on personal ethics; or on goodness and badness, but on different views about assisted death, for example.

Philosophical concepts are studied teleologically for the (consequential) good state of affairs they bring about, such as critical thinking, problem-solving, evaluation skills and ultimately employability and national economic growth. The emphasis shifted in favour of skills but intrinsic value shifts with it, because the importance, worth and usefulness of moral learning is now also about getting a job, rather than learning how to be a good person (no document has been found that discusses the latter). Political and economic benefits of workplace skills are of course much easier to discuss than difficult questions about personal ethics. Now that God is no longer on the case, who or what after all, is sufficient to this enormous task actually? The problem may be as much one of authority as about the good.

Affirming these perspectives, a 2017 Education Scotland, National 5 RMPS PowerPoint Presentation (cited in Chapter 3), argues that schools must teach candidates how to present factual knowledge and understanding of the moral issues and religious/non-religious viewpoints on them, analyse and present a reasoned viewpoint on the issues, and evaluate religious and non-religious responses. The *thing* itself; in this case religious values, specific

moral stances, etc., seems to have lost pole position on the grid. Skills not moral knowledge seem the main focus.

This is a particularly clear example of how CfE emphasises the instrumental role moral knowledge can play in teaching workplace skills, rather than the value and importance of moral knowledge for its own sake. The PowerPoint Presentation makes clear that the primary focus is on what moral and religious knowledge can 'do' to inculcate "analysis" and "evaluation" of "facts", "issues", "viewpoints and responses". Why any young person should be just, or good or honest is not stated, perhaps because it is not the main point; ethics too seem to have been functionalised and instrumentalised. Knowing about moral 'issues' is there, but is a vehicle for teaching skills such as investigating, research and synthesis; effective information-gathering, problem-solving and business communications. Instructions are repeated for World Religions, where again the prime focus is on consequential states of affairs rather than personal morals. A key ethical issue in view here, is that of intrinsic/extrinsic value.

10.4: CfE's Intrinsic/Extrinsic Value Distinction.

G.E. Moore's *Principia Ethica* (1903), is often taken as the starting point for twentieth-century discussion about the nature of value, in particular his claim that goodness cannot be analysed in terms of any other sort of fact. In asking 'what is good', many philosophers since have thought he set the agenda for subsequent debate about meta-ethics and value theory.

Moore argued that whether something is good is always an open question; for example, that 'courage is good', or 'education is good', can always be followed by the question 'why is it good?' Famously, he argued that classic utilitarians (Bentham and Mill), committed a 'naturalistic fallacy' by defining good as a natural object (happiness / pleasure), when good is in fact unanalysable. Warnock (1960) makes the point however, that Moore had two levels of fallaciousness; it is fallacious to define a non-natural object in terms of a natural, but the true fallacy according to Moore (she argues), went further, and was utilitarianism's "attempt to define the indefinable" (p19). For Moore value can never be defined in non-evaluative terms, and there was only one fundamental kind of final (intrinsic) goodness: absolute good.

Moore asked what kind of things ought to exist for their own sake, and answered things we call intrinsically good. He thought good (like the colour yellow), is unanalysable

because it is a simple, primitive concept, but that (like yellow) it is nonetheless a discernible property. Moore's point was that nobody thinks that because 'yellow' is indefinable it is impossible to say what things have the property of being yellow. Nor that there is only one yellow thing, or that anyone thinks all the other properties the yellow thing can have are identical with yellowness. Moore thought people (wrongly) forget this when they think about goodness. He also asked what kind of actions ought we to do, answering actions that cause the most good to exist. He thought in fact, that good was the *only* simple object of thought peculiar to ethics. Unlike CfE (apparently), Moore thought good existed in the world, that it mattered, and that it was possible and necessary to talk about and understand goodness despite its indefinability.

A certain kind of intuitionist and an ethical realist, Moore thought the common sense truth of any moral claim is recognised (intuited) by human (special) moral sense (i.e. the 'sense' or faculty J.L. Mackie above thought was impossible), and can only be ascertained by the rightness and wrongness of the facts it supervenes on. Such 'facts' have been seen as "features, internal and/or external, that are the value-making properties of the object" (Ronnow-Rasmussen, 2015, p34). The supervenience notion, that values are properties objects have in virtue of having other properties, is usually thought to be one of Moore's important contributions to value theory, despite there being no consensus on the precise nature of the relation. Its Moorean essence has been seen in terms of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction turning on "the nature of the value-making features of the value bearer; if a value depends exclusively on the bearer's internal properties it is intrinsic; otherwise it is extrinsic" (Ronnow-Rasmussen, 2015, p30). Mackie also exploited Moore's supervenience assumptions, denying Moore's realism and 'moral sense' (intuition), arguing that all such extrinsic value therefore crosses Hume's fact-value gap. In value theory, intrinsic value is what is valuable for its own sake, in itself and in its own right as an end, and extrinsic value is what is valuable as a means or for something else's sake.

In passing, it is worth noting some similarities between Moore's value theory, and Berlin's view that an objective value is one pursued "for its own sake, to which other things are means" (Berlin, 2013a, p12).

But what of CfE? It cannot be said to be either ethically realist or intuitionist in Moore's

sense, and it refuses to say what human goodness is or if it exists. This specifically evaluative aspect of ethics as a legitimate topic of discussion and learning in schools, largely seems to be missing in CfE's functionalising of knowledge and moral knowledge to ends beyond school. Why should children discuss moral knowledge, or learn about goodness and badness? Is it because moral knowledge as the value bearer is *itself good*, intrinsically good, or because it is instrumentally good? Is it because children learning about how to be an ethical human being will bring about consequential benefits for them (a job), and/or for society (economic growth), or because it is good simply, absolutely, in itself, regardless of extrinsic benefits accruing, as Moore thought?

Put another way, to what extent ought children to learn ethics simply because it is an ideal of human development, self-improvement and personal fulfilment, what Peters and his colleagues referred to as 'reform'; becoming a better person? And to what extent should they reason about specific moral issues for the sake of external value bearers, such as the employment skills it can inculcate? And why can it not be largely ethical with a functional aspect? The relationship in CfE seems to have flipped at any rate, and seems largely extrinsic.

There are important ethical questions for the Curriculum therefore, in relation to intrinsic and extrinsic value, the distinction between them, and what intuitionist W.D. Ross called the predicative use of the term good. His intuitionism (that some moral truths can be known inferentially, by moral 'sense'), became a rival of utilitarianism during the middle decades of the twentieth century (Rachels, 1998). In the *Right and the Good* (1930), Ross distinguished between an attributive use of good, as in 'a good knife', and a predicative use that something 'is' good. The latter in education terms might be that 'children learning how to live well is good' (good absolutely, which Moore thought was also an open question).

Contemporary value theorists tend to assume we can all, as Ross argued, intuitively grasp the difference between internal and external properties (Zimmerman, 2015). Everyone agrees that 'good' can be used attributively, but Ross' predicative use has been questioned. Various other doubts about the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction have developed since Moore's 1903 thesis: whether it is fundamental to ethics as he thought; whether it is redundant as a normative concept; and more importantly whether the concept itself is true (Ronnow-Rasmussen, 2015). Peter Geach (1956), for example, argued that Ross' predicative goodness made no sense, and the only kind of goodness that does is for a thing to be "good-of-a-kind"

(Olson, 2015, p52). Moore's intrinsic goodness is indeed simple and not analysable (not 'of a kind'), therefore Geach brings Moore's notion of intrinsic goodness itself into question. Judith Thompson (1997) agrees with Geach, but argued for goodness in terms of 'good in some way'. Others (Ewing 1939, for example) simply rejected Moore's analysability.

From Intrinsic to Extrinsic (Again).

How then, are we to understand CfE's functionalising of moral knowledge as an extrinsic value, in the light of general value theory? First, if Moore's thesis is right CfE probably commits the naturalistic fallacy, implicitly defining good in terms of natural objects such as skills for 'learning, life and work', and tries, again implicitly, to define the indefinable. The bearers of value, CfE says categorically, are not any particular ethics but derivative skills such as how to investigate, express, research and synthesise, etc. In Moorean terms however, goodness cannot be analysed in terms of any other sort of fact, therefore if children's reasoning about morality is to be good, the focus should be on the ethics as such (in itself for itself), not ethics functionalised (for something else). This CfE does not appear to do.

Secondly, whether something is good is always an open question, so that (according to Moore), whether children's reasoning about applied ethics is good, depends on why it is good. If the properties are internal to it, it is intrinsically good, so on a Moorean account children reasoning about moral issues *is* intrinsically good and something that should exist for its own sake, which in CfE it does not seem to. We're back to intrinsicality; if Moore, Berlin, Peters, Carr, Warnock, Pring, Olson and many others were right about the importance of the intrinsically good, CfE's consequentialist approach to moral knowledge is ethically problematic, because functionalising moral knowledge confuses the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, and downgrades the specifically ethical to things non-finally good: a job and national economic growth.

Finally, young people are likely to become acutely aware that gaining the skills needed for a life of constant change and upheaval (in an ever changing, highly competitive knowledge economy, as CfE puts it), is the end and purpose of their education, as indeed CfE says it is: "The aim of Curriculum for Excellence is to help prepare all young people to take their place in a modern society and economy" (A Framework for Learning and Teaching, p3). The *Review Group* (2004), also stating that "changes in the patterns and demands of employment, and the likelihood of new and quite different jobs during an individual's working life", coupled

with “the need to increase the economic performance of the nation” (p10), are why the Scottish Curriculum had to change. Young people might well assume that moral and ethical knowledge viewed as a vital social subject to cultivate a better self, for civic engagement and so on, was merely a means to yet more important final ends.

We are back to the age-old question of education *for* the good, or education *as* the good. Undeniably education has the former preparatory social role, the ethical question is not whether this is a social good; of course it is, but where the balance point sits; in CfE it seems to have moved significantly away from intrinsic ethical good, in favour of political and economic goods. The cursor slid decisively towards the extrinsic end of the spectrum. Ethics seem to have become a vehicle to do the heavy lifting work of preparing children to take their place in a modern society and economy, rather than trying to answer Socrates’ famous question to Thrasymachus, about how we ought to live (*The Republic*, Book 1, 351D).

A key ethical point here, is in Socrates’ problem of apparently altruistic actions having questionable ulterior motives benefitting the actor; whether self-interest is good or bad and whether altruism is possible. At any event, Plato too distinguished between the kind of good valuable for its own sake, and the kind that is valuable for the sake of something else, favouring the former, leading to Socrates’ famous question. The question insists: how should we live? Many have thought since that this is of the essence of ethics.

If most of the final value in discussing moral issues now resides in the skills needed to get a job, and become economically active, arguably it cannot but have become less finally valuable in its own right, less valuable as an end, and less intrinsically good. CfE’s discussion of applied ethics must, therefore, have become significantly more non-finally valuable.

An Argument From Resources.

Finite physical resources (as well as value) also moved. The school day was not extended; there were not suddenly more teachers, and it is extremely unlikely there was previously any slack in the system. Where then, did the (human and time) resources to achieve CfE’s ‘better balance’ come from if not from robbing Peter? This seems a practical logical necessity.

CfE’s new balance between academic and vocational aims, sold as a cost-free side-benefit of knowledge acquisition, to some or large extent was probably achieved by

rebalancing existing resources. But vocational values could have been incorporated within an academic education (as Pring argued, see Chapter 5 above), of the kind Scotland has in the past been proud of. Arguably, CfE could have done both without detriment to either. This would, however, have needed a different intrinsic/extrinsic balance; a clearer emphasis on knowledge (and moral knowledge) for its own sake, and clearer articulation of a specifically ethical dimension of children's personal moral development. This, I have argued, is because education seems to be fundamentally an ethical undertaking, good in itself, good for children and good for society, but CfE has an enigmatic relationship with the good.

10.5: CfE's Consequentialist Values and Ethics, Concluding Remarks

Chapter 10 examines CfE's ethical consequentialism, suggesting it is a significant part of its embedded ethics, and the coming of age of strong instrumentalist, economic and political trends in Scotland.

Williams (1973), thinks the consequences public institutions bring about, tend to be used by governments to justify their existence and policies, within what he calls a system of social and political decision. The 'good state of affairs' justifying CfE's worth are very clearly stated, to achieve the Scottish Government's "strategic objectives", for children to take "their place in a modern society and economy" (*A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, 2008, p3). Training young people for employment, and increasing national productivity and economic growth certainly became basic CfE aims.

The strong evidence is that CfE's wellbeing concept also became a consequentialist value; a means to promote conducive learning environments, and physical and mental states of feeling and being healthy and happy. It has seemed a classic floating signifier; slippery, vague, lacking perspicuity and precision, largely symbolic and mysterious, resisting rational explanation or precise definition.

CfE's consequentialist assumptions are, however, likely to imbue major curriculum aspects such as subject areas, the *Four Capacities*, and moral knowledge itself, with an instrumentalist spirit. I argue that the functionalising of religious and moral knowledge as a kind of ready-to-hand toolkit for the acquisition of skills, downgrades CfE's reasoning about applied ethics to something non-finally good. What it is to be a good person, facilitating a usually uncomfortable personal ethical struggle about this, seems to get lost somewhere

under depersonalised applied ethics, neo-liberal workplace benefits, and a motif of enjoyment.

To what extent ought children to learn ethics simply because it is an ideal of human development, self-improvement, personal fulfilment, or becoming a better person? And to what extent should they reason about specific moral issues for the sake of external value bearers such as national strategic objectives? I have argued that CfE's consequentialism is ethically problematic. In Moorean terms goodness cannot be analysed in terms of any other sort of fact, therefore if children's reasoning about morality is to be good, the focus should be on ethics for itself as something intrinsically good, not ethics functionalised to extrinsic benefits.

CfE eschews the idea of positive struggle; enjoyment and positive feelings are the focus. I suggest, however, that the fact that immature humans may not appreciate why they have to struggle, is not a reason to deprive them of learning how to struggle in a discontented world of perpetual flux and striving; it is merely a developmental fact about young human beings.

This completes an examination of CfE's consequentialist values and ethics. Chapter 11 examines CfE's developmental values and ethics.

Chapter 11: CfE's Developmental Values and Ethics (and Kant)

Chapter Abstract

Chapter 11 examines the developmental values and ethics reviewed in Chapter 8. I argue that heteronomous values for young children, and reasoning about moral issues for older, track Piaget/Kohlberg's cognitive developmental emphasis on internalized processes of moral reasoning. This dual 'heteronomy/reason' values approach can be seen most clearly in the *Review Group's* (2004) values statement (p11), where children must be 'made aware' of Scottish values (heteronomy), then decide their own based on reason (autonomy).

Piaget (1932), says he is not investigating children's "moral behaviour or sentiments" (pvii), but their moral judgement. I argue that his theory uses many similar terms to moral philosophy, but they often do not seem to mean the same thing, largely referring to processes of moral reasoning rather than good, bad, right and wrong actions or behaviour. This, I suggest, chimes with CfE's ethical neutrality, but leaves moral reasoning a largely internal, inside-out psychological exercise.

I argue further that RME does not distinguish clearly between 'religious ideas'; 'the psychology of morals' and 'moral action as understood by moral philosophy', conflating them into a single practices-beliefs-values-action moral continuum. Arguably it also conflates psychological and philosophical notions of moral realism, using terms that mean different things in the two disciplines, but impacting assumptions about the nature of values.

Insofar as CfE follows Kohlberg's theory, however, its aspiration for adolescents to establish their own stances on social justice issues does not seem possible, calling into question CfE's debatable optimism.

Piaget and Kohlberg grounded their ideas in Kant's ethics. That Kant's moral law involves a process of reasoning is universally agreed; the ethical problem, however, is that reason on its own is only part of what makes Kantian reason practical. I argue that shorn of categorical imperatives universalising a self-imposed moral law about personal ethics, CfE's moral reasoning is a half-way house lacking traction on the world.

Kant's content-free ethics arguably support CfE's ethical neutrality. I suggest that CfE does not take any sides, surreptitiously commending prosocial values. What is good? remains perhaps THE question of ethics. CfE delegates it to others, however, adopting a neutral ethical

stance. This chapter and my thesis generally, questions this lack of moral and ethical clarity.

11.1: CfE's Developmental Values and Ethics

Chapter 8 reviewed literature and theory relating to CfE's developmental ethics, suggesting how, and the large extent to which, it adopts developmental theory in RME pedagogy. I argued there, that its developmentalism rests ultimately on a Piaget/Kohlberg cognitive-developmental mix, which itself rests on Kant's ethics. It does not distinguish between Piaget's and Kohlberg's systems, however, appearing to adopt aspects of each. One possible reason for this is that the influential Millar Report (1972), also blended both theories in his recommendations for Scottish schools.

Millar blended Piaget's focus on the young child (to about age 12), with Kohlberg's stage-based extension to adolescents and beyond. He can be seen to have set the scene for *Standard Grade*, *5-14* and then CfE, arguing that the common theme (in various studies and theories), was that "moral development is a gradual progression from the egocentric through a period of conformity, to the formation of moral principles" (Millar, 1972, p57). I have argued that this 'common theme' is the general level at which CfE seems to adopt moral developmental theory, which is not to say that this is all that happens, rather that detailed theory is largely unargued-for, assumed and implicit

Both Piaget and Kohlberg theorized heteronomous values (rules) for young children, and moral reasoning as they develop (in a sense this is arguably the essence of moral developmentalism). This dual emphasis can be clearly seen in CfE's key value statement, that one of the prime purposes of education is to "to make our young people aware of the values on which Scottish society is based and so help them to establish their own stances on matters of social justice and personal and collective responsibility" (Review Group, 2004, p11). Young children are to be 'made' aware because (so the developmental story goes), for them rules are heteronomous, external, and based on their desires; whereas older children can reason things out based on self-imposed moral duty, rationally determined.

