**[A COMPARISON OF POLICY TRANSFER PROCESSES:](http://abstracts.etcproceedings.org/abstract_view.php?id=5329)**  **DIFFERENT SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORT CONCEPTS TRANSFERRED TO AND FROM DIFFERENT COUNTRIES**

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**Abstract**

Policy transfer is the process of applying a policy, or knowledge that informs a policy, from one setting to another. The European Union (EU) provides the ideal platform for knowledge exchange between member states and its various funding streams for multi-national projects, especially so. To date, however, there has been little research into the effectiveness of EU-funded projects for facilitating such policy transfer and in particular which particular processes within them were most effective at delivering the transfer – especially in the field of transport. This paper examines six different examples of policy transfer in sustainable transport, involving 8 different EU countries, where a deliberate attempt was made to structure, support and facilitate the transfer in a planned manner, within the EU STEER/IEE project EPOMM PLUS ([www.epomm.eu](http://www.epomm.eu)). This is important because many projects, particularly at the EU level, attempt to bring about policy transfer yet the way in which this process works is still poorly understood and there is a lack of actual examples, as Stead and Marsden (2011) point out.

*Keywords*: Policy transfer; Transport policy

1. **INTRODUCTION, OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURE OF the PAPER**

The purpose of this paper is to examine a number of cases of policy transfer that were organised within one EU project on sustainable transport. The “policies” transferred (in fact in most cases they were more measures that if adopted would reduce reliance on the private car) were different and the partners involved different, depending on the individual case. Each one focused on a different “policy” and involved two countries, one the exporter of the idea, the other the importer. However, the policy transfer process was structured deliberately and as far as possible this process was replicated for each policy. Therefore, the experience of each is broadly comparable. It is the purpose of this paper to understand what made the process work in each case, to what extent the drivers and barriers to policy transfer were similar across cases, and to what extent they reflect but also build on our knowledge of policy transfer in transport, as set out in the existing literature on the topic.

1. **Policy transfer in the transport field**

Whilst various definitions of policy transfer exist, one of the most frequently cited definition is from Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), namely:

“a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place” (p. 344).

It is considered to be an effective way for cities, municipalities or countries to learn from one another, and is documented by many (e.g. Evans 2009, Common 2011) as a process that is being used with increasing frequency. However, policy transfer is by no means a new concept. In 315BC Aristotle advised fellow citizens of the rationality of engaging in lesson –drawing from positive and negative experiences in the development of great city states (Evans 2009). The same applies today, policy transfer allows cities, municipalities or countries to learn from one another and solve their problems without having to reinvent the wheel. Many authors (e.g. Evans 2009, Common 2011) believe that increased networking, communication tools and globalisation are some of the reasons that policy transfer is occurring with increasing frequency. As highlighted by Timms (2011) ‘there are increasing opportunities of EU funding for projects that facilitate professional information exchange, which clearly have an impact on transport policy transfer’. This paper analyses the policy transfer facilitated by a specific EU project.

There are a number of key issues that should be investigated when seeking to understand whether policy transfer actually works, and how it might be improved. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) developed a framework to aid in this, (see Table 1 below) with 7 key questions at its core:

1. Why do actors engage in policy transfer? Is it voluntary or coercive or a mixture of the two and what impact does this have on the effectiveness of the transfer?

2. Who is involved in the transfer? What types of professionals from what types of organisations?

3. What is transferred? This can be whole or parts of policy content, goals or policy program down to ideas, attitudes and negative lessons.

4. From where are lessons learned? Locally, nationally, internationally?

5. What are the different degrees of transfer? Copying, emulation, combinations of different policies, or simply inspiration?

6. What restricts or facilitates the policy transfer process?

7. How successful is the policy that was transferred?

It is worth reviewing the current literature on policy transfer to understand how far these questions have already been answered with respect to policy transfer in the field of (sustainable) transport, and therefore how this paper adds to our understanding.

A recent review of policy transfer literature in the fields of transport and planning policy (Marsden and Stead 2011) showed that such study is still in its infancy, but that it has much in common, in terms of influences and factors for success, with policy transfer in other fields. There has been much literature examining the transfer of knowledge within multi-national companies (e.g. Adenfelt 2010) and temporary trans-national projects within private sector organisations (e.g. Lindener 2011; Bakker 2011). These studies highlight the impact of cultural and organisational differences and attitudes in fostering the take up of knowledge and ideas, but the studies are limited to transfer within the project or organisation. DeJong & Edelenbos (2007) also highlight the role of experts acting in transnational networks and communities in the spread of policy models, ideas and institutions.

According to Marsden et al (2011), in the field of transport city to city policy transfer is already a very active process. However, not enough is yet understood about its benefits or the conditions under which it is most effective. For example, whilst there is an understanding of the people who are involved in transfer, it is less clear what their respective roles are. There is little detailed information on the barriers and constraints to policy transfer. Such understandings should help to promote and accelerate the uptake of effective and well matched policies.

Pojani and Stead (2015) in their study of the Netherlands as an originator of policies and measures in sustainable transport planning find that many foreign ‘policy tourists’ are impressed and inspired by Dutch planning achievements. However, they also find that policy transfer efforts based on Dutch examples of planning have rarely resulted in concrete actions or hard outcomes abroad. Contextual differences in culture, social setup, language, planning legislation and financial resources, as well as the failure to involve political elites in transfer processes, are potential obstacles to embedding Dutch transport planning policies and measures elsewhere. In our paper, we examine specific case studies of transfer both to as well as from the Netherlands, and examine in much more detail why there have been both successes and failures.

Ison (2009) highlights a number of points from a synthesis of the earlier literature regarding the conditions for the success of policy transfer. These include:

* Acceptance of problem in the adopting country that the policy transfer intended to solve.
* A lack of existing solutions in the adopting country, but also the demand for a solution or new policy approach.
* A champion to promote the policy in the adopting country.
* Ease of understanding of the policy.
* The institutional framework in the adopting country should be supportive of the policy.
* Cultural and legal similarities between the exporting and adopting country.

This paper now goes on to consider a number of case studies of policy transfer and relates these back to the literature, in particular trying to assess the relative importance of Ison’s conditions, and also to comment on whether there are other factors that can account for success or failure of transfer.

**Study selection and methodology**

The European Platform on Mobility Management, EPOMM ([www.epomm.eu](http://www.epomm.eu)) managed an EU funded project called EPOMM Plus, between 2010 and 2013. One element of this project was something entitled a Best Practice Policy Transfer Process. This was a deliberate attempt to select measures within sustainable transport that were successful in one EU member state and to try to transfer them to other member states. More details of the process are provided in a subsequent section, but it was selected by the authors – two of whom were involved in one of the transfers – as an ideal overall case study for this research. To the authors’ knowledge, up until 2010, no other project within sustainable transport had made a deliberate attempt to transfer a number of measures between a number of different countries, and this therefore was an important opportunity to analyse these different cases with respect to the theoretical framework, and to compare them with one another.

Given that this was case study based research, the method used was one of in-depth interviews with those involved in each individual transfer, informed by the Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) framework. In addition, an interview was carried out with the project partner that coordinated the entire policy transfer part of the project. The interviews were structured around the following points:

* What was transferred, and why?
* The personal role of the interviewee and of others.
* What if anything was transferred, and how.
* Whether the transfer was ”successful”, and why.
* The value of this form of policy transfer.
* How such transfer could be more successful in future.

Interviews were carried out with those actors who either tried to export the idea from one country, and those who tried to import it into another – so in the case of the SUMP, above, both the Slovenian who took the idea to Lithuania, and the Lithuanian who tried to find a destination for the transferred policy idea within Lithuania. In addition to the interviews, the documentation available on the EPOMM website (normally itself written by the interviewees) was used. A total of 14 interviews were held with people who had been involved in the scheme. One of these was from national government, one from a municipality, two were from public sector research institutes, four were from NGOs and the rest were transport consultants.