The developmental approach also assumes autonomous moral action is a function of internalized moral reasoning (judgement), which develops gradually as children mature. The emphasis is almost exclusively internal and rational, however, said to stimulate "reflection, perspective-taking, conflict resolution and autonomous choice" (Nucci, 1989, pxvi).

Piaget Again.

For Piaget all morality consists in a system of rules, and the respect children acquire for them. He says Kant, Durkheim and Bovet all agreed about this, but parted company over *how* the mind comes to respect the rules. This 'how' is arguably part of the essence of Piaget's work on children's moral judgement: how they acquire moral concepts which begins, he finds, with the young child's respect for the "absolute and intrinsic truth of rules" (1932, p56).

Despite his stage theory, Piaget thinks moral reality cannot be cut up into simple linear stages, arguing that continuity runs alongside qualitative differences as the child develops, "There is an adult in every child and a child in every adult" (Piaget, 1932, p79). Both child and adult attitudes, he thought, can appear in repeated phases of heteronomy or autonomy for each new set of rules or level of thought and reflection. His final stage of autonomy and idea of justice (retributive and distributive, see Table 6), reached at around age 12, is a conjectured ideal, however, not an absolute.

Piaget's traces moral development from egocentricity and heteronomous constraint in young children from about age 3, towards autonomous cooperation and the idea of justice in older. In *The Moral Judgement of the Child*, he says he is studying the laws that govern the formation of men and women, analysing what he calls the "moral facts" (1932, pix), through systematic observation of children. Piaget's moral 'facts' are, however, data gathered through research, about which he says, "The only good method in the study of moral facts is surely to observe as closely as possible the greatest possible number of individuals" (Piaget, 1932, p107). His moral facts are, then, those arising from analysis of his experimental research findings.

One cannot read Piaget without being struck with a sense of a most humane, meticulous, experimental researcher. On the other hand he seems to have had a low view of morality as practised in families, schools and ethical theory, speaking of "a sort of rambling chatter" (1932, p110), which was arbitrary, illogical, designed to reinforce action, but "devoid of any intelligible meaning" (1932, p110). With heavy irony he says this is what constitutes our ethical theories.

Thus he says his book will make "no direct analysis of child morality … It is the moral judgement that we propose to investigate, not moral behaviour or sentiments" (Piaget, 1932,

pvii). He is not, then, discussing morals or behaviour as moral philosophy would generally understand it, but the cognitive-developmental processes of children's observed moral thought and reasoning (which he calls child logic). Complex "relations between thought and action are very far from being as simple as is commonly supposed" he says (1932, p173).

This distinction seems important, especially as he then says "The present book on child morality" is a preliminary piece of work (pix). The book is both 'not about morality'(above) and *is* about morality; it is about moral facts but not those discussed in moral theory. Such differences, or redefinition of terms, occur in other areas of Piaget's psychology, including moral realism, subjectivity, objectivity and responsibility, all of which seem to acquire meanings based on his empirical research. This does seem important to know if we are to understand his developmental approach to morals. It seems important too, that he saw his work merely as "scaffolding" (1932, pix), for others to use to erect an actual edifice.

Piaget's 'Relations Between Thought and Action'.

Piaget identifies the relationship between moral reasoning and moral practice with Kant and Durkheim, for whom the mind, he says, must "codify its norms, or at any rate reflect upon the nature of moral action" (Piaget, 1932, p110). Within a long discussion of *Adult Constraint and Moral Realism*, he distinguishes between what he calls verbal, theoretical judgement and thought, and practical, concrete thought (thought generated by language is verbal and thought about "objects perceived in the course of action" is concrete (Piaget, 1932, p109)). He asks what relation verbal thought has to concrete thought, and finds "a certain correspondence, not simple but yet quite definable, between children's judgements about rules and their practice of these same rules" (1932, p111), and between judgements of value and the moral act itself.

Piaget thinks "reflection is the conscious realisation of action" (1932, p110). This is one way his internalized psychology of morals seem to connect thought and action. But what does he mean by 'action'? As he explicitly says, his emphasis is on processes of moral reasoning not moral behaviour in the moral philosophy sense. Piaget's empirically observed moral laws, facts and actions, despite using similar language as moral philosophy, essentially seem to refer to children's observed moral *judgement on* actions, and reasoning *about* morality (as in fact the title of his book says).

CfE/RME does not, however, distinguish between Piaget's psychological, internalised reasoning, verbal and practical thought, and moral action viewed (for example by philosophy), as moral or ethical conduct, action, or behaviour. It seems, rather, simply to assume that children's actions are reliably determined by their beliefs and values, correlating well with Piaget's 'judgements of value and the moral act itself'. In all five RME Levels CfE assumes a reliable, internal connection between religious practices, beliefs, values and actions. Levels One and Two (ages 7-12), ask children to reflect on how their "own values can affect actions" (p7); Level Three (age 13-14), asks them to analyse "the relationship between own beliefs and actions" (p13), culminating in Level Four (age 14-15), where young people are asked to express "a developed opinion … on the relationship between own values and actions" (p18).

The problem is that either CfE is referring to Piaget's (psychological) internal kind of concrete thought (adumbrated above), in which case it does not say so and arguably suggests otherwise, or alternatively there is a very long, intricate philosophical history behind the notion of moral motivation, which by no means allows CfE's straight-forward internal, reliable connection between beliefs, values and human action. CfE offers no explanation, supporting argument or clarification, but such explication arguably seems necessary?

For example, a well-rehearsed moral motivation debate focuses on internalism versus externalism, and Humean versus anti-Humean readings. In their turn, many ensuing issues lead to yet further meta-ethical complications around realism versus naturalism. Internalists argue that moral thought is motivating, externalists deny this. Internalists see ethics as principles to guide practical action, externalists as theories and concepts to guide moral reasoning. Egoists such as Sidgwick understand moral motivation in terms of self-interest, sentimentalists such as Hume as a function of human sympathy. Rationalists such as Kant understand it in terms of the will, that a moral action, or duty must be done because it is moral, not for any ulterior motive. None of this CfE discusses, but it certainly does promote internal, reliable religious 'practices-beliefs-values-action' connections.

The point here, is that moral motivation is disputed ethical territory, so that if (as seems unlikely), CfE is adopting a philosophical internalist position it is on shaky ground. It seems more likely it adopts the psychological position, in which case children's moral action in statements like "analyse the relationship between own beliefs and actions" (RME Es&Os, p13), as schools, teachers, parents and children might normatively understand them, are

called into question because Piaget's work (he specifically tells us), was not straightforwardly about moral actions and behaviour, but moral 'reasoning' about complex "relations between thought and action" (1932, p173). Insofar as CfE adopts Piaget's developmental ideas, mutually exclusive concepts and categories often seem to lack necessary discussion argument and explanation.

Piaget's Moral Realism and Objectivity.

Piaget's notions of moral realism and objectivity are further examples of where we seem to lack clear distinctions, understanding, explanation or argument. His realism concept focuses on a heteronomy of moral rules and adult constraint in the young child, whereas in philosophy realism focuses on the objectivity, or not, of values generally (all ages).

Piaget the moral psychologist, says values for the young child are adult imposed rules, but for older children (at a more advanced stage of development), they become (Kantian) self-imposed rules. Philosophy, conversely, asks whether human values for all are moral rules at all; subjectivists arguing they originate in the mind with no corresponding objectivity, realists that they exist externally to the mind (Berlin theorises a middle way: values subjectively created but objective for their creator). Psychology seems to claim 'closure' here – what values and moral facts actually *are* (i.e. Piaget's observed rules, laws and facts) – whereas moral philosophy and meta-ethical enquiry largely questions and tries to understand what such terms mean.

Piaget (1932) says realism is "the tendency which the young child has to regard duty and the value attaching to it as self-subsistent and independent of the mind … imposing itself regardless of the circumstances" (p106). This is heteronomy, the good defined by young children's obedience to rules, not any internalised motive(s) behind them, entailing what he calls an objective conception of responsibility. The tendency to take rules literally, objectively, is an early stage of a larger developmental process. The end point is Kantian, landing young people at a stage of moral autonomy, in which they will rationally determine to do what it is their duty to do, according to a moral law they impose upon themselves. Again, Piaget's idea of objectivity differs from the philosophical, meta-ethical kind relating to the objectivity (or not) of knowledge, truth, and moral values generally.

Piaget's (childish) realism phase leads towards adolescent autonomy, but if and when

it gets there it has no content. Again, this correlates well with CfE's (heteronomous) Scottish values young children must be 'made' aware of, then adolescent's establishing 'their own' stances (see *Review Group*, 2004, p11). If CfE is following Piaget, its reasoning about moral issues in RME/RMPS must be seen as predominantly an inside-out psychological exercise, because in Kant's system the determination to do what it is one's rational duty to do, arises from a *self*-imposed moral law; there is no content only duty, and the internal working of the (adolescent) mind.

A philosophical (meta-ethical) interpretation of realism on the other hand, makes no assumptions about Kantian or any particular ethics. Moral philosophy might not, therefore, just focus on an internalised, formal process of reasoning, but on the values too, or virtues, normative actions and behaviours, making no assumption that young children are incapable of reasoning about morals and ethics. This also raises a point often made (see Chapter 8), about stage theory itself and whether moral development can be fitted into neat stages.

The Curriculum discusses none of these theoretical distinctions, categories and concepts. The differences, however, are arguably significant, impacting assumptions about what values and ethics are thought to be, and at what point in a child's life internalised ethical thought is possible. According to Carr (1999, discussing the educational relevance of difficult conceptual issues), "insofar as modern empirical psychology has also been a source of highly influential ideas … it is also arguable that teachers *qua* moral educationalists also need to be knowledgeable about the psychology of moral development" (p297). This seems true. If CfE assumes a psychology of moral development, should it not also make at least some argument for it, and elucidate some of its complexities?

For Kantian based moral psychology there can be no moral content for older children external to moral agents; for moral philosophy there is a lack of agreement about the status of moral values themselves, and which ethical system, if any, is correct. Two non-combinable enterprises – moral psychology and moral philosophy – often using similar terms, arguably mean different things in what might be seen as CfE's collage of blended moral concepts.

The Respect Value and Kant.

The very high priority CfE gives to the value of respect, arguably mirrors the emphasis Piaget gives to it in his system. Developing respect for others is probably RME's single most

important exemplified notion, occurring nineteen times in twenty Es&Os pages and in all five developmental 'Levels'. In Piaget's system young children's unilateral respect for adult moral rules, leads to moral heteronomy (moral realism and obligatory rules to be followed). Kantian-like autonomy can occur when children discover that truthfulness is necessary to the relations of sympathy and mutual respect (Piaget, 1932, p193), but appears only "when mutual respect is strong enough to make the individual feel from within the desire to treat others as he himself would wish to be treated" (1932, p194). The manifestation of respect for Piaget is a kind of formative assessment, an indication that the final stage of moral autonomy is being or has been reached. CfE/RME can be said to correlate closely with Piaget here, giving the respect value a very high priority.

Arguably this also affirms the significant extent to which Piaget's system assumes Kantian principles. Treating others as one would wish to be treated is a way of loosely describing Kant's categorical imperative, universalising the moral law. Kant calls the formal principle upon which we act morally, a 'maxim'. He wants "nothing left able to determine the will except objectively the *law* and subjectively *pure reverence* for this practical law, and therefore the maxim of obeying this law even to the detriment of all my inclinations" (Kant, 2005, 400, *Academy* pagination, his emphasis). Kant's practical law (in the negative) is that "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law" (402).

Kant's theory takes all *self*-interest out of the picture, so that the action is generated only by a combination of a formal, objective principle (the law), and my respect for it, the law having been derived from a consideration of what everyone else should also do in the same circumstances (*cf* Piaget's treating others as one wishes to be treated). My duty is then to obey it, and to do so despite not because of my own inclinations, feelings, hopes, interests and desires, even though no one else (until I act) may ever know what it is I have decided. My choice is mine and mine alone, but must consider everyone affected by it. Thus Kant says that "bare conformity" serves (assists) the will, not laws "prescribing particular actions" (402).

Piaget acknowledges (here in relation to the golden rule), fundamental Kantian principles throughout *The Moral Judgement of the Child*. CfE does not seem to discuss them at all however, concentrating only on younger children's heteronomous basic values, and adolescent reasoning about applied ethics. I return to Kant's ethics later. The next sub-section

looks at a problem arising in conjunction with Kohlberg's system, in relation to the stage at which young people's moral autonomy can be reached.

Kohlberg's Stages and CfE.

I have argued that CfE probably combines Piaget and Kohlberg's ideas in much the same way Millar (1972) did, and he suggested schools should. Insofar as it follows Piaget, the above problems for CfE's values and ethics seem likely. Insofar as it follows Kohlberg, its aspiration that adolescents can establish their own stances on matters of social justice and personal and collective responsibility, does not seem possible. This is because according to Kohlberg they will not have reached (till age 20), the stage at which morality can become self-accepted moral principles, based on an internalised moral conscience (and most never will).

Kohlberg (1976) too, theorises the cognitive-developmental approach; what moral development is, and how to assess it, but describes six rather than four moral stages (reviewed in Chapter 8). He presents a "theory of moralization which can best account for this picture of moral development" (Kohlberg, 1976, p31). Unique among moral psychologists, he used moral philosophy categories to understand what he calls the 'distinctively moral'. Some theorists he says, stress respect for rules (Kant, Durkheim and Piaget), he calls this the 'normative order'; some stress welfare consequences (Mill and Dewey), he calls this the 'utility consequences' orientation; others identify morality with an ideal-self (Bradley and Baldwin), which he calls the 'ideal-self' orientation; he and Rawls will, however, "identify morality with justice [but] individual persons may use any one or all of these moral orientations" he says (Kohlberg, 1976, p40).

His highest stage 6, called *Universal Ethical Principles*, involves being aware that people hold a variety of values and opinions, that most values and rules are relative to one's own group, and one acts in accordance with "principles of justice: the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons" (1976, p35).

Kohlberg clearly identifies morality with justice and rights; his justice as fairness thesis permeates all his work and becomes the endpoint of his developmental system. He and John Rawls were Kantian liberals (at Harvard together); justice and human rights were fundamental for them. Rawls' general conception of justice is in fact quite a good summary of (and commentary on) Kohlberg's own emphasis, Rawls thinks: "All social values – liberty and

opportunity, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect – are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage" (Rawls, 1971, p54). Injustice, Rawls then says, "is simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of all" (1971, p54).

Consistent with Rawls, Kohlberg thinks morality itself entails this kind of justice structure, in which conflicts of interest can be resolved using concepts, or principles of justice. He claimed universal status for his findings, but nonetheless cast a deflationary light over the moral level likely to be achieved by most children (Chapter 8, Tables 4 and 5 refer).

According to Kohlberg's stage theory (3 Levels, 6 stages, 2 per stage), some teenagers will leave school still at the most basic 'pre-conventional' Level 1, reached by most children under 9. Most will reach 'conventional' Level 2 before leaving school, where role-conformity, internalised rules and a 'good boy orientation' are dominant. Insofar as CfE follows Kohlberg's structure, therefore, most Scottish young people entering work or higher education will only have reached the stage of internalised rule following, conforming to avoid disapproval and/or dislike by others, to avoid censure by legitimate authorities and resulting guilt (Kohlberg's Level 2, 'authority and social order maintaining orientation').

None, however, will have reached (post-conventional) Level 3, where morality involves conforming to avoid *self*-condemnation rather than condemnation by others. According to Kohlberg in fact, most young people/adults never reach this level. This is how he put it:

> The preconventional moral level is the level of most children under 9, some adolescents, and many adolescent and adult criminal offenders. The conventional level is the level of most adolescents and adults in our society and in other societies. The postconventional level is reached by a minority of adults and … only after the age of 20 (Kohlberg, 1976, p33).

This is significantly at odds with CfE's stated aspiration, in which adolescents are asked to "establish their own stances on matters of social justice and personal and collective responsibility" (Review Group, 2004, p11). According to Kohlberg's framework this is not possible, because most will only have reached the stage of conforming to avoid disapproval and/or dislike by others, to avoid censure. None will have reached the stage at which morality becomes *self*-accepted moral principles, based on an internalised moral conscience, and most never will.

Although CfE does not say young people *will* realise this aspiration, claiming only that the Curriculum will help them to, it does say that "it is one of the prime purposes of education" to help them achieve it (Review Group, 2004, p11), and it would be surprising if one of Scottish education's prime purposes was to attempt something it thought impossible..

Insofar as it follows Kohlberg's stage theory the stage-based discrepancy puts CfE's improbable optimism into perspective, calling into question how realistic it actually is. If it is not explicitly following Kohlberg here however, it is bypassing the thinking of the theorist who exercised "the greatest influence on thinking about moral education in the post-war period, under the initial influence of Piaget" (Carr, 1999, p298), and whose ideas contemporary moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2012) thinks were dominant in the field in the two decades leading up to CfE.