**The transfers that took place**

It should be noted that the transfers that took place divide into two main categories: policies (for example, Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans (SUMPs)); and measures, broadly corresponding to what Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) classify as policy goals, structure and content, and policy instruments, respectively. In detail, they are as follows:

* There was an attempt to transfer, from Slovenia to Lithuania, the concept of Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans and how to set up a national platform to encourage their adoption by local authorities. With the recent development of a Sustainable Urban Mobility Plan (SUMP), which is an update of existing mobility plans, Ljubljana is one of the first cities in Slovenia and in the new EU member states to transform its transport strategy into a modern SUMP following the standards from the European Commission. In addition, with the support of national government, a successful national platform has been set up in Slovenia to spread the idea of SUMPs and to provide knowledge and expertise on how to do them. Lithuania were eager to learn from the experience of another “new” EU member state (both joined in 2004) and to if possible emulate Slovenia’s success in supporting its cities to to develop efficient SUMPs. The Ministries involved in this exchange of experience were both, at the time of the transfer (2010) considering developing national guidelines or toolkits in order to help and assist their cities in the development and implementation of SUMPs; Slovenia went on to do so (2011) and Lithuania is now (2015) in the process of so doing.
* From Belgium (Flanders) to Slovenia, the Traffic Snake Game, a mobility management measure applied in schools to encourage reduced car use to school by parents and children. By scoring points for how they travel to school, children can move along a picture of a snake on their wall at school, over the course of a month. This game is a form of Mobility Management but transformed into a game for schoolchildren. As a result of the transfer, the Traffic Snake Game - which was a successful campaign in Belgian schools – was tested in a small number of pilot Slovenian schools. However, it was also then included in the Manual on Sustainable Mobility and distributed to schools all over Slovenia.
* From the Netherlands to Sweden, there was a transfer of a concrete mobility management measure: using MM to manage demand on major roads at rush hours during periods of roadworks and reconstruction. This has been used in the Netherlands with some success as part of the national programme “Use existing infrastructure better” (*Beter Benutten*), where a range of organisations worked in partnership to deliver alternatives to driving during roadworks, and incentives to use these alternatives. (For more information on the programme, see REFERENCE TO BETER BENUTTEN.) The transfer process resulted in the publication of national guidelines on mobility management during road construction prepared by the Swedish Transport Administration (ADD REFERENCE TO THIS DOCUMENT.)
* From Germany to the Netherlands, mobility management measures for different target groups, such as new residents moving to large cities. In the Netherlands, mobility management has traditionally focused on employers and employees; it is a priority of the national government. Although there is evidence that this approach enjoys some success (REFERENCE TO BETER BENUTTEN EVALUATION REPORT), the transport planning industry increasingly feels that it should seek additional areas of activity, particularly mobility management for new residents. In the context of a staff exchange, a staff member from a Dutch NGO went to meet mobility management experts from the city of Munich and learn from their experience on their work with campaigns targeting groups of users; afterwards a meeting with the Dutch ministry of Infrastructure and Environment was organised to present the findings and their possible incorporation into *Beter Benutten*.
* There was an attempt to transfer, from the UK to Bulgaria, bus based park and ride and how it might be applied to a metro scheme. At the time of the transfer in 2010, metro construction in Sofia was in progress, and the municipality wanted to introduce Park and Ride at the four terminus stations. However, there was a lack of knowledge in Sofia about how to make Park and Ride successful, so the Sofia Mobility Centre Director met with the City of Edinburgh’s Head of Transport and Park and Ride specialists to discuss the challenges, success factors and other aspects to consider for the successful implementation of Park and Ride, and how these might be transferred to Bulgaria. This covered, for example, passenger waiting facilities, ticketing policy, opening hours, frequencies and signage to and from the Park and Ride. Park and Ride facilities were subsequently introduced at the metro stations in Sofia CHECK MAP!!!
* From the UK to France, the use of the HEAT economic evaluation tool to value the health related benefits of investment in cycling infrastructure. The transfer attempted to make the national and regional level of government in France aware of this tool that could be used to help to make the case for additional investment in cycling infrastructure.

**Results**

**4.1. Why did transfer take place?**

The key reason why the transfer took place was because there were interested people – “policy entrepreneurs” – in the importing and exporting countries. The second very important reason was that the EPOMM PLUS EU project included an activity devoted to policy transfer and there was therefore money available to help to finance transfer activities. As explained below, the existence of the project and availability of finance was not sufficient on its own to drive transfer – this also needed motivated people. Transfer was voluntary, not in any way coercive, and in a majority of cases took place without there being any specific need for the new policy or measure being identified by the implementing institution(s) in the adopting country.

**4.2. Who was involved and the role of the interviewee?**

As explained earlier, the policy transfers were arranged as part of the EPOMM PLUS EU project. Policy transfer was not, however, the main part of the project, but rather only one aspect; the main focus was on building an EU wide network to promote mobility management measures. Clearly policy transfer is related to this, but not at its core.