Insofar as CfE follows Piaget's stages, although autonomy and the idea of justice *can* be reached at age 12, it is an ideal and by no means certain, but there are other problems with Piaget's relation between children's "judgements about rules and their practice of these same rules" (1932, p111). Piaget is clear that "What we are after is not how the child puts his moral creed into practice … but how he judges of good and evil in the performance of his own actions" (p112). CfE, however, seems simply to assume right actions and behaviours reliably follow adopted beliefs and values (see RME Es&Os Level 2-09d, p10; Level 3-04b, p13; Level 4-09a, p18).

Furthermore, Piagetian notions such as cooperation, responsibility, and complex "relations between thought and action" (1932, p173), are internalised processes of reasoning guiding the moral judgement, not specific moral value positions. The latter, however (children establishing their own value 'stances' on matters of social justice and personal and collective responsibility), is CfE's explicit aspiration. There seem to be unanswered questions for CfE whichever theory is assumed.

11.2: Kantian Rationalism Minus The Moral Law

Chapter 10 examined the extent to which CfE uses processes of moral reasoning for the acquisition of workplace skills, concluding significantly so. The RMPS Course develops cognitive skills, analysing and evaluating beliefs and values, expressing reasoned personal opinions about them. The Philosophy Course develops reasoning skills, and critical thinking,

analytical and evaluative skills important in education and employment. This seems like a thoroughly rational use of moral knowledge.

RME's *Personal Search* follows a similar essentially rational path, aimed at helping children develop their own beliefs and values. A teacher sets the scene, children learn about religious stories or customs and reflect on them, drawing out their own meaning and conclusions. There are four steps:

1. Preparing the way, context and objectives.
2. Finding out, using the imagination.
3. Making connections, comparing and contrasting.
4. Thinking it over, reflecting and drawing conclusions.
   (see Kincaid and McVeigh, 2001, cited by Nixon, 2013, p494, in relation to CfE).

Any stimulus of the moral imagination must be seen as ethically good, but whether reasoning about morals is or should be essentially rational has been (and is), vigorously contested, not least by David Hume for whom "Reason, being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action" (Hume, 1751, p59). For sceptical Hume, morals were not objects of the understanding, and were grounded in "sentiments of approbation and disapprobation … we unavoidably feel" (Hume, 1751, p58).

CfE/RME does not correlate well with Hume (or contemporary sentimentalists such as moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt), but with rationalist Kant. Problematically, however, it does not (according to the documentary record), adopt Kant's moral law; its rationalism about values seems to aspire only to rights and a half-way Kantian house. Formalistic reasoning (about applied ethics and rights), minus the moral law can take children only so far towards knowing how to act and treat others, however. This was arguably not Kant's intention.

The Moral Law.

Kant focuses specifically on what it is that makes an action moral and a person morally good. His ethics rest on notions of 'good will', 'duty', and the 'categorical imperatives'. His thesis involves the idea that that moral worth and human nature are fundamentally antithetical (literally two worlds apart, the noumenal and the phenomenal), and therefore acting to achieve the good is just not possible. Human action *itself* without the slightest addition of interests is what is morally good.

In the opening paragraph of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, he says "It

is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will." (Kant, 2005, 393, *Academy*). Talents of the mind, qualities of temperament, gifts of fortune he says, are all good but have no unconditioned worth, and can be extremely bad when the will is not good. What someone achieves in their willing adds nothing to its worth. The moral worth of actions:

> can be found nowhere but *in the principle of the will*, irrespective of the ends which can be brought about by such an action ... determined by the formal principle or volition when an action is done from duty ... where every material principle is taken away from it (400).

Kant's "absolute value of mere will" (400), derives from his concept of duty. He is arguing that because humans have to struggle against unruly impulses and desires, a good will is characterised by acting for the sake of duty alone. Furthermore, because of the problem of human desires and feelings, we have to make a concerted effort to adopt the motive of duty. He says: "It is precisely in this that the worth of character begins to show – a moral worth and beyond all comparison the highest – namely, that he does good, not from inclination, but from duty" (399).

That Kant's moral law is a rational process of reasoning is agreed by everyone. The problem for CfE is not this, but that by concentrating on applied ethics, and avoiding personal ethics (good, bad, right and wrong), it seems to end up doing only this. On its own, however, moral reasoning is only a small part of Kant's ethics. Shorn of the concept of duty and the categorical imperatives taking all others into account – that is, all those affected, the interpersonal 'other', not just those potentially affected by specific moral issues – which universalise self-imposed personal moral decisions and actions, CfE's reasoning about moral issues arguably lacks the real-world application Kant's moral law needs for it to be fully practical (to use Kant's term).

According to Warnock (1987), for Kant, concepts of good, bad, right and wrong are not in fact topics of knowledge, because they reside in the noumenal world of things in themselves, which is "outside the world of all possible knowledge" (p183). As we saw discussing Piaget, for Kant there is no pre-existing moral content; there is the reasoning of autonomous moral agents, their (pure) good will, and duty. Kant's logic establishes "purely formal properties of concepts" (Hare, 1978, p163). A key aspect of his ethics is that "it is empty … doesn't provide any content to ethics … concentrates on the structure of moral judgements,

their universalisability and impersonality, rather than helping us discover precisely what we ought to do" (Warburton, 2000, p144). We arrived at a similar conclusion discussing Piaget's emphasis on moral judgement, contrasting it with practical actions and behaviour which moral philosophy (ethics) arguably assumes. Neill (2011) makes a related point: "If there is no content and only duty, then the direction and outcome of one's duty must remain irrelevant" (p10).

Clearly, writers have seen problems in the moral law as Kant intended it. CfE significantly compounds them however, by ignoring concepts of duty, will, and the categorical imperatives, which make the law practical. In a key statement in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant thought moral reasoning *must* be practical, however. He says:

> In order to extend pure knowledge practically, an a priori purpose must be given, i.e., an end as an object (of the will) which, independently of all theoretical principles, is thought of as practically necessary through a categorical imperative directly determining the will (Kant, 1976, p236).

The categorical imperatives "extend" pure knowledge practically. This is why just reasoning about moral issues on its own is not enough, there must be personal practical application (extension), "possible through a prior (objective) determination of the will and the causality of reason" he says (Kant, 1976, p188). The point then, is that the categorical imperatives, underpinned (caused) by reason, makes my moral maxim "conformable to the pure practical reason" (Kant, 1976, p146); it rationalises *and* universalises my maxim, and makes it practical. CfE's rationalism, minus the moral law in relation to personal ethics, seems to stop short of personal practical action. This seems to 'dodge the ethical' (paraphrasing Pring, 2012), and is a significant problem for CfE's moral developmental pedagogy.

CfE's Moral and Ethical Neutrality.

Kant's content-free ethics correlate well with CfE's ethical neutrality, however. Addressing CfE's teachers, the author of the *Higher RMPS Hodder-Gibson Study-Guide* says:

> I have strived very carefully to avoid taking any 'sides'… that is neither my job nor yours. Our role is to provide the contexts for thinking … reflection and analysis … to support children and young people in developing their own views, so that that they can build their own world view to support them in their own lives (piv).

This summarises very well CfE's ethical neutrality. The Curriculum certainly does not take sides; the evaluative terms good, bad, right and wrong are never used, and feature nowhere in the documentary record. CfE avoids commending an ideal of the good, and does

not ask schools, teachers or children, to discuss or understand it. Its neutral stance makes children 'aware' of values such as respect for others and tolerance, and an enormous unknown range of school and individual teacher and child values, but it does not say that tolerance, for example, is good, or harming others is bad, or that anything at all is bad.

As the *Study Guide* clearly states, values such as tolerance and respect provide CfE with 'contexts for reasoning', merely. But is it enough? Clarity about the good is surely something to be discussed? CfE provides guidance on all kinds of educational topics, in particular workplace skills, but it seems to refuse to provide young people with clear ethical guidance. Rational autonomy, perhaps, is respected, but clear guidance about how they should live, the most important of all topics according to Socrates, is unconsidered.

In CfE's *ethics 101+* there are glimpses of consequentialist values and wellbeing, arguably relative plural values, Kantian autonomy and rational formalism, flavours of Aristotelian character-based ethics (the latter discussed below in Chapter 12); and the unknown values and ethics of thousands of schools, teachers and children. But no clear statement of the 'good' can be found; to repeat because it seems so fundamental to ethics, human goodness is never mentioned, discussed, considered or commended. If, however, human goodness and badness are essential ethical categories, as my thesis (and many theorists think, CfE's ethical neutrality suggests that ultimately it may not in fact do 'ethics'.

Surreptitious, Ambiguous, Tainted Values.

The Study Guide's neutrality suggests a further problem for CfE, touched on by Iris Murdoch (1970), when she argued that moral philosophy cannot avoid taking sides, and "would-be neutral philosophers merely take sides surreptitiously" (p78). Following Plato, Murdoch sees moral philosophy examining a sovereign good, which for Plato was the most important of all human enterprises, symbolised by the sun in the physical universe. Moral philosophy as Murdoch's Plato understands it, simply cannot and therefore must not avoid the ideal of the good.

A question for CfE then, is that if children and young people are genuinely free to develop their own values (as the study guide says, so they can build their own world view), what happens when they get hold of bad views? Indeed, are there such things as 'bad' views? How 'free' is free and how 'neutral' is neutral? Will they, for example, be told that gratuitous

violence such as torturing cats for fun, or butchering and torturing children for that matter, is wicked? If so, why? On what grounds? Are children free to build their own world view around their own counterculture, or so-called 'influencers' peddled on social media, or not? Are they free actually, or free only within certain boundaries surreptitiously set by Government, CfE and society? This is Murdoch's point about taking sides, and her point about the importance (and sovereignty) of good.

Moore thought good could only be understood through direct experience, or moral sense. He thought the kind of actions we ought to perform were those that cause the most good to exist (Moore, 1903/2017, p3). Unlike CfE, he too was in no doubt that:

> In the vast majority of cases , where we make statements involving any of the terms 'virtue,' 'vice,' 'duty,' 'right,' 'ought,' 'good,' 'bad,' we are making ethical judgements; and if we wish to discuss their truth, we shall be discussing a point of ethics (1903/2017, p9).

If 'good' is essential to the ethical (as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Moore, Berlin, Murdoch, Williams and many others think), it is hard to understand why CfE rejects it, and is further evidence for the claim that in so doing it rejects ethics. Murdoch captures CfE's dilemma. In some respects all chapters have identified it from different perspectives; what is the good? Kant thought there was only one thing that was good, a pure good will robbed of every inducement, minus every inclination, where every material principle is removed. Such a good is subjectively conceived, however. Whatever else it is, for him the good will is internal to every free agent. At least he thought there was such a thing as good for human beings, however, and was willing to say so.

The universe for Plato and Aristotle was itself infused with moral purpose. The good for them was not merely made by humans; it was a basic characteristic of the cosmos. Plato (and Moore and Murdoch after him), thought good was indefinable but nonetheless objective, not just a matter of human will or opinion. They each theorise the objectively good in slightly different ways, consistent with their different approaches to ethics, but each thought it mattered a great deal.

Murdoch argues (contra Kant), that "good, not will, is transcendent" (1970, p69), because as the source of moral light it reveals things as they actually are. She wants to rescue the way we think about life from a "scientifically minded empiricism" that (she argues) cannot

deal with the issues involved. On Murdoch's scientism point, one of the positions Plato argued against in *The Republic* was that the excellence of the intellect on its own is enough. Not so, thought Socrates; without goodness it can be bad, "Did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue" he asked Glaucon (Republic, Book VII, 518A).

In Scotland, Carr contended however, that it is no more reasonable to suppose that the autonomous individual should decide what is right and wrong, than Christianity or society. He thought Piaget/Kohlberg's development theory mistaken for this reason (that it made moral principles the product of individual will). Tracing a rationalist line from Kant through Piaget to Kohlberg, he argued that a morally effective conscience (or will) needs illuminating in some way, but Kantian ethics have "form but not much content" (1991, p166), and so cannot do that, not least because it downplays human emotions and feelings.

Carr's argument, that the refusal of virtues such as honesty, self-control and courage (Kohlberg's eschewed bag of virtues), in favour of a "topic-neutral process of moral reasoning" was incoherent (1991, p167), may or may not have been heard by CfE's architects. The RME topic subsequently managed to (incoherently) blend young children's basic values with Kantian rationalism, albeit within a blended Piaget/Kohlberg framework of childish moral heteronomy, followed by adolescent moral reasoning.

With all this in mind, it is unsurprising that CfE's use of the terms 'moral' and 'ethical' almost always relate either to religious belief or applied ethics, rather than personal conduct or behaviour. It nowhere says what it means to *be* moral, or virtuous, or good, or wicked, in any personal ethical sense. Values are defined in many *non*-CfE education texts, for example as: fundamental moral principles; or convictions and general guides to behaviour; or normative moral standards by which particular actions are judged good or desirable, to name but three. Many others exist, as they do for ethics, none of which CfE uses, all of which it avoids.

Such ambiguity is surely part of what Halstead (1996) meant, when he thought the task schools now faced discussing and clarifying values became hugely complex. His rather dismal conclusion that in the end school statements of value may be "ambiguous, provisional and less than totally clear" (Halstead, 1996, p8), certainly seems true of CfE, which blends,

prevaricates, delegates, neutralises and avoids the moral kind of values as if there was something tainted about them. In Chapters 7 and 9 I argued that widespread ethical relativism was a likely major cause. Regardless (and accepting that school is but one potential source of ethics), if society and schools cannot acknowledge and discuss ethics, that is, human goodness and badness, we will probably have to accept a significantly higher risk of children growing up *not* knowing the difference, and not knowing how to behave ethically.

11.3: CfE's Developmental Values and Ethics, Concluding Remarks

I have argued that CfE's developmental values and ethics rest largely on a Piaget/Kohlberg cognitive-developmental mix, and that it does not distinguish sharply between their systems, blending aspects of each.

I have also argued that two different enterprises – moral psychology and moral philosophy – become confusingly conflated and blended. Similar terms in the two disciplines mean different things, but in CfE's blend of implicit concepts, they are neither distinguished or explained. I suggest that although Piaget was clear that his work was "not about how the child puts his moral creed into *practice* … but how he *judges* of good and evil in the performance of his own actions" (1932, p112, my emphasis), CfE seems to assume, conversely, that right actions and behaviour reliably follow chosen beliefs and values.

The chapter has two main sections: CfE's moral developmental pedagogy, and its vaguely Kantian impact on values and ethics. The single concept that connects them is rationalism, or reasoning. CfE/RME's developmentally appropriate practice has appeared fundamentally rationalist, and largely content neutral. Under CfE conditions, neutrality seems to have led to a surreptitious commending of values, however, without saying any are good. Good seems to be the missing term, and the missing value. CfE is by no means short of values, rather, it is unwilling to adopt a particular view about them. As Warnock (1996) argued, the fear of appearing to uphold a particular, universal standard of morals, in CfE seems to have become itself "almost universal and extremely inhibiting" (p47).

Developmental moral theory rests on the Kantian form of ethics. CfE's reasoning about applied ethics, however, means children are much less likely to discuss categorical imperatives in relation to personal (normative) ethics, which Kant seems to have thought was essential if the moral law is to be 'practical', that is, universalizable in everyday life.

In this sense, Kant's content-free ethics accords with CfE's ethical neutrality. CfE takes no sides; evaluative terms good, bad, right and wrong are never used, and feature nowhere in the record. What is good, does it exist, and if so what is it and where is it? are among the most important questions in ethics, however; perhaps good is still THE question of ethics. CfE dodges the question, avoids controversy, delegates it to others and assumes a largely neutral ethical stance.

This seems a shame, because keeping hold of the idea of good as a focus of discussion and reflection with children seems essential for ethics, for decent society, and even, perhaps for the kind of good behaviour optimal learning environments seem to need (on the latter, see for example MacAllister, 2014).

If, however, good *is* essentially ethical (as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Moore, Berlin, Murdoch and many others have thought), it is hard to understand why CfE feels the need to avoid it. If so, this amounts to important evidence for the claim that in so doing the Curriculum rejects ethics.

This completes Chapter 11, a critical examination of CfE's developmental values and ethics. Final Chapter 12 examines its social moral values and ethics, including glimpses of quasi-Aristotelian, character-based ethics.

Chapter 12: CfE's Social Moral Values (and Aristotle)

Chapter Abstract

Chapter 12 examines CfE's social moral values and ethics. There are many kinds of values and many kinds in CfE. I focus on three: policy values, educational values and what I have called its social moral values. Four primary policy values: wisdom, justice, compassion and integrity, underpin how the Curriculum operates from day-to-day. There are of course a very large number of educational values, the highest profile of which are the *Four Capacities* and eight SHANARRI indicators.

I refer to the moral kind of values as 'social moral', because they encompass both social facts and moral values and oughts in Kohlberg's cognitive developmental sense. I argue that they are largely delegated to schools, teachers and children, however, identified by a twenty-first century customary morality, by society and by education dynamics. Building on the developmental arguments of Chapter 11, I suggest a key problem for CfE's social moral values, is that the internalisation of moral judgement results in a weak, undeveloped link between moral reasoning and moral conduct.

I suggest further that Foucault's critique of modern government helps us understand CfE's delegation of values. A strong relation of fitting can be explained by (Foucault's), masked tendency towards individualism in society itself. His panoptic metaphor, furthermore, helps to explain how schools watched and assessed from the centre, might inscribe in themselves a governmental power relation. I argue however, that CfE's individualism is problematic because there can be no society at all without a minimum of common values.

CfE's unabashed neo-liberal individualism, and refusal to discuss the good, chimes with problems for community and society identified by MacIntyre (2008), and many others. I suggest the focus of CfE's 'ends' – education and employment – flipped to become 'employment and education', and the means to achieve them – knowledge and skills – inverted to support the new emphasis. Some basic skills and capacities vaguely resemble Aristotle's virtues, but the correlation is weak, and CfE does not aspire to help children be good, or seek a human good in Aristotle's or any other sense. CfE's wellbeing is in fact, largely a means to effective learning, not an end, still less Aristotle's final end.

12.1: Policy Values Masquerading as Moral Values

CfE obviously has many policy values regulating day-to-day business. It identifies four as primary however, which teachers are expected to apply and reinforce at every opportunity, giving a policy steer to everything it does. These are wisdom, justice, compassion and integrity.

Two paragraphs, the first in bold type, appear one after the other (unnumbered) in the 2004 *Review Group* document (p11), launching the Curriculum:

1. **The starting point for this process of change is the set of values which should underpin policies, practice and the curriculum itself. Wisdom, justice, compassion and integrity: the words which are inscribed on the mace of the Scottish Parliament have helped to define values for our democracy.**

   This is followed immediately by:

2. It is one of the prime purposes of education to make our young people aware of the values on which Scottish society is based and so help them to establish their own stances on matters of social justice and personal and collective responsibility. Young people therefore need to learn about and develop **these values**. The curriculum is an important means through which this personal development should be encouraged.

Despite the impression of continuity between them however (by the closest possible proximity on the page), they are saying two different things: "these values" highlighted in statement 2 just above (my emphasis), does not, I suggest, refer to 'wisdom, justice, compassion and integrity' of statement 1, but to Scottish society's values, as indeed it says.

The reason for pointing this out, is that statement 1 gives four values which underpin Curriculum policy and practice. They look and sound like the moral kind of values but they are in fact policy values; organisational values underpinning how the Curriculum will work in day-to-day practice, as it in fact states: the set of values which should underpin "policies, practice and the curriculum itself" (Statement 1 above).

To help clarify the difference, Napier University for example, has a number of 'Research and Integrity' Committees regulating the ethics of research activities. These bodies do not oversee researcher/student morality, but how day-to-day research is conducted; it is just that they (confusingly), use the same terms such as 'integrity' and 'ethics'. This is the regulative sense of how education is to be conducted in statement 1 above. Wisdom, justice, compassion and integrity are not CfE's underpinning moral values, they are policy values

regulating Scottish education itself; the values the *Review Group* is saying, by which it should be judged.

Statement 2 is different. Here, we are not given a list of values, but referred to an unknown, mysterious set of values upon which Scottish society is based. We are not told (here or anywhere), what they are because obviously no-one actually knows what they are exactly, but we are told that because they are Scottish society's values they will help young people establish their own stances on matters of social justice, personal and collective responsibility, and for this reason they need to be learned and developed. Again, why does this distinction matter?

Curriculum architects might, perhaps, have had reasons to appear so to CfE's so-called 'new' stakeholders, but they are not, I suggest, setting moral standards here, moralising or establishing an ethics schools should/will teach to children. Despite discursive appearances, they are not saying children must learn about and develop wisdom, justice, compassion and integrity, or *any* particular set of values, but the opposite. As we have seen many times now, its stance on ethics is completely neutral; it will 'make' young children aware of basic (Piagetian, heteronomous) rules, but it will not and does not set any specific moral standards, in CfE that is the role of schools, teachers and young people themselves.

As discussed in Chapter 3 and 11, within a broad policy framework, specific RME values such as tolerance, love and caring, are contexts for thinking, exemplars to guide schools, teachers and children in their task of deciding, localising and deploying their Scottish, social moral values. This is consistently reflected in all documents related to CfE's values education, and is, I suggest, the basis of its stance on values and ethics.

Fleshing out the organisational values underpinning policy, practice and the Curriculum itself, a set of statements immediately follow. The Curriculum says it will:

i. Enable all young people to benefit from their education, supporting them in different ways to achieve their potential.

ii. Value the learning and achievements of all young people and promote high aspirations and ambition.

iii. Emphasise the rights and responsibilities of individuals and nations. It should help young people to understand diverse cultures and beliefs and support them in developing concern, tolerance, care and respect for themselves and others.

iv. Enable young people to build up a strong foundation of knowledge and understanding and promote a commitment to considered judgement and ethical action.

v. Give young people the confidence, attributes and capabilities to make valuable contributions to society.

vi. In essence [the Curriculum] must be inclusive, a stimulus for personal achievement and, through the broadening of pupils' experience of the world, be an encouragement towards informed and responsible citizenship.
(Review Group, 2004, p11).

The policy statements touch on: recognition for all not a gifted few; how CfE will approach children's rights, diversity, tolerance and inclusion, considered judgement and ethical action (whatever the latter means; as with a similar statement in the *Four Capacities,* it is never explained, but could refer to RME's reasoning about applied ethics, or an assumed 'beliefs-values-action' moral continuum, discussed in Chapter 11). *Responsible Citizens* became one of the *Four Capacities* (the Capacities are said to be CfE's educational 'purpose', examined below). The other three Capacities: *Successful Learners* (statements i & ii above), *Confident Individuals* (statement v), and *Effective Contributors* (statement v), are implicit. Three 'shoulds' and three 'musts' make the statements ethical claims about what Scotland's new education policy should (ought to) do for children and families.

Condensation Symbols?

The earliest statement found of the four policy values in relation to CfE, is Stirling Headteacher Frank Lennon's assertion a year before CfE's launch. Writing in *Scottish Education* he said "if the authorities feel constrained here because of concerns about whose values they should be, they might want to take a look at the new Parliament's mace, which has the words 'WISDOM, JUSTICE, COMPASSION, INTEGRITY carved on it" (2003, p421, his emphasis). CfE's architects seem to have taken Lennon's advice, specifically referring to the mace in the inaugural document (*Review Group*, 2004, p11). The values, however, were almost certainly those of *Michael Lloyd*, the winner of the mace competition, subsequently endorsed by the new Scottish Parliament.

As with much else in CfE rhetoric, the policy values are unargued for and ungrounded. According to Gillies (2006), they lack (therefore), coherence and force. He too argues that as human choices their value rests on the rationale given, but none is. Citing Edelmann (1964), he compares them to "condensation symbols" (p31), asking if anyone at all is competent to

decide the values on which the Curriculum should be structured? On the other hand, as argued in Chapter 6, most modern public institutions now seem to need a set of structuring policy values, against which stakeholders can judge real-time delivery, and this seems a key part of the role wisdom, justice, compassion and integrity have in CfE.

12.2: CfE's Blended Educational Values

Self-evidently (although the distinctions are often blurred), CfE's many educational values are also not the specifically moral kind, because they are largely focused on the school's core business of learning and teaching. These include values such as:

- make learning active, challenging and enjoyable.
- not be too fragmented or over-crowded with content.
- connect the various stages of learning from 3 to 18.
- encourage the development of high levels of accomplishment and intellectual skill.
- include a wide range of experiences and achieve a suitable blend of what has traditionally been seen as 'academic' and 'vocational'.
- give opportunities for children to make appropriate choices to meet their individual interests and needs, while ensuring that these choices lead to successful outcomes.
- ensure that assessment supports learning.

(Review Group, 2004, p10).

A Framework for Learning and Teaching (p11), identifies many other educational values. Children's entitlements are: coherence from 3 to 18 (i.e. joined up, bringing together previous 3-5, 5-14, and Standard Grade curriculum elements); a broad general education (junior phase); a senior phase; skills for learning, life and work; a cross-cutting focus on literacy, numeracy and health and wellbeing; personal support; and support to get young people into "positive and sustained destinations beyond school".

On the other hand, CfE blurs the boundaries between educational and the moral kind of values in many statements, where it is not possible to identify a 'kind'. It says for example, that by having high aspirations for each child, schools can support them in developing confidence and ambition; "respectful and constructive relationships are the starting point for successful learning. Schools … can foster respect, responsibility and tolerance by living out their values, practising them within their own communities" (*Review Group*, 2004, p13). In such statements all three kinds of values can be seen: policy (school support); educational (high aspirations), and social moral (confidence and ambition). This blurring of value boundaries is probably to some extent a consequence of the nature of values, which often have generic applications, and are notoriously difficult, sometimes impossible to pin down. It

is also however, a characteristic of CfE's general eclecticism, coming to full expression in both the *Four Capacities* and RME Es&Os.

The Four Capacities Statement.

In the pivotal *Four Capacities* statement, not only are there glimpses of all three of the kinds of values I am discussing: policy, educational and social moral, but also all four identified elements of CfE's *ethics 101+*: consequentialism, Kantian rationalism, plural values and neo-Aristotelian ethics. It has an extremely rich discursive texture, and is, I have suggested, best understood in terms of the argument made in Chapter 6 about the Capacities being a vision, or mission statement (the 'strategic' metaphor supports such a reading). Nonetheless the Capacities are said to be CfE's over-arching statement of educational purposes.

A Framework for Learning and Teaching (p22), says "The purpose of the curriculum is to enable the child or young person to develop the 'four capacities'", which should be used by schools as a guide to assess whether "the curriculum for any individual child or young person sufficiently reflects the purposes of the curriculum" (p23). It says the four purposes "represent a very broad range of outcomes, including learning how to learn and the promotion of positive attitudes and attributes", and wants them to "complement the important contributions of families and communities" (Review Group, 2004, pp12-13). It says the opportunity for children to develop the *Four Capacities* will depend on the environment for learning, the choice of teaching and learning approaches, and the ways in which learning is organised. The *Review Group* (2004, p3) also says: "Our aspiration is to enable all children to develop their capacities as successful learners, confident individuals, responsible citizens and effective contributors to society".

Table 7 below, reproduces the full statement, quoted from *A Framework for Learning and Teaching*, p22.

Table 7.

CfE's Four Capacities Statement.

Capacity	with	and able to
Confident Individuals	• Self-respect • A Sense of physical, mental and emotional well-being • Secure values & beliefs • Ambition	• Relate to others and manage themselves • Be self-aware • Develop and communicate their own beliefs and view of the world • Assess risk and take informed decisions • Achieve success in different areas of activity • Pursue a healthy and active lifestyle • Live as independently as they can
Responsible Citizens	• Respect for others • Commitment to participate responsibly in political, economic, social and cultural life	• Develop knowledge and understanding of the world and Scotland's place in it • Understand different beliefs and cultures • Make informed choices and decisions • Evaluate environmental, scientific and technological issues • Develop informed, ethical views of complex issues
Effective Contributors	• An enterprising attitude • Resilience • Self-reliance	• Communicate in different ways and different settings • Work in partnership and in teams • Take the initiative and lead • Apply critical thinking in new contexts • Create and develop • Solve problems
Successful Learners	• Enthusiasm and motivation for learning • Determination to reach high standards of achievement • Openness to new thinking and ideas	• Use literacy, communication and numeracy skills • Use technology for learning • Think creatively and independently • Learn independently and as part of a group • Make reasoned evaluations • Link and apply different kinds of learning in new situations

The *Capacities* quickly became a defining statement of the new Curriculum, and something of a mantra establishing values, purposes and principles for education from 3 to 18, and the totality of experiences planned for children's education. They underpin CfE's oft quoted education ideals, that children and young people "should be valued by being safe, nurtured, achieving, healthy, active, included, respected and responsible" (*Review Group*, 2004, p3, reproduced in Figure 1, Chapter 3).

The *Four Capacities* are then, fundamental educational values despite their blurred and blended nature. They are strongly vocational with a purview well beyond the school, seamlessly connecting the world of education and the world of work (see also arguments

made in Chapters 3, 6 and 10). In policy language this is what 'success' looks like. Although they have many faces they do not, however, have any clear teaching progression bedding them into learning (Chapter 10 cites OECD Reports of 2015 and 2021 pointing this out), leaving them largely aspirational; a statement of hoped-for education outcomes for children, not unlike an architect's as yet unfunded vision drawings selling a design proposal to potential backers. As Bloomer (2016) said, the Capacities are a mission statement. They blend ideas about education and employment; values and virtues; character development and moral action; knowledge and skills; moral norms and ethical aspirations; children being something and becoming something. I have suggested in earlier chapters that this is radical, discursive, strategic, compacted blendedness.

Disaggregating the Four Capacities' Ethics.

I have also argued that the *Four Capacities* are an example of superb strategic planning and discursive capture, heavily pregnant with significance across a wide range of educational purposes and aspirations for pupils. Not only this, but CfE's *ethics 101+* can be glimpsed there too. A more condensed, richer statement of educational purposes is hard to imagine. In one sense, it is *so* densely packed that the task of translating its aspirations into practical learning and teaching, as the OECD (2015 and 2021) requires, is likely to be enormously complicated.

The four kinds of ethics I identify are implicit. There may be others, it is hard to say because of the nature of vision statements, but these four seem to be 'there' in some sense:

Consequentialist Ethics.

The *Four Capacities* can be read like a list of items any successful entrepreneur would make about attributes needed in the work place, with particular emphasis on "the likelihood of new and quite different jobs during an individual's working life [and] the need to increase the economic performance of the nation" (Review Group, 2004, p10). This focuses on the world beyond school and is inherently instrumentalist (see Chapter 6), and consequentialist (see Chapter 10):

- "Relate to others and manage themselves" and "Assess risk and take informed decisions" (Confident Individuals)
- "Commitment to participate responsibly in political, economic, social and cultural life" and "Evaluate environmental, scientific and technological issues" (Responsible Citizens)
- "An enterprising attitude" and "Apply critical thinking in new contexts" (Effective Contributors)

- "Openness to new thinking and ideas" and "Link and apply different kinds of learning in new situations" (Successful Leaners)

Each cited example relates to the need for young people to take their place in Scottish society, and become economically active, in each case it is a consequentialist focus.

Developmental (Kantian) Rationality.

Pedagogy is the 'how' of learning. The Capacities link to moral developmental pedagogy in the way they combine the 'social' and the 'moral' together. Kohlberg introduced his sociomoral point of view as that which an individual takes in defining both social facts and sociomoral values and oughts. These concepts (facts and values), mutually exclusive in many accounts of moral philosophy, are often conflated:

- "Relate to others and manage themselves" (social), and "Secure values & beliefs" (moral).
- "Commitment to participate responsibly in political, economic, social and cultural life" (social), and "Develop informed, ethical views of complex issues" (moral).
- "Work in partnership and in teams" (social), and "Resilience and Self-reliance" (moral).
- "Learn independently and as part of a group" (social), and "Determination to reach high standards of achievement" (moral).

Strategic vision statements of the policy kind can and often do fuse concepts together, and (thereby) can baffle precise theoretical analysis. They can, nonetheless, for that very reason communicate across many conceptual/cultural boundaries, which is one of the reasons strategists and policy people use them. I have argued above that this tells its own story about the strategic excellence of CfE's development process.

Plural Values.

The Capacities seem to display a radical plurality of different kinds of *thing*, not only kinds of values and glimpses of ethics, but concepts such as wellbeing, independence, self-awareness, beliefs, and cultures; use of technology, partnership working, creativity, use of literacy, communication and numeracy skills, to name but some. Trying to pin down 'what' the statement is saying would be pointless, because so many different descriptions of the world are implicit, explicit, suggested and stated. There is no single evaluative standard available by which to assess them. This makes them an essentially value pluralist statement. The following pairs are not cited as incompatible (although some are), but as incommensurable; unable to be measured on a single scale:

- "Communicate own beliefs" and "Live independently" (Confident Individuals).

- "Scotland's place in the world" and "Evaluate scientific and technological issues" (Responsible Citizens).
- "Self-reliance" and "Teamworking" (Effective Contributors).
- "Determination to achieve" and "Use technology" (Successful Leaners).

No one scale of measurement applies to such diverse concepts and ideas. It is reminiscent of Berlin's paraphrasing of Tolstoy's description of the battlefield of Borodino. Pierre Bezukhow wanders about lost, looking for the kind of set piece battle depicted by historians, but "finds only the ordinary confusion of individual human beings haphazardly attending to this or that human want … sees only a succession of 'accidents' … loosely strung groups of events forming an ever-varying pattern, following no discernible order" (Berlin, 1953, p20). This seems an excellent metaphor for the *Four Capacities*: confusion, immense variety, multiplicity, loosely strung concepts, and human effects.

Quasi-Aristotelian Ethics.

The very name of the Curriculum, '*for Excellence*', points vaguely, perhaps intentionally, towards Aristotle's ethics, whose notion of 'excellence', *arete*, is often translated as 'virtue'. Thirty-four separate attributes and traits are listed, some of which approximate conceptually to Aristotelian-type virtues, such as:

- "Ambition" and "A Sense of physical, mental and emotional well-being" (Confident Individuals).
- "Commitment to participate responsibly in political, economic, social and cultural life" and "Knowledge and understanding of the world and Scotland's place in it" (Responsible Citizens).
- "Resilience" and "Apply critical thinking in new contexts" (Effective Contributors).
- "Make reasoned evaluations" and "Use technology for learning (Successful Leaners).

The question is to what extent these character traits are like Aristotle's virtues, and the answer, I suggest, is only vaguely in the quasi-Aristotelian language employed, but not as regards their significance, or his meanings of happiness, moral character and the human good. I examine this below in the final Section of the Chapter.

Like an over busy viewpoint signpost, with 128 pointers going in different directions, the *Four Capacities* are certainly a remarkable piece of policy writing. It can be seen either as a hopeless confusion of incommensurable, mutually exclusive concepts, or discursive excellence by accomplished strategists summarising CfE's education values, depending on one's point of view.