The policy transfer process for all measures started by identifying measures and policies to be transferred. This was not necessarily as simple as it sounds, since those who might import are not necessarily fully aware of what measures are “available” for possible transfer – both what exists in an exporting country, and who is available to work on the transfer process. In some cases the exporter believes that their own measure or policy is worth exporting, but finds no obvious ready importer for it, a finding supported by the theory, as explained in the discussion section of this paper.

Once measure, importer and exporter were identified, there was then a need to set up face to face meetings between them. These meetings often but not always included the organisation in the exporting country that was responsible for the implementation of the measure, and their equivalent in the importing country. This was then often followed by further work, particularly in certain transfer cases, to further interest the possible implementing organisation(s) in the measure. In some cases, this involved site visits of possible implementers to view the measure in the exporting country – people from Sofia visiting park and ride sites in Edinburgh, for example. If required, important documents were translated, and in the process, often adapted to the local situation.

The role of those interviewed was generally *not* that of implementing organisation. The list of main contacts for each of the six case studies was provided by the partner in charge of the overall policy transfer element of the project. These contacts were primarily project partners, who, as explained earlier, were in the main were from consultancy firms, NGOs and research institutions, not from city or national government organisations that are the main implementers of sustainable transport measures. These are the kind of actors that Stead (2015:1564) calls “members of policy networks, coalitions, think-tanks and advocacy groups… curious and active individuals within an organisation, with a fondness for travel and experience in different parts of the world.” These in particular were the initiators; they then linked within their own countries to other individuals who were themselves, or were closer to, the implementers of a measure/policy.

**4.3 What happened as a result of the process?**

In the case of the transfer of Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans and the national platform for them from Slovenia to Lithuania, according to the interviewee, no definable progress resulted from the transfer in the first two years after the Slovenia partner made their visits to and gave their presentations in Lithuania – instead, what occurred was better defined as “inspiration”. Since then, the Lithuanian Ministry has begun to develop its own national guidance document on SUMPs. It is likely although difficult to prove unequivocally that the Slovenian visit and the awareness it engendered of the Slovene situation helped to make the case for the development of the Lithuanian guidance.

The export of the Traffic Snake Game (TSG) from Flanders to Slovenia led to the game being piloted in 10 schools in 2011 and the Ministry then producing and distributing to all schools a document that explained how to apply the game. Thereafter, some 33 schools participated in the game in 2015 (24 in 2014 as part of a new EU co-financed project, 6 schools in the project Connect and 10 school in national project menitoned in interviews). The National Ministry will build on the success of this transfer also in the future. It is planed to  assign a part of its EU Cohesion funds for the implementation of sustainable mobility measures in urban areas.  This programme is starting in 2015 and is co-financed by an Operational programme for implementation of European cohesion policy in the period 2014–2020. Part of the money will be used for the promotion of sustainable mobility and TSG will be offered to all schools in Slovenia without any additional costs for material.

As a result of the transfer from the Netherlands to Sweden of the techniques for mobility management at at roadworks on major roads, the national roads agency Trafikverket produced a guidance document on topic in 2012. It is likely that the technique will be implemented as a consequence of the guidance.

On the other hand, in the other direction, the attempt to transfer the concept and therefore the actual practice of mobility management measures for different target groups, such as new residents moving to large cities, from Germany to the Netherlands has seen no definable progress according to the Dutch interviewee who was the lead Netherlands project partner for this transfer, and the one above to Sweden.

The policy transfer from Edinburgh, Scotland to Sofia, Bulgaria of the practicalities of designing and implementing bus based park and ride and how these might be applied to a metro scheme led to a change in the planned location of Park and Ride on one line of the Sofia metro, and improved signage to all Park and Ride sites.

On the other hand, the attempted transfer from the UK to France of the HEAT economic evaluation tool to value health related benefits of investment in cycling infrastructure had no definable progress; there was little activity associated with this transfer, in spite of considerable efforts from the “importer” to generate interest in the idea in France.

In conclusion we can see that there were three rather more successful transfers, and four where it was difficult or impossible to see any progress.

1. **What were the success factors, and the barriers, to transfer?**

It should of course be recognised that a “successful” transfer can be defined in different ways or on a continuum, and interviewees certainly noted this: they saw success when they perceived that the transfer activities had raised an issue up the national agenda; or demonstrated its application in the “adopting” country, even on a pilot basis; or getting it into national guidance or legislation. Clearly, though, as explained in the previous section, certain transfers saw no discernible effects, whilst others did, and it is important to examine why.