The next Section examines CfE's social moral values, the everyday customary values of its many schools, teachers and children. These are the Scottish social values the *Review Group* says children must be made aware of and learn about, so that as adolescents they can choose their own social justice stances.

12.3: CfE's Social Moral Values

The thesis has reviewed evidence supporting the claim that the Curriculum as stated, (as conceptualised), does not discuss and explain values directly concerned with personal moral conduct, behaviour, or the good (which is not to say individual teachers do not). I have also argued that CfE seems to call such values 'Scottish social values', and largely delegates them.

As argued above, CfE defines what a moral 'issue' is, and what an issue of belief is, but not what a moral value is, or what morality or ethics are. Within the orbit of many policy and educational values, and human rights, CfE's moral kind of values are, I have suggested, essentially the choices and scales of value schools and teachers (and children) bring to the picture, based on locally derived priorities and individual teacher/pupil choice. What has often been referred to as the 'hidden' or informal curriculum, is I suggest, identified by the *Review Group* (2004), as the "values on which Scottish society is based", which children must "learn about and develop", so they can choose "their own stances on matters of social justice and personal and collective responsibility" (p11).

These values I have argued, are both social and moral, defined not by CfE but by society dynamics, education dynamics, and children and young people themselves. They correlate well with Kohlberg's "point of view the individual takes in defining both social facts and sociomoral values and oughts" (1976, p33). CfE seems to assume that schools, teachers and children should adopt something like this stance towards social justice issues (social facts), and sociomoral obligations (values and oughts).

Kohlberg thought children's moral development depended on cognitive-structural stimulation (stages advance through a kind of conflict between lower and higher moral experiences and interactions), and that this stimulation was essentially social "the kind that comes from social interaction and moral decision-making, moral dialogue, and moral interaction" (Kohlberg, 1976, p49). This 'social interaction and moral decision-making' is

arguably the dynamic CfE sets up to provide a basis for young people's decisions about values; a dynamic between what they think is socially just, and adopting a responsible moral attitude towards it. Where Kohlberg and CfE part company, is the age and development level at which young people are able to make such choices. CfE thinks around the age 14-17, Kohlberg's research found only after age 20, but that most never will.

On the other hand, a consequence of building ethics on experimental research which can always be falsified, and become outdated, is that CfE could easily point to other research such as Elliot Turiel's 'domain theory' of the 1970s and 1980s, distinguishing morality from the social and personal, suggesting that differentiation between morality and convention can emerge in children as young as 3. The point is, can there ever be an adequate or final set of empirical research findings? (see here, Neill, 2016, pp5-11).

The larger problem, however, is that only a weak, largely undeveloped link between moral reasoning and moral conduct is implied by the internalisation of moral judgement, and moral psychology's concentration on the how of moral reasoning, rather than the what of moral action. On one hand this arguably allows cognitive theorists to stop short of the fact-value problem in moral philosophy; on the other hand an inside-out (internalised) process of moral reasoning arguably stops short of practical action, leaving the direction and outcome of one's reasoning moot.

For moral philosophy, Hume's fact-value problem of getting an 'is' from an 'ought', insists that facts are logically distinct from values. Kohlberg's socio-moral concept bridges a gap between social facts and moral oughts, or rather, an internalised gap does not insist to the same degree or in the same way. Kohlberg states: "In discussing social perspectives we have not differentiated *perception* of social fact (role taking) from *prescription* of the right or good (moral judgement)" (1976, p39, his emphasis). This largely seems to avoid Hume's gap, but insofar as CfE adopts cognitive-developmental theory (I have argued it does extensively), the extent to which it pursues moral reasoning all the way through to practical moral action and pupil behaviour, must be questioned.

Individualised Social Moral Values.

I have suggested that CfE's social moral values have largely been localised as the values of schools, teachers and children, in their individual classrooms, in their individual schools in

their separate cities, towns, villages and hamlets throughout Scotland. Individuation is arguably an inescapable corollary of CfE's delegation of morals. The approach avoids problems of relativist plural values (also fitting well with content-free Kantian formalism), but necessarily becomes radically individualistic.

The delegation of morals, however, also fits very well indeed into an already highly individualised, marketized, neo-liberal society. If one were to assume that in fact, there was no such thing as society (as Prime Minister Thatcher once notoriously proclaimed), and only individual men and women and families who look to themselves first, each with their own interests and values, CfE's individualism seems particularly well positioned to nurture and perpetuate it. Michel Foucault's archaeology of individualism helps us understand why this might be so, and why it seems to fit the surrounding society so well.

Foucault's work has being characterised as understanding "the development of individuality in all of its modern forms" (Hamilton, 1985, p7). According to Foucault, a fundamental shift in the role and functions of the state occurred in the West roughly between the mid-1500s and the mid-1700s; from being a Sovereign governing a territory – such as depicted in Machiavelli's Prince – to a modern Government engaged in the particular care of individuals, and care of the bodies of individuals. He thinks western governments introduced something like a father's diligent care for his family into the management of the state, and that a key concern for government became the "introduction of economy into political practice" (Foucault, 1994, p207).

He observes further that eighteenth-century treatises of government such as Rousseau's *Political Economy,* used a ship metaphor of the state, where to govern means to take charge of and care for the sailors, not just the ship and its cargo, while reckoning with winds, rocks, and storms. To govern in this way Foucault thinks, is not just about safeguarding the ship or the family's property, but concerns "the individuals who compose the family, their wealth and prosperity" (Foucault, 1994, p209); becoming an individualised care for the ruled.

Foucault argues that during the eighteenth century as capitalism was developing and population, productivity and knowledge were rapidly increasing, the organisation and management of society assumed responsibility for "life processes and undertook to control and modify them" (Foucault, 1991a, p264). This, he claims, resulted for the first time in history

in biological existence being “reflected in political existence” (p264). From then on the state’s power was no longer merely over death (as in Machiavelli’s Prince), but over life and therefore over the body, what he called bio-politics and bio-power. This is what Foucault meant when he said: “For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question” (Foucault, 1991a, p265). All of this, Foucault thought, allowed governments to gain and maintain control over “production relations”, as well as major social institutions such as the family, army, schools and police.

The ‘art of government’ as theorised by Foucault, is a broad range of individualising and dividing practices he thinks became “techniques of domination” (Rabinow, 1991, p11). This critique of modern government and society and its institutions helps us understand CfE’s moral value individualism, because if he is right, there is an in-built but disguised (masked) tendency towards individualism in modern Western societies. If so, CfE’s delegation of morals to all of its localities, schools and teachers fitted very well indeed into a prior, existing condition of modern Scottish society. CfE merely removed one of the masks concealing an already highly individualised society.

When I speak of ‘excellence’ displayed in CfE’s development process this is partly what I have in mind. Not that individuation is a virtue, but that CfE’s political masters, ultimately sitting very high in New Labour’s ‘deliverology’ structure, could see this opportunity for what it was, turning strategic-relativist necessity into curriculum-individualist virtue. Seen from a governmental, vocational point of view, it arguably facilitates achieving and maintaining control over production relations, by controlling and modifying life processes, precisely as Foucault’s bio-politics thesis suggests.

Scottish education policy viewed in this way, was caught up in various hegemonic socio-political forces intrinsic to modern government, and intrinsic to modern, efficient economic policy, not just perpetuating but nurturing a status quo. This, I suggest, explains a very strong relation of fitting between CfE’s delegation of morals, and Scottish society itself; they complement each other, jointly and mutually reflecting a marketized, neo-liberal, plural society, and its individualised, largely relativist, consumer-oriented customary morality.

Individuated and Unknowable.

CfE seems to adopt two different stances, or gazes, in relation to the three kinds of values I identify, on the one hand standardising rights, policy, and educational values across all schools, on the other delegating and individualising social moral values. Wisdom, justice, compassion and integrity (policy), and the *Four Capacities* (education) for example, must be applied in all schools, but the social moral values chosen by schools, teachers and children, differ from locality to locality, school to school, teacher to teacher, classroom to classroom and child to child.

If so, it is axiomatic that schools (still less children), in the Inner Hebrides will not immediately know what specific social moral stances schools in the Central Belt are identifying, and teachers in Campbeltown at the tip of the Argyll peninsular, are unlikely to know what teachers in Aberdeen are identifying and applying. Put the other way, within a broad framework of common policy values, educational values, perhaps other kinds of values I have not examined, and a quasi-ethical rights-based framework, any personal, moral kind of values children discuss are likely to be local, plural, relativist and significantly differentiated.

The project has repeatedly shown the extent to which many educationists and philosophers see significant difficulties for any kind of objective status for moral values; if so, few if any assumptions about the nature of values, or shared social values and practices, were possible for CfE. And yet education writers such as Halstead (1996), think “Clearly there could be no society at all without a minimum set of common values and standards of behaviour” (p7).

Berlin’s objective pluralism is premised on the notion that despite many ends people seek, “understanding each other and sympathising and deriving light from each other” (2013a, p11), is a precondition of decent society. Halstead and Berlin argue from liberal positions, but neither writer argues for merely individualist conceptions of life that can be “cashed out in private satisfactions”(Gray, 1995, p101), as Gray puts it. Gray sees Berlin’s position as inconceivable outside of shared forms of common cultural life, and in full agreement with communitarian critics of liberalism, arguing for a “public or communal dimension of individual wellbeing” (1995, p101). Understandably so. But CfE’s individualising of values seems somewhat at odds with this kind of liberal/communitarian balance, favouring a Thatcherite kind of neo-liberal individualism.

The Need for a Shared Language.

Italian communist and activist Antonio Gramsci, in his *Prison Notebooks* argued for the importance of shared language, specifically so that a (new) culture might come into being. He thought that someone who only spoke an Italian dialect had a view of the world which was "limited and provincial, which is fossilised and anachronistic in relation to the major currents of thought which dominate world history. His interests will be limited, more or less corporate or economistic, not universal" (Gramsci, 1971/1999, p629, Note III). For this reason he thought it was necessary to learn a national language properly. Gramsci wanted to create a new (Marxist/Communist) culture and community, and for this to occur, "one's own individual 'original' discoveries" (Gramsci, 1971/1999, p629), or even the discoveries of intellectuals were not enough, and what he called socialisation of existing truths was necessary. He thought philosophy was caught up with a battle for the mind, and wanted to use it to transform the popular mentality.

The Italian fascist context of Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* (1929-1935) could not be more different to that of CfE's neo-liberal, plural values in 2004, but his principle of the importance of shared cultural artifacts such as language, arguably applies – perhaps more so – in our highly individualised society. For a culture to exist and be cohesive, he wanted known critical truths, not individual elaboration of ideas, to become the "basis of vital action, an element of co-ordination and intellectual and moral order" (Gramsci, 1971/1999, p630). For there to be such a culture, he thought intercommunication between groups through a shared language was essential. Dialect led to the opposite; inability to communicate, preventing the new society he longed for coming into being. Gramsci's principles of shared cultural artifacts, socialisation of existing truths, and importance of inter-communication arguably applies in modern Scotland, to a society largely withdrawn behind consumerist, relativist walls. Gramsci's dividing walls were local dialects, Scottish society's relativist, market-driven, individualised walls are perhaps harder to see and break down, because they are largely conceptual (and meta-ethical) rather than audible and culturally visible.

Gramsci sits on the left of the communitarian/liberal divide, arguing for language as a shared social catalyst. E.D. Hirsch Jnr., sits on the liberal right, but arguing for something conceptually similar. He refers to a 'speech community' as being an indispensable but often unspoken cultural requirement if citizens are to understand one another; he thinks people

"share the same meanings in their 'social communication', because they share the same … background knowledge" (Hirsch, 2020, p29). He cites Durkheim from a (1910) lecture to school teachers, that "For the teaching of morality to be possible, the notion of society must be kept intact … to deny the nation is not simply to deny her received ideas; it is to deny the moral life at its very source" (Durkheim, 1910, cited by Hirsch, 2020, p157).

Gramsci and Hirsch (and Berlin in fact), despite very different political views, think a cohesive culture and society is one in which people can understand, sympathise, and communicate with each another. If they are right, this is why CfE's individualised social moral values are problematic; the level of social dialogue, shared knowledge and cultural affinity is too diminished. Furthermore, if all (relativist) values and ends are equal, it not only becomes meaningless to ask which alternative value-set, standard or interest is correct, but opportunities for working across the respective boundaries become much harder, perhaps impossible, because differences and gaps between values and concepts can be very large.

We see some of this, perhaps, in the way debate around gender in Scotland lapsed into name-calling, demanding, position-taking, goading, refusal to listen or discuss differences, social media trolling, no-platforming and retreating behind walls of personal offence, oppression and victimisation. Misunderstanding and conflict seem to have resulted, among other things from failure to interact and communicate, and talking past each other. Arguably, this is why relativism and individualism are so problematic; they work against society, common ends, shared social, moral and cultural understanding and dialogue. Collective responsibility can too easily give way to self-regarding, individual human rights; the market, perhaps, gets its due, but civilised society and community too often suffer.

For goals and values to be in any sense common, they seem to *some* extent, to need to include what Berlin (and Wittgenstein) called 'shared forms of cultural life' (see Chapters 7 and 9), entailing ideas of permanence and objectivity. Berlin thought communication between people depends on the existence of *some* common values as well as a common factual world; the latter, he thought, is a "necessary but not a sufficient condition of human intercourse" (1969, pxxxi).

Values seem essential to society. Taking ethics as the common factor, thinkers on all sides of political life, Gramsci on the left, Hirsch on the right, liberal Berlin, and Warnock

centre-right, argue for the importance of shared cultural artifacts, shared language and common values, for an effective cultural/community life to be achieved and maintained. CfE's at best tenuous hold on such shared moral visions of community and society, suggests it may have somehow (perhaps unwittingly), become part of the societal problem rather than the solution. Landing, perhaps, too far on the neo-liberal individualist side of the debate following, perhaps, a dubious consensus, but distanced from social-communitarian visions of society.

In arguing for society in terms of shared cultural goals, values, artifacts and language, I am not suggesting there can, or ever could be unanimity, uniformity or complete agreement about incommensurable, often clashing, incompatible human values. Only (to cite Berlin), that "Forms of life differ. Ends, moral principles, are many. But not infinitely many: they must be within the human horizon. If they are not they are outside the human sphere" (2013a, p12). Berlin's point (argued in Chapter 7) is that society depends on "promoting and preserving an uneasy equilibrium" (2013a, p20), not assuming perfection is possible then going in search of it. Claims must be balanced, he thought, compromises must be reached, priorities "never final and absolute, must be established" (2013a, p18).

Panoptic Control.

Foucault's Panopticism thesis (intrinsic to his individualising thesis, and integral to his arguments about power and bio-power), can also help us to understand more about why modern Western governments might have reasons to isolate and individualise in the way CfE individualises morals. He used Bentham's *Panopticon* design as a metaphor of the way power works in modern societies, "a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men" (Foucault, 1977, p205). Bentham's architecture had a central observation point capable of viewing every surrounding prison cell, without the prisoners knowing whether they are being watched, where each encircling cell is isolated and separated from those either side:

> They are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualised and constantly visible … He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection." (Foucault, 1977, p202).

Foucault's thesis of efficient power is that not only does the panoptic mechanism apply (rather obviously) to school children being watched by, say, a teacher (or prisoners by

a warder, etc.), but to "nurses, doctors, foreman, teachers, warders" and schools themselves (1977, p204), being watched by central authorities. The institutions of society and how they function are continuously judged (inspected, assessed and corrected) from the centre. The panoptic metaphor applies to CfE, because all schools are subject to assessment and inspection. The very notion of education delivering *National Priorities* can itself be seen as an example of efficient, centralised authorities exerting a power relation over schools.

A Primary school's locally chosen 'OUR RIGHTS OUR VALUES' (in large capital letters above the entrance), for example, will be presented under inspection as an instance of how the school has individually settled on a local 'ethos', probably scoring valuable delivery/performance points, but simultaneously playing "both roles" as Foucault puts it. The school thereby inscribes "in itself the power relation" (Foucault, 1977, p202). Another Primary School has developed 'our values': respect, responsibility, honesty, fairness and kindness. These are locally developed, school-specific values; in this particular case precisely reflecting RME exemplified values for young children, and arguably another example of self-inscription of centralised power.

Panoptic Power.

Viewed from the opposite perspective, the Summerhill school saga presented the Blair Government with a school curriculum it was *not* in control of, and which as a result government tried (and failed due to parental support), to close down in 1999. Progressive Scottish educator and existentialist A.S. Neill argued that the purpose of education was not to control children but free them from unnecessary, excessive interference, promote self-determination and what he called responsible freedom. Summerhill's ethic of learning freedom was frowned on by a particularly controlling New Labour administration, however. It was thus precisely caught up in a power situation of Foucault's kind, nicely demonstrating Neill's point about freedom, as well as Foucault's about centralised control and power.

I argued in Chapter 6 that during the heyday of the New Labour years (which coincided with CfE's conception and launch in 2004), there was a strong central push towards local community oriented, multi-agency approaches to service delivery, where the state – steering but not rowing – exerted control, while appearing to hand over power. Under New Labour, public sector outcomes were constantly being articulated (becoming the very language of CfE's Es&Os, *Experiences and Outcomes*), but government was able to drive the agenda very

effectively from the centre. It was of course, accompanied by an extremely efficient public sector audit and inspection regime (at the time HM Inspectorate of Education in Scotland, HMIE). Schools and teachers (and many other public bodies) were indeed "caught up in a power situation of which they themselves are the bearers" (Foucault, 1977, p201), some – probably the vast majority – financially dependent, were watched and had little choice but to become compliant; a very few such as Summerhill remained independent and defiant.

Foucault's thesis helps us to better understand invisible, largely unarticulated power structures immanent in modern society (and CfE). Applying his panoptic metaphor allows us to see CfE's social moral values as caught up in a much bigger social/cultural strategic picture. Through regular inspection local values become known to central government whenever it chooses, but remain largely isolated and unknown to other Scottish schools, teachers and children. Even when known, the 'windowless boxes' of relativism can isolate and separate "like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualised" (Foucault, 1977, p202).

Teaching different moral content to different children in different schools, arguably erodes the basis of shared knowledge and understanding many writers and philosophers (Halstead, 1996; Gramsci, 1971/1999; Berlin, 2001 and 2013a; Warnock, 1996; Hirsch, 2020), think is necessary for an effectively functioning culture and society.

Individualising morals like this, is likely to work against the kind of shared knowledge, and community understandings, that could contradict the assertion that there is no such thing as society. There is, or there *can* be society, but like any organic thing, it has to be nurtured or it will atrophy. I have argued that it cannot, however, be effectively nurtured unless we are willing to make the effort to communicate across (not just within) value positions, trying to understand one another and integrate, which relativism either denies or makes much harder and much less likely.

Closer to home, Carr et al in Scotland specifically discuss CfE's approach to citizenship studies. Arguing strongly against 'bolt-on' conceptions of citizenship, by which they meant citizenship viewed separately from intrinsic education and knowledge, because it failed to see that "good citizens are not merely contingent sites of civic and political knowledge and skills, but rather particular kinds of normative (morally) defined persons" (2006, p18). What was

lacking in CfE according to Carr et al, was a *non*-instrumental conception of education for no other purpose than "personal (in the normative sense) formation" (Carr et al, 2006, p19). Their thesis affirms a common, non-instrumental, moral language in relation to the diffusion of culture and promotion of citizenship.

Chapter 12 has so far examined CfE's delegated, specifically moral kind of values, in relation to thousands of schools, teachers and children who, I have argued, identify and apply them. The latter are, I have suggested, the social moral values children must be made aware of, learn about, and develop; individuated, locally derived and isolated, and by definition largely unknown to each other.

The next, final Section examines CfE's vaguely Aristotelian (quasi-Aristotelian), language. I have variously referred to this as quasi-Aristotelian, or neo-Aristotelian, but have been reluctant to call it virtue ethics in the contemporary sense. This is because while some of CfE's values arguably approximate to some aspects of what Aristotle thought the virtues were, it nonetheless remains vague, implicit, non-committal, and often very un-Aristotelian. CfE's thoroughly blended values seem significantly more 'sociomoral' in Kohlberg's moral psychology sense, than 'virtue-like' in Aristotle's virtue ethics sense.

In relation to Aristotle's all-important notion of character, CfE has nothing to say in fact, preferring to talk about capacities and skills for learning, life and work, rather than moral character or living and faring well in Aristotle's specifically ethical sense. As with Kant and the missing categorical imperatives, Aristotle without settled moral character is less than half the story. In the same vein, wellbeing, although giving its name to the new cross-cutting *Health and Wellbeing* subject, is not at all what Aristotle meant by *eudaimonia*.

12.4: CfE's Values and Aristotle

Aristotle thought we have two soul-parts, intellect and appetites, with two corresponding kinds of virtue, intellectual (of the intellect), and moral (of the appetites). His moral virtues (excellences) are also called virtues of character, thus connecting moral character directly with the appetites it must bring under the management of reason.

Aristotle's virtues, therefore, are inextricably bound up with the notion of character. His twelve 'heroic era' moral virtues were: courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, proper ambition, patience, truthfulness, wittiness, friendliness, modesty, and

righteous indignation. His intellectual virtues included art (technical skill), scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, intuition, resourcefulness, understanding and judgement.

His moral virtues are acquired by repetition, and come about "as a result of habit, whence also its name *ēthikē* is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit)" (1103a). We get the moral virtues by habit not by teaching, by exercising a natural disposition towards virtue. We develop a virtuous character (become ethical), therefore, by habituating the virtues, doing things well, using one's reason.

Concluding Chapter 1, Book 7, he said: "we have practically defined happiness as a sort of living and faring well" (1098b). He says virtue is the excellent quality of the best kind of life, related to both choice and reason. But asks what sort of disposition moral virtue is? One, he says, which "makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well" (1106a). Aristotle's 'best life' does not presuppose any particular moral virtue, and takes the shape, then, of a whole life. He links virtue (human excellence) directly with character, choice and practical wisdom: "Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean … this being determined by reason", he concludes (1107a).

In some ways the *Four Capacities* do seem to approximate to Aristotle's virtues. Its focus is on skills and capacities children will need in the future; thus they vaguely resemble Aristotle's virtues of character (although never said to be). CfE's application of them, furthermore, is not unlike Aristotle's requirement that the virtues come about by action, exercising a disposition towards doing things well. It would be churlish to deny CfE some of this, in particular Aristotle's notion of using one's reason, acting and doing things well (always remembering that CfE's 'reasoning' is not reasoning about the good, personal ethics or character, but largely about moral 'issues' such as abortion).

It would also be a little unfair to question CfE's approach in relation to Aristotle's stress on the need for repetition, and virtues coming about as a result of habit. Clearly, schools can only do so much in the time they have available, and it is very likely they mostly try to exploit their slender opportunities to the full. Furthermore, there is no doubt that CfE aspires to help children *do* well (achieve), in the sense of Aristotle's "makes him do his own work well" (1106a).

The Human Good.

On the other hand, CfE does not at all aspire to help children be 'good', or seek the human good in Aristotle's sense of dispositions which "makes a man good" (1106a). He is very clear that there is a human good. In fact, the human good is the *subject* of his inquiry in the *Ethics*, and is, he says "generally agreed to be happiness" (*eudaimonia*), although what this happiness is will need untangling, he says. He discusses and rejects Plato's 'Form' of good, dismissing Plato's idea of universal good underpinning the goodness of everything.

Aristotle thinks everything has an end and purpose: "every art and every enquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason, the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim" (1094a). His means/end argument ultimately rests on the assumption that the universe itself is ethically motivated however, which many dispute today.

At any event, it is the human good Aristotle wants to know, and says he gets to 'happiness' by considering "the characteristic functions of man" (1097a). Eudaimonia, he concludes, is "activity of soul exhibiting virtue … in a complete life" (1098a), where activity of soul is a kind of rational action and contemplation, "a sort of living and faring well" (1098b), and virtue is therefore what a happy (flourishing), human exhibits in their character.

In his paper *How Aristotelianism Can Become Revolutionary: Ethics, Resistance, and Utopia*, MacIntyre (2008) discusses aspects of Aristotle's 'human good' and 'goods' in relation to children's schooling and development, and the institutions and practices through which it takes place in the West. MacIntyre asks:

> What do we take the goods of childhood to be?' and 'How through achieving the goods of childhood can our children be prepared to achieve later on the goods of adult life?', but also 'What are the virtues of teachers, children and parents? (p3).

MacIntyre (like many others) identifies an over-emphasis on the economy, and the goals of consumption, as significant problems for contemporary school ethics, and the idea of community in modern life: "we inhabit a social order in which a will to satisfy those desires that will enable the economy to work as effectively as possible has become central to our way of life" (p4), he says. Sitting behind his arguments – and indeed his influential 1981 text *After Virtue* – is his belief that modern western societies have largely lost the ability to value and nurture the human good. This critique is highly appropriate for CfE, which my research has repeatedly found to reflect this very problem.

Despite being a critic of G.E. Moore and his intuitionism, in his effort to discuss and understand 'good', MacIntyre arguably pursued a similar aim (in relation to good), albeit arguing from different (Aristotelian) premises. Furthermore, in his emphasis on the 'human' he chimes to some extent with Berlin's 'human semblance' and 'human horizon' thesis: "What is my good *qua* human being and not just *qua* role-player in this or that type of situation?' disappears from view, so that such questions no longer get asked or become very difficult to ask", he argues. In *After Virtue*, he had argued that intuitionism (dominant in the early decades of the twentieth century), had failed to set a coherent moral philosophical agenda, because the idea of community and ethics simply transcend logic and fact.

For MacIntyre, the abandonment of the virtues and loss of a sense of community, had led society into an ethical vacuum. CfE's refusal to discuss the good, or teach virtues to children as part of their education, seems largely consistent with this analysis, and (I have argued), with resulting problems for community and society (which MacIntyre also discusses).

Whether or not Aristotle's teleology was right or wrong, human beings do seem to want to live as though there was some discoverable, final end, meaning, or purpose to the things they do and aspire to. The Curriculum (largely aspirational and over-optimistic though it has appeared), is quite clear that it wants children and young people during their school years, to untangle the meaning of life and establish their own stances on matters of social justice, personal and collective responsibility. There is a comforting, almost Aristotelian well-orderedness and purposefulness about CfE's ambition here, despite never mentioning Aristotle. But we need to look again at the wellbeing value.

Wellbeing: Means or Aristotelian End?

CfE's significant use of the wellbeing term in the *Health and Wellbeing* subject area, wittingly or not (it is hard to say), deploys an important Aristotelian concept. I examined this in terms of its consequential nature in Chapter 10. This Section looks at it semantically, and the degree to which it can be said to encapsulate Aristotle's notion of the 'final end'.

As a concept, wellbeing has the highest profile of any CfE value. The term occurs no less than thirty-one times in the document *A Framework for Learning and Teaching,* which also says the Scottish Government's principal purpose is to "create a more successful Scotland with opportunities for all to flourish through increasing sustainable economic growth" (2008,

p3). There is to be a focus on wellbeing "at every stage" (p4); a "continuing emphasis" (p15); and "responsibility of all practitioners" (p18); who must be "sensitive and responsive to each young person's wellbeing" (p20); it must be developed progressively "at all stages and in a range of contexts" (p33); and be "embedded across the curriculum" (p39). CfE is clearly serious about what it wants here.

The wellbeing term is sometimes translated from Aristotle's notion of *eudaimonia*: a state or condition of 'good spirit', happiness or 'welfare'. Some thinkers, such as Rosalind Hursthouse (1986), combine these terms, describing the idea as an amalgam of wellbeing, happiness and flourishing. During the decade before CfE, some British educationists were arguing for an Aristotelian reading of wellbeing in education, saying schools should enlarge their conception of values education, and cultivate virtues such as "generosity, courage, friendliness, patience as well as inducting into rules against such things as stealing, killing, lying and breaking promises" (White, 1997, p21).

White's contribution was part of a collection of Essays on the moral education theme (on the reading list for Scottish Trainee Teachers). He made two further suggestions: if religion is disintegrating as a justifying moral framework, we should instead confidently inculcate in children a set of values and virtues, without scepticism and without vacillation. Secondly, he thought schools should make "the pupil's own flourishing" (1997, p24) central. His essay connects the work of Bernard Williams (1985) in *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, Nietzsche in *The Genealogy of Morals*, and Aristotle's notion of flourishing (wellbeing), arguing that education should give children a more rounded picture of their own wellbeing.

Whether or not CfE's architects knew of White's thesis, CfE did indeed embrace a larger conception of values (but not virtues), and beyond doubt adopted a concept of children's wellbeing in its new HWB subject area. The question is whether CfE's concept is at all Aristotelian (CfE certainly does not say it is), and to what extent if at all, CfE's notion is anything like Aristotle's notion of human flourishing? The following analysis suggests hardly at all.

CfE's Wellbeing: Eudemonic, or Consequentialist?

For Aristotle wellbeing was never a means to something else, but a way of living expressed in a whole life, the final end. A key statement is:

> Since there are evidently more than one end, and we choose some of these … for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends are final ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore, if there is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking … we call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be. (1097a).

At the surface level of language, CfE's wellbeing perhaps approximates to Aristotle's term. Its wellbeing notion might then, be what *we* are hoping for; a substantial ethical meaning of CfE's notion. In the above passage, however, Aristotle thinks eudaimonia (wellbeing) is something final, a final 'end' in fact, something desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. And a little later as something "self-sufficient the end of action" (1097b). Having started his argument asking what the human good is, and what the highest of all goods achievable by action is, he concludes that it is eudaimonia, happiness (wellbeing), a sort of "living well and faring well" (1098b).

CfE says in many places and ways that it wants children to be happy, and education to be enjoyable. Although for Aristotle there are different views about what happiness is, his emphasis is always on just persons not just states of mind, and on the enduring character of the actor rather than individual actions (one swallow does not make a summer, he says). Important though actions are, he makes the point that people often do just acts without being just people. He is concerned about the character of the actor not merely the action.

Aristotle's wellbeing is "desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else" (107a), and is not, therefore, the instrumental kind that concludes on the basis of the consequences produced by the action. Neither is it Plato's sovereign good existing in a realm beyond. For Aristotle the focus is the best life that can be had on earth, and on the settled character of an actor.

Immediately it can be seen that this is a very different concept from CfE's notion. For CfE it is largely a means not an end, (to effective learning; to promote a capacity to benefit from education, and etc., see Chapter 10), not something final or an end in itself, still less the final end. In CfE, we saw that the wellbeing of each child and young person is arguably a state of feeling healthy and happy, a state of complete physical and mental wellbeing. Some

scholars think Aristotle's eudaimonia included mental states, but all seem to agree that it is far more than that, and refers to a complete life.

The *Nicomachean Ethics* is literally the study of character (Irwin, 2012), making settled dispositions towards the world fundamental. Wellbeing for Aristotle was, then, something final without qualification, desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. CfE's learning in *Health and Wellbeing*, on the other hand, is a means for the development of "knowledge and understanding, skills, capabilities and attributes which [children] need for mental, emotional, social and physical wellbeing now and in the future" (HWB Principles and Practices, p1).

A straight-forward application of Aristotle's notion for CfE (expressed in CfE's consumerist idiom), might, for example, say that future economic prosperity is one of many means to human wellbeing (Aristotle does argue this), i.e., the exact opposite of CfE's usage, which makes wellbeing a means to economic prosperity. But CfE's wellbeing notion is largely instrumentalist and consequentialist, and the consequences have seemed largely politically and economically motivated, as opposed to Aristotle's ethical interpretation, where prosperity is not unimportant, but always a means to the human end; never the ethical end itself. Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia "is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else" (1097a).

Understanding this upending of Aristotle's means/ends argument helps us to understand more about CfE's skills agenda. The focus of CfE's 'ends' – education and employment – flipped and became 'employment and education', and the means to achieve them – knowledge and skills – inverted to support the new emphasis. Knowledge, either for its own sake or to equip children for life and work is arguably not CfE's prime focus. Young people would be forgiven for thinking they must learn and live to work, rather than work to live and learn. Skills dominate, and knowledge is arguably a convenient means to develop (knowledge economy) skills.

Wellbeing in CfE largely seems to function as yet another useful pedagogic tool, to facilitate and harness the effective use of knowledge for the inculcation of workplace skills. It does not, however, seem to function as Aristotle's fundamental principle of character, the final end, so that children might live well.

Overall, CfE can be said to have made a quarter-turn to virtue at most, deploying the language of wellbeing, and some aspects of children's moral and intellectual development, but not the spirit of Aristotle's ethics. For Aristotle, finding the human good was *the* purpose of his ethical enquiry. CfE, however, has often appeared to be no longer even looking for the good, let alone trying to discuss, understand or explain it to children. If so, this seems a shame, because many writers and thinkers from Plato to our own day, have thought the idea of good is essential to the best kind of life and society.

12.5: CfE's Values and Ethics, Concluding Remarks

There are obviously a large number of policy and educational values specific to CfE's core business of learning and teaching, and many other kinds of values – spiritual, civic, aesthetic, political, environmental, entrepreneurial and human rights to name but some. The three kinds I focus on: policy, educational, and the moral kind, have helped me understand more about CfE's embedded values and ethics. The moral kind of values have constantly appeared social and moral in a Kohlbergian, cognitive-developmental sense.

The thesis marshals evidence to support the suggestion that prevailing moral value relativism led CfE to delegate social moral values to around 4,500+ schools and early learning centres, 54,000+ teachers, and 790,000+ pupils, that is, to a twenty-first century, 'customary morality' (identified by society dynamics, education dynamics, children and young people themselves).

Why is this a problem? We want our children to choose their values after all, and paternalism has often been seen (by Kant, Berlin and many others), as among the worst of all oppressions. The problem, I suggest, paraphrasing MacIntyre (2008), is that abandoning good and the virtues left CfE in an ethical vacuum. But good, bad, right and wrong arguably exist whether or not CfE wants to acknowledge or talk about them with children. In educational settings, the missing concept has been described as "personal (in the normative sense) formation" (Carr et al, 2006, p19).

The impact on society of CfE's moral individualism is also likely to be a problem. According to MacIntyre (2008), over-emphasis on the economy and the goals of consumption, are significant problems for ethics, and the idea of community in modern life.

Different moral content discussed by different children, in different schools and localities, risks erosion of the shared knowledge and understanding many writers think is necessary for an effectively functioning society. Berlin for example, thought shared forms of cultural life are necessary for decent society. Gramsci argued that for a cohesive culture to exist, intercommunication and critical truths, not individual elaboration of ideas were essential. CfE's neo-liberal individualism, however, has seemed somewhat at odds with Berlin's communitarian-liberal balance, or Gramsci's call for a shared intellectual and moral order.