**The (perceived) need for the measure in the adopting country**

That people in the adopting country – particularly the implementing organisation – must be interested in and see a need and a place for the measure or policy in their policy landscape. This was a problem for the HEAT tool export from the UK to France; as one interviewee said

*It’s not clear to what degree that this transfer (the HEAT tool) is one that was really answering a pressing need, or that there were people in potential implementing organisations in France (Ministry, local/regional government) who were really interested in the idea.*

When one compares the experience of trying to transfer the target group approach to MM from Germany to NL, with that of transfer of MM at roadworks from NL to SE, one sees the importance of a need for the transferred measure being paramount, rather overriding the importance of similarities in cultures. Roadworks in the Stockholm area made the Dutch transfer highly relevant and Trafikverket could see the need for it (although they did not necessarily feel that they had run out of other possible solutions; more that when a further option for addressing congestion at roadworks was presented to them, they decided that they should try it). Whilst there are many existing MM projects in the Netherlands, it was far less clear where MM for target groups could fit in.

*The clear definition of this concept, and the clear focus, and the clarity as to which actors should be involved, and the clarity of when and where to implement it, and the fact that the site project managers have a real concrete problem (congestion caused by major roadworks) to solve are all points that have helped to make the transfer much faster and easier. Also the similarity of cultures has helped – including the fact that Rijkswaterstaat and TV have very similar remits.*

Related to the need for the measure in the adopting country is the problem experienced in this project that, especially to begin with, there were more exporters than adopters of ideas, and the project partners in countries that were interested in adopting an idea were not actually that certain of what was available or suitable for adoption. This was in part a function of the project: a section on policy transfer had been written into the proposal as a “unique selling point” to try to go beyond the more typical “exchange of best practice” that typify so many EU projects in transport. Once the project started, there was then a need to actually facilitate policy transfer in an active way. Other studies of policy transfer in transport (Stead, 2015; Marsden et al 2011, for example) have instead looked at situations where the adopters have been more actively seeking new ideas.

**Access to implementing agencies**

Transferring partners who had very good relationships with implementing bodies had more success. For example, WSP was a consultancy and EPOMM+ partner, but its good relationship with the national transport agency (Trafikverket) in Stockholm meant that it was able to raise awareness of the idea of MM at roadworks with various different people in different parts of Trafikverket, thus making it more than just one person’s project within that organisation, and therefore more likely to be implemented.

Good contacts with the national level were important, but also linking those contacts to the local level where that was the implementer helped in at least one example, the Traffic Snake (TSG) game in Slovenia, where the national level already had a traffic related project in which schools already involved, which meant that these were then the schools that piloted the TSG. This particular transfer was also greatly assisted by the fact that the Slovenian Ministry had some funds that it wanted to spend on activities related to mobility at schools; so not only did it see a need for the TSG, but also had money to finance it.

**Managing the transfer process across different cultures**

A recommendation from the partner who managed the entire set of transfers within the project was that it is important not to try to transfer too much too fast, first working to ensure good close working relationships between the initiator, the local importer and the implementing bodies, before trying to implement anything in the adopting country. For more complex policy instruments, it was also found to be important to give the importer the chance to really understand how the measure works in the exporting country. This process can take time; the export from Netherlands to Sweden of MM at roadworks was carried out within two years within the EPOMM+ projects, but there were many preceding projects and exchanges that prepared the ground for this.

It is also very important to be able to advise on how the measure fits into policy and institutional context of country. For example, with respect to the Traffic Snake Game, there were questions from Slovenian teachers as to how to fit it into their curriculum – here, the exporter could advise them and the Ministry on how this had been done in Flanders. Of course, it is much more problematic to give this advice with more complex policy measures such as SUMPs where the exporter has no clear understanding of the governance and legal framework in the adopting country and the concept being transferred is in any case more diffuse.