Wellbeing became a headline CfE concept, tantalisingly reminiscent of Aristotle's notion of eudaimonia. When examined however, CfE's use has largely appeared to be a means to effective learning, not an end, still less Aristotle's 'final end'. It does not, therefore, correlate with Aristotle's notion of character-based human flourishing (wellbeing). Furthermore, CfE does not at all aspire to help children be 'good', or seek the human good in Aristotle's sense of dispositions which make someone good, or in any other sense.

This completes Chapter 12, and (final) PART III of the thesis, critically examining and applying its value pluralism, consequentialism, developmental (Kantian) ethics, and the social moral values themselves, including tenuous links to Aristotle's ethics. The final chapter summarises some of the main findings of the project, together with implications for CfE values and embedded ethics.

Key Findings and Ramifications

Chapter Abstract

The final chapter summarises twenty significant findings for CfE's values and its *ethics 101+*: for consequentialism, value pluralism, developmentalism, and CfE's social moral values. Each finding is stated in the form of a conclusion to an argument, together with Chapter and page references to the evidence and arguments supporting it, and is followed by a brief summary of the central argument. The findings are summarised in Table 8 below.

The thesis has worked in gaps between the values and ethics articulated and/or suggested in the documentary record, and what has been written about them, making connections to unravel the puzzles. Twenty findings are identified, but many others would benefit from further investigation.

Does the Curriculum have an ethics? Psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan theorised the human subject as essentially lacking, supposing itself to have lost its being; in meaning but retaining a trace of being. And yet it must assume a position in what he called the symbolic order (the Big OTHER; language; the collective unconscious). This is a useful analogy of CfE's ethics; there but not there, retaining a trace of 'being'; necessarily becoming something in the language in which it must speak itself in the documentary record.

CfE certainly speaks about values; but if a particular ethics only exists if or when a school, teacher, or child brings it to the surface, the question whether it is there at all must be asked.

The answer I proffer, not unlike Lacan's divided subject, is yes and no: yes in that each of the elements of the *ethics 101+* do actually manifest in the record, if at times only like Freudian slips of the tongue. And yes in the fact that CfE's social moral values do exist in the collective conscious (and unconscious) minds of schools, teachers and children. But no in its ethical neutrality; its reluctance to discuss, explain, or argue for the existence of a human good, and in its refusal, arguably, to clarify and clearly articulate a distinctively human, ethical dimension for children.

Table 8 below, sets out twenty headline findings in summary form.

Table 8.

Headline findings of the research linked to chapters and chapter sections.

Headline Finding	Chapter
1. <u>CfE's Consequentialist Values and Ethics</u> **The Curriculum does have an ethical agenda, but it is surreptitious, instrumentalist and consequentialist, largely supporting political and economic purposes.**	
1. Strategic excellence and unabashed instrumentalist policies seamlessly connected Scottish education to *National Priorities*.	6.2 & 6.3
2. The *Four Capacities* arguably construct a strategic pathway from stakeholders, via education to *National Priorities*.	6.2, 6.3 & 10.1
3. The ethical value of education shifted significantly away from intrinsic, towards extrinsic ends.	5.2, 5.3, 6.1 & 10.1
4. Moral knowledge itself is largely functionalised to extrinsic ends.	5.4 & 10.1
5. CfE's wellbeing stands in for a very wide range of concepts and categories.	10.2
2. **<u>CfE's Value Pluralism</u>** **Relativist accounts of value pluralism permeated education and society as CfE was being conceived. CfE largely assumes a relativist view of plural values.**	
6. Value pluralism arguably impacts CfE's ethics at two distinct levels, not one.	7.1 & 9.1
7. The consensus-based approach to values misses the pluralist point.	7.1 & 9.1
8. The delegation of morals to all schools and teachers is the very essence of value pluralism.	3.2 & 9.1
9. Relativist accounts of value pluralism arguably work against human understanding.	7.4 & 9.2
10. Human differences are bridgeable and human understanding is possible.	7.4 & 9.2
3. <u>CfE's Developmental Values and Ethics</u> **Moral developmentalism's lack of ethical content contributed to CfE's surreptitious ethical agenda, its adoption of a neutral ethica stance, and avoidance of personal normative ethics.**	
11. CfE's moral developmentalism is a blended and adapted form of developmental theory.	2.3, 8.1, 8.2
12. A problematic religious practices-beliefs-values-action moral continuum is used in RME.	11.1
13. RME moral 'issues' emphasise internalised moral judgement and reasoning about applied ethics, not personal (normative) moral action and behaviour.	11.1 & 11.2
14. CfE's aspiration for children to develop their own social justice and other ethical stances is too optimistic.	8.1 & 11.1
15. CfE seems to promote a cut-down Kantian moral law minus duty and the categorical imperatives.	11.2
4. <u>CfE's Social Moral Values</u> **CfE's delegation of social moral values recognises and perfectly fits a sceptical, individualised, relativist neo-liberal Scottish society and customary morality.**	
16. CfE/RME social moral values can be theorised as secondary principles minus first principle support.	3.2
17. For ninety per cent of school leavers, any values discussed are likely to be broad, general and religiously framed.	4.1, 4.3 & 4.4
18. CfE's ethically isolated schools and teachers can be said to inscribe in themselves a power relation, but risk the foreclosure of society.	12.3
19. CfE's values resemble the letter but not the spirit of Aristotle's ethics.	12.4
20. CfE's blended *ethics 101+* operate at the intersection of personal, social, philosophical, psychological, political and intellectual life.	3.3 & Findings

I. *CfE's Consequentialist Values and Ethics*

Key Finding:
The Curriculum does have an ethical agenda, but it is surreptitious, instrumentalist, and consequentialist, largely supporting political and economic purposes (see Chapters 6, 10, and 12).

A principal aim of the Curriculum is clearly stated in the record, as bringing about consequential good states of affairs for children, society and the nation, to support national economic growth. The instrumentalising of moral education arguably captures a materialist, consumerist spirit of the age, but does little to help children see themselves, and others, as persons, as distinct centres of consciousness with the capacity to think, reason and feel, and contemplate intrinsic ends worth living for.

There are five headline findings in relation to CfE's consequentialism.

1. **Strategic excellence and unabashed instrumentalist policies seamlessly connected Scottish education to *National Priorities* (see Chapter 6, pp104-105, and pp108-114).**

CfE correlates well with Michael Schiro's *Social Efficiency* thesis, where schooling exists to meet the needs of society, "to train youth in the skills and procedures they will need in the workplace and at home" (2013, p5). It also correlates well with Whitty (2013), who argues that neo-liberal individualism and competition exposes western societies to the danger of being captured by a discourse of marketisation.

CfE can be said to mirror a private sector business plan, replete with vision, strategy values, mission, and learning targets. The intrinsic, ethical worth of education, and moral education, was however, arguably overtaken by an emphasis on extrinsic employment skills.

I cite RMPS and the *Four Capacities* as examples of consequences taking precedence over intrinsic education purposes, because their instrumentalist gaze is largely on the world of work and vocational consequences. Intrinsic value thus moved from moral knowledge learning to workplace skill consequences.

2. **The *Four Capacities* arguably construct a strategic pathway from stakeholders, via education to *National Priorities* (see Chapter 6, pp108-111, and Chapter 12, pp226-230).**

CfE statements suggest the purpose of the *Four Capacities* are much wider than the education of the young. They focus strongly on employment, but it is not clear where many

fine aspirations lead for children's learning, because they are not supported by any clear pedagogic programme translating CfE's 'mission' into learning progression.

I argue that from the outset CfE was intended to link New Labour's 'new stakeholders', via schools, to a larger national picture, strategically beyond the education theatre. The Capacities can then be understood as a picture of what success might look like, rather than a planned programme of learning emerging organically from education philosophy concepts. CfE states that they set out its educational purposes. Given their lack of learning metrics, however, I suggest they often seem more like a (consequentialist) calculation by politicians, demonstrating the benefits of government policy to a voting public, than a coherent statement of educational purpose.

According to many thinkers and writers cited, bottom-up philosophical, conceptual theorising about education and learning, is a missing but necessary part of CfE development. If so, vision statements should probably not be confused with day-to-day education activities, performance and learning. The OECD's repeated requirement for CfE to define indicators aligned to the Capacities' vision, and its implications for student progress and learning, is unlikely, therefore, to go away, or be quick or simple for CfE to put right.

3. **The ethical value of education shifted significantly away from intrinsic, towards extrinsic ends (see Chapter 10, pp195-199).**

The OECD thought education should be for students not subjects, but Scottish education has seemed as much for Scotland's economy, as students. The ethical balance between education *as* the good and education *for* the good, arguably moved significantly away from the former towards instrumental goods *for* society, the economy and national economic growth. Viewed ethically, this rebalancing of academic and vocational activities arguably moved value decisively away from the intrinsic to the extrinsic worth of education.

I argue that the ethical context and spirit of CfE, thus became overtly instrumentalised, focused more on vocational skills than knowledge or moral knowledge. The value schools and teachers attribute to their day-to-day tasks is now more likely to be instrumental and extrinsically valuable, than intrinsically valuable. This seems a shame, because humans seem to thrive on the belief that their efforts are intrinsically valuable. Value is like a zero-sum game; a gain for one category is likely to be a loss in another, in this case a loss for intrinsicality, and if so for ethics itself.

This value trade-off seems to have been forced by the collision of intrinsic and extrinsic priorities. Final value majorly resides elsewhere, and cannot therefore also reside in academic learning and knowledge for its own sake. Scottish education, I suggest, must have become significantly more *non*-finally valuable.

4. **Moral knowledge itself is largely functionalised to extrinsic ends (see Chapter 10, pp191-199).**

My argument here is that the major focus of moral learning in CfE, is not to help children learn how to live well, but to get a job. RME/RMPS became vehicles for teaching workplace skills, such as how to investigate, synthesise, and do business communications.

The instrumental role of moral knowledge is emphasised in documents far more often, and more emphatically than ethics. Applied ethics reasoning about moral issues such as crime and punishment, environmental and medical ethics, is there, but has been largely functionalised and de-personalised, thus shunted away from personal normative ethics, onto issues of special ethical concern such as euthanasia and abortion.

I suggest CfE is (surreptitiously) defining the indefinable, committing the naturalistic fallacy, implicitly seeing children's good in terms of natural objects such as skills, employment, and national economic growth. The bearers of value became the things skills make possible, confusing the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction.

Why should children receive a moral education at all? Is it because ethics and moral knowledge are good in themselves, or because they are instrumentally good? This evaluative aspect of moral education is problematic in CfE. What it is for a child to be a person, facilitating a usually uncomfortable personal ethical struggle about this, seems to get lost somewhere under the press of tangible workplace benefits, and religious scepticism.

5. **CfE's wellbeing stands in for a very wide range of concepts and categories (see Chapter 10, pp185-191).**

I suggest that wellbeing in CfE assumes a largely consequentialist, neo-liberal character, and is not so much about children flourishing ethically, as the development of their social and economic usefulness to society. The record says wellbeing is a means to promote conducive learning environments, and a physical and mental state of feeling healthy and happy, holding up everything that follows in children's education. As such, it is arguably a

paradigm example of a consequentialist value.

CfE's wellbeing can be seen as a classic floating signifier, always changing, resisting precise conceptual thought. It can mean whatever its use in language happens to be, but its looseness, lack of precision and sliding linguistic character make it impossible to pin down. The Curriculum largely seems to adopt meanings in accordance with the political and economic priorities of the day, and education requirements, focusing on consequential states of affairs and WHO connotations.

A positive psychology thesis promoting children's happiness emerged at the time of CfE's conception, correlating strongly with CfE's focus on children 'enjoying' their education, being happy, and avoiding uncomfortable struggles with difficult to understand knowledge. The latter, however, has been seen as the only way to strengthen long-term memory, and anyway, will be children's constant experience in adult life. Why, then, deprive them of the chance to learn how to struggle successfully at school?

II. CfE's Value Pluralism

Key Finding:
Relativist accounts of pluralism permeated education and society as CfE was being conceived. CfE largely assumes a relativist view of plural values (see Chapters 7 and 9).

The pluralism argument is that relativist accounts of value pluralism are an assumed, but largely unarticulated contextual element of CfE's values and ethics. Relativism in Scotland's plural society seems to be largely taken for granted however, and its impact on values education is not addressed. I suggest this is arguably an elephant in CfE's ethical room. Cultural diversity and rights are discussed, but all-important meta-ethical problems of clashing incommensurable social values receive little or no attention.

There are five headline findings in relation to CfE's value pluralism.

6. **Value pluralism arguably impacts CfE's ethics at two distinct levels, not one (see Chapter 7, pp120-124).**

I identify a significant body of value pluralist theory arguably sitting behind CfE's cultural diversity agenda. This impacts the Curriculum at a surface level of variety of different kinds of thing, but also a deeper meta-ethical level of moral value pluralism, and perceived relativism. The latter meta-ethics are not included in RME or HWB Es&Os, yet both elements, I suggest, are constitutive of Scotland's largely relativist customary morality.

Homogeneity of values is almost certainly decreasing year on year. It is not clear however, that merely urging values such as tolerance on children, can build understanding about the complexities and confusions the plurality of values generate. Concentrating on diversity is, I suggest, not enough, because underlying causes of incompatible human values, and how to avoid relativist assumptions about them (which I argue work against human understanding), do not appear to be addressed.

A Berlinian value pluralist perspective suggests children's culturally diverse patterns of life, meanings, and their causes, differ with each situation and the needs of every child, soluble only in contexts specific to their unique circumstances. Extrapolating from Berlin's theory, solutions could then be tailored to unique situations, involving children's participation and imagination; tolerance and mutual respect; dialogue and communication.

7. The consensus-based approach to plural values misses the pluralist point (see Chapter 7, pp121-124).

I argue that consensus may be a necessary, but is not a sufficient response to diversity issues, because it cannot take account of all children's values and needs. All attempts to establish shared values (such as the NFVEC's Statement of Shared Values), miss the pluralist point, because uniformity and homogeneity are the very things value pluralism resists. The aim in discussing value pluralism would not, therefore, be to arrive at definitive answers, but to work with particular issues of personal and public concern, in each particular setting and locality, acknowledging that there is no single right way of dealing with them, and anyway a particular solution may not be available.

Working through differences without demanding homogeneity, allied to avoidance of intolerance, prejudice, sectarianism and discrimination would be the value pluralist way. This approach could arguably transform the experience of some children who find themselves in a minority group of whatever kind, cultural, sexual, racial or simply different. Positive stress on bridges between people and communities, rather than barriers and differences, and on a common humanity despite cultural differences, seem particularly appropriate for contemporary plural societies such as Scotland.

8. The delegation of morals to all schools and teachers is the very essence of value pluralism (see Chapter 7, pp120-121, and 123-125).

The Curriculum talks about values of all kinds, but does not, itself, have a view about

whether any of them are good, or even what good is. I have argued that delegating morals to others leaves CfE without an ethics of its own. The general perception among many educationists at the time of CfE's birth, seems to have been that homogeneity of moral outlook had become impossible. Relativist accounts of value plurality seemed to many to have broken through (religious, sexual, ethnic) cultural barriers.

Graham Haydon at London University's *Institute of Education* suggested, for example, that ethics had become "just a matter of opinion" (1993, p4). Lack of clarity about values arguably became part of an educational orthodoxy of the day. On the surface this largely manifested in religious and cultural complexity and diversity. At a deeper level, however, relativist accounts of plurality seem to have become the everyday assumption of educators. CfE's delegation of social moral values, I have suggested, was a major result.

All of this is, however, is the very essence of value pluralism; investing in the values of the many not the ideal formulations of society, education, religion or any particular ethical system. Delegation and relativism can be theorised as two sides of the same relativist-pluralist coin, allowing CfE to turn relativist-plural 'necessity', into individualised-curriculum 'virtue'.

9. Relativist accounts of value pluralism arguably work against human understanding (see Chapter 7, pp136-140, and Chapter 9, pp172-176).

I argue here that relativism risks children growing up behind prison walls of their own value-sets; windowless boxes of their own viewpoints and scales of value. I suggest that it could leave them struggling to imagine what the world looks like from the perspective of the 'other', or appreciate things from another point of view.

Acknowledging the incompatibility of plural values at all levels; between faith groups, different sexualities, ethnicities as well as within a single human being, is hard ('agonistic' according to one theorist). It becomes much harder however, if all ends are equal because there is little or no reason to try. Humans tend to need reasons to do things, especially when their values and ways of life are at stake.

Berlin argued that rules, values and principles must yield to each other in varying degrees, in specific situations. But how can principles 'yield' if they are not discussed, balanced, argued for and against, clarified and mutually understood? But why would anyone yield, or even seek a dialogue at all, if all value claims are equal as relativism claims? Bridging

this gulf between people is part of Berlin's oeuvre and case against relativism.

10. Human differences are bridgeable, and human understanding is possible (see Chapter 7, pp143-148, and Chapter 9, pp175-179).

Berlin argued that intercommunication between cultures and individuals is possible, because what makes them human is common. I argue that instead of just discussing applied ethics, CfE could discuss with children how this works, why it matters, and think more about shared forms of cultural and social life, what they are and why they may be important.

Children understanding that if they want a decent society there will have to be trade-offs, and real sacrifices when, not if values clash, seems a powerful pedagogic principle ready to be exploited; unendingly challenging but necessary. Arguably, it could facilitate children's interaction, understanding and communication; help them transcend not merely acknowledge and tolerate diversity, and move beyond mutual differences to compromise, rather than stay immersed in conflict over their clashing values.