Professional/working cultures may make a measure or policy more or less suited to transfer – in the case of the HEAT tool, it is possible that the apparently lesser tradition of project evaluation and appraisal in transport in France than the UK made it difficult to find an obvious place for the tool. This may have amplified a fear that HEAT could show that a project was actually not worth doing. On the other hand, the transfer of MM at roadworks from NL to Sweden fits closely in terms of professional culture, outlook, existing experience and governance frameworks. As the Swedish interviewee said, “*For us, the Netherlands is a “typical” reference country.”*

**The value of face to face contact and site visits**

The face to face element, and the site visits also, were seen as very valuable, making people more likely to “take notice” of the measure or policy to be transferred, than if they were simply to passively receive some information about it. However, they have to be ready to take part in and devote time to the face to face transfer. As the Dutch interviewee said:

*You learn far more from such a visit than just hearing about an initiative at a conference or reading about it. On a site visit you can really “feel” what’s going on, and meet a lot more people who are involved.*

On the other hand, if a policy transfer is more a kind of best practice presentation, as in Lithuania, where the visitor from Slovenia mainly gave a number of presentations to rather large groups of people, not all of whom spoke English very well, then the transfer is likely to lack the kind of immediacy and detail spoken about by the interviewee in NL.

**Key people to drive the transfer**

This was not identified as an absolutely key factor by interviewees, but one that has some impact. The absence of a policy champion in France was a problem for the transfer of the HEAT tool. An exporter who is used to working internationally was found to be helpful in the case of the TSG. However, it is more the organisations that are involved rather than specific people that were judged to be most important in the cases examined.

**Barriers to transfer**

One can see the barriers to transfer as being largely the converse of the success factors but, primarily, the wrong people - especially implementers – were not involved; implementers were not interested in the policy; the concept being transferred was very diffuse and therefore difficult to understand how it could be applied (the key example being SUMP); there was no clear place for the measure or policy in the policy landscape; and/or there were great dissimilarities in governance and planning cultures, as for example with transfer of SUMP from SI to LT – as the Slovenian interviewee said:

*the direct transfer of policy is “quite impossible” between countries as different as ours – there are different planning systems, different cultures of planning, different administrations and laws, so you can’t just take a policy and put it there and expect it to work. Maybe it can work between more similar countries, or parts of the same country...*

Table 2, below, attempts to distill from these findings the relative importance of the various factors identified by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) and Ison (2009) to the success of the transfers examined in this paper.

**Table 2 Theoretical issues in policy transfer and their importance in the case studies in this paper**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Theoretical issue** | **Importance to success based on these case studies (5 (important) to 1)** |
| Acceptance of problem that policy transfer intended to solve | 3 |
| Lack of existing solutions | 2 |
| Demand for a solution or new policy approach in adopting country | 4 |
| Champion to promote the policy in the adopting country | 3 |
| Ease of understanding of the policy | 5 |
| Policy results in something visible | 5 |
| Cultural, legal, organisational similarities between the exporting and adopting country | 3 |
| Importer is directly in position to implement policy transferred | 2 |
| Place in policy landscape for new policy | 3 |

1. **Conclusions**

The key findings of this paper are as follows.

Firstly, the case studies do indicate that what Dolowitz and Marsh call ”non-coercive” (or voluntary) policy transfer can work. Also, the process, does not necessarily have to be led by end users/policy implementers – although they must be involved and interested. It is aided by a clear definition of what is to be transferred; and a perceived need for new solutions and/or a related problem in receiving country.

The networks of person(s) doing the transfer in the destination country and their relationship to the organisations that might actually use the policy transferred are very important. In many cases the transfers examined in this paper were organised by consultants who were therefore not in a position to directly implement the transferred policy. Nonetheless, they were able to be successful where they had a good relationship with the final implementing organisations.

Countries are more likely to listen to other countries that they historically have seen as role models and perceive to be more like themselves – therefore the origin of the policy to be transferred is critical to its acceptance at the destination. The importance of language in this was overlooked by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000).

Most important to successful transfer according to the findings of this paper are that simpler policy ideas (e.g. the Traffic Snake Game) are easier to transfer than more complex, “woolly” topics like SUMPs, purely because the idea is easier to convey, and because they fit more simply into the policy landscape of the adopting country, and they result in something very concrete.

Finally, and worthy of further investigation, is the fact pointed out by one interviewee that some measures are transferred without any deliberate attempt by technical staff to do so – the adoption of public bike hire schemes across Europe is a good example of this. Thus deliberate technocratic policy transfer as facilitated by the EPOMM+ project is clearly not the only way to transfer policy ideas from one country to another.

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