Berlin's thesis suggests that human differences are bridgeable, especially when children learn how to imagine what life might be like for others. Communicating, sympathising, understanding and integrating, rather than concealment, indifference, confusion and separation, is how his human horizon works. The bridge is essentially human understanding.

We share a common humanity; a horizon encircles us all, orienting and facilitating human interaction, transcending culture, tastes and circumstances. In today's super-sensitised clashing values around race, gender and sex, what could be more relevant than responding to other children's hopes, desires, fears and fantasies, and understanding more about why their outlooks and ways of life matter to them?

III. CfE's Developmental Values and Ethics

Key Finding:
Moral developmentalism's lack of ethical content contributed to CfE's surreptitious ethical agenda, to its adoption of a neutral ethical stance, and the avoidance of personal normative ethics.

CfE's five RME developmental Levels correlate roughly with Millar's five-stage adaptation of Piaget and Kohlberg's moral trajectory, from heteronomy towards moral autonomy. Both Piaget and Kohlberg built their systems on the Kantian form of ethics,

however, for whom, according to Warnock (1987), concepts of good, bad, right and wrong are not in fact topics of knowledge, because they reside in Kant's noumenal world of things in themselves, which is outside the world of all possible knowledge.

For Kant there is no pre-existing moral content, only duty, concentrating on the structure of moral judgements, and internalised, formalistic moral reasoning. As Warburton (2000), states, this does not help us (children and young people) know precisely what to 'do'.

There are five headline findings in relation to CfE's moral developmentalism.

11. CfE's moral developmentalism is a blended and adapted form of developmental theory (see Chapter 8, pp152-155).

I argue that CfE's developmental ethics rest on a Piaget/Kohlberg cognitive-developmental mix, itself resting on the Kantian form of ethics. Kant, Piaget, Kohlberg, Millar, plus other lesser-known research, mingle and jostle for position in RME Es&Os. Neither Piaget or Kohlberg seem to have differentiated clearly between moral psychology and moral philosophy, however, reinterpreting ethical terms such as moral realism and moral facts (Piaget), using moral philosophy to inform the interpretation of empirical research (Kohlberg).

Moral psychology and moral philosophy are not easily combinable however; they make different assumptions about ethics and human experience, in particular moral psychology emphasizes experimental research findings, reason, and the mind almost exclusively. Moral philosophy also utilizes conceptual analysis and reason, but also focuses on concrete moral action.

I suggest the confusion of terms is made more problematic, because in CfE ethical detail is largely implicit not explicit; concepts and categories are blurred and often concealed, and there is little or no explanation for schools and teachers regarding complex cognitive-developmental theory.

12. A problematic religious practices-beliefs-values-action moral continuum is used in RME (see Chapter 11, pp205-207).

I suggest that one of the results of not being a specified curriculum, and of CfE's strategic 'generality', seems to have been an over-simplification of complex cognitive developmental connections between religious practices, beliefs, human values and actions.

Piaget's research focus was on how children's minds codify norms and reflect upon

the nature of moral action. CfE/RME does not distinguish between this internalised reasoning and moral action viewed by philosophy, for example, as moral conduct, action, and behaviour. It seems, rather, to conflate Piaget's 'verbal and practical thought', with moral motivation as theorised by philosophy, into an internalised, reliable 'beliefs-values-action' moral continuum.

A well-rehearsed philosophical debate focuses on internalism versus externalism, and Humean versus anti-Humean understandings, however, internalists arguing that moral thought is motivating externalists denying this. Either CfE is simply referring to Piaget's 'judgement' about moral action, in which case it does not say so, and arguably suggests otherwise, or there is a very long and disputed philosophical history around the notion of moral motivation, which by no means allows the straight-forward internal, reliable connections CfE assumes.

13. RME moral issues emphasise internalised moral judgement and reasoning about applied ethics, not personal (normative) moral behaviour and action (see Chapter 11, pp218-219, and Chapter 12, pp231-232).

I argue that discussing issues of special ethical concern, such as euthanasia and abortion, is not quite the same thing as knowing how to be personally ethical, or how to treat other people. Internalised moral reasoning about moral issues such as the environment or medical ethics is fine, but human beings acting for the good also requires personal (normative) ethical decision, choice and action.

CfE's social moral values correlate strongly with Kohlberg's sociomoral values and oughts. The *Review Group* seems to assume that schools will adopt something like this stance towards social justice issues (social facts), personal and collective responsibility (values and oughts). I have argued that CfE's RME pedagogy is largely psychologically framed around cognitive-developmental judgement and reasoning, rather than philosophically grounded on the importance of personal moral action.

14. CfE's aspiration for children to develop their own social justice and other ethical stances is too optimistic (see Chapter 11, pp210-212).

Kohlberg claimed universal status for his findings, and cast a realistic if somewhat deflationary light over moral levels likely to be achieved. In his theory some teenagers will leave school still at the most basic pre-conventional Level 1, reached by most children under

9. Most will reach conventional Level 2; none, however, will have reached post-conventional Level 3, and most adults never reach it.

The problem, then, is that insofar as CfE follows what has been described as the most influential post-war educational moral psychology theory in the West (i.e. Kohlberg's), CfE's aspiration for adolescents to establish their own stances on matters of social justice, personal and collective responsibility, before leaving school, is at best optimistic, at worst unlikely. According to Kohlberg's theory no one reaches the age at which morality can become self-accepted moral principles (his level 3), until age 20. This puts CfE's improbable optimism, into perspective, calling into question how true to life it is.

15. CfE seems to promote a cut-down Kantian moral law minus duty and the categorical imperatives (see Chapter 11, pp213-215).

That Kant's moral law includes a rational process of reasoning is universally agreed. The problem for CfE, I argue, is not this, but that it seems to do only this. Shorn of categorical imperatives universalising a self-imposed moral law in relation to personal ethics, and Kant's concept of duty, CfE's reasoning about moral issues arguably lacks traction on the world. Reason on its own is only part of what Kant thought was needed to make the moral law practical.

Kant thought there was such a thing as good, but that it was one thing alone, a pure good will robbed of every inducement, minus every inclination, where every material principle is removed. He focused on what it is that makes an action moral and a person morally good. His ethics rest on notions of a good will, duty, and the categorical imperatives. Human action itself without the slightest addition of interests is what is morally good.

None of this CfE identifies, adopting a developmental approach that focuses on young people's reasoning about applied ethics. CfE's rationalism seems largely a half-way Kantian house. Formalistic reasoning minus the moral law can take children only so far towards knowing how to act and treat each other; but Kant thought the moral law must be practical.

IV. CfE's Values and Ethics

Key Finding:
CfE's delegation of social moral values recognises and perfectly fits a sceptical, individualised, relativist, neo-liberal Scottish society and customary morality (see Chapters 3, 4 and 12).

There are many kinds of values, and many kinds in CfE. Its values have, however, have consistently appeared blended and blurred. I identify three main kinds: policy, educational and social moral, and have argued that the latter, specifically moral kind, are delegated to schools, teachers and children themselves.

Foucault's critique of modern government and institutions, helps us to understand more about CfE's delegation choice, and resultant individualism, because if he is right, there was already an entrenched but masked individualism in modern society. His panoptic metaphor, furthermore, suggests why Scotland's government might have had reasons to individualise schools. By doing so schools arguably 'inscribe in themselves' a governmental power relation, to use Foucault's phrase.

I have argued, however, that one of the problems of such individualism, is that despite commonalities around organisational and educational values, and a strengthening human rights agenda, the delegation of social moral values means children throughout Scotland are likely to be confronted with a vast array of different moral and ethical values and principles (the 'customary morality' in fact). This lack of common social values has been seen by social and political theorists, however, to risk erosion of the shared forms of cultural and social life necessary for an effectively functioning society.

There are five headline findings in relation to CfE's values and ethics.

16. CfE/RME social moral values can be theorised as secondary principles minus first principle support (see Chapter 3, pp65-69).

Arguably, CfE does not have an ethics of its own (other than a surreptitious one). A few largely religious, exemplified values are used to contextualise and facilitate the social moral values of thousands of schools, teachers, and children, which I identify with what Mill called a 'customary morality' lacking philosophical justification, the handed down secondary moral principles of a multitude, lacking first principle justification.

Can Mill's 'secondary principles' be said to be values? I also argue that the evidence for Mill's secondary principles including, if not actually *being* what today we call values, seems compelling. He says his secondary principles lead to all rational creatures making their minds up about right and wrong, wise and foolish. Values seem to do this. Why, then, cannot Mill's secondary principles be thought of as a 'system of value' on which ends of life are based in,

for example, Berlin's sense (2013a, p1)?

17. For ninety per cent of school leavers, any values discussed are likely to be broad, general and religiously framed (see Chapter 4, pp88-90).

Around 10% of children select Senior Phase RMPS; for the 90% therefore, Junior Phase RME must be seen as their values-education core. Despite the largescale retreat of religion as a justifying framework for the moral, CfE's children are still learning about values within a quasi-religious framework, which (according to ScotCen analysis), will soon to be discarded by 80% of them. The argument CfE makes, that RME is fundamental to families and the fabric of society, and therefore should be part of education, is a logical *non sequitur* however; its conclusion does not follow from the premisses given.

Millar (1972) asked if it was wise to link morals so closely with religion, because an adolescent rejecting religion, his Report argued, may also consider that to be consistent he has to abandon morals as well. The problem of locating morals within an 'Early Years' (formative) religious framework, and then removing the framework on which it was built, seems particularly risky in an age of rapid religious decline and moral scepticism..

As Euthyphro discovered, it is likely the gods call things good because they *are* good. But CfE has nothing at all to say about good. RME 'contexts for thinking', and value 'examples', are never said to be good. For these and other reasons, CfE's social moral values have seemed to have an ambiguous, transitional character, no longer wholly religious, no longer intrinsic to education, and no longer a set of Curriculum specified moral standards. This, I argue, ends up dodging the ethical (Pring, 2012, p157).

18. CfE's ethically isolated schools and teachers can be said to inscribe in themselves a power relation, but risk the foreclosure of society (see Chapter 12, pp232-238).

Merely responding to individualism in modern society arguably makes shared forms of life less likely, because a minimum of shared knowledge seems to be fundamental for an effective social world. An unavoidable consequence of the delegation of values to all, is that in their ethically isolated local bubbles, schools do not know what others are identifying; even individual teachers in the same school may not know what each other are prioritising in the hidden, informal curriculum in their respective classrooms. Individualised so effectively, values arguably lack the unifying role they might otherwise play in nurturing a cohesive

society and community.

Foucault's critique helps to explain a very strong relation of fitting between CfE's approach and individualised neo-liberal society. I suggest CfE's delegation of values merely removed one of the masks concealing the fact, and that Scottish education viewed in this way is likely to be caught up in the kind of hegemonic, socio-political forces Foucault identifies.

Under New Labour, public sector outcomes were constantly being articulated, becoming part of the very language of BGE 'outcomes' for children. I suggest that schools watched from the centre, and subject to inspection, have learned to inscribe in themselves a governmental power relation (maximising the efficiency of government and power as Foucault puts it).

19. CfE's values resemble the letter but not the spirit of Aristotle's ethics (see Chapter 12, pp241-248).

I argue that CfE made at best a quarter-turn to virtue, because Aristotelian virtue is about much more than the language of excellence, or even doing particular excellent things. His 'best life' includes human virtues but does not presuppose any particular moral virtue, and takes the shape, rather, of a whole life well-lived. It is linked directly with character, choice and practical wisdom: "Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean … this being determined by reason", he concludes (Nicomachean Ethics, 1107a).

Some values and skills in the *Four Capacities* do vaguely resemble Aristotle's virtues. To what extent they are learned must remain uncertain however, because the *Capacities* lack pedagogic (learning) progression. Furthermore, CfE does not aspire to help children be 'good' or seek a human good in Aristotle's sense (of dispositions which make someone good). Neither does its notion of wellbeing accord with Aristotle's notion of human flourishing. In CfE wellbeing is largely a means to effective learning, not an end, still less Aristotle's final end (eudaimonia).

I suggest the upending of Aristotle's means/ends argument helps us understand more about CfE's skills agenda, because the focus of CfE's 'ends' – education and employment – flipped and became 'employment and education', and the means' to achieve them – knowledge and skills – inverted to support the new emphasis.

20. CfE's blended *ethics 101+* operate at the intersection of personal, social, philosophical, psychological, political and intellectual life (see immediately below, pp265-267).

It seems completely incoherent to try and hold together consequential states of affairs, developmental stages resting on Kantian formalistic reasoning, value pluralism, and a much diluted version of Aristotle's ethics; not to mention the social moral values of all schools, teachers, children, and six different World Religions. This is of course unmix-able and, I suggest, only really understandable in terms of CfE's facilitation of a hopelessly blended *ethics 101+*. It would be well to remember two things, however.

First, CfE's ethics are articulated at a very high level of generalisation, making system principles largely invisible, while facilitating local choice and decision. Values and ethics have often seemed to float above detail, in the same way the visible tip of icebergs conceal hidden volume. What I have identified therefore, seem to be the tips of four different kinds of largely hidden ethics.

Second, the ethical systems are not combined as one combines ingredients in a cake. The *ethics 101+* are a basket of options schools and teachers dive under the surface to retrieve if/as required, not a straightforward mixture of conceptual components. In a kind of discursive psychoanalysis, CfE has often seemed to facilitate access to a wide range of (suppressed/repressed) theoretical perspectives.

If, however, a particular ethics only exists if a school or teacher brings it up, the question arises whether it is there at all. The answer I proffer is yes and no: yes in that each element I identify does seem to manifest in some way in the record, if at times only like Freudian slips of the tongue. And yes in that CfE's social moral (Scottish) values do exist in the collective conscious (and unconscious) of all schools, teachers and children (i.e. Scottish society, or the *Review Group's* 'Scottish social values'). But no in its ethical neutrality; its reluctance to acknowledge, discuss, argue for or admit an ethical good, or clearly articulate a distinctively human ethical dimension for children.

Concluding Remarks.

The thesis argues that *Curriculum for Excellence* is a thoroughly blended mixture of values and embedded (implicit) ethics. I suggest its neutral stance in relation to good, and delegation of values and ethics to thousands of schools, teachers and children, are arguably

outgrowths of a relativistic, neo-liberal milieu into which it was born. I suggest too, that resulting individualism facilitates a potentially infinite proliferation of social moral viewpoints, downplaying shared cultural forms of life and knowledge, ultimately promoting the foreclosure of society.

Socrates thought the gods call things good that are good. Plato thought the good is sovereign in the cosmos, indefinable but objective; Aristotle that it is eudemonic, a sort of living and faring well. G.E. Moore thinks it is unanalysable, impossible to prove but recognisable and basic, nonetheless. Consequentialism claims it is good states of affairs; Berlin thought we all have a sense of good and evil, and what he called 'Great Goods' such as justice and mercy exist in decent societies. For Kant there was only a pure good will, and for Hume the source of goodness was human benevolence. The Scottish Curriculum, however, does not know whether good even exists, or at least if it does it promotes it surreptitiously, never owning or expressing a clear view about it.

Despite its difficulty as a concept, CfE's refusal to acknowledge or discuss human goodness seems an unnecessarily extreme ethical stance, notwithstanding a largely relativist Scottish customary morality, because there can be human goodness without having to define it, tell children what it is, prove it, dogmatically teach it, impose it on them or tell them how they should live. As Durkheim said, to teach morality is neither to preach or indoctrinate but to discuss and explain.

Similarly, when Berlin was asked how he would tackle questions for which there is no established method, questions we do not know how to answer (which he thought was the purpose of philosophy), he thought you do what you can; you worry it out. This is what Socrates did among the youth of Athens, but CfE does not do; explain, adjudicate between options, discuss arguments for and against goodness and badness, and the principles upon which ethical choices about how human beings should live and treat each other can be made.

CfE is a school system, and does not have a moral philosophy remit. It must, however, take account of colossal social, moral, political and cultural complexity. At risk of hugely over-simplifying, this at least includes:

- The needs and priorities of parents, government, employers and higher education.
- A plurality of personal, social, family and political values.

- Children of all physical and intellectual abilities.
- Diverse cultures, beliefs and outlooks.
- Non-liberal, sometimes illiberal views about toleration and freedom.
- Largely relativist, but also religious and/or realist assumptions about values and the truth.
- Infants becoming children, then young adults.
- Fading or non-existent Christian morals.
- Committed religious and other minorities.

Considering such complexity, clashing narratives and conflicting interests, CfE's moral eclecticism does look somewhat less surprising, and more like a policy choice made by a unique front-line public service, operating at the intersection of personal, ethical, social, philosophical, psychological, political, economic, and intellectual life. The result, however, has often seemed to be moral and ethical ambiguity, concepts blended to the point of incoherence, complex but assumed and implicit moral and ethical theory, and a refusal to say anything at all about the good.

CfE has a plethora of values, but I have argued that it does not provide clear, unambiguous ethical guidance for children and young people, largely delegating the task, and remaining ethically neutral. Part of the problem may be that moral philosophy itself has yet to come up with consensus on abstract principles of ethics, and it cannot be education's job to decide them. On the other hand, most people seem to agree at the very least that 'good' exists, or they want it to. For this reason alone the Curriculum should come off the fence, so that children have the best chance of knowing what human goodness is when they see it, living and behaving well, and of avoiding badness.

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